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The history of U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean is
long and varied. Successive U.S. Administrations have tried
to safeguard and further U.S. and Western interests in this
oil-rich and strategic part of the globe.
In the immediate post-World War II period, the Truman
Administration, relying on the U.S. nuclear monopoly, forced
the Soviet Union to end its occupation of Northern Iran.
Several years later, in 1949, the U.S. established the
Middle East Force as a symbol of its interests in the
region. President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles promoted various regional security pacts
and tried to establish a Northern Tier consisting of Turkey,
Iran and Pakistan as a bulwark against Soviet-inspired
attempts to expand communist influence and geographic reach
at the expense of the West. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,
preoccupied with events from Cuba to Southeast Asia, did not
concentrate their attention on the region for the most part
until Great Britain announced its intention to withdraw
"East of Suez." The Nixon Administration inherited this
legacy as well as the specter of a politico-military vacuum
in the region. Still tied down in Southeast Asia and con-




Nixon and Kissinger built a multidimensional apparatus of
regional security without undertaking costly and major U.S.
military commitments.
This approach consisted of the Nixon Doctrine with its
emphasis on Iran and Saudi Arabia and a modestly enhanced
U.S. naval presence. This framework lasted until early 1977
when signs of stress began to appear. These included the
growth of Soviet military capabilities in the region, a
decline in U.S. military strength vis-a-vis the USSR, and a
recognition oy some that the U.S. had relied too heavily on
local states. Concurrently, there was a growing movement
among the Non-Aligned Nations to declare the Indian Ocean as
a Zone of Peace. Domestically, there was strong congres-
sional opposition to enhancing U.S. military presence in the
region
.
The Carter Administration initially ignored these
signposts of stress and tried to further detente by means of
naval arms control in the Indian Ocean. This approach ended
abruptly oecause of Soviet gains in the Horn of Africa, the
fundamentalist Islamic revolution in Iran, and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Indian Ocean
Naval Arms Limitation Talks (NALT) were the first sub-
stantive attempt to control naval warfare since the
Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of 1922 and its
successor regimes. They were significant because they
furnished an insight into the tone of the Carter
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Administration's approach to both national security policy
and arms control and signalled a change in U.S. foreign
policy for the Indian Ocean region.
This study examines these talks based on open source
literature, declassified documents and a measure of deduc-
tive as well as inductive reasoning. It proceeds from some
general, well recognized principles of arms control as a
technique of international political behavior to the
analysis of four specific issues that confronted the
superpowers in their negotiations. By reviewing the events
that form the background to the talks and identifying the
rationale for the apparent shift in U.S. policy on NALT, the
study analyzes these issues in terms of both the policy and
operational impact on U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean
region.
In the broadest sense the Indian Ocean talks may be a
unique case study of the formulation of U.S. national
security policy in a regional context as well as vis-a-vis
the Soviet Union without the associated "historical baggage"
of the long-standing superpower relationships in Europe and
Northeast Asia. In addition, the background to the talks,
their issues, and their aftermath reveal a compelling
relationship among arms control, geography, and national
security policy.
The study concludes that there still is a strong
linkage between the element of power and the geographic
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circumstances in which states find themselves and that the
Carter Administration's "mental map" of the region gave rise
to an arms control forum that tried to separate the geo-
strategic entity, the Indian Ocean, from the larger, global
concerns of the United States. This in turn suggests that a
broader, more sophisticated appreciation of the influence of
geography on arms control in particular and national
security policy in general is needed.
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As a naval officer with a good deal of operational
experience in the Indian Ocean and background on matters
relating to the region, it seemed ironic to me that the
United States and the Soviet Union would seriously sit down
to negotiate a limit on the deployment of their respective
naval forces in the Indian Ocean precisely at the moment
when the West finally recognized that the vulnerability of
its oil supply was a crucial, if not vital, factor in the
national security calculations of the United States and its
allies. Nonetheless, on March 9, 1977, President Jimmy
Carter announced that he had proposed that the Indian Ocean
be completely demilitarized. Carter's initiative was sig-
nificant because it furnished an insight into the tone of
his approach to both national security policy and arms
control and signaled a change in U.S. policy for the Indian
Ocean region. As a result of Carter's initiative, the
United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the first
substantive attempt to control naval warfare since the





Despite an auspicious beginning, Carter decided to
forgo further talks on the subject because Soviet naval
operations in support of the USSR's political activities in
the Horn of Africa in 1977 and 1978 suggested that there was
no common understanding on how the Indian Ocean Naval Arms
Limitation Talks, commonly referred to as Indian Ocean NALT,
would actually affect the behavior of the United States and
the Soviet Union in the region. Despite a brief flurry of
activity at the June 1979 Vienna Summit, the talks remain
dormant.
As a student, I found that academic literature was rich
in analyses of arms control and disarmament; but literature
devoted specifically to conventional naval arms control was
rare. Indeed, there was relatively little current scholar-
ship on this subject. It seemed that historians especially
had not examined naval arms control negotiations in their
entirety with a view towards isolating generalizations about
their various aspects. Indeed, there did not appear to be a
single scholarly work that covered the period from the
Washington Naval Conference to the demise of the regime
established at Washington during the Second London Naval
Conference in 1935.
I also found that none of the existing works addressed
their subjects by utilizing geography as a principal element
in their analysis. This was surprising to me because one
particularly popular academic approach to arms control has
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been concerned with measures to reduce military confron-
tation in border areas. These studies assumed that mutual
withdrawal of military forces would reduce the risk of
war-provoking accidents or incidents, thereby reducing
tension and the chances of conflict. Schemes to accomplish
this recurred frequently throughout the literature, most
often in proposals for nuclear-free zones and a mutual
reduction of forces, usually in Europe. However, there were
few, if any, specific mentions of confrontations which
happened at sea.
The absence of geography as a determining element in
arms control literature was also evident in a review of tnat
literature. This was not at all surprising since geo-
politics, the relation of international political power to
geography, received scant attention after World War II due,
in part, to the fact that it had exerted an undue influence
under the leadership of the German geopolitician , General
Haushofer, on the power calculations and foreign policies of
the Nazi regime. Moreover, the advent of intercontinental
ballistic missiles convinced some analysts that geography
had lost the relevance that it formerly had to the rela-
tionship between states. They argued that this was espe-
cially so in the case of the Soviet Union and the United
States because a strategic nuclear exchange—the central




However, it seemed to me that geography and its
influence on inter-state relations had undergone a resur-
gence of sorts in recent years. In 1977 Colin Gray's The
Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era explored the often overlooked
relation of geographic setting and physical power to inter-
national politics with a view towards setting the national
security policy of the United States in a global framework.
Edward B. Atkeson cogently explained Soviet perceptions of
geopolitics in 1976 in his "Hemispheric Denial: Geopolitical
Imperatives and Soviet Strategy." Alan K. Henrikson's "The
Geographical 'Mental Maps' of American Foreign Policy
Makers" argued in 1980 that statesmen responded to world
events as they perceived and imagined the world—which may
not be the way the world really is.
The Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks emerged as
a saddlepoint between my professional and academic observa-
tions on the subjects of geography, arms control, and
national security policy. In the broadest sense, Indian
Ocean NALT may be a unique case study of the formulation of
U.S. national security policy in a regional context as well
as vis-a-vis the Soviet Union without the associated
"historical baggage" of the long-standing superpower
relationships in Europe and Northeast Asia. Moreover, the
talks highlight in microcosm a wide range of factors and
issues which are central to international politics in
general and arms control in particular. In addition, the
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central issues of the negotiations offer an insight on
several specific politico-military considerations of arms
control viewed in the context of the theory of arms control
but tempered by the geography of the Indian Ocean.
To a large extent, I based this study on my profes-
sional association with the problems of naval operations in
the Indian Ocean. My studies in diplomatic history and
international security studies at The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Georgetown University, and the Naval War
College created the academic and analytical framework.
Unfortunately the negotiating records of the talks remain
under the protection of those portions of U.S. law
pertaining to material under negotiation with foreign
governments. Hence, my research focused on the small
portion of documents that I was able to have declassified,
interviews with members of the Carter Administration who
were associated with the talks, and open source literature
tempered by a measure of inductive as well as deductive
reasoning. Nonetheless, this dissertation represents the
framework and substance of what is available and, therefore,
is conclusive for the time being. What precludes this study
from being complete are those documents which cannot be used
1. See 5 U.S.C. 552 and U.S. President, Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States—Ronald Reagan , "Executive
Order 12356—National Security Information, April 2, 1982"




in works such as this because of the security interests of
the states involved. Moreover, the loyalty and discretion
of individuals who have served their respective governments
also locks further information in their minds and private
papers. Even though this study is concerned with both
historical reporting and analysis of national security
policy, I do not believe that these shortcomings distort the
thrust or findings of the dissertation.
I am particularly indebted to Cyrus Vance, Paul Warnke,
and Leslie Gelb for graciously taking time from their busy
professional lives to discuss the talks with me and suggest
various sources of information and avenues of approach.
Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.), former Chief of Naval
Operations, shared his thoughts and recollections of the
first round of the talks with me during a trip from his home
in Honolulu to Washington. VADM Marmaduke G. Bayne, USN
(Ret.), was a most gracious host at his home, "Seascape," in
Irvington, Va. His broad grasp of the issues of the talks
as well as his expertise on the Indian Ocean region caused
me to rethink some of my original ideas. Capt . Gary Sick,
USN (Ret.), presently with the Ford Foundation, was an
incisive and helpful critic as well as a source of general
insight into the subject. Professor Paul Doty of the Center
for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University
assisted me in putting my research on the origins of the
talks in perspective. Professor Philip Stewart of the
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Political Science Department at Ohio State University
expanded on Paul Doty's assistance and provided me with
material from the Tenth Dartmouth Conference.
The staff of the Australian Consul General in New York
was most helpful, and understanding, in locating much of the
material on the Australian perceptions of the talks. Mr.
Murray Bradley and the staff of the Naval War College
Library in Newport, R.I., overcame some rather unusual
administrative obstacles that enabled me to use the War
College's fine library as if I had been assigned there. The
personnel of the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center
in Suitland, Md . , did yeoman-like work in retrieving the
data on Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. Mrs. Connie
Nordahl worked diligently in the typing and preparation of
this study through its various stages despite my short-
comings in penmanship and style.
Professors Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Alan K.
Henrikson of The Fletcher School directed my work throughout
and offered constructive criticism in matters of both
substance and style. Both of these men along with their
colleague at Fletcher, Professor John C. Perry, convinced me
that, when all is said and done, strategy is an intellectual
exercise. However, I alone am responsible for errors of
fact, opinion, and conclusion. I also am indebted to the
Honorable Fred C. Ikle, Francis J. West, and the late
Captain Hugh G. Nott, USN (Ret.), for their comments on a

- XXI -
1978 project that formed the substance of this
dissertation.
Finally, I owe the largest debt of thanks to my wife
Pat who, in addition to serving as a sounding board and
monitor for this whole undertaking, has endured and
sometimes even enjoyed the vagaries of Navy life that
ultimately led to our assignment to Fletcher. Though I
suppose I should dedicate this to her, the credit for this
endeavor finally coming to pass belongs to a fellow naval
officer and friend, the late Lieutenant Robert L. Crosby,
United States Naval Reserve, and to the officers and men of









There are, strictly speaking, only two
geostrategic regions today: (1) the trade-
dependent maritime world, and (2) the Eurasian
continental world. Projecting our views into the
future, we anticipate the eventual emergence of a
third geostrategic region— the Indian Ocean.
— Saul Bernard Cohen (1963)
. . . Current and future strategic concerns seem
to find too little reflection in the present arms
control approach. . . . Arms control must again
address the dominant security concerns. . . .
— Christoph Bertram (1980)
Introduction
It seems ironic that the United States and the Soviet
Union engaged in four rounds of bilateral negotiations in
1977 and 1978 to limit their respective naval forces in the
Indian Ocean. These talks, surprisingly, took place at a
time when the West finally recognized that it was vulnerable
to the interruption of its oil supply— then a crucial, if
not vital factor in the national security calculations of
the United States and its allies. Moreover, the Indian




NALT, are difficult to understand when considered in the
context of geography—one of the dominant factors that has
shaped the perceptions of the Indian Ocean in both U.S. and
Soviet national security policy.
The United States has traditionally had interests in
the region which have had little to do with the presence or
absence of the Soviet Union there. These interests have
been principally maritime in nature and have been dominated
by the fact that communications between the United States
and all of the states of the region must cross the Indian
Ocean. However, the Soviet Union shared land borders with
one of the states of the region which was crucial to the
economic well-being of the United States and its allies.
Moreover, the distance from the Indian Ocean to the southern
borders of the Soviet Union was less than 1000 miles in
certain cases. On the other hand, the continental United
States was more than 10,000 miles away. These seemingly
mundane facts of the physical geography of the Indian Ocean
and their effect on the national security policies of both
states is a classic case of geography at work in the policy
process.
These geographic realities suggest that the United
States had different military requirements in the region
from those of the USSR. Events in the Horn of Africa, Iran,
and Afghanistan lend credence to this perception. If the
Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks had resulted in an
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arms control treaty that did not equitably address these
differences, the flexibility of the United States to respond
militarily to events such as these would have been cur-
tailed. The acceptance of such a restraint by the United
States seems to contradict the geographic realities of the
region described above. Nonetheless, as a result of
President Jimmy Carter's initiative on March 9, 1977, to
"demilitarize the Indian Ocean," the United States and the
Soviet Union engaged in the first substantive attempt to
control naval armaments since the Washington Naval Arms
Limitation Treaty of 1922 and its successor regimes in the
1930's.
There are several fundamental questions about these
talks that remain unanswered. Why did the United States
choose to negotiate with the Soviet Union in the first
place? Why did President Jimmy Carter make this decision at
the time he did? What factors influenced these decisions?
The answers to these questions require an analysis of
several others. For example, was Carter's policy for the
Indian Ocean consistent with that of previous administra-
tions? If it wasn't, how did it change under the Carter
Administration? What were the immediate and long-term
implications for U.S. national security policy as a result
of these talks and the events surrounding them?
This study probes these questions, and others, within
the framework of a broad range of issues. They include the
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origins of the talks, their politico-military implications,
and the impact of technology on the contending positions of
the two sides.
Within the category of origins, the study addresses the
formulation of U.S. national security policy for the Indian
Ocean since 1970, the impact of the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace on that policy, and the issue of congressional over-
sight of Diego Garcia. By examining Soviet literature on
the subject, the study assesses Soviet interest in the
question of naval arms control in the Indian Ocean and how
this shaped the Soviet negotiating strategy. The study also
traces the views of officials in Carter's national security
apparatus on the subject and how these perspectives shaped
the decision to negotiate with the USSR on the Indian
Ocean
.
The political issues of the talks highlight in micro-
cosm a range of factors which are central to international
politics in general and arms control in particular. These
include interests, risks, and perceptions and how they
affected U.S. national security decision-making for the
Indian Ocean. The study examines such diverse politico-
military elements as bases, strategic forces, the alliance
implications of the talks and general purpose forces.
Because these issues have a technological side as well as a
politico-military one, they can offer an insight into the
subject of technical arms control, tempered by the
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geographic realities of the Indian Ocean. This in turn
leads to a consideration of technical arms control versus
political arms control and how each side viewed the Indian
Ocean negotiations in this regard.
In the broadest sense, Indian Ocean NALT is a unique
case study of the formulation of U.S. national security
policy in a regional context as well as vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union without the long-standing inheritance of the super-
power relationships, as in Europe or Northeast Asia.
Because of this, the diplomacy surrounding these talks
provides an opportunity to examine a recent case study of
the continuing debate between realism, geopolitics,
idealism, and arms control as guiding forces in U.S. foreign
policy. Moreover, because geography so heavily influenced
the national security policies of both states for the Indian
Ocean, the study addresses the broader issue of the role
that geography brought to bear on these issues and the talks
themselves
.
The Methodology and the Measures of Effectiveness
The analysis of these issues cuts across several dis-
ciplines including those of international politics, arms
control theory and practice, and diplomatic history.
Because this study blends factors from each of these fields,
it does not test the Indian Ocean negotiations on the basis
of any one of these disciplines above. The complexity of
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arms control in the national security calculus of the super-
powers makes such a unitary approach to what is a process of
integration of many factors suspect at best. The applica-
tion of these several disciplines to the talks provides a
means of examining them in a more comprehensive context.
This study measures the Indian Ocean Naval Arms
Limitation Talks against several fundamental assumptions of
international politics. The first of these is that arms
control is a technique of international political behavior
that may lead to restraint on the use of force or the acqui-
sition and deployment of armaments. The second is that arms
control negotiations may attenuate or divert other political
or legal conflicts. The third premise is that arms control
is a technique and process in which one actor in the inter-
national system tries to influence the structure and
deployment of the military forces of an adversary. If
successful, the actor can then perhaps change a fundamental
national security doctrine of his foe. These techniques are
grounded on a set of assumptions that form, in theory, a
complementary means of enhancing national security. Were
the three assumptions cited above mutually reinforcing or
did they contradict each other in the case of the Indian
Ocean talks? If they were in opposition to each other, then
what effect did this have on the negotiations?
The lessening of the scope of war has been closely
linked to the concept of strategic parity between the United
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States and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, strategic parity
has heightened concern about the ability of the two super-
powers to regulate the use of force and the escalatory
potential of conflict at the conventional level. Conflicts
wherein U.S. and Soviet nationals killed each other seemed
likely to develop into crises which may not have been con-
trollable. These types of conflicts may well have occurred
wherever Russian and U.S. forces operated in close, geo-
graphic proximity to each other. Hence the perception that
effective regional arms control offers one method of
defusing superpower conventional conflicts or at least
limiting their potential to escalate.
What has evolved from this concern over the ability to
control conflict was a concept of two zones of interaction
within the international system. The first was an area in
which the superpowers avoided the use of force and violence
to alter or maintain existing political arrangements on an
inter-zonal basis. These areas included the continental
United States, the USSR, Japan, the PRC, and Western and
Eastern Europe. They were areas of conflict avoidance. The
second zone was one wherein conflict management was the
rule. The superpowers appear to have placed the entire
Third World in this second zone.
Taken together, this technique and process of inter-
national politics try to compensate for one of the funda-
mental facts of the international system: most nations are
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free to arm themselves. They do so to achieve and maintain
their core state values of security, sovereignty, equality,
and economic well being or for geographic and political
expansion and conquest. This quest for armaments acknowl-
edges that there are goals that otherwise could not be
attained unless a nation has the capacity to employ force.
Though some argue that arms control provides an alternative
technique to attaining security through the possession of
arms, there are others who view it as merely a process of
regulating a political relationship by varying the levels
and types of armaments that an adversary can bring to bear
in a crisis. It is important to determine which of these
analytical concepts applied to NALT. Such a determination
will identify the intellectual approach to arms control that
shaped Carter's decision to negotiate on the Indian Ocean.
It will also enable one to assess its long-term validity, in
light of the course of history and the realities of the
relationship between the United States and the USSR as
superpowers.
Given this political context of arms control, it is
just as important to recognize the respective geographic
circumstances in which the superpowers found themselves.
The United States, at the time, was a maritime power and the
Soviet Union was a continental power. These facts plus the
premise that the basic framework of arms control negotia-
tions is political, suggest that one of the fundamental
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considerations in the formulation of the political context
in which negotiations are cast is geography. Did this
political context with its geographic derivative drive the
choice of issues to be negotiated in the case of the Indian
Ocean? If so, what does this mean for other arms control
agenda?
Given this interaction among these various considera-
tions of arms control, it is important to distinguish
between what has been termed political and technical arms
control. Robin Ranger defines technical arms control as a
process by which two or more states negotiate solutions to
potential problems of instability in the balance of military
forces whether they be nuclear or conventional. Such
solutions usually involve technically effective restraints
on the quantity, quality, or deployment of the forces so
limited or controlled: hence "technical" arms control.
Synonyms include real, effective, substantive, or meaningful
and legitimate arms control. Such arms control negotiations
can, but need not, have political significance, as well as
having a measurable net effect on force deployments or
developments. In contrast, what Ranger termed political
arms control is a technique which has no, or very little,
technical effect. That is, it is a process which imposes no
real limitations on military forces, technology, or
activities, but which does have considerable political
significance. Synonyms for this kind of arms control,
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though usually pejorative, include nominal, cosmetic,
ineffective, symbolic, or token.
Ranger explains this distinction by way of examples.
He argues that Carter's March 1977 SALT II proposals were
technical arms control. They included, for example, sig-
nificant reductions in superpower strategic forces and
extensive constraints on the modernization of these forces.
Both were designed to lessen the threat to strategic
stability posed by the emerging vulnerability of the land-
based U.S. ICBM force. Similarly, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty limited both the U.S. and USSR to very
low levels of ABM deployment. The 1974 Protocol to the
Treaty lowered this level further from two to one ABM site
each with no more than 100 ABM launchers. In both cases,
the military forces and deployments of both sides would have
been affected by the arms control regimes proposed, unsuc-
cessfully in the case of Carter's 1977 proposals but
successfully in the 1972 ABM Treaty.
The difference between these two measures of arms
control becomes clear if the so-called partial measures,
from the 1959 Antarctic Treaty to the 1977 Environmental
Modification (ENMOD) Convention, are considered. These
involved promises to abstain from activities which were of
1. Robin Ranger, Arms Control in Theory and Practice
(Kingston: Center for International Relations, Queen's
University, 1981), p. 3.
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little or no military use, such as military activities in
Antarctica or ENMOD for military purposes. For political
purposes, however, considerable importance could be, and
was, attached to "demilitarizing" Antarctica—an area which
had not and could not (at least not then) be militarized
—
and to "banning hostile military ENMOD techniques," an
2
activity which was not yet possible.
The problem is how one blends the political and tech-
nical approaches in a specific arms control proposal with
national security remaining the independent variable in the
relationship. This is significant because technical arms
control can have political significance which can be either
positive or negative for the negotiating parties. The
problem with a purely technical approach to arms control is
that it oftentimes ignores the broader, political ramifi-
cations of the issues at hand while purely political arms
control does not come to grips with the significant military
issues at hand. If this is so, then it is instructive to
examine how the United States and the USSR approached NALT?
Was it technical arms control, political arms control, or a
blend of the two? What should the proper choice have been?
Given the foregoing, there are certain measures of
effectiveness which can be applied to a specific arms






differences between purely political and purely technical
arms control. This distinction suggests that the basic arms
control approach of the adversaries may very well be
asymmetrical. Hence any arms control proposal must be
capable of addressing these asymmetries and resolving them.
One such asymmetry is the adversaries' geographic situation
since location influences the choice of allies as well as
doctrine and force structure. Other asymmetries include
such issues as existing and planned military capabilities,
technological bases and capabilities, and the values and
interests of the states concerned. How many of these
elements of arms control came to bear on the talks and were
able to resolve such differences will indicate, to some
degree, the capacity of conventional arms control negotia-
tions between the superpowers to resolve such problems.
The second measure of effectiveness is the degree to
which an arms control proposal affects the interests of
allies. This is a self-evident, though often ignored,
proposition because arms control agreements have implica-
tions in international politics far beyond the relationship
between the two superpowers. Negotiations which offer hopes
for a modicum of stability for the superpower relationship
may generate uncertainty and insecurity among one or the
other's allies. The net effect of this consideration is
that no member of a military alliance can initiate arms
control talks which are not, in the main, acceptable to its
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allies. Because the case of the U.S. consultations with its
NATO partners on the issues of SALT I and SALT II suggest
that this measure of effectiveness is both valid and
significant, it is important to examine what was the impact
of the Indian Ocean talks on the Western allies.
The third measure of effectiveness deals with the idea
of relative advantage. Historically, arms control agree-
ments have been successfully negotiated only where a careful
attempt has been made to preserve prevailing strength ratios
among the participants. The carefully worked out ratio
system of the Washington Naval Conference is an example of
this premise. Hence, almost any control or reduction of
armaments inevitably produces shifts in relative power.
However, a second kind of a shift is more subtle. No two
nations have exactly the same kinds of security problems,
and therefore the utility of any particular kind of force
structure varies from state to state. Historically, Great
Britain emphasized the importance of a strong navy, while
continental powers emphasized their armies. The Soviet
Union has extensive land frontiers along with a long history
of invasion by land. Except for Cuba, all of her important
allies are accessible to it by land. In contrast, the
United States has only a minimal requirement to defend its
land borders, but is more dependent upon overseas commerce,
and has extensive commitments to its overseas allies. This
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makes its army more crucial to the Soviet Union and the Navy
more crucial to the United States.
Thus any arms control agreement that did not address
this doctrinal asymmetry would have an unequal impact
because of the differences in national needs and geographic
circumstances. Moreover, there are certain implications for
crisis management in this notion of marginal advantage which
need to be considered in any arms control option. Did the
talks come to grips with this problem of relative
advantage? The answer to this question is important because
crises today may in fact represent a surrogate for war at
the superpower level. If this is true, then the importance
of the superpower's military capabilities that can be
brought to bear to attain a position of escalation dominance
in a crisis is a vital factor of statecraft and must be
addressed in regional arms control talks.
The fourth measure of effectiveness is that an arms
control proposal must be negotiable. This suggests that the
adversaries must agree on a context for negotiation of their
issues and that the outcome in this forum must be acceptable
to its members. In the final analysis, any agreement which
is reached should provide an outcome which the adversaries
prefer to having no agreement at all. This is, and must
always be, a political decision. Nonetheless, the more
important the issue, the less likely is the chance of
agreement. Could talks on the Indian Ocean have produced
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such an agreement or was the importance of the Indian Ocean
in the national security policy of the U.S. and the USSR of
such a scale that there was little chance for agreement?
Linkage and the Ob jec tive s, of_Axms_Cc-ntxoj,
Identification of the objectives of an arms control
proposal is crucial to the integration of arms control in
national security planning. These objectives set the
standard of accomplishment and provide tests of feasibility
for possible alternatives. Choice of the right objective is
more important than choosing the right alternative since
accomplishment of the wrong objective may result in
failure.
Nations traditionally negotiate arms control agreements
to achieve some combination of at least three objectives:
the enhancement of national security, the reduction of
military expenditures, and the attainment of non-military
goals. Against these interests must be set those national
concerns which prompted the acquisition and deployment of
arms in the first place. The primary concern of a state is
its national security and, to be acceptable, an arms-control
agreement must at least not diminish that security, and
preferably enhance it. The second concern is with the role
of military force as an instrument of national policy in
peacetime. If this is to be circumscribed by the agreement,
then it must be clear that the overall gains from the
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agreement outweigh the probable losses. It is in securing
these political objectives that the association of linkage
politics with arms control has come to be a common and
accepted tactic.
A most convincing and substantial case can be made for
a specific arms control agreement if there is an affirmative
response to the question, "Will an agreement substantially
reduce the probability of war?" Henry Kissinger argued that
"the test of any agreement is whether it adds or detracts
from stability, whether it makes war less likely or more so.
3
." However, under certain conditions, some weapons
systems and force structures might well be a stabilizing
influence and tend to reduce the probability of war. An
example is the relatively invulnerable nuclear powered
ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) which, allegedly, was not
accurate enough to be a credible first strike weapon until
the advent of the Trident II (D-5) missile. If both
superpowers have only systems that are susceptible to a
first strike, any condition of strategic parity between the
U.S. and the Soviet Union will be substantially less
stable. It follows that some forms of arms control which
render an SSBN force more vincible, while not alleviating
3. Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York:




the vulnerability problems of the bomber and missile forces,
may destabilize the relationship between the superpowers.
In a like manner, anything else which reduces the
credibility or capability to respond to a threat may be
destabilizing over a period of time. Such things as a
substantive change in relative military strength or any
series of events which requires a sudden or substantial
increase in force levels during a period of superpower
political tension can be destabilizing. Actions that
provide prompt and authoritative sources of information
about the intentions and capabilities of adversaries (i.e.,
intelligence) tend to increase stability by lessening the
chance for miscalculation or accident.
Nonetheless, history provides an abundance of cases
that dispute the logic that arms control agreements nurture
stability. It has been argued that the single most sig-
nificant factor that brought about World War II in Europe
was the failure of Great Britain, France, and the Soviet
Union to enter into an arms race against Germany with
4
sufficient vigor and clarity of purpose. In a similar
manner, the Washington Naval Treaty may have led straight to
Pearl Harbor. The United States, the British, and the
French, lulled by the Treaty and hard pressed to find money
4. Hedley Bull, The Control o f the Arms Race , 2nd ed. (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 7.
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for their navies, permitted their building programs to lag
behind their quotas while the Japanese, and later the
Germans, took full advantage of their quotas. The post-
World War I arms limitation agreements—demilitarization of
the Rhineland and the various naval agreements—may also
have failed to prevent World War II. Some scholars conclude
that those agreements helped to bring on World War II by
reinforcing the blind and willful optimism of the West, thus
inhibiting military preparedness and diplomatic actions that
5
could have deterred the war. What were the prospects of an
Indian Ocean arms control agreement enhancing the national
security of the United States?
Reduction of Defense Expenditures
The limitation of defense funding is not new. Imperial
Russia tendered the first major initiative of this type at
the Hague Peace Conference in 1899. Since then, this means
of arms control has been suggested numerous times in a
variety of forums but there is no known case wherein con-
straints on a nation's naval budget have been accepted and
5. Eugene V. Rostow, "SALT II—A Soft Bargain, A
Hard-Sell—An Assessment of SALT in Historical Perspec-
tive." Lecture, Conference on United States Security and
the Soviet Challenge, Hartford, Connecticut: July 25, 1978.
6. Abraham S. Becker, Military Expenditure Limitation for
Arms Control: Problems and Prospects (Cambridge: Ballinger
Publishing Co., 1977), p. 1. For a detailed history of the
limitation of military expenditures in the post-World War II
era see Appendices A through G of Becker's work.
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implemented. The major objective of any arms control
measure limiting funding for naval forces is to increase the
perception of stability in the international system as well
as the security of its actors by constraining the level of
naval force that one actor can bring to bear on another. It
is complemented by the notion that if conflict does occur,
the decreased level of expenditure may contribute to the
lessening of the destructive potential of modern naval
warf are
.
In addition to saving money, constraints on military
budgets have two other perceived advantages. Because they
are couched in monetary terms, such restrictions can cover
the entire spectrum of naval programs. This includes such
program elements as research and development which are
difficult to control physically. Secondly, since funding is
the most general of all force measures, budgetary limita-
tions permit states sufficient latitude in reallocating
resources to meet special requirements within agreed
limits
.
Not too long ago, the mention of arms control conjured
up visions of large sums being diverted from the defense
budget to domestic programs. However, the cause and effect
relationship is not that simple and this expectation is no
longer valid. Arms control agreements may not yield rapid
7. Ibid
. , p. 2-3.
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and significant reductions in defense expenditures for two
principal reasons. First, there is the delayed cost
question. An arms control agreement may only serve to
change the timing of defense expenditures. In this regard,
there has been a distinct tendency on the part of the United
States to alternate periods of low military profile with
periods of sustained rearmament. World War II and the
Korean War are cases in point. The results have proven to
be not only militarily precarious but also less than
economically efficient. The second problem is that an arms
control agreement may not result in a net reduction in
expenditures but an increase in other military outlays or
even qualitative improvements in the armaments subjected to
constraints. Moreover, it is clear that the SALT accords
have not reduced Soviet expenditures.
Yet of all the objectives of arms control, this
particular one may have offered the best chance of achieving
some symmetry of interest in the Indian Ocean talks. Both
nations demonstrated some desire to reduce their naval
expenditures. However, while the percentage of the U.S. GNP
allocated to defense declined, there was evidence at the
time that there would not be a corresponding slowdown in the
8. U.S., Department of Defense, Department of Defense Annual
Report—Fisc al Year 1980 , Washington: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1979, p. 8 and 21 (hereinafter referred to as





Soviet military growth rate. Given the foregoing, then it
is of some significance to examine how the Carter Admin-
istration shaped its naval program and what effect, if any,
this program had on the role of the U.S. Navy in the Indian
Ocean
.
Attainment of Non-Militar y Goals
A nation may use arms control as a means to achieve a
non-military goal. This theorem suggests that national
security is a precondition of attainment of other core
values of the state (i.e., equality, sovereignty, and eco-
nomic well-being) . By means of manipulating its level of
armament, a nation may be able to enhance its ability to
pursue effectively its other goals whether they be political
or economic. This objective incorporates the primacy of
politics and economics in the international system. The
principal strategy that has been employed in the pursuit of
these non-security goals, and in some cases security
objectives, is linkage politics. In the case of U.S. -Soviet
relations, the United States has generally pursued the
strategy of linkage while the USSR has tried to block the
9
strategy. Though there are other meanings for the term,
linkage is both a conscious strategy and a deliberate tactic
9. Angela Stent, "The Political Economy of Soviet-West
German Relations," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University,
1977) . Ms. Stent demonstrates how the Soviet Union tries to
prevent the application of linkage tactics.
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of binding separate issues together. It is a negotiating
strategy— a quid pro quo type of arrangement.
There were three key reasons why the U.S. -Soviet
relationship gave rise to linkage situations. First, there
was no "normal" economic system between the two countries.
All aspects of the relationship were highly politicized.
The two states were rivals in conscious opposition as eco-
nomic systems and political ideologies. Since World War II,
they had confronted each other as the leaders of two com-
peting military coalitions. Moreover, even the most basic
exchange was seen as fraught with political meaning.
Second, the relationship was asymmetrical. The Soviet
state was a monopoly not only of political power, but also
of economic power. Economic development was both a central
concern and responsibility of the political leadership. But
the USSR was oriented to the U.S. in the way a less devel-
oped country is oriented to a developed country, needing the
more advanced state's technology, managerial expertise, and
finance. For the U.S., economic matters were less
pressing. While trade may have been profitable for certain
sectors of the U.S. economy, it hardly in itself was of
central concern to Washington. Thus there was a tendency to
10. Daniel Yergin, "Strategies of Linkage in Soviet-American
Relations," Paper delivered at the Center for International




seek political concessions in return for economic conces-
sions the Russians sought.
Third, the United States government had to concern
itself with the play of domestic politics and find a way to
mediate between certain factions who viewed the Soviet Union
as a market and others who were concerned more with the
ideological, political, and security practices and goals of
12the Soviet state.
The issue of linkage and arms control during the Carter
Administration remains a delicate one. On October 6, 1976,
during the second Ford-Carter debate in San Francisco,
presidential candidate Carter said that he would bargain
more toughly with the Soviet leadership, move human rights
to the fore of his foreign policy, and abandon the secret
13
and pragmatic diplomacy of the early 1970's. Carter
repudiated his intent to employ linkage politics as a tactic
in achieving these goals shortly after being elected. In
February 1977, he explained that:
. . . I think we come out better in dealing with
the Soviet Union if I'm consistently and
completely dedicated to the enhancement of human
rights . . . and I think this can legitimately be
severed from our inclination to work with the
Soviet Union, for instance, in reducing dependence
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. "Transcription of Second Ford-Carter Debate," Con-
gressional Quarterl y. December 1976, p. 928.
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upon atomic weapons, and also in seeking mutual
and balanced force reductions in Europe. I don't
think we wf ut tne tw0 to De tied
together. . . .
Yet on January 4, 1980, he asked the Senate to defer further
consideration of the SALT II Treaty in response to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. How did this rejection and
then reaffirmation of linkage operate in the case of the
Indian Ocean talks? Was it a credible basis from which to
deal with the Soviet Union in the region?
The Means to These Ends—Regional Arms Control
The method of arms control that was most applicable to
the U.S. -USSR Indian Ocean NALT was the imposition of limi-
tations on the naval capabilities of the two states in a
regional context. Arms control proponents have often
suggested regional arms control agreements as a means of
defusing potential areas of conflict. As a process,
regional arms control seeks to impose constraints on the
movement into or basing of forces in an agreed upon
geographic area such as the Indian Ocean. The principal
goal is the enhancement of the political and military
stability in regions of both conflict avoidance and conflict
management although, in a sense, regional arms control
shares the same broad objectives as all other efforts to
14. U.S. President, "The President's News Conference of 8
February 1977," Weekly Compi lation o f Presidential Docu-
ments . February 14, 1977, p. 160.
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reduce or control military capabilities. The classic naval
example of such an arrangement is the Rush-Bagot Treaty of
1817 wherein Great Britain and the United States agreed to
limit the number of naval vessels deployed on the Great
Lakes. A second and more recent example is the Treaty for
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America or the
Treaty of Tlatelolco. It contains protocols which commit
its signatories to respect the denuclearization of Latin
America and not to use or threaten the use of nuclear
weapons against any of the other signatories to the treaty
in the region.
Geography clearly is a central element in the regional
approach to arms control. Virtually from the earliest times
the owner of territory has endeavored to devise some effec-
1 c
tive means of protecting it from external aggression. In
modern terms arms control arrangements on a regional basis
have consisted of demilitarization agreements, nuclear
15. At the time the United States was a party to Additional
Protocol II of this treaty. See U.S. Treaties, etc.,
"Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
Ame r i c a , " United States Treaties and Other International
Agreements , TIAS 7137 (Washington: U.S. Department of State,
1971), v. 22, pt. 1, p. 754-756, 766-786. President Carter
forwarded Additional Protocol I to the Senate for rati-
fication on May 24, 1978. It should be noted that Cuba was
not a signatory to the treaty.
16. Perhaps the classic study of the regional approach to
arms control is J. H. Marshall-Cornwall's Geographic
Disarmament; A_jstu,dy_.p.f_Jtegic>nal JQemilitarization (London:
Oxford University Press, 1935) .
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weapon free zones, zones of peace, confidence building
measures, and actual force limitations or reductions.
Because the origins of Indian Ocean NALT and the talks
themselves contained elements of all five of these
approaches, this raises the question of whether or not they
are compatible. Moreover, were they applicable to the
Indian Ocean?
Geography and Arms Control
Although political and military leaders have paid lip
service to geography for centuries, they have not always
appreciated its lessons or, more significantly, applied
them. National security planning requires a knowledge of
the effects of geography on military operations. In this
sense it seems imperative that policymakers dealing with
problems of national security such as arms control not be
satisfied with a simplistic appreciation of Mercator
geography. They should realize that this geographic system
creates distortions and hence misconceptions. Only by
appreciating and applying the elements of a region's
geography in a global sense is it possible to comprehend the
world as a unit wherein geography, power, and strategy are
intimately linked. Though geography, including the mental
images manifest in policymaker minds, is not the sole, and
rarely the decisive, factor in national security
calculations, geographical factors, both objective and
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subjective, have been underestimated in the study of
international politics in general and arms control in
particular. These notions raise one final question about
the Indian Ocean negotiations. Did a concern for enhanced
U.S. -Soviet political and military stability in the Indian
Ocean region distort Carter and his advisors' mental image
of the Indian Ocean region within a global framework?
The American geographer Saul Bernard Cohen offered
several theories in 1963 which are useful in addressing this
question. Cohen argued that any framework of geopolitical
analysis should distinguish between divisions that have
global extent and those that have regional significance. He
called the first a geostrategic region and the second a
1
8
geopolitical region. He went on to explain that a
geostrategic region must be large enough to have certain
global influencing characteristics and functions. Moreover,
a geostrategic region is the expression of the interrela-
tionship of a large part of the world in terms of location,
movement, resources, and cultural bonds. It is a single
feature region in the sense that its purpose is to embrace
areas over which power can be applied. He cited control of
17. Alan K. Henrikson, "The Geographical 'Mental Maps' of
American Foreign Policy Makers," International Political
Science Review, v. 1 (no. 4), 1980, p. 507.
18. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World
Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 62.
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strategic passageways on land and sea as frequently being a
19
crucial element to the unity of geostrategic regions.
A geopolitical region, according to Cohen, was a sub-
division of the geostrategic region and was an expression of
the unity of geographic features. Because it was derived
directly from geographic regions, this unit provided a
framework for common political and economic actions. Con-
tiguity of location and complementarity of resources were
distinguishing marks of the geopolitical region. Cohen
argued that geopolitical regions were the basis for the
emergence of multiple power nodes within a geostrategic
region. Put another way, the geostrategic region had a
strategic role to play and the geopolitical region a
20tactical one.
Carter's Secretary of Defense Harold Brown alluded to
this kind of conceptual framework in June 1977 when he
remarked that:
In addition to Europe, there are a number of other
areas around the world in which there are delicate
or even potential explosive situations. The
Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and Korea are three
examples of areas where the U.S. and its allies
have vital interests. Conflict in one of these
areas not only might require the dispatch of some
appropriate U.S. forces to the scene in support of





well precede and e^en set off a crisis or confla-
gration in Europe.
Was this indeed the perception of the Carter Administration
with respect to the Indian Ocean? Or did, in reality,
Carter address the Indian Ocean as a geopolitical region in
the talks? If the former is the case, then how did the
geostrategic nature of the region shape the issues of the
negotiations? If the latter is true, then were the talks
simply a tactic in Carter's vision of the U.S. -Soviet
relationship?
In summary, the objective of this study is to outline a
case study of a regional arms control regime to limit naval
forces from which a series of generalizations can be drawn.
These generalizations will provide insight into the national
security policy of the Carter Administration as well as the
role that geography plays in arms control.
21. Harold R. Brown, "An Address Delivered to the National
Security Industrial Association, 15 September 1977."
Selected Statements (Washington: United States Air Force,
October 1, 1977) , p. 76.

PART TWO
THE BACKGROUND OF THE TALKS

CHAPTER II
THE DISTANT ORIGINS OF THE TALKS
The future is like a corridor into which we can
see only by the light coming from behind.
-- E.J. Weyer
Thomas B. Millar, a noted Australian scholar and
student of Indian Ocean affairs, once argued that the
majority of foreign policy decisions were like Topsy— they
just grew. They matured out of past policies, were shaped
by the bureaucratic process, and were heavily circumscribed
Dy the logic, or lack thereof, of events. This logic and
the legacy of the past explained most foreign policy
transactions and, where they did not, they could be called
on to justify those policies. One can draw a parallel to
Millar's observations in examining the evolution of a
specific national security policy. In the case of U.S.
national security policy for the Indian Ocean, there were
four such sequences that formed the logic of that policy
1. T. B. Millar, "On Writing About Foreign Policy," James N.
Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New




with respect to the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation
Talks.
The first was the formulation of the concept of an
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace in September 1970 at the
Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Lusaka, Zambia, and
subsequent actions on the proposal by the General Assembly
of the United Nations. The second was the attempt by
members of the U.S. Senate from 1974 through 1976 to
operationalize NALT in the Indian Ocean. Throughout both of
these, the U.S. and the Soviet governments maintained a
consistent position on the subject: they discounted the
utility of NALT in both word and deed. The third event that
influenced Indian Ocean policy was the move into the Carter
Administration of policymakers who sharpened their ideas on
this subject through their association with the Tenth
Dartmouth Conference in May 1976 and a study conducted by
the United Nations Association of the United States
(UNA-USA) in November 1976. Former Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance confirmed that these three sequences of events were
uppermost in his mind at least when President Carter
2
announced his intentions with respect to the Indian Ocean.
The last, and perhaps the most significant, event was
the recognition by Carter in early 1978 of an increasing
2. Interview with Cyrus Vance, U.S. Secretary of State
(January 1977-April " 1980), New York: July 11, 1983




level of instability, uncertainty, and insecurity in the
littoral along the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean
and the function which naval power would play in any role
the United States might choose for itself as a result of
these disturbances.
U.S. Presence in the Indian Ocean
and the British Withdrawal from East of Suez
For over one hundred and fifty years Great Britain
imposed a Pax Britannica on the Indian Ocean. The cutting
edge of that force for stability was the COLONY and LEANDER
class cruisers of the Royal Navy and their successors that
Great Britain argued for so forcefully in the London Naval
Conference of 1930. The Royal Marine Commando, as well as
other British forces on station at such posts of the Empire
as Aden, Singapore, and Trincomalee, bolstered the presence
of the Royal Navy. Moreover, the British political
residents in the states along the Persian Gulf insured that
Great Britain's interests, as well as those of its friends,
were protected.
The United States traditionally favored this arrange-
ment. Even as late as 1964 Prime Minister Harold Wilson
remarked after a meeting in Washington with President Lyndon
Baynes Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that
"the most encouraging fact about the conference was
America's emphasis on Britain's worldwide role" and that
"McNamara had gone out of his way to emphasize the
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importance of Britain's role east of Suez." However this
presence and its effect were to be short-lived.
Though there is an abundant literature on Britain's
decision to end its role east of Suez, it is worthwhile to
4
review the highlights of that decision. In June of 1966
elements of the British Labour Party argued for decisive
reductions in the United Kingdom's military commitments east
of Suez so that Britain could focus more on its military
requirements in Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) . The cost of maintaining military
forces suitable for use in the European theatre was rising.
Moreover, these forces were not compatible with the kinds of
missions that the U.K. historically had encountered east of
Suez. The landings in Kuwait in 1961 at the request of the
Government of Kuwait for assistance against Iraq as well as
the suppression of mutinies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika
in 1964 demonstrated that a qualitatively and quantitatively
different force structure than that required by the British
Army of the Rhine in Germany was necessary for operations
3. R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, 1964-66
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1975), v. 1, p. 73.
4. See, for example, Phillip Darby, British Defense Policy
East of Suez (London: Oxford University Press, 1973);
Alastair Buchan, "Britain East of Suez," RUSI Journal
,
August 1967, p. 209-215; Walter Goldstein, The Dilemma of
British Defense: The Imbalance Betwe en Commitments and
Resou rces (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966) .
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like these. This issue and Great Britain's declining
economy dictated that a resource-driven policy decision was
inevitable
.
When this dilemma came to the fore in January 1968
Wilson announced that the United Kingdon would withdraw its
forces east of Suez by 1971. Spurred by one of the several
economic crises that marked Wilson's tenure as Prime
Minister, Wilson also explained that all British aircraft
carriers, the very instruments which had permitted Britain
to intervene in the littoral of the Indian Ocean, were to be
7
scrapped. The details of the U.S. reaction to this deci-
sion as well as the degree to which the United States took
part in the debate remains a subject for future scholars.
However, two things are certain. The first is that Wilson's
decision marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the
United States to establish a logistics support facility in
the Indian Ocean. The second is that the Soviet Union began
5. See, for example, Anthony Verrier, "Strategic Mobility
Forces: U.S. Theory and British Practice," RUSI Journal ,
November 1961, p. 479-485; LtCol. T. M. Stevens, RM, "A
Joint Operation in Tanganyika," RUSI Journal , February 1965,
p. 48-55; D. C. Watt, "The Role of the Aircraft Carrier in
Some Recent British Military Operations," RUSI Journal , May
1966, p. 128-131.
6. See Great Britain, Parliament, Papers by Command f
1964/65, Cmnd. 2592, "Statement on the Defence Estimates:
1965" (hereinafter referred to as Cmnd. 2592 ) ; Great
Britain, Parliament, Papers by Command f 1966/67, Cmnd. 3203,






to deploy naval forces to the region on a regular basis less
o
than two months after Wilson's announcement.
U.S. association with the Indian Ocean region dated
from the eighteenth century and the entry of the United
States into global maritime trade. Geography influenced
this activity because the only favorable way to reach the
trade of Asia and the Indies was via the Cape of Good Hope
and the Indian Ocean because of the wind patterns in the
Indian Ocean as opposed to those in the Pacific. The
geography of these winds in the days of sail was also the
starting point for anyone planning military operations in
the Indian Ocean as well as the navigational considerations
of U.S. merchant captains who sought out new markets for the
9developing industry of the United States. One of the
earliest contacts in this regard was the Treaty of Amity and
Commerce with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in 1833.
8. The first Soviet surface combatants deployed to the
Indian Ocean in March 1968. The first Soviet submarine
appeared in the region in March 1968 with the surface
combatant group. Soviet naval TV-95 BEAR aircraft operating
from bases in Soviet Central Asia began reconnaissance
flights over the Indian Ocean in 1967. See SECSTATE WASHDC
msg 122333Z Sep 80 (State Cite 233001) (Subject: Soviet
Military Buildup in the Indian Ocean Region)
.
9. G. S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 45.
10. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Treaty of Amity and Commerce,"
Treaties, Conventions. International Acts. Protocols and
Agreements Between the United States of America ajad Other
Powers. 1776-1909 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1910), v. 1, p. 1228-1230.
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Nonetheless, with the exception of occasional transits of
the ocean by such forces as the squadron commanded by
Commodore Robert Wilson Shufeldt, USN, in 1879 and the Great
White Fleet in 1908, U.S. military presence in the region
remained insignificant until World War II.
Prior to 1945, when the European colonial powers domi-
nated the area, U.S. interests centered on Persian Gulf
12
oil. During World War II the United States established
the Persian Gulf Command in Iran to deliver lend-lease
equipment to the Soviet Union. Only given lip service as a
major combined command, the China-Burma-India (CBI) theatre
remained a backwater of operations during the war. In the
1950's the U.S. began sending military advisory missions to
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Ethiopia. These missions
complemented the growing economic aid to the region and
underscored U.S. concern for the area. In addition, the
11. See Kenneth J. Hagan, "Showing the Flag in the Indian
Ocean," Clayton R. Barrow, Jr., ed., America Spreads Her
Sails: U.S. Seapower in the 19th Century (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1973), p. 153-175, for an account of the
Shufeldt expedition; see Robert A. Hart, The Great White
Fleet: Its Voyage Around the World, 1907-1909 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1965) for an account of the voyage of
the Great White Fleet.
12. See, for example, John A. De Novo, "The Movement for an
Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920," American
Historical Review , July 1956, p. 854-876; Aaron D. Miller,
Search for Security: Saudi Arabian Oil and American Foreign
Policy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1980) ; and Barry Rubin, "Anglo-American Relations in Saudi




United States, largely through the efforts of Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles, expanded the idea of containment
to the Indian Ocean by supporting such regional defense
agreements as ANZUS in 1951 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955
along with its successor the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) in 1959. Moreover, the United States entered into
bilateral agreements with Iran and Pakistan thereby forging
the first formal U.S. security commitments in the region.
Nonetheless, it was not until 1971 that Congress saw
fit to examine U.S. policy for the region. Congressional
hearings revealed a wide diversity of opinion both within
and outside the U.S. government foreign and national
security policy apparatus as to what were the real U.S.
interests in the region, what the United States and the
Soviet Union were doing there, and what U.S. policy for the
13
region should be. Other hearings followed these in 1972
14
and 1973 and focused on U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean.
13. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments, Uifi Indian Ocean: Political and Strategic
Future . Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1971) .
14. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, The United
States and the Persian Gulf
, Hearings (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1972); U.S. Interests in and
Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973) (hereinafter referred to as Interests




These proceedings revealed that U.S. military presence
in the region was modest to say the least. Ever since 1948
the U.S. Navy had maintained a flagship and two destroyers
in the Indian Ocean. These ships constituted the Middle
East Force (MEF) . They performed essentially politico-
diplomatic functions such as showing the flag, demonstrating
U.S. interest in that part of the world, and enhancing U.S.
friendship with the littoral states through an extensive
schedule of port visits by individual MEF units. Throughout
the several crises, such as the troubled history of Iran
during the 1950's and the Suez crisis of 1956, the tiny
force of one seaplane tender and two destroyers remained
unchanged.
This low force level was commensurate with a national
security objective of maintaining stability. Naval forward
deployments in sensitive areas were a classic diplomatic
expression of a state's intention to foster stability and
demonstrate interest in a region. These commitments also
served to develop relationships favorable to U.S.
interests. These tactics presumed that the principal U.S.
interests in the region, an area where the United States
could not easily maintain a military capability, were
commercial and economic in nature. The United States left
the politico-military considerations to Great Britain.
Oil and mineral resources were the most important in
this regard. The United States and the other industrialized
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nations depended on the Indian Ocean region for natural
resources including, in addition to oil, such strategic
minerals as antimony, asbestos, copper, lead, nickel, tin
and uranium. Access to these resources was indispensable to
the economic structure of Europe and Japan. At the time of
the 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) boycott western Europe depended on oil from the
region for 75% of its energy needs; Japan's dependence was
conservatively put at 85%. Moreover, some 50% of the world's
15
seaborne oil imports crossed the Indian Ocean. Hence a
stable regional order in which the states of the area
favored international cooperation rather than conflict was a
reasonable national security objective for the United
States. At the time, the military mission performed by the
MEF was a logical expression of a military capability to
support this policy objective.
However, in the event of a serious challenge to this
goal such as might develop in a crisis situation, the MEF
was inadequate either to affect the outcome of the crisis
ashore or to control the situation at sea. Indeed the
15. See U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Information
for the Armed Forces, U.S. Policy: Indian Ocean Region
(Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Infor-




United States never seriously considered the mission of the
MEF to be war-fighting in nature. Hence, the United
States recognized the need to augment the Middle East Force
from time to time in the Indian Ocean to demonstrate a
crisis resolution capability. The USS BONHOMME RICHARD
(CVA-31) was the first U.S. aircraft carrier to deploy into
the Indian Ocean in 1960 and was symbolic of the U.S. intent
to insure its ability to manage crises in the region. When
it became apparent that the Pax Br itannica in the Indian
Ocean was going to end, the United States adopted a policy
of periodic augmentation of the Middle East Force by more
militarily capable naval forces. Although several battle
groups operated in the region on what were essentially
politico-diplomatic cruises, the U.S. Navy never fully
implemented this Indian Ocean deployment policy. The cause
attributed to this non-implementation was the overriding
force requirements of Southeast Asian operations. The one
exception to this trend was the deployment of Task Force 74
16. Interests in and Policy Toward the Persian Gulf , p. 109.
17. J. Owen Zurhellen, "Statement," U.S., Congress, House,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Near East
and South Asia, Proposed Expansion of U.S. Mi l itary
Facilities in the Indian Ocean
r Hearings (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1974) , p. 3 (hereinafter
referred to as Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military




built around USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) during the Indo-
1 8
Pakistani crisis in December 1971.
However, with the end of the Vietnam War and in the
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli October War in 1973 and the
OPEC oil boycott, the United States carried out this policy
by sending a carrier battle group centered on USS HANCOCK
(CVA-19) into the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean.
Shortly thereafter, in November 1973, Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger announced the return to a policy of more
frequent and more regular deployments to the Indian
19Ocean. This pattern of U.S. naval presence continued in
the Indian Ocean through 1978.
What these decisions imply is that in the early 1970 's
the United States formally adopted an Indian Ocean strategy
as part of its national security policy. The force levels
and patterns of operations allocated to support this policy
18. This deployment remains a controversial issue even
today. For a description of the events surrounding Task
Force 74's Indian Ocean incursion see, for example, Henry
Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1979) , p. 842-918 (hereinafter referred to as White
House Years ) ; James M. McConnell and Anne M. Kelly,
Superpower Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis .
Professional Paper No. 108 (Arlington: Center for Naval
Analysis, February 5, 1973); Michael Walter, "The U.S. Naval
Demonstration in the Bay of Bengal During the 1971
Indo-Pakistani Crisis," World Affairs . Spring 1979,
p. 293-306; Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force
Without War (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978)
,
p. 175-214.
19. James H. Noyes, "Statement," Proposed Expansion of U.S.
Milita ry Facilities in the Indian Ocean , p. 53.
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demonstrated that the United States had shifted from a
policy of maintaining stability to enhance its commercial
and economic interests to one of maintaining this stability
supplemented by a capability to contain crises. The choice
of the modest presence of the Middle East Force occasionally
augmented by battle groups with the power to influence a
situation either at sea or ashore supports this contention.
Moreover, the periodic deployment of these crisis oriented
forces as opposed to their continuous presence suggested
that, for political reasons, there was an element of tacit
restraint with respect to the region by the United States.
When President Richard M. Nixon took office in 1969, he
immediately began a major review of U.S. policy in the
region. Perhaps prompted by the concerns posed by the Amir
of Kuwait in a meeting with Nixon and his National Security
Advisor, Henry A. Kissinger, on December 17, 1968, as to
just what were Nixon's plans for the Persian Gulf after the
20United Kingdom left the area, the policy review focused
on how the Nixon Doctrine, announced on Guam on July 25,
1969, could best be applied to the regional powers in the
21Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
20. White House Years
, p. 51.
21. Gary Sick, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategy Toward the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Regions," Alvin Z. Rubinstein,
ed
. , The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South
Asia (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 57.
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The Nixon National Security Council completed the
review of Persian Gulf policy in late 1970. Based on this
study, it concluded that the British intent to retain much
of their political presence in the Gulf implied that there
was not so much a power vacuum as a realignment of the
existing power balance. Though there was potential for
instability in the Gulf, the study concluded that the
situation was unlikely to be responsive to U.S. military
power. Hence the problem was cast as a political rather
22than a military one. Based on this appreciation of the
situation, Nixon and Kissinger approved a low profile policy
that emphasized security cooperation with regional states.
Because it relied so heavily on Iran and Saudi Arabia, it
quickly became known as the "Two Pillar Policy." One key
element of this policy was to maintain the tiny U.S. naval
23presence embodied in the Middle East Force intact.
Because this policy concerned itself only with the
Persian Gulf, it left unanswered the problem of U.S.
interests in and military strategy for the broader area of
the Indian Ocean. The Kissinger national security apparatus
undertook further studies to examine this question as well
as the issues of naval presence and bases in the region. On
November 9, 1970, Kissinger promulgated National Security
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 57-58.
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Study Memorandum (NSSM) 104 which called for "an assessment
of possible Soviet naval threats to U.S. interests in the
Indian Ocean area and the development of friendly naval
force and basing alternatives consistent with varying
judgments about possible threats and interests over the
1971-1975 period." NSSM 104 marked the beginning of a
year or more of considering what the United States could and
should do in the Indian Ocean. NSSM 109 ordered a study of
25
U.S. policy for South Asia. NSSM 110, chaired by the
State Department, asked for a much broader, politico-
26
military analysis of the region. NSSM 118 directed a
27
contingency study on secession in Pakistan. Finally, NSSM
133 required the U.S. national security apparatus to begin
2 8
contingency planning on South Asia. This was the first
review of regional military policy in nearly a decade and
the first attempt by the U.S. government to examine
systematically the elements of an integrated Indian Ocean
29policy.
24. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch (New York: Quadrangle/The





29. Sick, op. cit., p. 58.
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These studies concluded that the Indian Ocean could not
be regarded as a political unit. There was simply too much
diversity to regard it as a whole. Moreover, no state or
group of states in the region had the same importance to the
United States as did Europe, the Far East, or Latin
America. Nixon and Kissinger recognized, however, that U.S.
interests would suffer if the region fell under the sway of
forces hostile to the United States and its allies. The
importance of oil in this regard was specifically high-
lighted. Although the Soviet Navy's presence in the region
would probably increase over time, the studies characterized
these deployments as cautious probes. Hence Nixon and
Kissinger concluded that the United States had a relatively
low level of interest in the Indian Ocean and that these
interests could best be served by normal commercial and
political access supported by a low level of military
30presence.
However the strategic environment that shaped the
premises of these decisions was fundamentally altered in
1972 and 1973. The Treaty of Friendship between the Soviet
Union and Iraq in April of that year ultimately provided
modern military equipment to Iraq, then the most radical
Arab state, and posed a problem for Nixon and Kissinger.
They decided to help Iran arm itself or face a shift in the
30. Ibid., p. 59.
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basic power considerations in the Gulf. The second factor
that altered U.S. perceptions of the region was the October
War and the Arab oil embargo against the United States.
These two events prompted the Nixon Administration to
undertake another comprehensive review of its Indian Ocean
32
strategy. This review and its policy implications will be
discussed later in conjunction with Diego Garcia.
In summary, at least until 1973, three separate yet
interrelated factors influenced U.S. national security
policy for the Indian Ocean region. The first was the
withdrawal of British military forces from east of Suez.
The second and the most enduring element of this policy was
the relentless demand for Persian Gulf oil by the industrial
nations of the West and Japan. The last factor was the
growth of Soviet military presence and political influence
in the region.
The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
Concurrent with these developments was a growing impa-
tience among the Third World nations to exert their influ-
ence politically and try to achieve some degree of control
over their own future. The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
movement was one such tactic in this strategy. Members of
31. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheava l (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1982), p. 669.
32. Sick, op. cit., p. 64.
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the Non-Aligned Movement had traditionally endorsed the idea
of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean. As early as 1964,
the Cairo Non-Aligned Conference condemned the intentions of
the "imperialist powers" to set up bases in the Indian Ocean
33
region. The Lusaka Conference adopted a resolution in
1970 that reiterated this charge and called upon the non-
aligned nations to focus their efforts in the next session
of the U.N. General Assembly on the adoption of a resolution
that called:
. . . upon all states to consider and respect the
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace from which great
power rivalries and competition as well as bases
conceived in the context of such rivalries and
competition, either army, navy or air force bases,
are excluded. The area should also be free of
nuclear weapons.
Sri Lanka and Tanzania caused the item to be added to
the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General
Assembly in October 1971. They recommended that the entire
high seas area of the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of
peace to be used exclusively for non-military purposes. The
wording of the proposal took special note of the role that
3 3 . Conference o f Heads of States and Governments of
Non-Aligned Countries (Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance
Publication, 1964), p. 350. This proposal also called for
the denuclearization of Africa, the Indian Ocean and the
South Atlantic.
34. Main Documents Relating to Conferences af Non-Aligned





naval vessels, especially submarines, played in the context
of superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean.
The General Assembly adopted Resolution 2832 (XXVI) in
December of 1971 declaring the Indian Ocean, within limits
to be determined, together with its air column and sea bed,
to be a zone of peace. Appendix A contains the text of this
document. The Resolution called upon the "Great Powers" to
enter into negotiations with the littoral states of the
region to halt further escalation of their military presence
and to eliminate all bases and other symbols of superpower
competition. Moreover, the General Assembly requested its
Secretary General to report on the progress of the imple-
mentation of these measures at the following session of the
35United Nations. The resolution passed by a vote of 61-0
with 55 abstentions. The extent of the opposition to the
idea can be gauged not only by the high number of
abstentions—almost equal to the number of votes in favor of
the resolution—but also by the fact that all of the perma-
nent members of the Security Council, with the exception of
China, abstained. It is also significant that the General
Assembly adopted this resolution on December 16, 1971,
35. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Re solution s Adopted by the General Assembl y During Its
Twenty-Si xth Session, 1971, Resolution 2832 (XXVI), Sup-
plement No. 29 (A/8429) (New York: 1972), p. 36-37.
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during the height of the Indo-Pakistani War and the U.S.-
Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean.
The United States took the position that such a concept
would infringe on the traditional freedom of the high seas
and warned that "purporting to establish special regimes for
particular areas" would undercut the more general negotia-
tions then ongoing in the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea. Furthermore, the United States rejected
"the view that a group of States in a certain region can
establish a legal regime for the high seas in that region"
because such a move could affect the "fundamental security
interests" of all states. The Soviet Union, while sharing
the reservations of the United States concerning the Law of
the Sea, argued that the first efforts of the General
Assembly should be directed toward the elimination of the
existing foreign military bases in the region and that the
proposal should "become the object of agreement among the
parties concerned before the General Assembly takes a
37decision.
"
36. "Statement by the U.S. Representative (Martin) to the
First Committee of the General Assembly . . . December 10,
1971," quoted in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Documents on Disarmament 1971
,
(Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972) , p. 866-867 (hereinafter referred to
as Documents on Disarmament 1971 )
.
37. "Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to
the First Committee of the General Assembly . . . December




During its twenty-seventh session in 1972, the
Secretary General advised the General Assembly that the
negotiations requested had not taken place. In response to
this and to continuing pressure from the Non-Aligned Move-
ment, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2992 (XXVII)
.
The resolution established the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Indian Ocean to "study the implications of the Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace Resolution with specific reference to
practical measures that could be taken to facilitate its
3 8implementation." The number of votes in favor of the
resolution increased from 61 to 95 in favor, none against,
39
and 33 abstentions. The United States and the Soviet
Union, along with France and the United Kingdom, continued
their opposition to the measure.
Since 1972, the focus of the actions of the General
Assembly on the Zone of Peace question has centered on the
yearly reports of the Ad Hoc Committee. Based on the
recommendations contained in the Committee's first report,
38. United Nations, General Assembly. Official Records;
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its
Twenty-Seventh Session. 1972
, Resolution 2992 (XXVII) Sup-
plement No. 30 (A/8730) (New York: 1973), p. 20 (hereinafter
referred to as A/8730) . The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian
Ocean included Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Japan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.
39. Australia, Madagascar, Singapore, and Thailand were
among those littoral states that changed their position from
that of abstention to open support. Israel, Oman, and South
Africa were the only remaining littoral states to abstain.
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the General Assembly carried Resolution 3080 (XXVIII) in
401973 requesting the Secretary General to compile a factual
statement on military presence in the Indian Ocean with
41
emphasis on the patterns of naval deployments.
Accordingly, the Secretary General appointed a panel of
three experts who submitted their report to the General
42Assembly in April 1974.
The report of this panel generated substantial of
controversy. The United States, France, Great Britain and
the USSR labeled the document as inaccurate and specula-
tive. The U.N. experts criticized the U.S. facility on
Diego Garcia and charged that the United States was creating
a situation conducive to an intensified regional rivalry in
the future. Because of the criticism of the document, the
Secretary General referred the report to the head of the
United Nations Disarmament Division for review. As a
result, the experts submitted a somewhat less contentious
40. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean , 28th
Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9029) (New York: 1973), p. 22.
41. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly Du r ing Lts
Twenty-E ighth Session, 1973 , Resolution 3080 (XXVIII), Vol.
I, Supplement No. 30 (A/9030) (New York: 1974), p. 18-19.
42. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean , 2 9th
Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9629) and Add. 1 (New York:
1974) . The report is general in nature and addresses the




version of the report which replaced the original in its
. . ,.43entirety.
That same year, 1974, a new facet of the issue became
part and parcel of the debate. Resolution 3295 (XXIX)
requested the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian
Ocean to begin consultations to convene a conference on the
44Indian Ocean. Moreover, the Committee recommended that it
be constituted as a negotiating forum so that it could begin
discussions with the four permanent members of the Security
Council who were not members of the Committee (i.e., the
United States, USSR, U.K. and France) aimed at lessening
45their rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Once again, the United
States and the Soviet Union abstained.
In 1975 the General Assembly again used the report of
the Ad Hoc Committee as its principal working document and
adopted Resolution 3468 (XXX) calling for the continuation
43. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records;
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean , 29th
Session (A/AC. 151/1 and Rev. 1), May 3, 1974, and July 11,
1974, p. 6.
44. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Recor ds:
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its
Twenty-Ninth Session, 1974
, Resolution 3259 (XXIX), Vol. I,
Supplement No. 31 (A/9631) (New York: 1975), p. 21-22
(hereinafter referred to as A/9631) . The General Assembly
added Bangladesh, Kenya, and Somalia to the Ad Hoc Committee
on the Indian Ocean.
4 5
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of the consultations on the Indian Ocean conference. The
remainder of the resolution was worded substantially the
47
same as its predecessors. The 1976 document of the Ad Hoc
Committee reported that several nations, among them the
United States and the Soviet Union, declined to participate
48in the ongoing deliberations on the proposed conference.
The General Assembly noted this lack of participation in
Resolution 31/88 and invited all states and, in particular,
the superpowers and major maritime users of the Indian
49Ocean, to cooperate with the Committee.
Shortly after Vance's trip to Moscow in late March 1977
to discuss Carter's arms control proposals with the Soviet
leadership, the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee approached
the U.S. and Soviet U.N. delegations to clarify the status
of the Indian Ocean component of Carter's arms control
46. See United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Ind ian Oce an, 30th
Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/10029) (New York: 1975) (here-
inafter referred to as A/10029)
.
47. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records;
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assemb l y During Its
Thirtieth Session. 1975 , Resolution 3468 (XXX) , Supplement
No. 32 (A/10034) (New York: 1976), p. 21.
48. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 31st
Session , Supplement No. 29 (A/31/29) (New York: 1976),
w/corrigendum, p. 4.
49. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by the General Assembly
During Its Thirty-First Session. 1976 , Resolution 31/88,
Supplement No. 39 (A/31/39) (New York: 1977), p. 40-41.
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program. Noting that substantive talks had not begun, the
Committee chairman reported that the position of the U.S. on
the Indian Ocean and the Ad Hoc Committee had not changed,
though its future policy could not be separated from mutual
and reciprocal actions by the Soviet Union. The USSR
restated that its major concern was still the dismantling of
foreign military bases and that it did not have any inten-
tion of constructing such bases in the region. However,
both the Soviet Union and the U.S. agreed to keep the Ad Hoc
50Committee informed of the progress of their negotiations.
The General Assembly took note of the Committee's report in
Resolution 32/86. It cited the beginning of the Indian Ocean
talks between the United States and the USSR in June 1977
and noted that the next step in the convening of the Indian
Ocean conference was a meeting of the littoral and hinter-
land states of the Indian Ocean in New York at a time yet to
be determined. The General Assembly tasked the Ad Hoc
50. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records:
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 22M
Session
, Supplement No. 29 (A/32/29) (New York: 1978),
p. 1-9 (hereinafter referred to as A/32/29) .
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Committee with the responsibility for the preparations for
51this meeting.
The U.S. and the USSR abstained without exception on
all the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions in the
General Assembly through 1976. With minor exceptions, all
the littoral and hinterland states of the region consis-
tently voted in favor of the Zone of Peace resolutions. A
voting record is contained in Appendix B. The United States
justified its position by stressing the issue of freedom of
navigation and by fending off criticism of its Naval Support
Facility on Diego Garcia. The U.S. emphasized that it could
not accept criticism of Diego Garcia when the General
Assembly took no notice of the military activities of other
states external to the region. The intent of this stance
was to publicize the then active Soviet facility at Berbera
in Somalia. The U.S. explained its abstention on the issue
by arguing that:
... it constituted in effect a move on the part
of certain states to impose a regime on the high
seas. While there may be good reason in the eyes
of certain countries from time to time in wanting
to do this, the interests of the United States in
a global sense require us to take unswervingly the
51. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records;
Resolutions and Dec isions Adopted by the General Assembly
During Its Thirty-Second Session, 1977 , Resolution 32/86,
Supplement No. 45 (A/32/45) (New York: 1978), p. 51 (here-
inafter referred to as A/32/45) . The membership of the Ad
Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean was increased by the




position that the high seas are not to be limited
by any group of nations, particularly by those who
simply happen to be on a particular ocean.
While expressing sympathy with the principles which moti-
vated some of the nations in the area to promote concepts
like the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, the United States went
on to argue that:
. all major maritime powers, including the
United States and the Soviet Union, have been
doubtful about a special right to limit or control
the use of the high seas by others. The United
States has long held the view there must be
unimpaired freedom of navigation on the high
seas. "
Despite an agreement in principle on the issue of the Law of
the Sea, the Soviet Union used the issue of bases as a
rationale for its own actions and stressed that the prin-
cipal problem was the elimination of foreign military bases
54from the area.
The Zone of Peace Resolution, popular as it was among
the littoral states, suffered from a number of drawbacks,
not the least of which was its name. The very term "Zone of
Peace" carried a connotation of a well intentioned but
visionary hope which proved to be impossible to translate
into a political and practical reality. To some in the
United States, it evoked memories of such undeniably
52. Proposed Expansion of Military Fac ilities in the Indian
Ocean
, p. 8.
53. Ibid., p. 27.
54. A/32/29, p. 5.

- 59 -
laudatory but nonetheless ineffective efforts as the
55Kellogg-Br iand Pact of 1929 which called on all states to
forgo the use of war as an instrument of national policy.
Moreover, apart from declarations on such matters by the
U.N. General Assembly, no such zone has ever been legiti-
mized in a multilateral arms control agreement.
The declaration also suffered from its association with
the United Nations where the Secretary General of that body
remarked in an unusually candid statement in 1982 that the
organization had largely been defied and ignored. The
General Assembly, perhaps recognizing that such a concept
was without structure, failed to subject the concept of a
zone of peace to an examination such as that conducted in
571974 by a U.N. experts' study on nuclear free zones.
Moreover, the resolutions passed by the General Assembly on
the Indian Ocean raised a legal issue. Like all other U.N.
General Assembly resolutions they were essentially political
55. The position that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was a largely
useless multilateral treaty is argued in academic literature
by Robert H. Ferrell in Peace i n Thei r Time: The Origins of
the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1952) .
56. Bernard D. Nossiter, "Perez de Cuellar Concedes the U.N.
Is Being Ignored," The New York Times , September 8, 1982,
p. 1:4.
57. See United Nations, General Assembly, Officia l Records:
Special Report of th e Confere nce of the Cc-mmittee Qn
Disarmament , 30th Session, Supplement No. 27A
(A/10027/ADD.1) (New York: 1976) .
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documents. They were only recommendations and were not
legally binding on the members of the General Assembly in
5 8
the sense that full effect had to be given to them. In
other words, they did not have the effect that a treaty
would have. Nonetheless, they may have constituted a loose
form of jurisdiction in the sense that a recognized inter-
national organization was speaking on how an issue should be
addressed.
The debate also demonstrated a lack of political con-
sensus on the issue both among the extra-regional states,
whose military activities posed the initial and continuing
sources of concern, and the regional states who remained
divided over such basic issues as the geographic scope of
the zone as well as its functional intent. This point
demonstrates that there was a lack of homogeneity in the
region which, in turn, created a regional sense of
uncertainty, insecurity, and instability.
Although the littoral states of the region were broadly
in agreement with the concept of the Zone of Peace, their
approaches to the presence of the superpowers differed. The
positions of two of the more important littoral states—Sri
Lanka and India
—
provide an insight to this problem. Both
worked hard to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Sri
58. See R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territo ry in





Lanka, however, perceived a threat in the increasing Soviet
interest and presence in the region. While hosting the
fifth Non-Aligned Conference in August 1976, Sri Lanka's
Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike, said that:
The United States has now engaged upon expanding
military and naval facilities in Diego Garcia.
There is also the intensified military and naval
presence of the great powers in the Indian Ocean
which by reason of their known rivalries in other
areas could cause apprehension of danger to the
security of the Indian Ocean region. ... We
must, therefore, stand together and demand the
dismantling of the Diego Garcia base and must also
demand that the great powers which have no lit-
toral interests withdraw their navies and military
presence from the Indian Ocean region for detente
and the interests of security are not concepts
that can have one meaning to powerful nations and
no meaning at all to the rest of humanity.
Even though couched in cautious rhetoric, her unmistakable
reference to the Soviet presence in the region disturoed the
« „ 6Soviet Union.
India considered Bandaranaike ' s fears to be unfounded.
While Sri Lanka viewed both superpowers with apprehension,
59. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Bandaranaike Delivers Innaugural Address at Colombo," FBIS
Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa, August 17, 197 6,
p . AA7
.
60. Denzil Peiris, "Moscow Stirs the Pot," Far Eastern
Economic Review, September 10, 1976, p. 10.

- 62 -
the Indian attitude was less critical of the Soviet
Union. Speaking in May 1976 on the occasion of the visit
of Iranian Premier Amir Abbas Hoveyda to New Delhi, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi distinguished between Soviet and U.S.
presence in the Indian Ocean by arguing that:
As for the difference between the Russian presence
and the American presence, I think the difference
is that the Russians do not have a base. They may
be going back and forth, but we hear that the
American base^in Diego Garcia is going to be a
nuclear base.
However, even in India, there was a shift in attitude on
this issue between 1977 and 1979 when the government seemed
to evince a greater awareness of Soviet activity in the
region. In the Indian Parliament on July 14, 1977, Prime
Minister Morarji Desai explained that, "There is a race
between two powerful nations. It is from that we have to
save Asia and that is what we are engaged in."
There were also differences between India and Sri Lanka
over the basic concept itself. While Sri Lanka wanted the
Indian Ocean to be a nuclear free zone, India disapproved of
61. B. Vivekanadan, "Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: A
Problem in Indo-British Relations," The Round Table . January
1975, p. 67.
62. William Branigan, "Iran-India Split on Big Powers," The
Washington Post
,
May 17, 1976, p. A14:7.
63. The Hindu
,
July 15, 1977, quoted in B. Vivekandan, "The
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace—Problems and Prospects,"
Asian Survey . December 1981, p. 1244 (hereinafter referred




this proposal. The fact that China possessed nuclear
weapons remained a major constraint against any unilateral
abandonment of the nuclear option by India. At the U.N.
Special Session on Disarmament in June 1978, Desai argued
that it was:
. . . idle to talk of regional nuclear free zones
when there would still be zones which could
continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons.
Those who have such weapons lose nothing if some
distant area is declared non-nuclear. The nations
without nuclear capacity who imagines that their
inclusion in such zones ^affords them security are
suffering from delusion.
The denuclearization aspects of the Indian Zone of Peace
also suggest that there would be disagreement between India
and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, and China and India. A review
of the records of the Ad Hoc Committee bears this out. This
rivalry, especially in the case of one, or perhaps several
regional powers attaining a nuclear capability or being well
on their way to that position, suggests that the other
states of the region may very well have welcomed an outside
nuclear presence as a counter to their adversaries' capa-
bility. For this reason India has worked to disassociate
the concept of a nuclear free zone from the Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace by raising objections to the inclusion of land
64. The Indian Express , November 30, 1978, quoted in
Problems and Prospects , p. 1245.
65. See "The Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace," World






territories and territorial waters in this concept.
Hence, the other states of the region, even though they
supported the Zone of Peace openly in the forum of the U.N.,
may have been less than enthusiastic for the idea in
private.
The Zone of Peace declaration was not an international
agreement ready for signature and implementation. The text
stated that it was only a call for consultations, first by
the "Great Powers" with the littoral states and, secondly,
by the "littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean,
the permanent members of the Security Council and other
major maritime users of the Indian Ocean." The declaration
was a statement of principle and intent— a goal towards
which states might work. It was not a detailed negotiating
proposal. To have translated it into an agreement capable
of producing tangible, verifiable results would have
required defining terms, expanding general statements of
principle into precise formulae for action and even speci-
fying precisely such basic matters as the exact geographic
limits of the area in question. These problems proved to be
insurmountable to such a political body as the General
Assembly.
66. See Marcus F. Franda, "The Indian Ocean: A Delhi





Moreover , even as a general statement of principle, the
declaration left something to be desired. For example, it
prohibited warships and aircraft from using the Indian Ocean
not only as a means to employ force but also as instruments
implying the threat of force—at best a difficult situation
to resolve. Did the presence of a warship during a crisis
or when hostilities seemed imminent constitute a threat of
force per se, especially if the vessel belonged to a state
not directly involved in the crisis and was engaged in
innocent passage? At first glance, the answer would appear
to be not; but one state's exercise of the right of innocent
passage could be perceived as a threat by another state.
Even more difficult to translate into a formula for action
was the clause seeking to eliminate any manifestation of
superpower military presence "conceived in the context of
Great Power rivalry." This appeared to be an escape
mechanism of sorts, inserted for no readily apparent reason,
which would permit a superpower to maintain a military
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presence so long as it was not so planned. But how was such
a determination to be made and by whom?
Despite these shortcomings, the movement for the Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace did work an influence on the concept of
bilateral arms control for the Indian Ocean even though its
political shortcomings, compounded by the complexities of
the region's strategic character, weighed heavily against
it. Though the non-aligned nations had little to lose and
clearly everything to gain by keeping the Zone of Peace
issue alive, the United States and the Soviet Union could
not afford to draw attention to their rejection of what was
essentially a regional arms control accord for the Indian
Ocean. Though they would have preferred to be rid of the
problem, they participated reluctantly in the debates rather
than take a negative stand on the issue. Indeed, the Soviet
Union may have even achieved a marginal political gain by
expoiting the issue of Diego Garcia.
The foregoing evidence demonstrates that the Indian
Ocean Zone of Peace was a political issue within the Third
67. By 1979, even the chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee
during the fall 1979 session of the United Nations remarked
that "[he] knew of no country in our region which would
oppose or interfere with the peaceful naval activities of
external powers in the Indian Ocean." See United Nations,
General Assembly, Official Records, Verbatim Record of the
35th Meeting of the F irst Committee , 34th Session,
"Statement of the Sri Lankan Representative (Fernando) to
the First Committee . . . November 15, 1979,"
(A/C.1/34/PV.35) (New York: 1979), p. 6.
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World and its dealings with the superpowers. From the
perspective of the developing nations, the Indian Ocean was,
in effect, a Third World ocean and the Third World viewed it
as coming more and more under the sway of the two super-
powers. These perceptions and their background offer a
partial explanation of Carter's decision to pursue the
Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet
Union
.
Two of Carter's key policy advisors, Vance and Zbigniew
Brzezinski, were in agreement regarding the importance of
improving U.S. relations with the Third World. Indeed one
of Brzezinski's ten original foreign policy goals for the
Carter Administration was to diminish hostility toward the
ft R
U.S. in the Third World. This approach dated from the
early emergence of Brzezinski as Carter's principal foreign
policy advisor. In late December 1975, when Carter asked
him to "develop for me the outline of a basic
speech/statement on foreign affairs," Brzezinski replied
that:
. our national purpose must be (1) as the
first priority to create a stable inner core for
world affairs, based on closer collaboration among
the advanced democracies (open-ended trilater-
alism) ; (2) secondly, to shape on the above basis
more stable North-South relations, which means (i)
68. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoir s of the
National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar,
Straus, Giroux, 1983) , p. 54 (hereinafter referred to as




more cooperat ion.Q with the emerging Third World
countries. . . .
Brzezinski also felt that the Carter Administration should
address itself to the many problems that had emerged in the
wake of the collapse of what he called "the Eurocentric
1 A A .. 7world order.
Vance took over the duties of Secretary of State in
January 1977 with the conviction that very real progress had
been made in the first half of the 1970's in strengthening
strategic stability, limiting the nuclear arms race,
improving political relations with the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, and intensifying U.S. coopera-
tion with Europe. The one area that had not evinced any
71progress was U.S. relations with the Third World. He
considered it essential to demonstrate early on to the Third
World an understanding of and a willingness to take a
leading role in addressing their problems as well as dealing
with them on an equal footing as legitimate, sovereign
72governments. In October 1976 Vance sent a memorandum to
Carter setting out specific goals and priorities for a
Carter foreign policy should Carter be elected. Much like
69. Ibid., p. 7.
70. Ibid., p. 515.
71. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's
Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 24
(hereinafter referred to as Hard Choices )
.
72. Ibid., p. 256; Vance .
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Brzezinski's early advice to Carter, Vance argued that ". .
.
perhaps the most difficult set of problems [that Carter
would encounter] are the global issues, i.e. . . . north-
73
south disputes. ..." Carter took these recommendations
to heart. The appointment of Andrew Young as Ambassador to
the United Nations served as a signal to the Third World
that Carter was committed to a new framework for dealing
with the Third World.
To argue that the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace was
dominant among Brzezinski and Vance's concerns for the Third
World would be overstating the case. Nonetheless, the
debate within the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the
Indian Ocean and the consistent record of U.S. abstention in
supporting the concerns of the Third World in this forum
were cases in point, even if only psychological and politi-
cal ones, that Carter could use to demonstrate his concerns
for the Third World by modifying existing U.S. national
security policy.
73. Hard Choices , p. 445.

CHAPTER III
THE PROXIMATE ORIGINS OF THE TALKS
If we make it easy for the Navy to go places
and do things, we will find ourselves always going
places and doing things. . . .
— Stuart Symington (1974)
The U.S. Senate and Diego Garcia
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the
issue which dominated the concern of the littoral and island
nations of the Indian Ocean in the Zone of Peace proceedings
was Diego Garcia. The same was true of the U.S. Senate
although different motives generated its interest. A
chronology of the U.S. Navy's legislative proposals con-
cerning Diego Garcia is helpful in understanding the
Senate's scrutiny of the project as it developed.
In June 1968, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
approved the Navy's request to construct a modest logistic
support base on Diego Garcia. The Navy, as a follow-on
action to Clifford's approval, submitted a request for $9.6
million to Congress in January 1969 for the first increment
of construction. Though approved by the House of




December 1969. The Senate position prevailed in the
House-Senate conference to resolve the issue. In March
1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird approved the
inclusion of $5.4 million in the Fiscal Year (FY) 1971
military construction budget for the construction of the
first increment of an austere naval communications facility
on Diego Garcia. Later that same year, in December,
Congress approved the funds which the Navy had requested.
The House and Senate funded the second increment in November
1971 in the amount of $8.95 million and the third increment
in October 1972 in the amount of $6.1 million. In January
1974, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger directed
inclusion of $29 million in the FY74 Supplemental Authori-
zation Bill to expand facilities on the island to provide
for logistic support facilities. Though passed by the
House, the Senate disapproved the project. However, the
Senate indicated that it expected the Navy to resubmit its
request in the FY75 defense submission and that it would
more thoroughly examine it then.
1. See Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the
Indian Ocean , p. 156; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on
Appropriations, Military Construction Appropriations for
1972 f Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1971)
, p. 568-572; Military Construction Appropriations for
1973 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972),
p. 599-602; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed
Services, Military Procurement Supplemental—Fiscal Yeax





Schlesinger resubmitted the request as part of the FY75
Military Construction Authorization Bill and included an
additional $3.3 million for Air Force construction on the
island. House-Senate conference action reduced the amount
to $14.8 million for the Navy while leaving intact the Air
Force funding request. But the conference committee
attached a rider to the legislation stipulating that the
Department of Defense could not obligate any of the funds
authorized for construction on Diego Garcia unless the
President advised Congress in writing that he had evaluated
all policy implications regarding the need for United States
facilities on the island and that he certified the addi-
tional construction essential to the national interest of
2the United States. However, even though they refused to
fund the Diego Garcia projects in a separate authorization,
the House and Senate Appropriations Committees authorized
the Navy and Air Force to use other funds available to them
in the Appropriations Act for the construction of any
facility on the island, provided that neither house
2. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "The Military Construction
Authorization Act, 1975," United States Statut es at Large ,
Public Law 93-552, 93rd Congress, 1st Sess. (Washington:




of Congress adopted a resolution disapproving the
3
construction.
The Navy's request to expand the military capabilities
of Diego Garcia stemmed from the United States' reevaluation
of its Indian Ocean strategy after the 1973 Arab-Israeli
October War discussed in the preceding chapter. The most
dramatic change emerging from this review was the recogni-
tion that Persian Gulf oil was of direct and vital interest
to the United States and its allies. For the first time
there was a clear understanding that OPEC could turn off the
oil at the wellhead for political reasons rather than any
identifiable military threat. This recognition by senior
policy makers was the major watershed in U.S. strategy for
4the Indian Ocean.
Two other changes in perceptions of the region emerged
from this study. The first was an intensified apprehension
over the growing Soviet military presence in the area
because of the form and size of the Soviet force posture
during the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1971 and the October
5War. The second perception was that the United States
3. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services,
Disapproving Construction Projects on the Island of Diego
Garcia f Report (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1975)
, p. 6.





could not rely on its allies in future crises in the
region. These two perceptions, more so than any others, led
to the reconsideration of the kind and level of U.S.
logistics infrastructure required in the Indian Ocean.
These impressions raised several issues— issues whose
resolution formed the substance of U.S. national security
policy for the Indian Ocean until Carter's initiative on
NALT in March 1977. The substance of these issues dealt with
what level of U.S. military presence would best serve U.S.
interests in the region and how could the United States most
effectively combine that presence with political instru-
ments, including possible arms control initiatives, to
achieve U.S. objectives. Nixon and Kissinger decided that
no initiatives on Indian Ocean arms limitation would be
undertaken with the Soviet Union for the time being.
Rather, the United States would pursue a policy of "tacit
restraint" with respect to its naval deployments to the
o
Indian Ocean. Schlesinger reported that the first element
of this problem had been resolved when he announced in a
press conference on November 30, 1974, that a contingency











periodic deployments of battle groups from the U.S. Pacific
9Fleet. Because Schlesinger ' s disclosure was his opening
statement and not in reply to a reporter's question, its
significance was thus underscored. In practice, the Navy
implemented this policy by deploying three battle groups per
year to the Indian Ocean with every other battle group
. ,. „ ... .10including an aircraft carrier.
The decision to upgrade Diego Garcia, discussed earlier
in this chapter, was the focal point for the discussion of
U.S. Indian Ocean national security policy in the Congres-
sional debates on these decisions. At about the same time
as this investigation got underway, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced Senate Concurrent
Resolution 79 (SCR-79) . The intent of SCR-79 was to express
the sense of the Senate that Nixon should negotiate with the
Soviet Union to get an agreement on limiting the deployment
of naval forces to the Indian Ocean. Kennedy recommended
that these negotiations be conducted either on a bilateral
basis or under the auspices of the United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean. Because the Senate failed
9. "U.S. to Beef Up Indian Ocean Force," Seapower , December
1973-January 1974, p. 35.
10. Sick, op. cit., p. 65.
11. "Senate Concurrent Resolution 79—Submission of a
Concurrent Resolution Relating to Arms Control in the Indian




to carry SCR-79, Kennedy reiterated his concern by intro-
ducing Senate Resolution 117 (SR-117) in March 1975. The
language of SR-117 closely paralleled that of SCR-79 one
12year earlier. SR-117 became an amendment to the FY76
Economic Foreign Assistance Bill. However, on May 12, 1975,
President Gerald R. Ford certified that the new construction
on Diego Garcia was essential to the national interest. As
a result, the House-Senate conference committee that was
preparing the final draft of the legislation dropped the
Kennedy amendment.
The submission of Senate Resolution 117 by Kennedy for
himself and Senators Jacob Javits of New York, Claiborne
Pell of Rhode Island, John Culver of Iowa, and Patrick Leahy
of Vermont rekindled the debate on the advisability of
seeking Indian Ocean arms control talks with the Soviet
Union. The essence of Kennedy's sense-of-the-Senate reso-
lution was that Ford should not certify that construction on
Diego Garcia was essential, nor should he approve planning
for the military use of facilities on Masirah Island off
Oman without first trying his best to negotiate directly
with the USSR to limit facilities and forces in the Indian
Ocean area. When Ford certified that the expansion of Diego
Garcia was essential to the national interest without first
12. "Senate Resolution 117—Submission of a Resolution
Calling for Arms Control Talks on the Indian Ocean,"
Congress ional Record , March 21, 1975, p. 121: S8190-S8196.
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making some effort to negotiate, it was likely that a
combination of forces in the Senate would unite to challenge
his certification.
Kennedy, Javits, and Pell were not alone in issuing a
call for a limitation on naval forces in the Indian Ocean.
One week later, on May 19, 1975, in another move intended to
block construction on the island, Senator Mike Mansfield of
Montana, the Senate majority leader, introduced SR-160. The
resolution argued that the construction on Diego Garcia was
an unnecessary escalation in an area of the world where none
was needed. Mansfield labeled the Defense Department's
request as a "down payment" on a much larger U.S. presence
in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, he drew a parallel between
the authorization for Diego Garcia and the Gulf of Tonkin
13Resolution in 1964.
The Senate Armed Services Committee considered the
Mansfield Amendment and disapproved it in committee. The
Armed Services Committee took the position that the U.S.
should have the capability to maintain a naval presence in
the Indian Ocean and that the new construction on Diego
Garcia would substantially enhance that capability. The
committee's report noted that the United States had vital
13. "Disapproval of Construction Projects on the Island of
Diego Garcia," Congressional Record , July 28, 1975,
p. 13926-13972 (hereinafter referred to as Congressional
Record, July 28, 1975 ) .
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interests in the region and that Soviet presence in the area
had steadily increased. The committee considered the
request for construction funds to be prudent and recommended
14
approval. There is every reason to believe that the
Senate Armed Services Committee recommended disapproval of
the Mansfield Amendment because of Schlesinger ' s testimony
in June 1975 in which he publicly revealed that the Soviet
Union was constructing a base, including missile facilities,
at Berbera in Somalia. The Senate upheld the committee's
15
recommendation by disapproving SR-160 by a vote of 53-43.
The debate that accompanied this vote was spirited and
evinced the level of emotion that had become associated with
Diego Garcia and, by implication, Indian Ocean NALT in the
overall context of U.S. national security policy for the
Indian Ocean region.
Additional evidence of this emotion was evident in a
controversy that erupted in the latter half of 1975
concerning the resettlement of some 1,000 inhabitants of the
Chagos Archipelago, including Diego Garcia, to Mauritius.
Great Britain had carried out the resettlement as part of
the series of events in which the Wilson Government created
14. Disapproving Construction Projects on the Island of
Diego Garcia , p. 13-14.
15. Congressional Re cord. July 28. 1975 , p. 121: S25317-
S25363. See James Schlesinger, "Statement," Disapproving




the British Indian Ocean Territory and granted base rights
to the United States. There was a good deal of controversy
in the United States and Great Britain over what some
described as a forcible and callous removal of people from
their homes to build a military base. Congress expressed
its resentment because, before approving funds for the base,
it believed that Diego Garcia was uninhabited. However,
Congress was not entirely blameless in this matter because
the fact that the island did have a population, even if only
a very small number of itinerant fishermen and copra
farmers, was reported in the press as early as 1965.
Nevertheless, Congressional critics were incensed by what
they considered to be deception by the Executive Branch and
the Soviet Union exploited this opportunity to criticize the
1
8
United States and Great Britain. The controversy gradu-
ally died down in late 1975 in part because the people had
16. See Proposed Expansion of U.S. Facilities in the Indian
Ocean , p. 57. For a general description of this process see
Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hong Kong
and Indian Ocean Department, Office of the Commissioner for
the British Indian Ocean Territory, Under Two Fla g s: A Brief
History of Dieg o Garcia, Br itish Indian Ocean Territory
(London: 1975) (Xerox)
.
17. Anthony Lewis, "Indian Ocean Coral Atoll Will Be Used as
a Joint British-U.S. Base," The New Yor k Times , November 11,
1965, p. 8:3; the author is personally familiar with infor-
mation provided by the Department of Defense to Congress on
this matter in 1970.
18. V. Zhitomirsky, "The Tragic Story of Diego Garcia," The
New Times (Moscow), October 1975, p. 12-13.
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long since relocated to Mauritius and in part because, as it
turned out, the British government had compensated the
people involved. But the incident, implying, as it did,
callousness and deception in a matter involving national
security did nothing to reduce opposition to Diego Garcia in
19Congress
.
In fact, the incident generated another opportunity for
the pro-NALT group to get additional leverage for their
cause. On September 11, 1975, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado
asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to report to him
as to how the dislocation of the Ilois inhabitants of Diego
Garcia was financed and whether U.S. law was violated in
20this regard. The GAO reported that the United States, in
19. This aspect of the issue has surfaced again. In mid-
June 1982, a left-wing political coalition won the Mauritian
general election and promptly asserted that it would use
"every means possible, political, diplomatic, and judicial
to try to establish the sovereignty of Mauritius over Diego
Garcia." The issue of the displaced islanders is closely
linked to internal Mauritian politics since it was to
Mauritius that the islanders were resettled. See Dennis
Taylor, "Sovereignty the Issue for Diego Garcia," The Times
(London), June 15, 1982, p. 4:7; Dennis Taylor, "Mauritius
Puts Diego Garcia Claim to Pym," The Times (London), July
22, 1982, p. 6:5; Joseph Lelyveld, "Socialist Alliance Swept
into Office in Mauritius Vote," The New York Times , June 13,
1982, p. 3:3; Joseph Lelyveld, "Election in Mauritius
Sharpens Diego Garcia Issue," The New York Times , June 20,
1982, p. 16:1; "Displaced Islanders Ask U.S. for Reset-
tlement Aid," The New York Times , February 6, 1984, p. A:5.
20. U.S., Office of the Comptroller General, General
Accounting Office, Financial and Legal Aspects of the
Agreement on the Availability of Certain Indian Ocean
Islands for Defense Purposes, Report (B-184915) (Washington:
January 7, 1976), p. 1.
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a classified note to the U.S. -U.K. agreement on the use of
the British Indian Ocean Territory, agreed to provide up to
half of the total detachment costs not to exceed $14
million. The U.S. share of these costs was offset by a
waiver of the five percent research and development sur-
charge imposed on Great Britain under the April 6, 1963,
21POLARIS sales agreement. The report concluded that,
although no U.S. law had been violated, the GAO considered
that the method used in financing the relocation of the
Ilois was a circumvention of congressional oversight
22
authority. This finding exacerbated the already emotional
debate over the issue of Indian Ocean NALT. Nonetheless,
Congress authorized and obligated $18.1 million for the FY75
construction increment on Diego Garcia. Funding for the
second increment of construction on the island in the amount
of $13.8 million was contained in the FY76 Appropriations
Bill.
However, early in July 1975, a delegation of U.S.
senators visited Moscow as part of a parliamentary exchange
program. The delegation, headed by Senator Hubert Humphrey
of Minnesota and Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania,








included Senators Culver, Hart, and Leahy. Given their
personal commitment to arms control in the Indian Ocean and
their allegations of Soviet interest in the subject of
Indian Ocean arms control, it is not surprising that Culver,
Hart, and Leahy pressed the issue again on their Soviet
counterparts.
When pro-NALT senators realized that Mansfield's
resolution would not have enough support to carry it in the
Senate, Culver asked Kissinger to begin discussions with the
Soviet Union on limiting naval operations and base con-
struction in the Indian Ocean on July 17, 1975. Hart and
Leahy joined him in this effort. The State Department
responded that there was little probability for success in
negotiations at that time and explained that the chances
would increase if the U.S. finished the proposed con-
struction on Diego Garcia. Its completion would demonstrate
that the U.S. had both the means and the resolve to protect
its interests in the region. Culver did not agree. As a
result of his private discussions with the Soviet leadership
during his trip to Moscow for the U.S. -USSR parliamentary
conference, he argued that the Soviet Union would respond
23. Malcom W. Browne, "U.S. Senate Group Sees Soviet Jews,"
The New York Times , June 30, 1975, p. 5:1.
24. "Let Us Explore the Possibilities of Negotiations in the




favorably to a U.S. initiative to reduce tensions in the
25Indian Ocean through NALT. Concurrent with this activity
was the release of a study by the Brookings Institution that
argued that the Indian Ocean was the one region where there
was a good possibility that a U.S. /USSR naval limitations
agreement could be negotiated.
Later in 1975 Hart introduced an amendment in November
to the FY76 Military Construction Appropriations Act
requiring that none of the funds appropriated under that act
were to be used prior to April 15, 1976, for the purpose of
27
carrying out any military construction on Diego Garcia.
His intent was to complement another amendment submitted by
Kennedy to the FY76 State Department Authorization Bill
which required Ford to report to Congress on his efforts to
begin talks with the Soviet Union. Hart argued that the
inclusion of his amendment in the legislation would afford
the Administration a few months to get the talks started.
28
The amendment passed the Senate by a vote of 51-44. The
25. Ibid.
26. Barry Blechman, The Control of Naval Armaments;
Prospects and Possibilities (Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1975) .
27. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Military Construction Act of
1976," United States Statutes at Large , Public Law 94-138,
94th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1977), v. 89, pt . 1, p. 749.
28. "Military Construction Appropriations, 1976,"
sional Record
,








Prompted by this continued congressional interest in
Indian Ocean arms control, Ford directed the National
Security Council to conduct an in-depth study of the tech-
nical problems associated with possible naval arms limi-
tation agreements for the Indian Ocean region. The NSC
established a working group under the auspices of its
Verification Panel, the senior NSC coordinating committee
for SALT and certain other arms control issues. The mem-
bership of the working group roughly paralleled that of the
Verification Panel but at a lower level. These included
staff members from the State Department, the Defense
Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) . In early April 1976 the Verification Panel Working
Group (VPWG) completed its task. Its report concluded that
naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean would pose severe
technical problems but would not necessarily be impossible
to negotiate. However the consensus view of the
Verification Panel, as expressed by ACDA Director Fred C.
Ikle, was that the timing for such negotiations was
29. "Military Construction Appropriations 1976—Conference




inappropriate considering the recent Soviet incursions into
30Africa. Nonetheless, the VPWG report did serve a purpose
in that it formed the core document that identified many of
the issues when the Carter Administration began to study the
31
subject of Indian Ocean arms control.
In April 1976 the State Department submitted the report
required by the State Department Authorization Act to
Congress. It concluded that it was inappropriate at that
time for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet
Union. The explanation acknowledged that the actions of the
Soviet Union in Angola and the buildup of its facilities in
Somalia had raised substantive questions about Soviet
intentions in the Indian Ocean and its littoral. Moreover,
any form of arms control agreement might convey the impres-
sion that the United States was willing to acquiesce in
Soviet use of a proxy or surrogate state to exploit local
crises. The report emphasized that successful negotiations
could only be achieved within a general political framework
30. Duncan L. Clarke, Politi cs of Ar ms Control: The Role and
Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Contro l and D isarmament
Agency (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 76, 96; Sick,
op. cit., p. 67.
31. Interview with Captain Gary Sick, USN (Ret.), Staff
(Middle East and North Africa) , National Security Council
(1976-1981), New York: October 13, 1983 (hereinafter





of mutual restraint in the region. Culver, one of the
most outspoken supporters of NALT in Congress, described the
report as a "curt rejection of the Congressional request,"
and Kennedy referred to the report as nothing more than a
33
"weak and lame explanation by the Department of State,"
So the lines were drawn for another round of debate since
the issue remained an open one as the Presidential campaign
of 1976 drew nearer.
The debate in the Senate was not so much concerned with
Diego Garcia as it was with the formation of U.S. national
security policy. Diego Garcia was the symptom--the control
and direction of foreign policy by the Executive Department
were the perceived ills. The experience of the Vietnam
conflict and Watergate helped in their own way to fuel the
controversy over the distribution of foreign policy power
between the President and Congress. Any initiative was fair
game for scrutiny. The Indian Ocean, both in the Zone of
Peace context and the debate over the expansion of Diego
Garcia, was an issue whose timing was ideally suited to
generate controversy— a controversy which questioned the
essential national security ramifications of its basic
issue.
32. "Report on Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, April 15,
1976," Cong r essional Record , May 6, 1976, p. 122: S6626.
33. "U.S. Opposes Talks on Indian Ocean," The New York
Times, April 22, 1976, p. 6:1.
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The case of the Senate and Diego Garcia through 1976 is
perhaps a unique case study of Executive-Congressional
relations. It was among the first of the post-Vietnam era
and was symptomatic of the growing tendency of the legis-
lative branch of the U.S. Government to assert itself in the
details of national security policy by exercising a greater
legislative oversight role. The case of Diego Garcia
demonstrated that role in the context of the broader issue
of Executive-Congressional relations in at least one major
way: Congress can and has questioned the rationale for
major administration programs. Although serious challenges
came from Congress relatively infrequently, they began to
34grow in number. Diego Garcia was such a case of challenge
and denial by forcing further study and by controlling the
allocation of funds to implement national security policy.
This reaction was part of the overall disillusionment with
the war in Vietnam. This, in turn, had fueled a reaction to
U.S. involvement overseas. Indeed the 1972 campaign theme
of Senator George McGovern, the Democratic candidate for
President, was "Come Home America." In a sense, this
reflected a concern of many of his colleagues in the Senate
34. See Stanley J. Heginbotham, "Congress and National
Security: Toward a Realistic Set of Expectations," paper
delivered at the Twelfth Annual Conference of the
International Security Studies Program of The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford,
Mass. , April 28, 1983.
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which their critics described as a kind of neo-
isolationism.
Whether or not isolationism in the classic sense was
the right label, there was a considerable interest in
reducing the scope of U.S. politico-military involvement
overseas. In addition to the efforts to block the expansion
of the facilities on Diego Garcia, the Mansfield Amendments
to Defense authorization bills requiring major cuts in the
35
number of U.S. military personnel stationed overseas, the
Tunney Amendment of 1975, and the Clark Amendment of 1976
to cut off U.S. covert involvement in Angola are additional
examples of this trend.
International concern over U.S. expansion of Diego
Garcia complemented the domestic battle over the control of
the direction of U.S. national security policy. If a
state's military forces are to serve the requirements of its
foreign policy, if navies exist to be the instruments of
that policy, then decisionmakers must take into account at
some point in the policy formulation process what kind of
reaction a specific national security policy is likely to
35. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law
and Organization, U.S. Forces in Europe, Hearings
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974) ,
p. 3-29.
36. See, for example, Neil C. Livingston and Manfred von
Nordheim, "The U.S. Congress and the Angola Crisis,"
Strateg ic Review, Spring 1977, p. 34-44.
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have overseas. Certain members of Congress recognized this
theorem of foreign policy and tried to use it to buttress
their arguments against expansion of the facilities on Diego
Garcia and for NALT. In response to requests from Congress
in 1974 and 1975, the Department of State analyzed the
reactions of the Indian Ocean littoral states to the pro-
posed expansion of facilities on Diego Garcia. The analyses
were based upon canvassing by the U.S. embassies in those
37
countries and are worth examining.
On March 6, 1974, during hearings before the House Sub-
committee on the Near East and South Asia, the subcommittee
chairman Congressman Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana asked that
he be provided with the results of the State Department
canvass. Six days later on March 12, during hearings before
the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Defense Department
official was asked for similar information which was sup-
plied to the committee. Because this information was
recorded in a form slightly different from the information
provided to the House, it is not clear whether the two
tabulations were based upon the same data. A little more
37. The results were published in two separate Congressional
committee documents. It is not clear whether canvassing was
undertaken on two or three different occasions. Though it
was definitely done once in 1975, it may have been done once
or twice in 1974. See Proposed Expansion of U .S. Military
Facil ities in the Ind ian Ocean , p. 45, and U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Selected Material
on Diego Garcia f Report (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1975), p. 9-11.
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than one year later, in mid-1975 f the State Department
canvassed reactions again, and the results were published
together with the above-mentioned Senate information from
1974.
The 1974 House tabulated the information according to
"official" and "press/public" reactions in 30 countries and
classified the reactions under five headings: "favorable,
"
"balanced," "negative," "unfavorable," and "no reaction."
Unfortunately, the meanings of those terms were not defined,
so it is not clear, for example, what the difference was
between "negative" and "unfavorable" or exactly what
"balanced" means. The tabulation for "official" reactions
showed seven favorable, four balanced, one negative, five
unfavorable and twelve with no reaction. "Press/public"
reactions included one favorable, seven balanced, three
negative, seven unfavorable and twelve with no reaction.
Thus, the single reaction most often reported was "no
reaction" which occurred 24 times and, of a total of 60
tabulated responses, eight were favorable while 16 were
either unfavorable or negative.
The Senate reported the information differently.
Reaction in each country was described in a few sentences of
text. Nonetheless, the overall results seemed to be essen-
tially the same despite some slight differences. For
example, the House information reported press/public reac-
tion in South Africa as "favorable," but the Senate
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information described press reports in South Africa as
"balanced." The House information tabulated official
Ethiopian reaction "favorable," press/public as "balanced,"
while the Senate data reported "no official Ethiopian
comments" and "no editorials and very little press
reporting." The House information described official
reaction in Yemen as "favorable," while the Senate
information noted that in Yemen "mid-level Government
reaction was confined to the one word 'good'"— a rather
slender thread on which to hang a "favorable" rating. The
results of the 1975 canvass were summarized as a single
reaction for each country and classified in one of four
categories: "favorable," "balanced," "unfavorable," and
"unknown." The results as reported were: favorable—none;
balanced--f our ; unfavorable—twelve; unknown—thirteen.
Though it is clear that substantive decisions affecting
the national security policy of a state should neither be
made on the basis of this kind of polling nor on the basis
of what public or official opinion in foreign countries
appears to be, the results of the State Department polling
should not be dismissed out of hand since they probably do
reflect what the general trend of thought among the
countries of the Indian Ocean periphery was with respect to
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3 8Diego Garcia and, by extension, to NALT. In many, perhaps
most, of the countr ies--the smaller countries with very
small or non-existent navies and few maritime interests
—
there was little or no reaction to U.S. intentions. But in
the large, influential states with navies and significant
maritime interests and foreign trade— in short, the impor-
tant countries regionally and even globally— there was
opposition to American activities on Diego Garcia. Support
was given only reluctantly, and those countries giving it
were unwilling to declare their approval publicly. The
opponents of Diego Garcia, and hence the proponents of NALT,
used these surveys in their arguments whenever it was
convenient
.
These observations give rise to two themes that influ-
enced the Senate during the 1970's. The first was that U.S.
national security policy worked some sort of unfavorable
influence on the states toward which it was directed.
Culver referred to this theme in his statement on Diego
Garcia on July 28, 1975. He argued that:
We are responding to the tragic misadventure
and trauma of Vietnam in a way which shows we did
not learn anything, but are only hell bent in our
38. Though it perhaps offers only a snapshot of the various
states' positions, a compendium of these declaratory
policies is contained in U.S., Department of Defense,
Defense Intelligence Agency, "Official Positions on





madness -±x> reassert our machismo in a reckless
f ashi on
.
Earlier that same month he argued that the United States
should cease its "exclusive reliance on gunboat diplomacy
40
and condescending colonialism." The second theme was that
the foreign policy of the United States relied too heavily
on its military capabilities. Senator Walter Mondale of
Minnesota argued in June 1975 that:
. . . military power is increasingly irrelevant to
the host of economic, social, and political issues
facing this country. If there is anything that
must underline a new foreign policy for the United
States, it should be the recognition that the
source of America's strength and influence in the
world is our ability to meet our needs at home.
Culver went so far as to charge that "the State Department
[was] running around with its tail between its legs trying
to catch up with foreign policy as it [was] set by the
42Defense Department."
39. issional Record . July 28, 1975, p. 25329.
40. "Diego Garcia— in the Context of U.S. Foreign and
Defense Policy," Congressional Record . July 11, 1975,
p. 22323.
41. "American Foreign Policy After Vietnam,"
Record, June 2, 1975, p. 16469.
is_§iojiaJ.
42. "Disapproval of Construction Projects on the Island of





One final episode in the Senate's relationship with
arms control in the Indian Ocean requires mention. In 1976
Congress passed the International Security Assistance and
43Arms Control Export Act of 1976. In the broadest sense
Public Law 94-329 channeled most U.S. foreign arms transfers
into the easily monitored foreign military sales route and
established procedures designed to force the Executive
branch to articulate a national policy on arms sales over-
seas. Moreover, the act required public disclosure of this
policy in order to foster Congressional oversight on such
transactions. Specifically it directed the President to
submit certain statements concerning the arms control impact
of each proposed sale. The law tasked ACDA with the
responsibility for preparing these statements in coordina-
tion with the State and Defense Departments. In essence
this tasking institutionalized ACDA's role in the policy
process along with the State and Defense Departments.
President Ford issued Executive Order 11958 in January 1977
43. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "International Security
Assistance and Arms Control Export Act of 1976," United
States S tatutes a t Large , Public Law 94-329, 94th Congress,
2nd Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1978), v. 90, pt. 1, p. 729-769 (hereinafter referred to as
Public Law 94-329)
.
44. U.S., President, Executive Order, "Administration of




directing implementation of this legislation.
The law also made specific reference to the Indian
Ocean. Section 407 set forth the sense of the Congress that
the President "should undertake to enter into negotiations
with the Soviet Union to achieve an agreement limiting the
deployment of naval, air, and land forces of the Soviet
Union and the United States in the Indian Ocean." These
negotiations should be convened as soon as possible and
should consider, among other things: limitations with
respect to the establishment or use of facilities for naval,
air, or land forces in the Indian Ocean and littoral
countries; the number of naval vessels which may be deployed
in the Indian Ocean, or the number of shipdays allowed
therein; and the type of military forces and facilities
allowed therein. The law also required the President to
report to the Speaker of the House and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee not later than December 1, 1976, with
respect to the steps taken to carry out the provisions of
45this section.
The Senators that had been opposed to Diego Garcia and
for negotiations on the Indian Ocean also were critical of
the role that arms sales had assumed in U.S. foreign policy
and particularly in the Persian Gulf. During the course of
his campaign, Carter supported this opposition and thus, at
45. Public Law 94-329, p. 759.
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least by association, became linked to that element of the
Democratic Party which opposed U.S. arms sales there.
The Tenth_Daxtmojith_i:^£L££j:£iic£_ and
LJ^A-USA/UNAriJ£5E_M££tJ1rj3_Pf_ JNoyer[ibex_15I6.
Private contacts among influential citizens of states
have served as a traditional method of bringing issues to
the attention of policymakers. The issue of Indian Ocean
arms control did not prove to be an exception and was
discussed by the participants in the Tenth Dartmouth
Conference from April 30 to May 4, 1976, in Rio Rico,
Arizona
.
Organized at the initiative of Norman Cousins, Editor
of The Saturday Review , and Alexander Korneichuk, the
Dartmouth Conferences have been held since 1960. Their
objective has been to open up broader lines of communication
between the people of the Soviet Union and the United
States. Once such contact had been established, Cousins and
Korneichuk believed that a more rational discussion of the
issues dividing the two states might at least become pos-
sible. The first four Dartmouth Conferences focused on
exploring the nature of these issues while succeeding
meetings tried to find and promote common solutions to
them.
Participants from the United States in the Tenth Dart-
mouth Conference included: Barry Blechman, head of the
Defense Analysis Staff at The Brookings Institution and
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author of the Brookings study on naval arms control
mentioned earlier in this study; Marshall Shulman, Director
of the Russian Institute at Columbia University; Brzezinski,
then Director of the Research Institute on International
Change at Columbia; Richard N. Gardner, Law Professor at
Columbia and a former foreign policy advisor to Carter when
he was Governor of Georgia; and Paul C. Warnke. Soviet
conferees included Georgi Arbatov, Director of The Institute
46
of USA and Canada Studies. During the course of the
conference these men and the others attending it devoted
considerable attention to identifying ways and means of
making further progress in arresting and reversing the arms
race. The conferees addressed a number of topics in this
regard including naval arms limitations. During the course
of the discussion one U.S. participant remarked that "it may
be fruitful to codify measures of restraint that each of our
two countries would take in specific local conflict situa-
47tions, such as the Middle East or the Indian Ocean."
Both sides expressed the hope that their two countries
would pursue negotiations on limiting naval presence in the
Indian Ocean. The U.S. conferees expressed their opinion
46. Charles F. Kettering Foundation, Lilly Endowment, and
the Rockefeller Foundation, Dartmouth X: Soviet American
Relations in an Era of Detente. Rio Rico. Arizona, April 30
to May 4, 1976, p. 5.
47. Ibid., p. 20.

- 98
that such an agreement should limit the size of deployments
in the Indian Ocean and ban foreign military bases as
48
well. Agreeing that there should be no bases or
"permanently deployed fleets" in the Indian Ocean, a Soviet
delegate urged his American colleagues to understand that
the Indian Ocean "is as important for us as the Panama Canal
or the Magellan Straits for the U.S." Therefore, the Soviet
Union shall continue to "insist on the right of passage and
49
certain measures relevant and pertinent to that." The
final joint communique emphasized the potential benefit of
talks between the two governments on ways to abolish
military bases and limit naval deployments in the Indian
Ocean. 50
The Tenth Dartmouth Conference was not the only forum
in which representatives of the two sides discussed NALT.
Just after the Presidential election in November 1976, a
joint meeting of representatives of the United Nations
Association of the U.S. (UNA-USA) and the U.N. Association
of the USSR took place in Moscow. The meeting was held
under the auspices of UNA-USA 1 s Parallel Studies Panel and
was the first of the Association's meetings following the
1976 U.S. Presidential elections. Coincident with this
48. Ibid., p. 22.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 9.
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meeting was the completion of a major study by the UNA-USA'
s
National Policy Panel. The study addressed possible new
initiatives for limiting conventional arms and was one of
the three papers presented by the U.S. delegation.
The study started with the premise that, while it was
imperative that strategic arms control negotiations continue
to receive very high priority, it was advantageous to
initiate a parallel effort to control conventional
51
armaments. Among the approaches available, the study
identified "the limitation of naval deployments as having
the capacity to forestall incipient arms races in poten-
tially explosive regions by decreasing the possibility of
52dangerous military incidents." The study attributed much
of the impetus of these so-called arms races to the growing
competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in general
53purpose naval forces and suggested that "limitations on
general purpose forces were an appropriate subject for
54
serious bilateral U.S. -USSR negotiations." Citing the
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean as potential regions for
discussion, the study suggested that U.S. -Soviet NALT would
51. United Nations Association of the United States of
America, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race (New York:
1976)
, p. 4.
52. Ibid., p. 7.




be less difficult to negotiate than reductions in other
major conventional force components and would be effective
55
in promoting stability. As side benefits, such nego-
tiations were perceived as:
1. symbolic of the superpowers' awareness of the future
dangers of unrestrained naval competition;
2. helpful in maintaining the momentum of detente; and
3. conducive to the creation of an atmosphere in which other
significant negotiated reductions might be possible.
The study concluded that it was in the interests of the
U.S. to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit or
control general purpose naval forces and their deployments.
Such an agreement would be an important step toward stabi-
lizing relations in certain potentially dangerous
57
regions. The Mediterranean was discounted in this respect
since the study projected that conditions in that region
might eventually stabilize. However, the Indian Ocean was
identified as the region with the most potential for
58
successful NALT. In this regard, the study suggested that
the Indian Ocean, unlike the Mediterranean, had not been an
area of intense naval competition between the superpowers.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. 24.
57. Ibid., p. 27.
58. Ibid., p. 37.
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However Soviet and American interest in establishing
military bases and increasing their respective naval
59deployments in the area appeared to be on the increase.
The study contended that several factors were promising for
successful negotiations on the Indian Ocean. Among these
the policy panel alleged that neither state had truly vital
interests in the region but immediately qualified this
perception by stating that this was true only so long as
hostile military action did not impede Western access to
oil. Moreover, its authors argued that U.S. and Soviet
deployments in the area had leveled off after several years
of growth. The report accurately characterized these
deployments as being motivated just as much by political
considerations as military factors.
The study concluded that it was an especially auspi-
cious time to broaden the arms control agenda and to
reevaluate widely held assumptions regarding the proper
scope and priorities of arms control. Limitation on naval
forces should be given a particularly high priority in this
effort. The United States and the Soviet Union should agree
to limit their naval deployments and bases in the Indian
Ocean to be followed by negotiations to reduce this
presence. The study concluded that such an agreement would
59. Ibid., p. 29.
60. Ibid., p. 30.
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be a significant step towards stabilizing one of the
potentially most dangerous and expensive aspects of the
Soviet-American military competition.
When considered in the context of the subsequent Carter
initiative and the membership of UNA-USA National Policy
Panel on conventional arms control— the body that authored
the study— the origin of the shift in U.S. policy toward the
Indian Ocean takes on new perspective. Four of Carter's
appointees to policy level positions in his national
security organization were members of this panel. They
included: Vance, Vice-Chairman of the panel and
subsequently named as Secretary of State; Paul C. Warnke,
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs and later appointed Director of ACDA; Lynn
E. Davis, Assistant Professor of Political Science at
Columbia University, member of Carter's transition team, and
designated as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Plans, Policy and National Security Council Affairs; and
Barry Blechman, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution
and author of The Control of Naval Armaments: Prospects and
Possibilities f and subsequently selected as Assistant
Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau of ACDA.
61. Ibid., p. 79.
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As was customary with UNA policy panel reports, the
final section permitted its members to express minority
opinions. None of the foregoing members expressed any
variance with respect to Indian Ocean NALT. However,
Davis did render an opinion that the United States should
begin negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit the size
of naval deployments in the eastern Mediterranean as a first
step toward an overall agreement on the number and kinds of
superpower naval forces in the Mediterranean. She also
remarked that the arguments in the report in favor of limits
on Soviet-American naval deployments in the Indian Ocean
were contradicted by the subsequent emphasis on how such an
agreement would not inhibit the projection of U.S. naval
power in the region during a crisis.
Thus, as of late November 1976, there was a significant
amount of carryover on the subject of the Indian Ocean and
arms control that confronted the incoming Carter Adminis-
tration. Brzezinski's and Vance's early views on the
subject were discussed in the preceding chapter. However,
there is little information available on how the subject
developed during the transition process. Nonetheless, David
Aaron, Mondale's foreign affairs advisor and chief of
Carter's National Security Council transition team, did
bring up the subject on at least one occasion. While
62. Ibid., p. 83, 85.
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interviewing incumbent members of the NSC staff to determine
those who would stay on under Brzezinski' s revised concept
of the NSC, Aaron raised the subject of Indian Ocean arms
control with Commander Gary Sick, USN, who had only reported
to the NSC about a month earlier from the office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs. Commander Sick, an expert in the regional
affairs of the Near East and South Asia as well as a Ph.D.
in political science with a concentration in Middle Eastern
affairs, had a broad operational and staff background in the
region and participated extensively in the 1976 VPWG Study.
64
Aaron briefly discussed the Indian Ocean issue with Sick.
Commander Sick stayed on in the Brzezinski NSC. Though it
is certainly tenuous to suggest that his retention on the
NSC staff was solely the result of his discussion with Aaron
on the Indian Ocean, the incident does suggest that the
subject of Indian Ocean arms limitations was on the minds of
some of the Carter national security team.
Brzezinski, both independently and within the context
of the NSC, was an early supporter of the idea of Indian
Ocean arms control. The studies that were commissioned on
63. See Power and Principle, p. 74.
64. Sick.
65. Interview with Paul Warnke, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (January 1977-October 1978) , Washington:




January 5, 1977, during the Carter Administration's first
informal NSC meeting reflect the broad scope of Carter's
policy. Three of the first ten Presidential Review
Memoranda (PRM) dealt with issues that, although not
directly related to the Indian Ocean, contributed to the
perceptions of the utility of NALT to the Carter
Administration.
PRM-2, issued on January 24, 1977, dealt with SALT.
PRM-8, announced on January 21, 1977, addressed the issue of
North-South strategy considerations. PRM-10, issued on
February 18, 1977, directed a comprehensive review of U.S.
global military force posture. With SALT II stalled,
Carter may have wanted to have several additional options
available in his repertoire of arms control initiatives to
maintain the momentum if, as was the case, the Soviet
leadership rejected Carter's "deep cuts" proposal and to
impress the Soviet Union with his interest in arms
c o
control. The PRM on North-South strategy reflected the
concern by Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski of the need to
develop a more accommodating framework of North-South
66. Power and Principle, p. 51.
67. Lawrence J. Korb, "National Security Organization and
Process in the Carter Administration," Sam C. Sarkesian,
ed.
, Defense Policy and the Presidencyj_£^£tgxl£_.Fij;g_t_ Ygaxs.




relations so as to diminish hostility toward the United
States and lessen Soviet influence in the Third World. 69
The use of Indian Ocean naval arms limitations as a tactic
to support this policy goal cannot be discounted. PRM-10,
the most ambitious project of the Carter NSC undertaken by
Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard University assessed
the overall global balance between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Though it took over six months to complete
and thus shaped the initial Carter Administration's percep-
tions only peripherally, it provided the intellectual under-
pinnings of Brzezinski's optimistic poll on detente and
thus could very well have influenced the decision to
negotiate on the Indian Ocean.
PRM-10 identified the military domain as the one in
which the Soviet Union was making the most gains. It also
earmarked the Persian Gulf as a vulnerable and vital region
to which greater military concern ought to be given. PRM-10
led to what was perhaps one of the two most important
Presidential Directives (PD) of the Carter Administration.
Issued on August 24, 1977, PD-18 entitled "National
Strategy" directed the maintenance of "a deployment force of
light divisions with strategic mobility" for global contin-
gencies, particularly those in the Persian Gulf region.
69. Power apd.Pxiiigipj.,e, p. 54.
70. Ibid., p. 177.
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However, there was a faction within the Administration that
preferred to address the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region
71through arms control talks with the Soviet Union. Thus,
it seems that some sort of preference for Indian Ocean NALT
existed within the national security apparatus of the Carter
Administration probably at the outset of the PRM-10 process
and more certainly as the prospect of what was to become the
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) emerged during the staffing
process of PRM-10.
71. Ibid. See also Korb, op. cit., p. 131.

CHAPTER IV
THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE ON THE TALKS
You Americans will never be able to do this to us
again
.
— Vasily Kuznetsov to John J. McCloy (October 1962)
Any discussion of the Soviet approach to arms control
is necessarily inductive as well as deductive. It is also
difficult, because what the USSR says and what it does are
two quite different things. While Soviet declaratory policy
endorses the western notion of technical arms control in
principle, Soviet development and deployment of military
forces implies that the USSR rejects these principles and
prefers to guarantee its national security through its
military forces. The Soviet Union believes that this policy
fosters deterrence and, at the same time, ensures that if
deterrence failed, the USSR could fight and win a war and
limit damage to its territory. In addition, the Soviet
Union has used arms control negotiations to further its
image as a supporter of detente and disarmament. In a
sense, what the Soviet leadership has done is to take the




process which has limited the adverse politico-military
effect on the USSR of U.S. advances in military technology.
In general, Soviet pronouncements on the subject have
demonstrated the same dichotomy. Selected passages from
both official Soviet media as well as public forums demon-
strate that the USSR supported the creation of a zone of
peace in the Indian Ocean even though, as previously dis-
cussed, its voting record in the U.N. General Assembly on
the subject did not corroborate that rhetoric.
Although naval disarmament was one of the leading
themes of international politics in the 1920 's and early
1930's, the low level of Soviet naval capabilities prevented
the USSR from being a major factor in the Washington Con-
ference of 1921 and its successors. The Soviet Navy, whose
posture was purely coastal, did not draw much attention when
compared to the five major powers who were building capital
ships at a substantial rate. H. Wilson Harris points out in
his work on naval disarmament of the period that:
Russia [was] not relevant in a discussion on naval
disarmament . . . [Great Britain's] concern, if it
be a naval war, [was] only with the United States,
Japan, France and Italy. . . .
However, since the late 1960s, there has been a quali-
tative and quantitative change in the character of Soviet
peacetime naval operations and more emphasis on the





diplomatic and power projection missions of the Soviet
fleet. An on-again f off-again diplomatic campaign for
mutual U.S. -USSR naval limitations in the Mediterranean and
Indian Ocean has paralleled this development. The timing
and content of these proposals reveals something about their
motivation and the seriousness with which the Soviet
leadership has offered them.
Soviet Rhetoric—
The Political Leadership and the Press
Soviet concern for U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean
appeared at about the same time as the United States and
Great Britain created the British Indian Ocean territory.
On December 7, 1964, in a memorandum to the United Nations,
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko charged that actions
by the U.S. and U.K. to create a structure for new military
bases in the Indian Ocean were "contrary to the clearly
expressed will of the peoples of that region [and] merit [ed]
2
resolute condemnation."
The first, and most substantive, initiative happened in
March 1971, when Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin asked Secretary
of State William Rogers in private what the U.S. view would
2. U.S., Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, "Memorandum by the Soviet Government on Measures for
the Further Reduction of International Tension and Limita-
tion of Arms, December 7, 1964," Documents on Disarmament,




be of a declaration designed "to keep the Indian Ocean free
3
of major competition." In June of that year Communist
Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev publicly expressed
interest in the subject when, in a Supreme Soviet election
speech on June 11, 1971, he argued that:
We have never considered
. . . that it is an ideal
situation when the navies of the great powers are
cruising about for long periods far from their own
shores, and we are prepared to solve this problem,
but to solve it . . . on an equal basis.
The Soviet media gave minimal coverage to Brezhnev's
initiative. A Soviet domestic radio service broadcast on
June 13, 1971, alleged that the U.S. State Department's
refusal to respond immediately to the Brezhnev speech was an
indication "that the Nixon Government intends to study this
5proposal carefully before issuing any statement." Only one
follow-up story mentioned the Indian Ocean specifically. A
TASS dispatch of June 20, 1971, citing the Indian newspaper
3. Sick, op. cit., p. 60; see also J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.,
"Statement," Proposed Expansion of Military Facilities in
the Indian Ocean f p. 4; "U.S. Says It Asked Soviet to
Discuss Limiting 2 Navies," The New York Times f February 3,
1972, p. 10:4.
4. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Supreme Soviet Nominee Brezhnev Addresses Constituency,"
FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union , June 14, 1971, p. J10
(hereinafter referred to as FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union ,
June 14, 1971) .
5. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Comment on Proposal for Naval Talks Focuses on Mediter-
ranean," FBIS Trends , June 16, 1971, p. 19.
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National Herald , pointed out that:
. . .
the Soviet Union readily responded to the
call of the peoples of Africa and Asia to make the
Indian Ocean a peace zone
. . . the recent Soviet
proposal ... to reduce great powers' naval
presence far off their shores, had again displayed
the Soviet Union's sincere striving for safe-
guarding peace on earth.
Though Nixon and Kissinger tried to get more information
from the Soviet Union on Brezhnev's speech, no reply was
forthcoming. U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam raised the issue
during a meeting with Gromyko in Moscow in July 1971. Beam
referred to Dobrynin's informal conversation with Rogers and
told him that the United States agreed in principle that it
would be in the mutual interests of the United States and
the Soviet Union to avoid military competition in the area
and that the U.S. wanted to know more about what Dobrynin
had meant. Gromyko told Beam that he had not been briefed
on the subject but would look into it. The Soviet
Government never again raised the subject.
There were perhaps two explanations for Brezhnev's
proposal in addition to the Dobrynin-Rogers conversation.
6. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
FBIS/Analysis Group, Soviet Statements on Indian Ocean Area:
Military Bases, Naval Activity, Zone Ql Peace
(FB-M-77-10009) (Washington: June 15, 1977), p. 8 (herein-
after referred to as FB-M-77-10009)
.
7. U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Office of Press Relations, Transcript of Press, Radio, and
Television News Briefing (DPC 21), February 2, 1972, p. 5-8
(Xerox); Sick, op. cit., p. 60-61.
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The first was the promulgation of the Soviet Peace Program
at the 24th Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
Congress in April. The Peace Program alleged a Soviet
commitment to detente and offered a broad range of measures,
including various arms control regimes, to enhance the
process. The Indian Ocean proposal seemed to fit within the
general framework of this scheme since Brezhnev had also
called for talks on force levels in Central Europe less than
a month earlier in a speech on May 14, 1971. Indeed,
Brezhnev challenged NATO to respond to his May 14 proposal
in the same speech in which he raised the issue of talks on
the Indian Ocean.
The second possible explanation, cast in terms of the
SALT negotiations, had more to do with one specific issue in
those talks. The Soviet Union had pushed hard for the
inclusion of the Forward Based Systems (FBS) issue in the
SALT agreement. However, in May 1971, the Soviet leadership
agreed to exclude this problem from the forthcoming
agreement. One month later Brezhnev went public with the
call for naval limitations in the Indian Ocean. Thus, when
the USSR agreed to table the FBS issue until after the
signing of the SALT I agreement, it changed the forum in
which the campaign was conducted. Soviet persistence on
8. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Storv of SALT (New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 194-195, 222.
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this question suggests more than mere exploitation of the
issue for immediate political gain; the USSR was reminding
the United States that it did not consider the issue
closed.
Later in 1971, just after the U.N. General Assembly had
placed the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace on its agenda, Radio
Moscow broadcast an editorial in Hindi on October 15, 1971.
The commentator explained that:
The inclusion of this vital issue in the assembly
agenda is significant and timely due to reports of
continued large-scale aggressive activities by
Britain and the United States in the Indian
Ocean
.
In the wake of the Indo-Pakistani crisis in late 1971, the
Soviet Union again criticized U.S. naval activity in the
Indian Ocean as a source of tension and an attempt to put
pressure on the states in the region. The Soviet media
avoided, however, any discussion of "great-power naval
rivalry.
"
Articles in Pravda on January 8, 1972, and Red Star on
January 12 cited documents released by Washington Post
columnist Jack Anderson to deplore the Department of
Defense's announcement regarding U.S. Seventh Fleet patrols
in the Indian Ocean after the Indo-Pakistani crisis. Citing
the documents as evidence that a U.S. carrier battle group
had deployed to the Bay of Bengal to exert pressure on the
9. FB-M-77-10009, p. 8.
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Government of India, Pravda criticized what it described as
a long-term U.S. policy of constant politico-military
pressure on states in the region. Red Star claimed that
there were "ill-omened analogies" between events in the Bay
of Bengal in 1971 and the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 and condemned
these operations as a source of "dangerous tension." A
January 18 Izvestiya article introduced the factor of
Sino-American relations in assessing the U.S. policy.
According to the article, U.S. failures in Indochina and
South Asia motivated these "new gambles." The "present
direction of American-Chinese relations," according to the
article, demonstrated that the United States did not have to
fear any initiatives by the PRC in defense of national
liberation movements in Asia.
Although the subject remained dormant in both the
official and media context for some time, the Soviet Union
took advantage of the visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister
of Mauritius, Sir Seewoosagor Ramgoolam to raise the issue
again. Alexi Kosygin, in a speech during this visit,
10. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Moscow Deplores U.S. Naval Presence in Indian Ocean," FBIS
Trends
, January 19, 1972, p. 29; see also U.S., Department
of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, "Pravda Reaction," FBIS Daily
Report: Soviet Union
,
January 10, 1972, p. B2; U.S., Depart-
ment of Commerce, National Technical Information Service,
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, V. Kudryavtsev, "A
False-Bottomed Policy," FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union ,




reiterated the position that:
The Soviet Union treats with understanding the
desire of Mauritius and other countries of the
Indian Ocean to strengthen peace and security in
the area. This can be reached through renun-
ciation by states of the use of force or threat to
use it, respect for sovereignty
. . . and also
through ei-imination of foreign military bases in
that area.
Some four months later during Brezhnev's visit to New
Delhi from November 26 to November 30, the Soviet Union and
India concluded a comprehensive fifteen-year economic
agreement, an agreement on cooperation between the Soviet
and Indian economic planning groups, and a consular con-
vention. This visit marked Brezhnev's first to a Third
World country since he became Chairman of the CPSU in 1964.
He took the occasion to link the Indian Ocean with his Asian
collective security system in a major speech before the
Indian Parliament when he explained that:
Many interesting initiatives, inspired by concern
for a peaceful future of Asia, are arising, such
as the idea of neutralisation of South East Asia,
the search for formulas of mutual relations
between states of southern Asia which would safe-
guard good neighborly cooperation between them,
the proposal for making the Indian Ocean a, zone of
peace, and plans for regional cooperation.
11. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Kosygin Luncheon Speech," FBIS Daily Report; Soviet Union ,
August 31, 1972, p. J2
.
12. FB-M-77-10009, p. 3.
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At the end of the visit Brezhnev and Gahdhi issued a
joint declaration on November 30. On the subject of the
Indian Ocean, the declaration announced that: "The two
parties reaffirmed their readiness to take part, together
with all interested states on an equal basis, in the search
13for a favorable solution" to the issue. This was in
contrast to a 1971 joint declaration that specified that:
The Prime Minister of India reaffirmed that the
Indian Ocean area should be made a zone of peace.
The Soviet side expressed its readiness to study
this question and to solve, it together with other
powers on an equal basis.
This rhetorical qualification can perhaps best be
explained in the context of Brezhnev's attempt to get Gandhi
to support his Asian collective security system. A Delhi
radio broadcast in late August 1972 established an early
linkage between the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace and the Asian
collective security proposals. The commentator explained
that a collective security system was "inextricably linked
with a trouble-free Indian Ocean" and that under circum-
stances of "big power rivalry," India was against involve-
15
ment in any security pact or system. " However, the
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 2.
15. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Moscow Acclaims Results of Brezhnev's Visit to Delhi," FB_XS_
Trends
, December 5, 1973, p. 10.
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Brezhnev speeches and the joint declaration offer no
evidence that he was able to change Gandhi's reluctance to
endorse his Asian collective security project. In his
speech to the Indian Parliament the Soviet leader linked
support for his proposal with what he called "active, broad,
and constructive" discussions on the concept. Brezhnev's
rhetoric thus suggested the convening of an international
conference on the subject—a proposal whose implications for
an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace were meant to sway India. His
call for talks pressed Gandhi to give at least reserved
support for his vaguely defined proposal. Spokesmen from
both sides revealed the sensitivity of both the USSR and
India on this subject in press conferences during the
visit. These spokesmen stressed that the Asian collective
security was not discussed during at least four of the five
meetings between Gandhi and Brezhnev, even though the
situation in Asia was said to have been the main topic
during one of these discussions.
The Soviet media tried to exploit this linkage. In a
commentary in English on December 20, 1973, Radio Moscow
remarked that:
A joint Soviet-Indian declaration notes that both
sides reaffirmed their readiness to participate





finding a favorable solution to the problem. 7 of
making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.
. . .
The linkage of the Zone of Peace concept with Brezhnev's
Asian collective security system was most apparent in the
closing words of the broadcast. The commentator explained
that:
The Soviet Union has full understanding for the
Indian Ocean countries' desire to enhance their
security. It has repeatedly made proposals on the
liquidation of the military bases in the region
and on the disbandment of the aggressive military
blocs. Supporting [the proposal] of turning the
Indian Ocean into a zone of peace we believe that
its implementation could become an important step
forward toward creating a collective security
system on the entire Asian Continent.
Schlesinger ' s request to Congress for funds to expand
the capabilities of Diego Garcia in January 1974 elicited a
flood of Soviet criticism of the United States. Articles in
Pravda f Izvestiya , and Red Star criticized Great Britain's
agreement to the U.S. plan, contending that U.S. efforts to
control the Persian Gulf would jeopardize the region's
security and intimidate the national liberation movements in
Africa and the developing countries of Asia. Numerous
Moscow Radio Asian-language commentaries accused the United
States of planning to construct a base on Diego Garcia
capable of supporting "the same strategic bombers used over




Vietnam and nuclear submarines that would keep a consid-
19
erable part of Asia and Africa at gunpoint."
The Soviet media contrasted the U.S. plans for Diego
Garcia with Soviet efforts to relax tension as exemplified
by Brezhnev's Asian collective security system and Soviet
support for the Indian and Sri Lankan proposal to declare
the Indian Ocean a peace zone. This rhetoric was consistent
with long-standing Soviet sensitivity to U.S. military
activities in the Indian Ocean—manifested after the U.S.
and the U.K. reached agreement on Diego Garcia in 1966 and
1972, and whenever the U.S. Navy deployed a sizable force in
the area. The Soviet campaign included exploitation of
public protests against the expansion by various littoral
20
countries.
Commenting on U.S. claims that reopening of the Suez
Canal would permit a buildup of the Soviet Navy in the
Indian Ocean, Pravda defended the Soviet naval presence
there on February 10, 1974, insisting that plying normal sea
routes was not "exceptional" and was "a generally accepted
practice." Similarly, an article in Red Star on February
13, 1974, "exposed the falsehood of U.S. propaganda
19. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Moscow Scores U.S. Plans for Indian Ocean Base," FBIS




statements" alleging the USSR would gain a strategic
advantage when the canal was opened. Several TASS foreign-
language radio commentaries denied that the Soviet Union had
naval bases in the area and countercharged that the United
States was planning to construct a chain of bases to control
21
the sea routes and intimidate the littoral nations.
An article in Pravda on February 27, 1974, on U.S.
plans to expand Diego Garcia repeated the same themes of the
earlier media commentary. The article charged that the
United States was "threatening the peace and independence of
countries in the area" and explained that "Soviet military
activities in the Indian Ocean posed no threat." It went on
to claim that the USSR had adopted a favorable position on
22
the proposal to make the Indian Ocean a peace zone. The
article concluded by explaining that:
The Soviet Union's position on the question of
turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace was
clearly expressed in the joint Soviet-Indian
declaration during the visit to India by L.I.
Brezhnev . . . last November. This declaration
points out in particular: "Both sides confirm
their readiness to participate together with all
interested states on an equal basis in seeking a
21. Ibid.
22. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,




favorable solution to the question. -.of turning the
Indian Ocean into a zone of peace.
Later the same year, on July 21, 1974, in a speech
before the Polish Parliament, Brezhnev called for the
"withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons" from the
24Mediterranean. The choice of Poland as a location to
speak about a maritime security issue was strange unless the
target audience was the Soviet domestic and Bloc factions
opposed to the economic and military commitments of the USSR
in the Third World. Given the downward turn in Soviet-
Egyptian relations beginning with the ouster of the Soviet
military advisors in July 1972, and capped by the Egyptian
defeat in the October War, Brezhnev's speech may have been
designed to placate this opposition.
Moreover, since the Soviet Union considered the U.S.
Navy's nuclear capable platforms in the Mediterranean to be
part of FBS, the choice of an Eastern European country,
directly involved in the MBFR talks, to raise a Mediter-
ranean security issue appears to be more than mere coinci-
dence. More explicit evidence that the Soviet Union
intended to discuss FBS in future negotiations appeared in a
speech by Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny in Sofia,
23. FB-M-77-10009, p. 9.
24. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Brezhnev SEJM Speech," FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union
,
July 22, 1974, p. D14.
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Bulgaria, on September 8, 1974. Podgorny explained that:
Among the more urgent practical steps which
would substantially improve the international
atmosphere, ... is the further easing of tension
in sectors where NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are
directly contiguous. ... In addition, the Soviet
Union advocates the turning of the Mediterranean
into a zone free of nuclear weapons and into a
zone of peace. This would be promoted by the
withdrawal of ships with nuclear weapons on board
from the Mediterranean region. The Soviet Union
is ready to take such an important step, of
course, on a basis of reciprocity.
Because he made this speech during the 1974 Cyprus crisis,
Podgorny could have used the occasion for propaganda by
trying to contrast Soviet actions with those of NATO. He
may also have put the idea forth for its propaganda value in
relations with the non-aligned states of the region, the
majority of which would like to have seen both fleets
withdraw.
Podgorny thus forged a link between Brezhnev's
Mediterranean proposal and the issue of what the USSR called
"military detente in Europe." His discussion of these two
concepts in the same speech and the importance he assigned
to naval arms control for the resolution of security issues
in Europe suggest that a nuclear stand-down in the
Mediterranean was, from the Soviet point of view, an
25. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Podgorny Speech," FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union
,




essential adjunct to the reduction of land and air forces in
Europe. In early October 1974 Brezhnev, speaking in East
Berlin, raised the issue again by calling for the removal of
U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons platforms from the
26Mediterranean.
There were significant differences between the Soviet
statements of 1971 and 1974. First, Brezhnev's 1971 state-
ment stressed both the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean; the
1974 speeches addressed only the Mediterranean. Second, the
1971 statement focused upon steady state naval deployments
and not on intermittent deployments to "show of the flag,"
transits, and crisis operations. The 1974 statements did
not address the issue of steady state versus intermittent
deployments; they emphasized the weapons systems of the
deployed forces. Taken together, these differences could
have reflected Soviet flexibility in offering alternative
approaches to reach agreement. Nonetheless, it could be
argued that Brezhnev's 1974 proposal superseded his 1971
statement
.
Diego Garcia again elicited comments from the Soviet
press. As a result of a remark by Ford in a news conference
26. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Brezhnev Speech," FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, October




on August 28, 1974, concerning the expansion of Diego
Garcia, the Soviet press criticized Ford for the first time
since he assumed office on August 9, 1974. The initial TASS
account of Ford's news conference made no mention of the
Indian Ocean issue, although a more comprehensive Pravda
commentary on August 30 noted that Ford said he supported
the expansion of Diego Garcia. But when Ford went on to add
that he did not view this as a challenge to the Soviet Union
since the USSR already had three major naval operating bases
in the Indian Ocean, and that this "particular construction
[Diego Garcia] is, I think, a wise policy," Pravda said only
that he claimed that expansion of the base "would not
complicate the situation in the area." Pravda also reported
him as concluding that the base should not "lead to any
2 8
spread of problems" in the Middle East.
On August 31, TASS again chided Ford for a "regrettable
inaccuracy" in declaring that expansion of the U.S. base on
Diego Garcia did not represent a challenge to the Soviet
Union. TASS absolved Ford himself of the error, declaring
27. U.S., President, Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents
, "The President's News Conference of August 28,
1974" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974),
p. 1072.
28. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Indian Ocean Bases: TASS Regrets 'Inaccuracy' in Presi-
dent's Remark on USSR Bases," FBIS Trends , September 5,
1974, p. 5 (hereinafter referred to as FBIS Trends
,
September 5, 1974) .
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that he had been, "unfortunately, misinformed by his staff,"
since "there are neither three nor even a single Soviet
29
naval base" in the Indian Ocean. TASS cited testimony by
CIA Director William Colby before the Senate Armed Services
Committee during a July 11 closed-door hearing, made public
30
on August 3 in The New York Times . The broadcast noted
that Colby had described the Soviet military presence in the
Indian Ocean "as a relatively small one" while the Times
quoted Colby as saying small "and inactive." TASS also
noted that Colby had said that the level of Soviet forces in
the Indian Ocean "would depend on what forces the United
States allotted for that area." Summing up "Pentagon plans"
for making Diego Garcia a "major U.S. naval base" in the
Indian Ocean, TASS explained that these plans had met with
"serious objections" from Congress and had triggered a wave
31
of protests from countries in the Indian Ocean.
On November 11, 1974, Kosygin seized the opportunity of
a visit to Moscow by Sri Lanka's Prime Minister, Mrs.
Bandaranaike, and again tried to link the Indian Ocean to
the broader context of Asia. He said that:
29. Ibid.
30. See Bernard Gwertzman, "CIA Chief Doubts Soviet Navy
Plans Indian Ocean Build-Up, " The New York Times , August 3,
1974, p. 3:5.
31. FBIS Trends , September 5, 1974, p. 5.
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We view with respect the political initiatives of
Asian countries motivated by concern for peace.
These include, for example, the idea of creating a
zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. . . . The
forces of imperialism and reaction are striving to
hold on to their positions in Asia. To this end
they are endeavoring to galvanize the activity of
aggressive military blocs, expand the network of
military bases in this area and maintain the
hotbeds of tension existing here.
At the conclusion of Bandaranaike ' s visit, a joint Soviet-
Sri Lankan communique of November 17, 1974, explained that:
Sri Lanka outlined its views on the proposal to
turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. The
Soviet side pointed out that the Soviet Union
supported the idea aimed at consolidating the
national sovereignty and strengthening the
independence of countries and removing foreign
military bases from the area. The two sides
reaffirmed readiness to participate, together with
all interested countries on an equal basis, in
searching for a favorable solution to the question
of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace,
in accordance with the principles of international
law.
Perhaps the greatest volume of Soviet rhetoric on the
issue of the Indian Ocean appeared in 1976. Speaking before
the 25th CPSU Congress on February 24, 1976, Brezhnev
remarked that:
There have recently been many speeches in a number
of countries in support of the Indian Ocean not
becoming an area of military bases of this or that
power. We agree with these speeches. As far as
the Soviet Union is concerned, we have never
intended and do not intend to construct military




bases in the Indian Ocean. We call an the United
States to take up a similar position.
Later that year in May Pravda carried a report of a joint
Soviet-Laotian communique that focused on the issue of Diego
Garcia. The communique said that:
The USSR and the LPDR support the opposition of
the countries of the Indian Ocean region to the
United States building^a military base on the
Island of Diego Garcia.
The visit of Mozambique's President Samoro Machel from
May 17 until May 22, 1976, was also the occasion for another
joint communique that addressed the Indian Ocean. The
Soviet leadership and Machel advocated that:
. . . the Indian Ocean be free of foreign military
bases and call for the liquidation of the bases
which exist in the region. They condemn the
creation of a U.S. military base on Diego Garcia
Island, which represents a threat to the
fi
peace and
security of the freedom-loving peoples.
Later that same month during a visit to Iraq by Kosygin
another joint communique reiterated that:
Both sides support the struggle to turn the Indian
Ocean into a zone of peace free from all foreign
military bases and for securing the freedom of
navigation in accordance with the principles of
international law.
The visit of Mrs. Gandhi to Moscow during June 1976
afforded the Soviet leadership another opportunity to






expound on the subject. The Soviet Union and India
reaffirmed their economic and political links in a joint
declaration signed on June 11. The joint declaration, signed
by Gandhi and Brezhnev, repeated the positions of both
countries on international issues and updated the decla-
ration signed during Brezhnev's November 1973 visit to
India. The overall tone was positive, outlining broad areas
of common agreement. However, differences remained over
3 8
Brezhnev's Asian collective security plan.
The USSR again supported India's proposal for a zone of
peace in the Indian Ocean, affirming in the joint declara-
tion, as it had in 1973, that the Soviet Union would
participate in "finding a favorable solution to the question
of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace." The 1976
declaration underlined Soviet interest in unrestricted naval
access to the area, however, by adding that this should be
done "in conformity with generally recognized rules of
international law." Both sides also opposed the estab-
lishment of "foreign military bases" in the Indian Ocean.
Brezhnev repeated his challenge to the United States to
announce its intention not to build military bases in the
38. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Gandhi Visit Reaffirms Soviet-Indian Ties; Differences
Remain," FBIS Trends , June 16, 1976, p. 14.




region. The joint communique issued at the end of
Gandhi's visit on June 14, 1976, reflected the foregoing.
It said that:
India and the Soviet Union support the desire of
the peoples of the Indian Ocean area to prevent it
from becoming an arena for the setting up of
foreign military bases. The sides reaffirm their
readiness to participate together with all states
concerned on an equal basis and in conformity with
generally recognized rules of international law in
finding a favorable solution to the question of
making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.
Soviet opposition to Diego Garcia continued to be the
central theme of both official and press statements on the
Indian Ocean. An article in Izvestiya on June 27, 1976,
explained that:
The Indian Ocean is one of those regions of the
world in which the opposed aspirations of the
imperialist circles and of the young,, independent
states conflict most obviously. . . .
It went on to remark that:
Regardless of opposition in the Congress, the U.S.
military continues speeding up the construction of
naval and air establishments on the atoll of Diego
Garcia.
Finally, it concluded with the observation that:
40. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Documents Issued on Gandhi Visit to USSR: Joint Declara-
tion," FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union
, June 14, 1976, p.
J8.




Where the big fish go, the small fry will follow.
Certain Asian countries are also turning toward
arms buildups in the Indian Ocean region.
Cleverly playing on the anti-communist sentiments
of these countries' ruling circles, the United
States is providing mass supplies of combat
equipment to the Persian Gulf region.
Western propaganda tries to justify the military
actions of the United States and its allies by
referring to the notorious "Soviet threat." In
fact, the Soviet Union has not had and still does
not have any intentions of building military bases
in the Indian Ocean.
However, the most significant statement on the subject
came from Gromyko in his annual speech to the U.N. General
Assembly on September 28, 1976. He delivered a generally
cautious assessment of the world situation but reaffirmed
the Soviet Union's commitment to detente. He expressed some
reservations on East-West relations as to what could be
expected of the United States during an election year and
avoided detailed comment on Soviet relations with most other
Western countries. On the subject of arms control, he
restated the well-known Soviet proposal for a treaty which
would ban the use or threat of force in international rela-
tions. On the issue of the Indian Ocean, Gromyko indicated
a Soviet willingness to consider measures for "reducing"
military activities in the area by non-littoral states.
In his remarks on the Indian Ocean, Gromyko went beyond
Moscow's vague support for transforming the area into a




willing to entertain more concrete proposals in this
regard. He said that "the Soviet Union is ready to look,
together with other powers, for ways of reducing on a mutual
basis military activity of non-littoral states in the Indian
Ocean and the areas directly adjoining it." The only
previous Soviet public indication of this sort was the more
broadly phrased offer made by Brezhnev in his Supreme Soviet
election speech in 1971.
Gromyko followed this speech by submitting the annual
Soviet memorandum on disarmament to the United Nations on
September 30, 1976. In it he alleged that:
The Soviet Union believes it is desirable to make
new efforts on an international scale to achieve
the liquidation of all foreign military bases on
alien territory and the withdrawal of foreign
troops from such territories . . . the littoral
countries of the Indian Ocean are expressing alarm
over the fact that several states which are
geographically very remote from this region are
deploying military bases there and increasing
their military presence. . . . Obviously a key
question here is to insure that there are no
foreign bases in the Indian Ocean region, that
those bases which have been created there
4
gre
liquidated and that new bases are not created.
He closed the memorandum by proposing that:
. . . the Soviet Union would be prepared, together
with other powers, to seek ways to reduce, on a
mutual basis, the military activity of
non-littoral states in the Indian Ocean and the
regions directly adjacent to it. Of course,
measures of this sort must take full account of
the universally recognized norms of international
law concerning freedom of shipping on the open sea
44. Ibid., p. 6.
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and the need for business visits connected with
this to the ports of littoral states and for
scientific reasearch. For the Soviet Union this
question is important because virtually the only
sea route open all year round connecting the
European part of the USSR with the Soviet Far East
passes through the Indian Ocean.
Izvestia restated general themes echoed by Gromyko in
an article on November 4, 1976, only two days after Carter
had defeated Ford. The article began by noting that "the
attention of the world press is now riveted on Western
military strategy in the Indian Ocean." After discussing
U.S. naval deployments to the region and Diego Garcia, the
article concluded with the remark that:
The USSR is not seeking onesided advantages for
itself. If the Soviet proposals encounter a
positive response, our country would be prepared
together with other powers, to seek ways of
reducing military activity, on a reciprocal basis,
in the Indian Ocean and the regions immediately
adjacent to it. Of course, measures of this sort
should take fully into consideration the norms of
international law concerning freedom of navigation
in the open sea and the need for access to the
ports of the littoral states for business
purposes, and also for scientific research.
The invitation to Carter was obvious.
From November 1976 until March 1977 the Soviet press
remained silent on the subject of Indian Ocean
negotiations. However, on March 24, 1977, the same day that
Carter raised the issue of Indian Ocean talks for the second
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 11-12.
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time in a news conference, Podgorny, in a speech in
Zanzibar, declared:
The Soviet Union is . . . prepared to solve on an
equal basis with other interested states the
questions of declaring the Indian Ocean a "peace
zone." The key question of preserving peace in
that region is the elimination of the existing
imperialist military bases in the Indian Ocean
which represent a direct threat to international
security, the independence of the coastal states
and world navigation.
Soviet Rhetoric—The Military
The foregoing discussion of the Soviet political
leadership and media view of the Indian Ocean talks covered
the years from 1971 through 1976. During the same period a
parallel commentary appeared on the subject from within the
Soviet military. Not surprisingly the author of these works
was the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral of
the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov. The admiral authored two
major works during this period. The first was a series of
articles entitled "Navies in War and Peace" published in the
Soviet Naval Digest in 1972 and 1973 and reprinted in United
States Naval Institute Proceedings in 1974. The second was a
major book, Sea Power of the State
,
published in February
1976. While the series dealt more extensively and more
explicitly with the issue of naval arms limitations, the
treatment of the subject was sufficiently similar in the
47. Darnton, op. cit.
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book to suggest that Gorshkov's views on it did not
48
change.
Gorshkov presented a generally pessimistic view of the
naval arms control agreements of the period between the two
World Wars. He argued that they did not achieve their
purpose and that "from the mid-1930's, a new unrestrained
49
and in no way regulated naval arms race began." He
bordered on sarcasm in his description of the successive
naval conferences as "the war of the diplomats for supremacy
„50 Accordingly, a case can be made that Gorshkov
51
at sea.
was arguing against naval arms control.
48. There are contending positions as to the
author itativeness and content of these articles. Some
analysts believed that the articles reflected doctrine.
See, for example, Cdr. Clyde A. Smith, USN, "The Meaning
and Significance of the Gorshkov Articles," Naval War
Colleg e Review , March-April 1974, p. 18-37. Others argue
that Gorshkov was writing as an advocate for his navy. See,
for example, Robert Weinland, Robert Herrick, Michael
MacGwire, and James McConnell, "Admiral Gorshkov's 'Navies
in War and Peace'," Survival , March/April 1975, p. 54-63.
49. Admiral of the Fleet S.G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and
Peace," Morskoi Sbornik . May 1972, p. 24, cited in Center
for Naval Analysis, Institute for Naval Studies, Gorshkov on
Naval Arms Limitations: KTQ KOGO , Memorandum: CNA 74-2005.20
(Arlington: April 28, 1977), p. 1 (hereinafter referred to
as CNA 74-2005.20. References to the Gorshkov articles will
be from those published in the United States Naval Institute
Proceedings
.
50. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 1/S. G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and
Peace," United States Naval Institute Proceedings , June
1974, p. 47.
51. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 1.
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Gorshkov drew on the historiography of the Anglo-
American naval competition in the aftermath of World War I
to reach these conclusions. Rather than engage in a
difficult, costly and probably hopeless naval arms race with
the United States, the British cabinet decided to concede
equality. Soviet discussion of detente in general, and SALT
in particular, reflected this same theme and argued that
progress toward world peace had come about because realistic
western statesmen abandoned the policy of trying to deal
with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, and,
52instead, agreed to the principle of equal security.
The discussion of America's "prolonged struggle" to
achieve naval parity with England appeared in August
531972. The July issue did not contain an article in the
series, while the June issue was signed to press on May 29,
1972, before the end of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, and was
written and approved even earlier. In other words,
Gorshkov's discussion appeared in the first article of the
series to appear after the summit meeting between Nixon and
Brezhnev. This bit of evidence, though perhaps circum-
stantial, supports the notion that this article was intended
as a discussion of the relations between the U.S. and the
52. Ibid.
, p. a.




USSR with respect to arms control agreements. Thus
Gorshkov was able to explain to naval officers, and perhaps
officers of the other Soviet armed services as well, the
55benefits the USSR could obtain from SALT.
Gorshkov's description of the naval arms control
agreements, both in terms of their goal "to limit and
regulate the construction of warships" and achievement of "a
delaying function in naval construction" followed by an arms
race proceeding "without any sort of limitations," sounded
like an appraisal of the Interim Agreement on Offensive
Weapons of May 1972. Perhaps Gorshkov was trying to reassure
the Soviet officer corps that the Soviet leadership recog-
nized that, if they could not extend the Interim Agreement
major new expenditures for arms would be forthcoming.
Hence the Soviet Union could then confront the United
54. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 8. It can be argued that the
discussion of America's "prolonged struggle" in the August
number of Morskoi Sbornik is mere coincidence and that the
discussion, however awkwardly placed in an article entitled
"The Building of the [Soviet] Navy," would have been even
more awkwardly placed elsewhere. Michael MacGwire, "Naval
Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," in Soviet Oceans Devel-
opment
, U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce and National
Ocean Policy, Study (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, October 1976), n. Ill to p. 123. However this may be
from the point of view of logic, Gorshkov does discuss,
cursorily, the post-World War I naval agreements in the
article "The First World War," which appeared in the May
1972 number.
55. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 8.
56. Ibid., p. 10.
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States, if necessary, from a position of strength.
However, Gorshkov argued that, with respect to naval
forces, the U.S. had not recognized the "equal rights" of
the Soviet Union. He explained that:
. . .
today abroad there is widespread propaganda
produced by American ideologists asserting that
the Soviet state does not need a powerful navy.
Gorshkov went on to cite Nixon's news conference on July 30,
1970, in which Nixon argued that what:
. . . the Soviet Union needs in way of military
preparations differs from what we need. The USSR
is a land power . . . while we are primarily a sea
powerrn^nd our needs are therefore different.
• • •
The admiral concluded this article with the observation
that:
One hardly has to say that this speech of Nixon's,
which is a modern version of the old attempts by
the English politicians to show Russia's lack of
need for a strong Navy, bears no relationship to
the actual state of affairs and contradicts^gthe
interests of our state both past and present.
Gorshkov' s main purpose was to attack, by comparing the
effect of British propaganda in the late nineteenth century
57. "Navies in War and Peace," February 1974, p. 28.
58. U.S., President, Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents . "The President's News Conference of July 30,
1970," August 3, 1970 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office: 1970)
, p. 1000.
59. "Navies in War and Peace," February 1974, p. 28.
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on Tsarist Russia, Soviet officials who would willingly
6 o
accept naval inferiority.
However, some form of naval arms control which
recognized the "equal rights" of the USSR would put an end
to this problem. For instance, in advocating, in 1971,
limitations on out of area naval deployments, Brezhnev
expressed a willingness to solve the problem of "the navies
of the great powers . . . cruising about for long periods of
time far from their own shores, . . . but to solve it . . .
on an equal basis." While Brezhnev maintained that any
agreement would have to be on an "equal basis," he did not
specify just how the principle of equality would be
applied. Since he specifically cited Soviet deployments in
the Indian Ocean as a source of U.S. concern, some analysts
interpreted his proposal as a call for deployment limita-
tions in that body of water.
Gorshkov contended that the achievement of American
naval supremacy was due to two causes. The first was the
effect of the law of the nonuniformity of development of
capitalist countries. The second was the revolutionary and
60. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 12.
61. FBIS Dai ly Repo rt : The Soviet Union f June 14, 1971.
62. See Center for Naval Analysis, Institute for Naval
Studies, Recent Changes in Soviet Naval J>ali£y_s Pr ospects
for Arms Limitations in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.
Professional Paper No. 150 (Arlington: 1976), p. 1.
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national freedom movements embracing the entire world. The
former referred to the fact that the U.S. outstripped Great
Britain in economic development. At the time, the Soviet
Union seemed to have accepted the idea that the U.S. would
remain the economically predominant power, although it had
not given up the belief that, eventually, the economic
superiority of socialism would make itself manifest. The
latter, which operated to the advantage of the U.S.
vis-a-vis England, now worked against the U.S., which had
taken over the role of "suppressor of the national freedom
movement of peoples who are freeing themselves of the
colonialist yoke." It would therefore seem that the basic
factors which led to American naval supremacy now opened the
long-range prospect of Soviet supremacy. This analogy with
the U.S. -Soviet competition demonstrated, according to
Gorshkov, that the existence of "detente" should not impede
the Soviet "prolonged struggle" for naval parity and
eventually superiority. Furthermore, there would seem to be
no reason why naval arms control could not play a role in
this long-range development.
Gorshkov referred to the Soviet Union as "one of the
strongest continental powers" but as only "a mighty
seapower." Nonetheless, he suggested that the absence of
63. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 13-14/"Navies in War and Peace,"
October 1974, p. 61-64.
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naval parity would detract from the political equality which
the Soviet Union had attained. Unless the Soviet Navy could
defend Soviet interests with the same facility as the U.S.
Navy permitted the United States to protect its interests,
64
complete equality would not exist. It therefore seems
that he was making a case for naval parity.
What Gorshkov seemed to fear most was that the Soviet
political leadership would repeat the mistake of the Tsar's
advisors in believing that the USSR should accept a position
of naval inferiority. In particular, he feared that some
Soviet leaders would be willing to freeze Soviet naval
inferiority by means of a naval arms control agreement in
return for concessions from the United States in other
areas. He might have interpreted Nixon's remark as evidence
that the United States was thinking along the same lines.
Nixon suggested that it would be reasonable for the United
States to recognize, possibly formally, Soviet superiority
with respect to ground troops in return for a similar Soviet
recognition of U.S. naval superiority. Gorshkov would find
such an agreement unacceptable. Naval agreements "on an
equal basis," on the other hand, to the extent that they
could be negotiated, would seem to serve Gorshkov'
s
64. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 16.
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Yet, despite this rhetoric, there was a demonstrable
pattern of the use of the Soviet Navy in politico-military
missions in the Indian Ocean between 1963 and 1976. When
Somalia rejected a $10 million military aid program proposed
by the U.S., Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany in
November 1963, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to
gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa by providing Somalia
with a military aid package totaling $35 million to develop
a 14,000-man army, a coastal navy, and a modern air force.
Substantial amounts of Soviet military equipment began
arriving in Somalia in 1965 and 1966 along with Soviet
military technicians and advisors. These events set the
stage for the first use of the Soviet Navy as a politico-
military instrument in the Indian Ocean.
The first case followed the military coup in Somalia in
October 1969. On April 27, 1970, the Somali government
announced that it had discovered a plot against itself. How
65. CNA 74-2005.20, p. 17-18. It should be emphasized that
no such interpretation of Nixon's remarks is here asserted.
What is suggested is merely that Gorshkov may have believed
(1) that they were subject to such an interpretation, and
(2) that others in the Soviet hierarchy might wish to probe
the matter further.
66. State Cite 233001.
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much of this rhetoric was real remains open to debate.
Nonetheless, on April 17, 1970, some ten days before this
announcement, two Soviet destroyers arrived in Mogadiscio
for an official five-day port visit. Though scheduled to
depart on April 23, 1970, there was no announcement of their
departure as is customary at the end of an official visit.
The ships apparently did not get underway from Mogadiscio
until the second week in May when the stability of the
fi 7
Somali regime seemed assured.
The second of these, the harbor-clearing operation in
Bangladesh from March 1972 until December 1973, was an
example of a Soviet initiative in naval diplomacy to enhance
and consolidate Soviet influence in this infant republic.
While the efforts to help reopen the Suez Canal represented
an attempt to cut expected political losses, the Chittagong
operation was an attempt to maximize gains that resulted
from Soviet support for the independence of Bangladesh.
The third case involved Soviet support of "wars of
national liberation." There were at least two cases of
Soviet naval support of actions by regimes engaged in
67. Center for Naval Analysis, Institute for Naval Studies,
The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, Professional Paper
No. 77 (Arlington: August 1971), p. 11.
68. See Center for Naval Analysis, Institute for Naval
Studies, The Soviet Port Clear ing Oper ation in Bangladesh,





conflict against pro-Western or non-aligned nations. In
April 1973, the Soviet Navy provided overt support to Iraq
in its territorial conflict with Kuwait. Although the
Soviet Union probably did not approve of Iraq's attack on
Kuwait, Gorshkov's and his navy's presence in Iraq during
the negotiations on the dispute indicated Soviet interest in
border changes that would increase Iraq's security. The
operation was also associated with other practical steps the
Soviet leadership undertook at the time to promote unity in
the Arab ranks. The Soviet naval activity in the Iraq-
Kuwait case, along with the Soviet sealift of Moroccan
troops to Syria in the spring and summer of 1973, were
concrete steps to promote the Soviet message of Arab
"unity," and actively involved the Soviet Navy.
The fourth case, the establishment of an AGI patrol in
the Strait of Hormuz in 1974, was not so much a reaction to
real or potential threats to Soviet shipping in the Persian
Gulf but rather a capacity to monitor passage through this
choke point. It may have served to signal Soviet desires to
prevent control of the Gulf by Iran and the West. A similar
case could be made for Soviet mineclearing operations in the
69. See Center for Naval Analysis, Institute for Naval
Studies, The Soviet Naval Presence During th e Iraq-Kuwait






Gulf of Suez in 1974 incident to reopening the Suez
Canal
.
The fifth case, the creation of the Somalia/PDRY axis
at the other strategic choke point in the northwestern
Indian Ocean— the Strait of Bab el Mandeb—suggested that
the Soviet Navy was both instrumental in enhancing Soviet
relations with Somalia and South Yemen and the major
beneficiary of expanded Soviet access to these states.
Gorshkov's navy frequently used the naval facilities in both
Berbera and Aden, and it no doubt played a role in Soviet
efforts to bring these states into closer coordination
politically and militarily. The Soviet strategic objective
seemed to be to strengthen its position at the southern end
of the Red Sea, using Aden and Mogadiscio as vehicles. In
April 1975, the Soviet Union had begun to stage IL-38
flights out of airfields in Somalia. In October 1976, TU-95
BEAR reconnaissance aircraft deployed to Somalia for the
71first time. This was more than a symbolic operation
because it marked the first time that the Soviet Union
introduced land based aircraft into the region. Moreover,
because the Soviet Union lacked tactical air support, even
70. See Center for Naval Analysis, Institute for Naval
Studies, The Soviet Union and the Reopening of the. Sue z
Cajialj Mineclearing Operations in the Gu lf of Suez,
Professional Paper No. 137 (Arlington: August 1975) for a
discussion of these operations.
71. State Cite 233001.
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if only in the form of reconnaissance aircraft, for its
Indian Ocean squadron, this qualitative change in mission
support for the Soviet Navy marked a milestone in Soviet
Indian Ocean operations and demonstrated that the Soviet
squadron was moving toward the development of both a crisis




It is clear that the Soviet Union continued over time
to raise the naval arms control question in various
contexts. As will be demonstrated in the following
chapters, there were substantial incentives for Soviet
interest in such controls. These include, but were not
limited to, removing U.S. strategic forces from within
striking range of the USSR, inhibiting the ability of the
U.S. to intervene in the Third World, weakening the alliance
relationships of the United States, and achieving regional
parity with the United States in another area of superpower
competition.
In fact, the USSR was already a party to at least one
form of naval arms restraint: the prevention of unsafe
navigation practices by the superpower navies vis-a-vis each
other. In signing the Incidents at Sea Agreement in May
72. Sick, op. cit., p. 68.
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1972, each party undertook not only to "observe strictly the
letter and spirit of the International regulations for
73
Preventing Collisions at Sea," but also to "refrain from
simulating attack by training naval weapons on the other
party's ships," to "remain well clear" of the latter while
operating in proximity to them, and to "avoid maneuvering in
a matter which would hinder" the "evolution of the other
74party's naval formations." While this agreement did not
limit forces or deployments, it modestly constrained the use
of naval forces. The Soviet Union publicly indicated that
this instrument, though a step in the right direction, did
not go far enough. Consequently, the probability that the
Soviet Union was serious about pursuing some form of naval
force limitation agreement cannot be discounted.
The rhetoric cited in this chapter also demonstrates
that the Soviet leadership took every opportunity to portray
the Soviet Union as a supporter of detente and arms control
as well as a champion of Third World causes. The Soviet
73. See U.S. Treaties, etc., "International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, I960," United States Treaties
and Other International Agreements f TIAS 5813 (Washington:
U.S. Department of State, 1966), v. 16, pt . 1, p. 794-811.
74. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Prevention of Incidents on and
Over the High Seas," United States Treaties and. Other
International Agreements f TIAS 7379 (Washington: U.S.
Department of State, 1973), v. 23, pt . 1, p. 1168-1180. For
a discussion of this navy-to-navy agreement see Anthony F.
Wolf, "Agreement at Sea: The United States-USSR Agreement on
Incidents at Sea," Research Paper, International Studies
Association Convention, March 16-20, 1977.
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Navy, on the other hand, was developing its utility as a
political instrument much as the U.S. Navy had traditionally
been employed. The Soviet naval operations discussed in
this chapter demonstrate that, although still a developing
navy, the Soviet Navy was capable of sidestepping techno-
logical disadvantages and actively supporting Soviet
political goals in the Third World. The Soviet political
leadership, as well as its naval bureaucracy, recognized
that the Soviet Union may have been at a tactical
disadvantage in the Indian Ocean through 1976. They viewed
an Indian Ocean agreement, in some form, as a hedge against
a crisis situation in which Soviet naval forces may not have
been able to fight and win. Thus the Soviet leadership
approached Indian Ocean NALT as an exercise in political
arms control as well as a means of further isolating
U.S. -Soviet competition in the Third World.
The foregoing also suggests that the Soviet Union had
nothing to lose and everything to gain from negotiating with
the United States on the Indian Ocean. If the USSR was
serious, then it stood to gain some measure of control of
U.S. activity in the region while preserving a good deal of
political maneuvering room for itself. If the Soviet Union
was not serious, then, by accepting Carter's call for talks,
it could at least maintain its position vis-a-vis the United
States with respect to disarmament. Moreover, it could use
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the talks as a means of learning as much as possible about
U.S. strategy and policy for the Indian Ocean.

PART III
THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR ISSUES
When the Carter Administration assumed office on
January 20, 1977, the individual actors who had been
influenced by the background discussed earlier in this study
were in place. Moreover, Carter was on record as favoring a
broad improvement in U.S. -Soviet relations. He attached a
great deal of importance not only to SALT but to reacti-
vating the MBFR talks in Vienna. He also had pressed his
advisors to develop new arms control initiatives to engage
the Soviet leadership in a deeper, more broadly based
dialogue. Thus the stage was set for Carter's Indian Ocean
arms control proposal.
At the recommendation of Brzezinski, Carter sent a
personal letter to Brezhnev on January 26, 1977. Carter
stressed that it was his "goal to improve relations with the
Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and
o
benefit." The President met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
1. Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New





Dobrynin for the first time on February 1, 1977, to under-
score some of the points he had made in this letter. Among
other things, the two discussed U.S. -Soviet reciprocal
restraint in crisis areas as well as the mutual reduction of
insecurity and uncertainty with regard to each state's
intentions and capabilities. During the course of the
meeting Dobrynin probed Carter for his position on a variety
3
of topics including the Indian Ocean. As a result of this
meeting and Brezhnev's response of February 4 to the
President's letter, Carter directed Vance and Brzezinski to
draft a response on February 7 which would be "personal and
specific, including particular comments on ... a demili-
4tarized Indian Ocean."
This was the first time that Vance became aware of
5Carter's intention to pursue the Indian Ocean option. That
very same day, Fred S. Hoffman, the Associated Press cor-
respondent for the Pentagon, wrote an article that contained
the first public reference to Carter's Indian Ocean plans.
The article remarked that Carter himself raised the idea of
Indian Ocean naval arms control talks in the context of
discussing issues bearing on the size of the defense
3. Ibid., p. 152. See also Henry S. Bradsher, "Can the
Militarization of the Indian Ocean Be Reversed," The
Washington Star March 17, 1977, p. 3:1.




budget. Hoffman reported that a memorandum had been
circulated to Cabinet and NSC officials listing a range of
subjects, among them Indian Ocean naval arms control,
requiring the preparation of position papers for submission
to the President. Within the Department of Defense, one of
the position papers that Carter called for addressed a
"Concept for Naval Forces Limits That Might Be Sought
Through Discussion With the Soviets."
Precisely thirty days later, on March 9, 1977, Carter
announced in a press conference that he had "proposed that
the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized." Eight days
later on March 17 he revised his goal downward in an address
before the United Nations General Assembly, when he declared
that "[the United States] will seek to establish Soviet
willingness to reach an agreement. . .on mutual military
o
restraint in the Indian Ocean." Though Carter's earlier
call for "demilitarization" and his subsequent goal of
"restraint" raised some questions as to the real intent of
his policy for the Indian Ocean, these statements were
6. The relationship of the Indian Ocean talks to the size of
the defense budget will be discussed later in this study.
7. U.S., President, "The President's News Conference of
March 9, 1977," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments
f March 14, 1977, p. 334.
8. See "Transcript of President's Address at U.N. on Peace,




significant because they furnished an insight into the scope
of his Administration's approach to both national security
policy and arms control and signalled a change in U.S.
foreign policy for the Indian Ocean region.
Carter raised the subject again during his opening
9
statement at his March 24, 1977, news conference. Though
the rhetoric framing the issue was somewhat different from
that of the President's, the Soviet government accepted Mr.
Carter's challenge that very same day. Speaking in
Tanzania, Podgorny indicated that the USSR was "willing to
open talks with the United States and other concerned
nations on the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone
of peace." Podgorny dampened hopes for a quick resolution,
however, when he argued that "the key question" in preserv-
ing peace in the area was "the elimination of imperialist
bases." Nonetheless, Carter's policy pronouncements came
as a surprise to many government officials. Military
officers in the Department of Defense knew of no PRM
ordering a study of the question of arms limitations—naval
9. U.S., President, "The President's News Conference of
March 24, 1977, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Dqcu-
mejits, March 28, 1977, p. 440.
10. John Darnton, "Podgorny, in Zanzibar, Welcomes Parley




or otherwise— in the Indian Ocean. Even Paul Warnke, the
Director of ACDA, was surprised. He believed that the
Indian Ocean talks were not an "actor initiative" and that
"the first he heard about it was the press conference which
President Carter gave in which he said that [the Indian
12
Ocean talks] was one objective that [Carter] had."
Vance carried Carter's proposal to Moscow with him in
March 1977 when he discussed the Carter Administration's
SALT II proposals with the Soviet leadership. During the
second meeting between Vance and Gromyko on the afternoon of
March 28, 1977, the two men agreed to set up bilateral
working groups to examine Indian Ocean naval arms control as
well as a number of other matters concerning the limitation
of armaments. Though the relative priority of these
proposals is open to debate, they included a comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty, discussions addressing chemical
weapons, an agreement providing for prior notification of
missile firings, an anti-satellite weapons agreement, the
entire issue of civil defense, a radiological weapons
treaty, a discussion of limiting conventional arms transfers
to Third World countries, and steps to strengthen the
11. Rear Admiral Robert J. Hanks, USN (Ret.), "The Indian
Ocean Negotiations: Rocks and Shoals," Strategic Review .




13Non-Proliferation Treaty. A summary of these initiatives
and their outcomes is contained in Appendix C.
The Carter SALT proposals called for "deep cuts" in the
strategic forces of both states with Soviet forces taking
the larger share. On March 30 Brezhnev abruptly rejected
not only the "deep cuts" proposal but also Carter's backup
approach that accepted the Vladivostok ceilings and deferred
the cruise missile and BACKFIRE bomber issues. The agree-
ment to set up the various working groups stood in sharp
contrast to the overall outcome of Vance's mission. The
rejection out of hand of the entire Carter SALT strategy, a
strategy that was the first test of Carter's strategic and
political acumen, was devastating. It also cut directly at
Carter's deep, personal commitment to reverse the trend of
strategic warfare and not simply to curb it. Thus, perhaps
to minimize a possible political loss, the bilateral working
groups were the only positive result of the Moscow talks.
The United States proposed to establish a bilateral
working group on the Indian Ocean and the Soviet Union
13. Vance ; see Hard Choices
, p. 53-54. Though after the
fact, testimony before Congress suggests that the Indian
Ocean negotiations were of a lower priority than other of
Carter's arms control policies. See U.S., Congress, House
of Representatives, Committee on the Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of
Nuclear Energy, Designation of Panels Concerning Arms
Control and Disarmament , Hearings (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1978) , p. 11.
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accepted the offer before any comprehensive interagency
review of the problems at hand took place. Though the study
by the VPWG in 1976 could very well have served as a basis
for such a review, Carter did not issue PRM/NSC-25 on the
subject of arms control in the Indian Ocean until April 7,
14
1977. In accordance with the organizational framework of
the Carter NSC, the review process was in the hands of the
Special Coordination Committee (SCC) — a committee which had
been tasked with decisions regarding intelligence policy,
15
arms control, and crisis management. Brzezinski as
Assistant for National Security Affairs chaired the SCC.
Brzezinski appointed an ad hoc working group to examine
the issue of Indian Ocean arms control and prepare a range
of alternative negotiating strategies for consideration by
the SCC. This interagency group, in addition to members
from the National Security Council, consisted of staff
members from the Departments of Defense and State, ACDA, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The working group completed its task of developing
14. Korb, op. cit., p. 123.
15. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 59.
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various options late in the spring of 1977. The SCC first
addressed the question of the Indian Ocean talks in May
1977. Thus Carter did in fact announce a policy objective
prior to subjecting that policy to the scrutiny of his own
1
8
National Security Council apparatus. Available evidence
suggests that the SCC meeting in May 1977 left unresolved
the decision as to what the ultimate negotiating objective
of the United States should be. It did, however, recommend
to Carter that the U.S. delegation to the first round of
talks adopt an exploratory posture to gauge the Soviet
19Union's position on the subject. This was a prudent
approach since it had the advantage of not only determining
16. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of
Nuclear Energy, Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and
Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation, Indian Ocean Arms
Limitations and Multilateral Cooperation on Restrai ning Con-
ventional Arms Transfers , Hearings (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1978) , p. 6 (hereinafter referred to as
Indian Ocean Arms Limitations, 1978 ) .
17. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 174.
18. Leslie Gelb contends that this was not the case. He
argued that Carter simply announced a long-term objective
(i.e., demilitarization) without committing the U.S.
Government to negotiation. See Indian Ocean Arms
Limitat ions, p. 10; interview with Leslie Gelb, Former
Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, U.S.
Department of State. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 1983
(hereinafter referred to as G_e_lb_.
19. See Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 174-175; Gelb, Vance ,
Warnke ; see also U.S., Department of State, Transcript of
Daily News Briefing, Monday, October 3, 1977 (DPC 194)
(Washington: October 3, 1977) , p. A2 (Xerox) (hereinafter
referred to as DPC 194 ) .
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the level of seriousness of the Soviet Union on the question
but also gauging the range and depth of the issues that the
USSR would raise. These objectives could be accomplished in
the context of demonstrating Carter's interest in a
meaningful give and take on the issue of arms control while,
at the same time, providing the U.S. with an opportunity to
see if there was any hope for progress on Indian Ocean arms
control
.
The delegation heads met for their initial meeting in a
private session at 6:00 p.m. on June 21, 1977, in
20Moscow. Warnke in his capacity as Director of ACDA headed
the U.S. delegation. The senior U.S. military representa-
tive on the delegation was Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN,
who was then serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific
Fleet (CINCPACFLT) . Reginald Bartholomew, Deputy Director
of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the State
Department assisted Warnke as deputy head of the
delegation. Dr. Lynn E. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs, and LtCol.
Thomas P. Gorman, USAF, represented the Department of
Defense. M. Lyall Breckon, John G. Hibbits and Sherrod B.
McCall were the State Department's members of the
delegation. John Newhouse and John F. Twombly represented
20. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 202002Z Jun 77 (State Cite 142836)
(Subject: Indian Ocean Working Group Meeting) (hereinafter
referred to at State Cite 142836) ; Warnke .
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ACDA. Captain Charles H. Kinney, USN, was the other
military member from the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
while Commander Gary Sick, USN, represented the NSC. The
21delegations interpreter was Cyril Muromcew. Ambassador at
Large Lev Isaakovick Mendelevich of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs headed the Soviet negotiating team. Admiral
Nikolayevich Amel'ko, Deputy Commander in Chief of the
22
Soviet Navy, assisted Mendelevich. Ambassador Mendelevich
chaired the first session which consisted of plenary
meetings of the delegations beginning at 10:30 a.m. on June
22, 24, and 27. 23
Carter did, however, provide an indication of the
framework within which Warnke tested Mendelevich during the
first round. Speaking to the press on the very same day
that the talks began in Moscow, Carter explained his views
on the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. He said that:
Our basic hope is that we can stabilize the status
quo in the Indian Ocean and refrain from any
further escalations.
. . .
Our first hope, and
without delay, is that we might prevent any
further build-up of military presence in the
Indian Ocean: later prior notification of any
military movements there, and perhaps later on,
21. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 142132Z Jun 77 (State Cite 137909)
(Subject: Indian Ocean Working Group Meeting in Moscow)
.
22. Interview with Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, USN (Ret.),
Former Chief of Naval Operations and senior U.S. military
delegate to the first round of talks, Washington: September
15, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as
23. State Cite 142836.
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some reduction in the present level of military
presence, which is fairly low at this time.
Thus Carter's original objective of demilitarization had
shifted to one of stabilization of the U.S. and Soviet
presence in the region by the time of the first round of the
talks.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union generally
agreed on the issues involved in the negotiations during the
first round even though there was disagreement on the
25
substantive aspects of the questions themselves. It is
perhaps for this reason that Warnke remarked, at the
conclusion of this round of negotiations, that there were
"good expectations of reaching some sort of constructive
result." The two sides agreed to meet again in late
September 1977. Warnke reported his impressions of this
27first round of talks to Carter on July 11, 1978.
The working group and the SCC met again during the
summer to assess the results of the first round of talks and
24. U.S., Department of State, United States Information
Agency, Office of Policy and Plans, "Infoguide: Indian Ocean
Arms Limitations," (No. 77-26) (Washington: July 26, 1977),
p. 2 (hereinafter referred to as Infoguide 77-26) . See also
Murray Marder, "U.S. Downgrades Goal in Indian Ocean,"
Washington Post , June 23, 1977, p. 7:1.
25. Sick : Hayward .
26. Infoguide 77-26, p. 1.
27. U.S., President, "Digest of Other White House Announce-
ments," Weekly Compilation of Presiden tial Documents. July
18, 1977, p. 1017.
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to develop a strategy for the second round. Carter must
have believed that the Soviet Union was serious about
negotiating an arms control agreement for the Indian Ocean
because, by September 1977, the United States was ready to
move forward with a proposal for a mutual declaration of
2 8
restraint. This confirms that the SCC refined the U.S.
goal in the talks to one of stabilizing the U.S. and Soviet
military presence in the region.
Mendelevich and his delegation arrived in Washington on
Sunday, September 25, 1977, for the second round of the
talks. He and Warnke again met privately at 6:00 p.m. on
29that same evening. Leslie Gelb, Director of the State
Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, replaced
Bartholomew as deputy head of the U.S. delegation. Thomas
McNamara of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow joined the
30delegation. Finally, Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor
recalled Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne, USN (Ret.), to
active duty on August 31, 1972, to replace Admiral Hayward
as the JCS representative to the talks. This action caused
some concern on the part of the Soviet delegation who viewed
28. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 174.
29. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 192217Z Sep 77 (State Cite 224734)
(Subject: U.S. -USSR Indian Ocean Talks) (hereinafter




it as a signal that the United States was not seriously
31
concerned with pursuing the talks.
The remainder of the U.S. delegation remained the same
for the second round of talks which took place from
September 26 through September 30 in Washington with plenary
32
sessions at 10:30 a.m. on each of these days. During
these sessions both sides discussed the specific elements of
33
a possiole agreement.
There is no question that the basic negotiating
objective of the United States was to stabilize the military
presence of the two superpowers in the Indian Ocean. Four
days after the end of the second round of talks, Carter
himself re-emphasized this objective in an address to the
31. Interview with VADM. Marmaduke G. Bayne, USN (Ret.),
Senior U.S. Military Representative on the U.S. Delegation
to the Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks. Irvington, Va.:
August 15, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as Bayne )
.
Hayward . The presence of a four-star officer on the U.S.
delegation to the first round of talks was in response to
the presence of Admiral Amel'ko on the Soviet delegation.
This in itself may have been a contentious issue from a
bureaucratic standpoint since Admiral Hayward, even though
he had been involved in the negotiation of the Prevention of
Incidents at Sea agreement as a Rear Admiral, was more
concerned with his operational responsibilities as
CINCPACFLT. As an operational commander he would not have
had the time to keep up on the details and planning for
subsequent sessions as well as fulfilling his primary
responsibility as CINCPACFLT. Hence Admiral Hayward
recommended that a Vice Admiral who could devote his full
attention to the negotiations was sufficient.
32. State Cite 224734.
33. DPC 194 , p. A2.
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U.N. General Assembly on October 4, 1977. The President
explained that:
In the Indian Ocean area, neither [the U.S.] nor
the Soviet Union has a large military presence,
nor is there a rapidly mounting competition
between [them] . Restraint in the area may well
begin with a mutual effort to stabilize our
presence and to avoid an escalation in military
competition. Then both sides can consider how our
military activities in, the Indian Ocean might be
even further reduced.
There is also evidence to suggest that, if successful
in stabilizing their presence, the superpowers would have
considered reducing it. In welcoming the Mauritian Prime
Minister to New Delhi on November 2, 1977, Prime Minister
Desai of India noted the announcement that the United States
and the USSR had commenced talks on naval arms limitations
in the region. Desai remarked that when both the U.S. and
the Soviet Union had agreed on no increase in their base
structure or force levels in the area, it was then to be
their objective to lessen their presence every year
thereafter until it disappeared. Moreover, Desai confirmed
that the Soviet Union was keeping him advised on the status
34. U.S., President, "Address Before the General Assembly,
4 October 1977," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
Hl£nts_, October 10, 1977, p. 1475-1476. See also "U.S. Sees
Progress in Talks with Soviets on Indian Ocean," The




of the talks. The State Department and ACDA supported
this approach as a long-term negotiating objective for the
ib 36talks.
At first the USSR probably opposed the stabilization
concept, because it allowed the U.S. the flexibility to
deploy carrier-based aircraft to the region if necessary.
However, by the second round of talks, in the fall of 1977,
the Soviet Union was ready to accept several elements of the
freeze. At the U.N., the Soviet delegation indicated that a
provisional agreement "freezing" the military activities in
the area, if reached, should be followed by talks on a
35. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Excerpts from Desai's Press Conference of 27 October 1977,"
FBIS Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa , October 28,
1977, p. S-l; U.S., Department of Commerce, National
Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, "Indian and Mauritian Premiers Speak at Banquet,"
FBIS Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa , November 2,
1977, p. S-l; and U.S., Department of Commerce, National
Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, "U.S.S.R. Envoy to Indian Ocean Talks Arrives in
New Delhi," FBIS Dai ly Report: Middle East and North Africa ,
January 17, 1978, p. S-2; DPC 19 4 f p. A3. In addition a
State Department press spokesman commented on December 22,
1977, that the U.S. was aimimg to "first stabilize the
United States and Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean." He
went on to say that once this agreement had been reached
"the United States is prepared ... to consider mutual
reductions in forces in the Indian Ocean." See SECSTATE
WASHDC msg 240317Z Dec 77 (State Cite 307163) (Subject:
U.S. -Soviet Indian Ocean Talks).
36. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 175.
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drastic reduction of military activities there, including
37
the dismantling of foreign bases.
The two delegations met in Berne, Switzerland, from
December 6 until December 10, 1977, for the third round of
talks. There was no change in the principles involved in
the negotiations. However, the U.S. delegation increased in
size by the addition of Michael Arietti and Jerome Kahan
from the State Department as well as CDR. Haig Pakradooni,
o o
USN, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The
39
United States tabled a draft treaty during this round of
talks which was designed to ensure, at a minimum, that,
during a period of about five years, deployment of Soviet
and American naval forces in the Indian Ocean would be
40limited approximately to the current levels on each side.
Thus the United States remained committed to its goal of
stabilization through the third round.
Both delegations met in Berne again from February 7
until February 21, 1978, with plenary sessions on February
37. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World
Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Year Book 1979 , p. 501;
Richard Burt, "U.S. Is Hopeful on Indian Ocean Talks with
Soviet," The New Yor k T imes , November 20, 1977, p. 4:1;
Henry S. Bradsher, "Indian Ocean Buildup Halted by U.S.,
Soviets," The Washing t on Star , October 3, 1977, p. 4:1.
38. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 110004Z Nov 77 (State Cite 268815)
(Subject: U.S. -USSR Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks) .
39. Bayne.
40. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 175.
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7, 9, 14, and 17 at the Soviet Embassy. Prior to that
session and because of its context in his overall arms
control policy, Carter addressed the Indian Ocean talks in
his State of the Union message on January 10, 1978. He
explained that:
the fundamental purpose of our arms limitation
efforts is to promote our own national security
and to strengthen international stability. . . .
In the Indian Ocean, where neither we nor the
Soviet Union has yet deployed military power on a
large scale, we are working for an agreement to
prevent a major military competition.
Additional evidence supporting this position was found in
the statement on NALT of Secretary of Defense Brown that
".
. . [the U.S.] . . . hope[s] to achieve stability at the
43levels that prevailed during recent years." However,
because of the increasing involvement of Soviet and Cuban
forces in the Horn of Africa and the related buildup of
Soviet military presence in the Indian Ocean, Carter
approved a recommendation of the SCC on January 24, 1978,
that Warnke should deliver a protest to Mendelevich
regarding the negative implications of the Soviet actions on
41. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 111929Z Jan 78 (State Cite 007443)
(Subject: U.S. -USSR Indian Ocean Arms Control Talks)
.
42. U.S., President, "The State of the Union: An Address
Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress, 10 January
1978," Weekly Compilat ion of Presidential Documents ,
January 20, 1978, p. 122.




the negotiations at their first private meeting in Berne in
44
February. Warnke did this as did Bayne in private
discussions with his Soviet Navy counterpart. Both tried to
45
convey the sense of U.S. disbelief. Having received no
positive reply to these protests, Carter decided not to
schedule any more rounds of negotiations because Soviet
naval operations in support of their political activities in
the Horn of Africa in early 1978 had suggested that there
was no common understanding on how a stabilization agreement
would actually affect the behavior of the United States and
46
the Soviet Union. Although there were several attempts by
the Soviet Union to remove this linkage and get the talks
going again by lobbying with the littoral nations of the
Indian Ocean to exert pressure on the U.S. to resume the
talks and by direct approaches to the U.S. Government, these
44. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 175.
45. Bayne , Warnke . During a press conference on February
10, 1978, Vance was the first Carter Administration official
to publicly suggest a linkage of the talks with events in
the Horn of Africa. See U.S., Department of State, "The
Secretary: News Conference, February 10," The Department of
State Bulletin, March 1978, p. 13-16.
46. Indian Ocean Arms Limitations. 1978 , p. 7. See also U.S.
Congress, House, Committee on the Armed Services, Sub-
committee on Intelligence and Military Application of
Nuclear Energy, Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and
Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation, Indian Ocean Arms
Limitati on and Conventional Arms Trans fer Limitation , Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979) , p. 3-4
(hereinafter referred to as Indian Ocean Arms Limitation
Report ) y "U.S. Decides to Stall Parley with Moscow on the
Indian Ocean," The New York Times, February 8, 1978, p. 8:1.

- 168 -
efforts produced no immediate results. Warnke conveyed
this decision to Mendelevich by informing him that, because
of these problems, the Government of the United States had
reserved the right to arrange the scheduling of the next
round of talks to the government to government level. This
authority had previously been delegated to the head of
i i 48delegation level.
One final comment is necessary before beginning the
analysis of the issues of the talks. The most comprehensive
public statement of U.S. hopes for NALT appeared in
testimony before a panel of the House Armed Services
Committee empowered to review and study governmental
activities in international arms control and disarmament.
On October 3, 1978, Gelb testified that:
Under a stabilization agreement neither the U.S.
nor the Soviet Union could increase the size of
its military presence in the Indian Ocean or
significantly alter its pattern of deployments.
The U.S. would maintain our Middle East Force and
continue our pattern of periodic task group
deployments to the Indian Ocean. Our ships could
continue to transit the area and to make routine
port calls in littoral countries. We would
47. See "Soviet Negotiator on Indian Ocean Arrives in
Colombo," U.S. Joint Publications Research Service,
Translations on the Law of the Sea
,
JPRS 70818 (Washington:
March 22, 1978), p. 21; "France Seen as Increasing Its
Presence in the Indian Ocean," U.S. Joint Publications
Research Service, Translat ions on the Law of the Sea , JPRS
70824 (Washington: March 23, 1978), p. 34; and "Feud in
Administration Said to Endanger Talks on Arms Sales Pact,"
The New York Times , December 20, 1978, p. 12:1.
48. g ayne .
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maintain our facility on Diego Garcia. Our
military forces would continue to participate in
military exercises with our ANZUS and CENTO
partners. The military forces of our allies would
not be limited by the agreement. In sum, an
agreement would maintain the U.S. -Soviet force
balance and would permit us to fulfill our
security and foreign policy commitments in the
area.
The foregoing discussion describes the framework within
which the delegations discussed the issues of the talks as
well as establishing the chronology of the policy
formulation process for the Indian Ocean talks. The next
part of this study discusses the substantive and technical
aspects of those questions.
49. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of
Nuclear Energy, Panel on Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and
Conventional Arms Transfer Limitation, Indian Ocean Arms
Limitat ions and Multilateral Cooperation on Restraining Con-
ventional Arms Transfers , Hearings (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1978) , p. 6 (hereinafter referred to as





We can never tell beforehand in war what points it
will be necessary to occupy as naval bases. . . .
The making of a provision which will tend to force
ships to go for supply and repair to certain
positions, whether they are placed conveniently or
not in regard to operations in hand, is a policy
likely to end in some loss and much wasted
expense
.
~ Philip Colomb (1891)
The occupation, defense and use of naval bases have
traditionally been three of the quintessential factors in
the naval element of the national security policy of
maritime nations. Mahan argued that without overseas bases
the U.S. Navy would "be like land birds, unable to fly far
from their own shores." Indeed bases just such as those
that the European colonial powers established around the rim
of the Indian Ocean from the beginning of the sixteenth
century through the early twentieth century were an
1. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence q£ Seapower on






imperative for the maintenance of their overseas empires.
The loss of this spiderweb of bases not only signalled the
end of those empires but marked the beginning of a new
competition to secure their capabilities.
The limiting of overseas bases was a tactic of this
competition as well as a technique that complemented the
regional approach to arms control. Just as major maritime
powers recognized the need for naval bases overseas, they
tried to impose constraints on their adversaries' oasing
structure to limit the forward deployments of their naval
forces and thus constrain any political advantage derived
from such operations. In the case of the Indian Ocean, this
technique of naval arms control would, no doubt, have
satisfied those non-aligned nations, such as India, which
expressed concern over the presence of bases in the region
but would also have worked a serious disadvantage on the
United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.
The preponderance of Soviet rhetoric on the subject
demonstrates that the subject of bases was one of their
principal, if not the dominant, concerns in the Indian Ocean
talks. Soviet official and press statements issued after
Carter's proposal and Vance's Moscow trip confirm this. On
April 1, 1977, Podgorny, during a visit to Mozambique,





favors the idea of creating a zone of peace in the
2
Indian Ocean being free of foreign military bases." The
Soviet media criticized Carter's March 9 press conference by
echoing the standard Soviet position that only dismantlement
of Diego Garcia could achieve a demilitarized Indian Ocean.
In an editorial on April 12, TASS explained that Carter's
failure to follow up his call for demilitarization by-
liquidating U.S. Indian Ocean bases indicated that the
United States intended to do the opposite of what it
professed. Citing Congressional testimony that work on
Diego Garcia would continue as proof that Carter's Indian
Ocean policy was unchanged, the TASS commentator concluded
that initial optimism toward the plan by the Indian Ocean
states had been "hasty" and attributable to the "propaganda
hullabaloo" raised by Carter over his "broad plan" to limit
the strategic arms race. He argued that the removal of
military bases must be the "first step" toward relaxing
tensions in the Indian Ocean, and that this should be
followed by the mutual reduction of military activity in the
region by non-littoral states. This critical treatment of
Carter's plan was consistent with Soviet public statements
cited earlier in this study depicting the USSR as willing to
2. FB-M-77-10009, p. 7.

- 173 -
limit Indian Ocean naval activity despite an alleged buildup
of U.S. naval capabilities in the region.
The same theme resurfaced later that month in the joint
Soviet-Indian communique on the occasion of Gromyko's visit
to India from April 25 through April 27, 1977. The
communique said that the Soviet Union and India stood "for
the elimination of all existing foreign military bases from
4
the Indian Ocean and the prohibition of new ones." In a
commentary on this communique on April 29, 1977, TASS added
that:
The means of achieving this is to abolish existing
foreign bases in the Indian (Ocean and insure that
no new ones are established.
Pr avda took note of the issue on May 18, 1977, and
indicated the potential range and depth of what the Soviet
position on bases would be during the forthcoming talks.
The Pravda article alleged that:
The United States [had] an entire network of bases
which [were] constantly being expanded and
modernized. On the perimeter are the Persian Gulf
bases; the air force base on the island of
Al-Masirah in the Arabian Sea; the Republic of
3. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Moscow Media Criticizes President's Indian Ocean Proposal,"
FBIS Trends, April 13, 1977, p. 15.






South Africa's naval air base in Simonstown; the
naval base in Cockburn Sound [Australia] ; the
Subic Bay and Clark Field bases in the Philippines
which control the approaches to the Indian Ocean
in the east.
The article went on to suggest that:
In order to transform the Indian Ocean into a
peace zone, it is necessary to liquidate the
foreign bases there, not to create new ones.
Given this solution of the bases issue, the Soviet
Union is prepared to join other powers in seeking
ways of reducing, on a mutual basis, the military
activity of nonlittoral states in the Indian Ocean
and the areas immediately adjacent to it.
TASS, in the first public Soviet commentary on the
Indian Ocean talks after the initial round of negotiations
in Moscow, linked the "key problems of international peace
and security" with "the network of military bases belonging
to states lying geographically very far from the Indian
o
Ocean." Two weeks later, in what was more direct evidence
of the importance of bases in the Soviet negotiating
strategy, TASS explained that "the main thing on which the
possibility of turning the Indian Ocean into a peace
6. Ibid., p. 13-14.
7. Ibid.
8. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "TASS
Comments on Talks with U.S. on Indian Ocean," FBIS Daily
Report: The Soviet Union . July 1, 1977, p. J1-J2




zone is the liquidation of foreign military bases in the
area.
"
Carter, however, decided to continue with the expansion
of Diego Garcia' s military capabilities planned by the Ford
Administration and authorized by Great Britain in the
Anglo-American agreement of February 25, 1976. Thus, even
before the talks began, there was substantial evidence of
disagreement on the basic functional issue of the talks.
Base Limitations in Historical Perspective
Perhaps the best known attempt to impose limitations on
an overseas basing system was Article 19 of the Five-Power
Naval Treaty. Though originally omitted from the "stop now"
proposal of the U.S. delegation to the Washington Conference
because of a promise to the U.S. Navy's General Board that
any treaty would not prohibit fortification of the U.S.
9. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Novoye Vremya Condemns U.S. Policy in Indian Ocean," FBIS
Daily Report: The Soviet Union , July 14, 1977, p. B7
(hereinafter referred to as FBIS: Soviet Union , July 14,
1977) .
10. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Naval Support Facility on Diego
Garcia," Un ited States Treaties and Other International
Agreements, TIAS 8230 (Washington: U.S. Department of State,
1977), v. 27, pt. 1, p. 318 (hereinafter referred to as TIAS
8230) ; David A. Andelman, "Navy Rushes to Complete Work on
First Indian Ocean Base," The New York Times , April 7, 1977,
p. 1:4; David A. Andelman, "Indian Ocean: Arm-Race Focal
Point," The New York Times
, April 10, 1977, p. IV:2:3.
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Pacific island naval bases, Article 19, the non-
fortification clause, restricted the improvement of existing
fortifications on the island possessions of the treaty's
signatories. This included Hong Kong, the Philippines, and
Guam but omitted the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New
Zealand, Singapore, the West Coast of the United States, the
islands off the Panama Canal Zone, and the home islands of
Japan.
The issue came to the fore when a deadlock developed
over the problem of the ratio of capital ships. Japan
linked acceptance of a lower capital ship ratio with the
Pacific islands fortifications agreement as a quid pro
12quo. The negotiations surrounding Article 19 were
13detailed and highlighted some of the enduring geographic
realities of bases in the national security of states.
Japan's naval establishment took the position that
inferiority to Great Britain and the United States in
capital ships was acceptable only if the two powers agreed
11. Thomas H. Buckley, The United State s and the Washington
Confe r ence, 192 1-1922 (Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 57.
12. Ibid., p. 84.
13. See, for example, Buckley, op. cit., p. 90-103; Roger
Dingman, Power in th e Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms
Limitation
r
1914-1922 (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1976), p. 48, 80-81, 192-193, 209-222; Seward W.
Livermore, "The American Naval Base Policy in the Far East,"
Pacific Historical Review , June 1944, p. 113-135.
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to limit or destroy fortifications in their territories in
the Western Pacific. The Imperial Japanese Navy argued
that:
The fact that the Imperial Navy is readily able to
maintain the national defense against the United
States Navy depends principally upon the fact that
the United States has insufficient advanced bases
in the Pacific and the Far East. If . . . the
[Americans] were to complete the necessary mili-
tary facilities . . . our strategic relationship
would take on a completely new aspect.
The main premise of the U.S. War Plan Orange for hostilities
with Japan was that the United States Navy needed to hold or
to recapture Guam to establish a secure basing system in the
Western Pacific to support anticipated operations against
Japan. The key to the success of this concept of operations
was the development of protected shore facilities around the
Panama Canal, in the Hawaiian Islands, on Guam, and in the
Philippines. The opening of the dry dock at Pearl Harbor in
1919 coupled with the transit of the battleships of the
Pacific Fleet through the Panama Canal in the same year
signalled a commitment of sorts to this strategy even though
Guam and the Philippines remained neglected.
These contending positions, as well as the negotiations
that sought to advance them, suggest that the United States
recognized, perhaps less than Japan did, its dependence on a
Pacific basing system from which the U.S. Navy could project
14. Dingman, op. cit., p. 188.
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power when U.S. national interest so required. Moreover,
Japan understood full well that this adjunct to power
projection in the interwar years was a threat to its
national security as embodied in the Imperial Navy. Hence
Japan tried to control this threat through negotiation
during the Washington Naval Conference.
Contending Positions
There is a striking parallel between the positions of
Japan and the United States in 1921 and 1922 in the Pacific
and those of the United States and the Soviet Union in the
Indian Ocean in 1977 and 1978. For a variety of reasons, the
United States had not seen fit to develop Guam or any
suitable location in the Philippines as a major fleet
15
operating base. The Navy's facilities construction and
dredging program at Pearl Harbor had achieved results of
sufficient magnitude to enable the U.S. Navy to use Hawaii
as a base for forward deployment of the Pacific Fleet by
1919 even though the decision had been made in 1908 to
develop Pearl Harbor as the principal U.S. overseas naval
15. See William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in
the Pacific, 1897-1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1958), p. 118-124, 216-223, 237-239; Harold and Margaret
Sprout, The Rise of American Ra.ya.1 POJtfejL, 1776-1918
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946) , p. 243-245,
300-302; Harold and Margaret Sprout, Toward a New Order of




base in the Pacific. Thus, if the U.S. executed War Plan
Orange in 1921 or 1922 , the United States Navy would have
had to project its forces across some 5000 miles of the
Pacific Ocean in order to engage the Imperial Japanese Navy
and, ultimately, the home islands of Japan. The logistics
problems inherent in such an operation were monumental and
17
the U.S. Navy recognized them.
Japan understood the advantages that these positional
deficiencies conferred on her. The other premise of War
Plan Orange was that the U.S. Navy would have a numerical
advantage on the order of two-to-one in capital ships and
that this numerically superior battle fleet could go on the
offensive from well supplied and protected bases in the
Philippines or Guam. Japan, at the time, had no need to
project power anywhere beyond the Western Pacific. The
Japanese were thus in a defensive posture— a position which
conveyed an advantage to its holder because of the tech-
nology of the period. Moreover, this positional aspect of
conflict insured the success of subsequent Japanese
operations nearer to Japan's power base— its home islands
and the Asian mainland.
16. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897 -
1909
, p. 222-223.
17. See Sprout, Toward a New Orde r of Sea Powex, p. 26-29.
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The Soviet Union enjoyed similar circumstances with
respect to military operations in the northwest quadrant of
the Indian Ocean. The central Asian border of the USSR was
only 700 miles north of the Gulf of Oman. The USSR was thus
able to project substantial numbers of ground forces and
aircraft over that distance from nearby bases in the Soviet
Union. Portions of the USSR such as the Transcaucasus
,
Turkestan, and Central Asia were all within 2,500 miles of
the Indian Ocean, the approximate combat radius of the
BACKFIRE bomber. In addition, the reopening of the Suez
Canal conveyed a marginal advantage in the Soviet Union's
ability to surge naval forces into the Indian Ocean from its
Mediterranean Squadron or Black Sea Fleet. Such forces
could be on station in the Arabian Sea in approximately five
days' time as long as Egypt did not deny them permission to
transit Suez.
However, the United States, if it did not already have
a battle group deployed in the Indian Ocean, would have
needed some twelve days to deploy one of the Seventh Fleet's
carrier battle groups from the western Pacific and longer if
one had to transit from the the United States. If Soviet
forces had to transit to the Indian Ocean from the Soviet
Navy's Pacific Fleet, the Soviet Union would be at a similar
disadvantage. The issue then was one of sustaining both
Soviet and U.S. forces and providing support in the form of
communications, intelligence, logistics, etc., during their
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operations in the region. It is for these reasons that
bases were a likely candidate as an agenda item during the
talks.
Previous discussion in this study regarding the Soviet
declaratory position on bases in the Indian Ocean suggests
that the Soviet Union introduced the issue. If one takes
the USSR's stated position of not maintaining or having any
intention of constructing any bases in the region as an
entering argument, it follows that the Soviet objective
would have been the U.S. abandonment of Diego Garcia as well
as Bahrein. The USSR perceived these facilities as bases
relatively close to Soviet territory from which the United
States could project military power into the Indian Ocean as
well as serving as facilities in being should the United
States decide to create an enhanced permanent naval presence
in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet negotiators were particu-
larly concerned with any bases which they thought were
1
8
capable of supporting strategic forces.
The principal political and military objective of the
United States with regard to this issue was to constrain the
establishment of a major Soviet naval support infrastructure
in the littoral of the Indian Ocean. Recognizing that both
the United States and the Soviet Union had legitimate, if
asymmetrical, security interests in the region, the United
18. si ck , Warnke.
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States wanted to limit use of support facilities but not
routine port calls by Soviet naval and merchant vessels.
The United States, however, would not discuss Diego Garcia
in isolation from other facilities in the region nor would
it consider the abandonment of Diego Garcia as any kind of
19precondition to further discussions.
Thus, even from a conceptual viewpoint, the issue of
limitation on bases offered little chance of success. While
the Soviet Union approached the issue from a doctrine that
was akin to disarmament (i.e., abandonment of Diego Garcia),
the United States tried to regulate the utilization of the
various facilities available to the Soviet Navy throughout
the Indian Ocean littoral. In this regard these facilities,
or bases, could be limited both as to the frequency and the
nature of their use. Both approaches, however, were not
without political risk for both the U.S. and the USSR. Such
restrictions on the use of bases might have suggested that
bases, or facilities for that matter, as symbols of interest
and guarantees of a capacity to act in peacetime and crisis
had lost their importance in the national security policy of
both the U.S. and the USSR.
Nevertheless, if the United States could have concluded
an agreement preventing the development of additional




Indian Ocean operations although, at the same time, it would
have capped its support infrastructure in the region.
Moreover, such an agreement might have prevented the Soviet
Union from enhancing its politico-military position in
certain of the littoral states by capitalizing on its
political advantage and developing additional facilities in
the region.
Recognizing that this objective would be unacceptable
to the United States, the Soviet Union pushed for the
cessation of construction on Diego Garcia with a commitment
to no new construction as a fallback position. Even though
the U.S. opposed any Soviet demand to abandon Diego Garcia,
a possible U.S. position would have been to insist on
finishing the current phase of construction on the island
with an agreement for no new military construction.
However, coincident with the opening of the negotiations and
in response to a Congressional directive to report on the
progress of the talks prior to going ahead with certain
portions of the FY78 Military Construction program for Diego
Garcia, the Carter Administration delayed certain projects
on the island which were related to the kind and level of
operations that the facility could support. In early 1978,
after the Administration had made clear its decision not to
build up Diego Garcia beyond the authorized program and upon
notification to the chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Sentaor John C. Stennis, Secretary of Defense
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Brown authorized the Navy to proceed with the complete FY78
20
program. Even though such a position would have been
consistent with that previously articulated on the future of
the island as well as the U.S. objective of stabilizing U.S.
and Soviet presence in the region, the U.S. delegation
informed its Soviet counterpart during the third and fourth
rounds of the negotiations in Berne that the programmed
expansion on Diego Garcia would not be discontinued and was
21
not negotiable.
Nonetheless, the United States enjoyed one distinct
advantage over the Soviet Union with regard to facilities in
the Indian Ocean. The U.S. position on Diego Garcia was
22politically secure while the Soviet Union ran the risk
20. U.S., Congress, Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Division, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and
Overseas Military Insta llations f Report (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 90-91. The admin-
istration held up approval for the procurement of materials
relating to the construction of aircraft shelters and
Bachelor Enlisted quarters.
21. "Disapproval of Construction Projects on the Island of
Diego Garcia," Congressional Record . July 28, 1975,
p. S24340; Joel Larus, "The End of Naval Detente in the
Indian Ocean," The Worl d Today , April 1980, p. 127.
22. There is a contending view that argues that the claims
of Mauritius, attacks by the British Labor Party in
Parliament and ambiguities in the terms of the original
cession of the island to Great Britain and in the U.S.-
British arrangements governing its use pose vulnerabilities
to the United States. See Joel Larus, "Diego Garcia:
Political Clouds Over a Vital U.S. Base," Str ategic Review,
Winter 1982, p. 44-55.
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that, just as in the case of the Soviet expulsion from
Egypt, certain host states would terminate or curtail Soviet
access to such ports as Aden, Urn Quasr, and Berbera.
However, the situation at Bahrein was somewhat
different. The U.S. established the Naval Support Activity
(NAVSUPPACT) at Manama, Bahrein, in 1971 when the Sultanate
of Bahrein achieved its independence from Great Britain.
The United States took over the facilities of the former HMS
JUFAIR by negotiating a treaty with the newly independent
state. The agreement contained the provision that either
party could terminate the treaty at any time upon one year's
23
notification of its intention to do so. The Government of
24Bahrein exercised that option on October 20, 1973 — the
very same day that Saudi Arabia announced that it and the
other Arab oil-producing states, including Bahrein, had
decided to embargo all sales of oil to the United States.
Though Bahrein subsequently withdrew its decision, this
incident should have demonstrated to the United States that
facilities, no matter whose they were, were vulnerable to
23. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Deployment in Bahrein of the
United States Middle East Force," United States Treatie s and
Other Inte rnational Agreements , TIAS 7263 (Washington: U.S.
Department of State, 1972, v. 22, pt. 2, p. 2184-2189.
24. See "Bahrain: Termination of Facilities for United
States Navy," Keesing' s Contemporary Archives. September 2,
1977, p. 28538. See also Emile A. Nakhleh, Bahrai n:
Political Development in a Modernizing Society (Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1976, p. 97, 112.
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political coercion by the littoral states of the Indian
Ocean. Indeed, even the 1976 joint U.S. -U.K. agreement on
the use of the island nominally constrained the United
States' use of Diego Garcia. The agreement stipulated that
the U.S. commanding officer and the of f icer-in-charge of the
United Kingdom service element "shall inform each other of
intended movements of ships and aircraft in normal circum-
stances." However, "in other circumstances the use of the
facility shall be a matter for the joint decision of the two
Governments .
"
Both cases suggest a relationship between the issue of
overseas bases and the political cost-benefit analysis that
any host state would normally undertake relative to the
granting of access to its territory for base rights or even
the semblance of base rights. Such scrutiny could become
the focal point for political opposition, both domestic and
international. In a like manner, the inclusion of bases as
an agenda item in an arms control forum, such as the Indian
Ocean talks, heightens such perceptions as well as rendering
the host state more conspicuous in the regional political
system. Perhaps in an effort to defuse any such develop-
ment, as well as to emphasize the austere nature of its
facilities on Diego Garcia, the United States provided an




opportunity in April 1977 for the first group of jour-
nalists to get a firsthand look at what had taken place on
the island since construction began in 1971.
The Que^tlQD_ol_uj:iij,zation
A base does not simply exist to support itself. To be
useful, it must be functional— it must be capable of sup-
porting operational forces. This logic suggests that the
negotiations addressed not only the issue of bases per se f
but also their utilization. It would have been to the
advantage of the Soviet Union to include some form of
limitation on the utilization of Diego Garcia such as no
SSBN/SSN support, limited support for a carrier battle
group, or no use of the 12,000-foot runway by B-52 ' s in a
treaty. Such an agreement would not have been in the
overall interests of the United States even though the U.S.
did try to achieve stabilization at some level of prior
usage within the context of its overall negotiating
objective. Within this same framework, it seems plausible
that the question of alternative facilities in other parts
of the region as well as adjacent areas would have been
raised. Here the problem would have been one of
definition.
26. See, for example, Jack Fuller, "Dateline Diego Garcia:
Paved Over Paradise," Foreig n Policy , Fall 1977, p. 175-186.
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Even among professional military officers there was a
certain amount of semantic confusion over the terms "base,"
"facility," and "access." The Joint Chiefs of Staff
27
Dictionar y of Milita ry and Associated Ter ms did not
contain a definition of access. However, Robert E.
Harkavy's work on overseas bases suggests that the term
"access" normally subsumes all types of bases and facili-
ties, aircraft overflight rights, and port visit privileges
not involving any permanent military presence by the
2 8
visiting state. The Joint Chiefs did, however, provide an
insight into what the United States defined as a base and a
facility. The JCS defined the former as a locality from
which operations were projected or supported and an area or
locality containing installations which provided logistic or
29
other support. They refined this definition in the case
of a naval base to focus on the support of forces afloat and
usually contiguous to a port or anchorage, consisting of
activities or facilities for which the Navy has operational
responsibility, together with interior lines of
27. U.S., Department of Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Dictionary of Militar y and Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1)
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1, 1979)
(hereinafter referred to as JCS Pub. 1 )
.
28. Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competitioi
Basest The Geopolitics of Access DipJ.<
Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 14.





communication and the minimum surrounding area necessary for
local security. These definitions, as general as they may
be, provide a clue to the U.S. negotiating position on the
subject of bases. As discussed earlier in this study, the
main points of contention were Diego Garcia and Berbera.
The principal military facility utilized by the Soviet
Union in the Indian Ocean at the time was Berbera. The
Soviet Union constructed the complex principally for its own
use. It became available in 1972 although the USSR had been
developing Berbera as a deep-water commercial port since the
mid-1960 ' s. After 1972, there was a major expansion of the
port's capabilities, including a Soviet large floating
drydock which was capable of docking any of the Soviet
submarines that had operated in the Indian Ocean as well as
surface ships up to the size of KRESTA II class guided
missile cruiser as well as storage capacity for 200,000
31barrels of fuel.
These capabilities included a naval communications
complex built in 1973 consisting of a transmitter and
receiver site as well as a facilities control center. When
30. Ibid., p. 229.
31. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Visit to _ the Democratic Republic of Somalia. , Report
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 14;
Brian Crozier, The Soviet Presence in SjpjMXla, (London:




Senator Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma and his staff of defense
experts visited Somalia in July 1975, their Somali escort
officer insisted that the group could not enter or inspect
the communications station because the station belonged to
the USSR and the Soviet officer in charge had refused Somali




Moreover the USSR had constructed a housing complex to
accommodate support personnel in addition to the berthing
capabilities of a Soviet barracks and repair barge which
arrived in Berbera in 1972. Again, the Bartlett delegation
was unable to visit the barracks ship though this action was
justified since it did fly the Soviet naval ensign and hence
was under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union. However, the
Bartlett delegation gained only limited access to the
housing compound. Signs in this compound, including those
in an outdoor movie theater, were all written in Russian in
the Cyrillic alphabet. Bartlett' s delegation estimated that
this compound could support a contingent of about 1000
33personnel.
The Bartlett group also identified a location in the
port area as a cruise missile handling and storage complex.
32. Visit to the Democratic Republic of Somalia , p. 12, 17,
21, 25, 29; State Cite 233001.
33. Ibid., p. 11, 16, 20.
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This facility was substantially larger and more elaborate
than similar complexes in other states which had obtained
Soviet tactical cruise missiles. The Somalis argued that
the complex was theirs and intended to service the SS-N-2
STYX anti-ship cruise missiles which would arm the OSA fast
patrol boats which Somalia was scheduled to receive from the
Soviet Union. The Bartlett delegation noted several incon-
34
sistencies in this line of argumentation.
One of the buildings in the complex contained a 25-ton
capacity crane while several of the missile storage bunkers
had relatively sophisticated temperature and humidity
controls. In addition, artillery ammunition stored in these
bunkers had the appearance of having been hastily arranged.
Moreover the Somali officer who was put forth as the com-
manding officer of this complex could not even answer the
most elemental technical questions about the missile
, 35
complex.
In addition to Berbera, Somalia also provided addi-
tional bases to the Soviet Union. AN-12 CUB reconnaissance
aircraft and IL-38 MAY ASW aircraft operated from airfields
at Berbera, Hargesia, Galacio, and Uale Uen within Somalia.
The Soviet Union and Cuba also utilized the port facilities
34. Ibid., p. 21, 27, 31.
35. Ibid., p. 22, 26, 31, 32.
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at Kisrnayu in the southern portion of the country.
The foregoing suggests three considerations that might
be useful in answering the question of whether or not Soviet
access to Berbera constituted a base. If the JCS definition
of the presence or absence of a specific support infra-
structure in the form of command and control capabilities,
airfields, military housing, and ammunition and missile
storage handling capabilities, and a petroleum storage
capacity is used, then Berbera was a Soviet base since these
factors were evident in the case of Berbera and the other
Somali installations. The other factor that both the JCS
definition and Somali statements on control over at least
portions of this infrastructure suggests is that the Soviet
Union had certain extraterritorial rights over the Berbera
complex. Usually, when the host state imposes some form of
control or where joint access is the rule, as in the case of
Diego Garcia, it is common practice to refer to the complex
37in question as a "facility" as opposed to a base.
Semantics aside, the real question was one of utili-
zation and what constituted utilization in the context of
operational support. One criterion that analysts have
36. State Cite 233001; Avigdor Haselkorn, The Evolution of
Soviet Security Strategy: 1965-1975 (New York: Crane, Russak
and Co., 1978), p. 37; "The Soviet Collective Security
System," Orbis
,
Spring 1975, p. 231-254.
37. Harkavy, op. cit., p. 15.
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relied on to assess these problems is the aggregate data for
3 8port visits of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the
Indian Ocean along with the Mediterranean littoral accounted
for almost all Soviet port visits up to the time of the
Indian Ocean talks. Most Soviet naval combatants visited
Berbera at least once during their deployment to the Indian
39
Ocean. The issue then turns on the question of at what
level or frequency do visits to a given port constitute that
port being a base in the context of the definition derived
above. It seems that some sort of common ground could
ultimately have been reached, within the context of the
foregoing argument, on the distinction between full
utilization of a facility or base, which could be limited,
and routine port visits, which need not have been limited.
The limiting of U.S. overseas bases was an attractive
goal to the Soviet Union. If successful in the Indian Ocean
talks the Soviet Union would have achieved a verifiable
constraint on U.S. operational capabilities in the Indian
Ocean at a modest cost to itself. However, the converse is
not true. The assumption that Soviet bases were easily
38. See, for example, Center for Naval Analyses, Institute
for Naval Studies, Port Visits and the Internationalist
Mission of the Soviet Navy . Professional Paper No. 143
(Arlington: April, 1976).
39. State Cite 233001; James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy
in the Indian Ocean," Michael MacGwire, ed., Soviet Naval
Developments: Capability and Context (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973), p. 395.
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verifiable does not stand up to analysis. One only has to
consider the various landing rights agreements wherein the
Soviet Union may get ground support from Soviet Bloc nations
40
such as its Cuban proxies in, for example, Angola, and
pseudo bases as Berbera used to be , to comprehend the
definitional problems of negotiating the issue of bases.
Moreover, the USSR could not have ignored the political
implications for other U.S. overseas activities such as
Yokosuka and Subic Bay in terms of the precedent that could
have been established. Though such an agreement might have
hurt the Soviet Union more in the near term by politically
hindering it from seeking bases where it did not have them
(e.g., the South Atlantic), its effect on the U.S. would
have been more significant in the out years. The U.S. might
have been forced to seek other options such as an increased
Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) structure or con-
struction of facilities in the former Trust Territory of the
Pacific to retain its operational flexibility. The impact
in future budget dollars would not have been insignificant.
Moreover, such an agreement might have encouraged the Soviet
Navy into becoming increasingly more self-sufficient by
relying more on its MLSF.
40. James R. Mancham, "Why Democracy Is Drowning in the
Indian Ocean," U.S. Joint Publications Research Service,
Translations on Sub-Saharan Africa (GUO 1899), JPRS 70832






For any Indian Ocean agreement to demonstrate
significant political and military credibility, both parties
would have had to retain the capability to quickly and
decisively return to the region if their interests so
dictated. However, an arms control agreement from which
breakout in the event of a crisis was not only feasible but
expected should have been approached with more caution than
was evident. This dilemma raises the question of where did
the U.S. intend to be when negotiations were concluded. The
Soviet Union, as demonstrated by the events in Afghanistan,
was a back-door neighbor to the region. It is precisely for
this reason that not finishing the planned construction on
Diego Garcia, or any form of more severe limitation, was
more in the interest of the Soviet Union. Such rationale
was an argument against the successful completion of NALT
since naval power was essential to the U.S. position in the
region while it was only marginally additive to the
capabilities available to the Soviet Union to influence
events there during a crisis or warfighting environment.
The reported expansion of Soviet airfields in Afghanistan in
41November 1982 highlights this perception. Such a
capability substantially complicates the problem of
41. Richard Halloran, "New Soviet Afghan Bases Seen as Peril
to Gulf," The New York Times, November 14, 1982, p. 21:1.
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executing the Carter Doctrine because of the enhanced
land-based strike air capability of the Soviet Union because
of these bases in Afghanistan.
The importance of bases became readily apparent in the
wake of the events in Iran and Afghanistan and will be
discussed later. Nonetheless there was a foreshadowing of
the significance of this issue when the Government of
Somalia severed ties with the Soviet Union and expelled
Soviet personnel and fleet units from Berbera. In abro-
gating the agreement of July 11, 1974, between Somalia and
the Soviet Union, the Somali government withdrew the use of
"any facilities of a military nature [formerly] available
for the use of the Soviet Union in the territory and waters"
of Somalia on November 13, 1977. Moreover, "all Soviet
experts, military and civil, [then] in [Somalia] [were]
42
requested to leave the country within a week."
The Soviet delegation thus entered the third round of
negotiations at Berne in December 1977 at a disadvantage in
the short term since Soviet use of other facilities in the
region had generally been on an a_d hoc basis. Thus the
United States enjoyed a slight tactical advantage with
respect to the issue of bases although, in a lighter vein,
42. Official text of the Somali Minister of Information's
statement on November 13, 1977, as quoted in AMEMBASSY
MOGADISCIO msg 141105Z Nov 77 (Mogadiscio Cite 1924)





Mendelevich used the occasion to drive home his point that
the Soviet Union really didn't have any bases in the Indian
43
Ocean.
The USSR reacted promptly to this disadvantage and
tried to get access to an alternative port facility. In a
flurry of diplomatic activity, it tried to gain access to
both the port and airfield, vacant since 1966 when the
British left it, at Gan in the Maldives. However, the
Government of the Maldives, having joined the Non-Aligned
Movement only a year before this Soviet overture, rejected
the request on the grounds that a Soviet presence on Gan
would only exacerbate what the Non-Alighed Movement viewed
as superpower confrontation since Gan's airfield was only
44
400 miles north of Diego Garcia. The President of the
Maldives, Ibrahim Naisir, at a time when his country was
desperately in need of foreign capital, emphasized that the
Maldives were "simply not interested in leasing the former
45base for military purposes to the superpowers."
43. Warnk e.
44. See William Borders, "For Rent. Furnished Air Base on a
Quiet, Lush Maldive Island," Th£_Jie_w. York Times , December
24, 1977, p. 2:5.
45. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Soviet Attempt to Lease Indian Ocean Island Hit," FBIS
Daily Report: The PRC f October 31, 1977, p. A10.
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The Soviet Navy moved rapidly to reestablish itself at
nearby facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. Indeed,
Massawa, Assab, Aden, and anchorages in the Dahlak Archi-
pelago replaced, and possibly even enhanced, the
46
capabilities of Berbera. A number of Soviet naval units
moved directly from Berbera to Aden. Even the floating
drydock at Berbera was repositioned to form the nucleus of a
47
repair facility in the Dahlak Islands. These facilities
may very well have placed the Soviet military in a better
position to provide support, especially land-based tactical
air support as well as reconnaissance, for Soviet operations
in the northwest quadrant of the region. In any case,
Soviet access to Ethiopian facilities enabled the USSR to
capitalize on Ethiopia's desire for more military aid
through the December 1976 Soviet-Ethiopian arms agreement.
However, the United States did not protest the Soviet
overture to the Maldives. This suggests that, within the
framework of the ongoing talks, each party was prepared to
recognize the legitimacy of the other party having one major
base or facility in the region.
46. Pranay B. Gupte, "Soviet Activity Found Growing in Aden
Region," The New York Times . June 10, 1980, p. 13:1; Drew
Middleton, "New Soviet Anchorage Reported in Ethiopian Isles
in the Red Sea," The New York Times , October 28, 1980,
p . 6:3; Bayne .
47. Bayne : State Cite 233001; Ulrich Meister, "Strategic
Shifts in the Indian Ocean," Swiss Review of World Affairs ,
April 1982, p. 18.
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Twenty-twenty hindsight suggests that, had the issue of
bases been carried to a conclusion in NALT, the U.S. would
have been at a severe disadvantage when it needed to project
a force into the region to support its national security
policy. If one accepts that the premise that the goal of
the negotiations was stabilization at levels consistent with
previous activity in the region, then it seems that, using
the criteria established earlier in this chapter, Diego
Garcia and Berbera, or another Soviet facility, would have
legitimized each other. The intriguing question remains
what would have been the effect on U.S. national security
policy of an agreement limiting shore support beyond this
if, as was the case, the United States tried to get access
to facilities closer to the Persian Gulf in Somalia and Oman
in response to the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Perhaps
such an agreement cast in the geographic terms of reference
to be described later in this study would have prevented
such a U.S. move while not addressing Afghanistan which,
although not an Indian Ocean littoral state, could assist in
bringing Soviet forces to bear in an Indian Ocean crisis.
The distance of Diego Garcia from the Persian Gulf could not
have offset such a Soviet gain.
The problem of bases is the most striking of the ques-
tions addressed during the talks in terms of its geographic
implications. Carter's decision to seek expanded access to
support facilities in the Indian Ocean demonstrates the
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association of distance with the effective projection of
military power. The perceptions of U.S. ability to project
power into the region, and in particular into the Persian
Gulf, held by the Carter national security apparatus changed
by a quantum factor in early 1978 and culminated in the
frantic search for access in the Indian Ocean littoral.
This set of events demonstrates that distance, and its
politico-military implications, is a matter of perception.
Moreover, these perceptions are more often than not mental
or cognitive and reflect individual perceptions of the world
and thus influence the policy options of their holders.
This in turn suggests that Carter pursued Indian Ocean NALT
out of a belief, honest though it was, that the Indian Ocean
could be dissociated from the global politico-military
framework and geographically isolated from the continuing
U.S. -Soviet adversarial relationship.
Such perceptions, and they are only perceptions, offer
a recent and perhaps compelling case study to support the
idea that even a regional arms control issue must be sub-
jected to analysis using as a framework the global
considerations of the national security policies and
interests of the states concerned. Moreover, such analysis
cannot be limited to using geography as its sole or dominant
criteria since, as a discipline, it constitutes but a
collection of partial solutions separated from the issues at
hand. The limitation of geography in this regard derives
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:rom the fact that a purely geographic analysis tends to
focus on the one or several distinctive phenomena that
differentiate an area or region. The key to integrating
such an analysis of a regional proposal into an arms control
forum is to blend the region's geopolitical and geostrategic
characteristics into the global framework of the state's
interests.
The issue of bases also demonstrates that geographic
interpretations of an issue may change as a result of
relative changes in the military capabilities of adver-
saries. The Soviet move from Somalia to Ethiopia placed the
Soviet Navy in an advantageous position on the Red Sea. The
increasing use of Aden called into question the ability of
the West to control the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. The Soviet
presence in Afghanistan threatened one of the premises of
the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) —that its principal mission
was to contain a cross-border attack from the north in the
Gulf region. The Soviet air bases in Afghanistan, besides
posing a threat to Pakistan, dictated that RDF operations
must also consider a threat axis to the east as well as to
the north. These factors call into question Carter's
premise of stabilizing the superpower relationship through a
regional arms control accord given the changing pattern of
base access of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Soviet shift
to Ethiopia demonstrates that any form of base or facility
limitation would have had little or no effect on the
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uestion of Soviet military assistance— the principal Soviet
nstrument for gaining leverage with its client states or
ther governments leaning toward the Soviet Union.
This in turn suggests that those who would design a
egional arms control proposal must take account of the
ifficult notion that the significance of geography is not
tatic and immutable. Though the broad, physical aspects of
he discipline are enduring, the implications of a change or
ariation in the political forces that control the physical
sography are the key elements in the relationship between a
sographic area and the international political process,
ases serve as a case study of this theorem. Hence,
sgional arms control, just like all other forms of arms
Dntrol, must recognize the primacy of politics in the arms
Dntrol process and must integrate the technical issues,
jch as bases, with the broader, long-term political
Dncerns of the states involved.

CHAPTER VI
THE INDIAN OCEAN AND STRATEGIC WARFARE
The imperialists are converting the World Ocean
into a vast base of launching sites for ballistic
missile submarines. . . . Our Navy must be capable
of countering this real threat.
— Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (1972)
Th e P roblem
There is substantial evidence that the Soviet Union
considered the issue of U.S. strategic force deployments as
equally an important agenda item as bases during the talks.
The TASS statement on the first round of negotiations cited
in the preceding chapter tried to link Diego Garcia with
ballistic missile submarines. The commentator argued that
"strategic strike forces [were not] needed for ensuring the
security of oceanographic and other scientific investi-
gations" in the Indian Ocean. The article concluded by
explaining the relationship of strategic forces to "one very
important fact of geography, namely, that some sections of
the Indian Ocean, especially in its northwestern part, lie





Union." TASS reiterated this theme two weeks later and
remarked that:
The peculiarity of the geographic position of
the Indian Ocean is such that some of its areas,
above all in the northern and northwestern part,
are situated quite close to the Soviet Union's
southern districts. . . . The significance of this
circumstance from the strategic viewpoint is easy
to see.
Indeed, some analysts have argued that the basic Soviet
maritime interest in the Indian Ocean stems from Soviet
concern for and assumptions about U.S. Submarine Lauched
3Ballistic Missile (SLBM) deployments in the region.
Several prominent Soviet publicists have suggested that the
primary focus of these operations was the anti-SSBN
4
mission. Moreover, the issue of bases in the region, such
as Diego Garcia, which was addressed in the preceding
chapter demonstrated the concern on the part of the Soviet
Union that the United States would utilize Diego Garcia to
1. FBIS: Soviet Union . July 1, 1977.
2. FBIS: Soviet Union . July 14, 1977.
3. For example see Geoffrey Jukes, "The Indian Ocean in
Soviet Naval Policy," Adelphi Paper . No. 87 (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972); Alvin
J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, eds, The Indian Ocean: Its
Politica l, Economic and Military Importance (New York:
Praeger, 1972); and Michael MacGwire, Soviet Naval Devel-
opments: Capability and Context (New York: Praeger, 1973).
4. See, for example, V. Kudryavtsev, "The Indian Ocean in
the Plans of Imperialism," International Affairs (Moscow),
November 1974, p. 117, and Zhitomirsky, op. cit., p. 12.
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support two elements of the U.S. strategic tr iad-SSBN ' s and
5
B-52's. The lengthening of the runway on the island to
12,000 feet and testimony in 1973 which inferred that there
may have been some advantage to the basing of the TRIDENT
force on the west coast of the United States with respect to
TRIDENT operations in the Indian Ocean may have reinforced
Soviet apprehension in this regard.
The Soviet leadership has historically demonstrated a
willingness to expend considerable resources whenever the
defense of Soviet territory has been concerned. This has
been true even when the potential return on their investment
may not have been substantial. This historical precedent
suggests that any method of countering the U.S. SLBM threat
would have been extremely attractive. Indeed, the Soviet
Union had been addressing the problem of U.S. SSBN's, as
well as those of France and Great Britain, in a variety of
arms control forums. Though its ultimate goal may very well
be the operational deployment of a surveillance system that
5. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Colonel Aleksy Leontyev, "Imperialism Stands Accused," FBIS
Daily Report: The Soviet Union , September 26, 1974,
p. A6-A9.
6. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Armed Services,
Fiscal Year 1974 Authorization for Military Proc u rement,
Research and Development, Construction Authorization for the
Safegua rd ABM, and Active Duty and Selected Reserve
Strengths r Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1973) , p. 728.
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would continuously locate all missile firing submarines
coupled with a rapid response kill capability, the USSR
would certainly have been prepared to pursue any approach
that offered a chance of reducing the overall threat from
the sea-based forces of the United States. Those means that
offered an option of reducing the resource allocation prob-
lem while at the same time constraining the threat would
have been even more remunerative to the Soviet Union. The
Indian Ocean talks were one such option.
The Sea Based Leg
The issue of U.S. SSBN deployments in the region was an
old one. The initial operational deployment of the POLARIS
A-l missile with a range of 1200 nautical miles on board USS
GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) on November 15, 1960, con-
strained United States SSBN's to operate from patrol sta-
tions in an area off the north coast of the Soviet Union.
Its follow-on version, the POLARIS A-2 missile, became
operational in 1962 with a range of 1800 nautical miles. As
a result the eastern Mediterranean was a feasible deployment
area for the U.S. POLARIS force. When the A-3 missile went
to sea in 1964 with a range of 2500 nautical miles, it was
readily apparent to anyone who could use a chart of the
Soviet Union, a globe, and a piece of string whose length
equated to the A-3's range that Moscow was within range of
an A-3 missile fired from a hypothetical patrol station in
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the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Moreover,
agreements with the United Kingdom and Spain for bases at
Holy Loch in Scotland and Rota, Spain, accompanied the
deployment of the A-l and A-2 variants of POLARIS. It was
logical then that the Soviet Union began to look for
evidence in the form of negotiations for base rights to
support an Indian Ocean POLARIS deployment.
The United States did not disappoint the Soviet gov-
ernment. In July 1959 the NSC, with the concurrence of the
JCS, directed that U.S. planners consider the "availability
of Australian facilities in limited hostilities in the Far
East" in their deliberations with their SEATO and ANZUS
g
counterparts. Also, the 1959 review by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of U.S. strategic objectives indicated for the first
time the growing importance of the Indian Ocean as an area
of concern to the United States. The decolonization of
Africa and the Chinese operations in Tibet suggested that
7. See U.S., Department of State, "The Establishment of
Support Facilities in the United Kingdom for Polaris Sub-
marines of the United States Navy," American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents—I960 (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1964), p. 368; Drew Middleton, "U.S. Polaris
Submarines to Use Firth of Clyde Base," The New York Times .
November 2, 1960, p. 1:6.
8. U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations,
Unclassified Memorandum on Long Range Planning £o_L
Australia. 1959-1960 : cited by Roy Neil Wallace, "The
Australian Purchase of Three United States Guided Missile
Destroyers: A Study of the Defense Aspect of Australian-
American Relations (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1980), p. 121.
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the Soviet Union and the People's Republic could soon break
out of the U.S. containment perimeter into the immediate
Indian Ocean area and thus add the region to the ongoing
Western-Communist confrontation. Because of this percep-
tion, the Chiefs envisioned an expanded operational role for
9
naval forces in the area.
Although a U.S. fleet operating base or facility in
Australia was not required, a need did exist for a com-
munication station to support U.S. conventional and
strategic forces. At the time, this requirement implied
that there was a need for a communication station which was
capable of operating in the very low frequency (VLF) band
because VLF was the principal means of communicating with
SSBN's on patrol while they remained submerged. In
9. U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations,




, cited by Wallace, op. cit., p. 122.
This emphasis was reflected in several articles of the
period. See, for example, Anthony Harrigan, "Sea Power:
Bulwark Against Chinese Communist Imperialism," United
States Nav a l Institute Proceedings , June 1960, p. 68-74;
M. H. Hellner, "Sea Power and Soviet Designs for Expansion,"
United States Naval Institute Proceedings , March 1960,
p. 23-32; and I. W. Zartman, "Communist China and the
Arab-African Area," United States Naval Institute Proceed-
ings
, September 1960, p. 23-30.
10. VLF transmissions are those carried in the 10 to 30
kilocycles portion of the radio frequency spectrum. Because
of characteristic long wave length, VLF transmissions
possess physical attributes which are very desirable for
reliable communications with submarines at substantial
ranges. Primary among these are the ability to follow the





reviewing the planned worldwide VLF program the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) determined in early
1959 that the network did not provide adequate coverage of
the Western and Southern Pacific and the Indian Ocean areas
to meet strategic requirements. Initially, the Navy staff
planned to construct a VLF station in the Marianas Islands
to offset this shortfall. The Office of the Secretary of
Defense approved this plan early in 1959.
By August of that year, however, the Navy had assembled
sufficient data to support an argument for siting the
required VLF facility in Australia rather than the
12Marianas. The shift was the product of "continued
engineering analysis" which "indicated that such a facility
in the Western Australian area would have great advantages
over one in the Marianas." Locating the station in
Australia would improve worldwide VLF coverage and enhance
the command and control capability to support operations in
13the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
11. U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Naval History Division, Unclassified Files on Naval
Communications, cited by Wallace, op. cit., p. 131.
12. U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Unclassified File Summary on the United States Naval
Communication Station Harold E. Holt, cited by Wallace, op.
cit., p. 132.
13. U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Opera-
tions, Naval History Division, Command History, U.S. Naval




Negotiations for a site at Northwest Cape in Western
Australia began in 1959. The United States and Australia
14
reached agreement on the matter in May 1963. Construction
began later the same year. The U.S. Navy commissioned the
station as an operational facility in September 1967 with a
VLF mission. Moreover, the negotiations with the United
Kingdom concerning the formation of the British Indian Ocean
Territory also fueled Soviet apprehension over U.S. inten-
tions for the Indian Ocean with regard to strategic
warfare
.
The Soviet Union was not the only party watching these
events. Shortly after the naval communications station at
Northwest Cape was operational, a noted Indian military
analyst suggested in 1968 that the U.S. had, or would soon
have, ballistic missile submarines deployed in the Indian
Ocean. He argued that:
The U.S. has built a VLF communication station at
Northwest Cape in Australia and this is part of a
global network with other stations being located
14. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the
Commonwealth of Australia Relating to the Establishment of a
United States Naval Communication Station in Australia,
"
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements
,
TIAS 5377 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1964),
v. 14, pt. 1, p. 908-913. The U.S. and Australia amended
this agreement in March 1974 to provide for joint operation
of the station. See U.S. Treaties, etc., "Australia: United
States Naval Communication Station in Australia," United
States Treaties and Other International Agreements , TIAS
8338 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1977), v. 27,
pt. 3, p. 2667-2671.
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at Cutler [Maine] , Japan, the Canal Zone, Maryland
and Seattle. The Australian station is stated to
be many times more powerful than the others, and
in addition a wireless station has also been built
at Asmara in Ethiopia. The communication in the
VLF band enables submarines to receive signals
without surfacing. This would indicate that U.S.
nuclear . . . ballistic missile submarines are
operating in the Indian Ocean. Before the
Poseidon and Polaris A3 missiles were developed,
the Polaris missiles Al and A2 had ranges of 1,380
and 1,785 miles. Because of the limitations on
their range with reference to main Soviet target
clusters, it was necessary to station most of the
Polaris submarines in the Arctic Ocean. The
Poseidon has a range of 2,900 miles and 31 out of
41 U.S. ballistic missile submarines are to be
fitted with ,Pjoseidon missiles operating from the
Arabian Sea.
Michael MacGwire, a well-known Canadian defense analyst,
reiterated the essential points of this argument, alleged
that the facility at Diego Garcia was the third node of an
Asmara-Diego Garcia-Northwest Cape chain of communication
stations stretching across the Indian Ocean, and concluded
that:
On the basis of this evidence, Soviet strategic
planners could hardly conclude otherwise than that
the United States was developing . . . the capa-
bility to operate submarines in the Indian Ocean.
And since there was no realistic role for U.S.
attack submarines in the area ... it could only
be concluded that these new facilities were
15. K. Subrahmanyam, "Ebb and Flow of Power in the Indian
Ocean , " The Journal of th e United Service Ins titution of
India, January-March, 1968, p. 11.
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intended to provide the necessary,
fi
command and
control for ballistic missile units.
There was, however, a contending approach to U.S. SLBM
operations in the Indian Ocean. Other commentators alleged
that evidence of this sort was not compelling. They
described the idea of U.S. SSBN's patrolling in the Indian
Ocean as a rather surprising misconception for Soviet
planners to entertain. James M. McConnell, a well-known
American naval analyst, explained that:
[The U.S.] government has never announced such
deployments; there is no need for them at the
present time. There would be a requirement if
[U.S.] submarines deployed elsewhere were in
jeopardy or if the Soviets had an effective
ABM—since an Arabian Sea launch would add a
complicating angle of approach. ... If Polaris
submarines were in the Indian Ocean, there would
have to be a tender in the area. Otherwise,
Indian Ocean patrols would actually detract from
[U.S.] deterrent posture, by appreciably reducing
total on-station time. It takes only a few days
for the submarines serviced by tenders at Holy
Loch, Rota or Guam to reach their stations in the
North Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific. No one
contends that [the U.S. has] a tender in the
Indian Ocean. This would be visible and everyone
16. MacGwire, op. cit., p. 439. A similar line of argumenta-
tion was proposed by other experts who reached similar
conclusions. "Introduction of Polaris A3 and the later
Poseidon with similar range of about 2,800 nm [has made] the
Arabian Sea the second-best deployment area in the world,
only slightly inferior in its range of targets to the east-
ern Mediterranean." See also Geoffrey Jukes, "Soviet Policy
in the Indian Ocean," Soviet Naval Policy: Objectives and
Constraints (New York: Praeger, 1978, p. 311. Jukes went on
to say that "there still was no sign that Polaris/Poseidon
boats [deploy to] the Indian Ocean," but he added that "this
does not, however, mean that the Polaris/Poseidon factor can
be left out in examining why the Soviet Navy deployed into




would know about it. From where, then, would
boats deploy? Transits from the continental U.S.
would be prohibitively time-consuming,
devouring the entire 60 days allotted for the
standard patrol. Guam is closer, but even here
more than half of the patrol period would be used
in passing to and from an Arabian Sea station.
What planner could justify such a wasteful expen-
diture of American strategic resources, just to
have another launch point that of£ers no
significant advantage over existing ones?
During testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Near
East and South Asia in 1974, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then
Chief of Naval Operations, fueled this argument even more
when he commented on the possibility that countering POLARIS
was a mission of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean. In
response to a question concerning possible Soviet naval
missions in the Indian Ocean, he replied that one such
mission was to "counter U.S. POLARIS activity" though he
quickly disclaimed any plans with regard to U.S. SSBN
1
8
deployments to the region.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union responded to what it
considered as a strategic threat. This argument has some
merit since the timing of the actions associated with it was
closely related to the beginning of the extensive out-of-
area deployments of the Soviet Navy to the Mediterranean and
the Caribbean, and, to a lesser extent, the Indian Ocean.
17. James M. McConnell, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian
Ocean , " Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context ,
p. 390.
18. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Milita r y Facilities i n the
Indian Ocean, p. 137.
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Though it is correct that the first Soviet deployment to the
Indian Ocean in 1968 roughly coincided with the initial
operational deployment of the POLARIS A-3 system, there is
little convincing evidence that the force mix that deployed
there—an aged SVERDLOV class cruiser, two destroyers, and
an oiler—had any credible anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capability against a nuclear-powered submarine since none of
these platforms had a modern ASW detection and weapons
suite.
Moreover, the logistic problems in supporting U.S. SSBN
deployments to the Indian Ocean were enormous. Given a
nominal 60-day patrol cycle, too much time would be required
in traveling nearly 4000 miles from Replenishment Site Three
on Guam in the Marianas Islands to a hypothetical patrol
station in the Arabian Sea. Employment of SSBN's in such a
manner would have decreased weapon system availability due
to extended patrol cycles and lengthened post-patrol refit
19periods. When coupled with possible extended scheduled
refit periods for maintenance that could not be accomplished
during the normal refit periods conducted by a submarine
tender, the concept of maintaining an SSBN patrol station in
19. An SSBN cycle normally consists of about a 68-day patrol
followed by a 32-day refit period for maintenance and
replenishment of supplies. See U.S. General Accounting
Office, Comptroller General, Thp Navy's Submarine Launched
Ballisti c Miss il e Force XS Highly _Re_aj3y (B-146756)





the Indian Ocean does not appear very attractive. One
measure that would have overcome this loss of availability
would have been the establishment of a Replenishment Site by
stationing a submarine tender designed or converted to
service fleet ballistic missile submarines at Diego Garcia.
However, the United States had not exercised this option at
20
the time the talks got underway.
Perhaps the Soviet Union also perceived a threat from
future Chinese strategic systems. Though China was not a
maritime power on the order of the Soviet Union and the
United States, Soviet analysts had argued prior to the talks
that the Chinese might use the Indian Ocean either as a
launching area for its yet-to-be developed SLBft force or as
a test range for ICBM's. This argument made sense in terms
of China's continuing debate over where its scarce resources
should be allocated. Given that China was making progress
in the technology of ballistic missiles and that a program
was underway to develop a nuclear submarine, it followed
that perhaps the quickest and most economical means of
establishing a viable Chinese nuclear deterrent capability
was via an SSBN force. Moreover, China's economic and
military aid to Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan assumed an
added dimension when considered in terms of the potential of
20. Of the submarine tenders (AS) designed or converted to
provide repair and supply services to U.S. Fleet Ballistic
Missile submarines, none deployed to Diego Garcia.
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their ports from which the Chinese might support SSBN
21
operations in the Indian Ocean. Though the PRC did not
22
successfully test an SLBM until October 1982, and did not
23deploy its first SSBN until 1983, the implications of
Chinese strategic weapons research and development programs,
when considered in the context of Sino-Soviet antagonism,
were not lost on the Soviet leadership. Though it is not
clear precisely how the Soviet Union would have constrained
this Chinese capability in the Indian Ocean talks, the
possibility remains that the USSR could have argued that a
Chinese deterrent force, like its British and French
counterparts, were an adjunct to the U.S. strategic force
posture and that the Soviet Union had no such equivalent.
The USSR charged repeatedly that the United States had
deployed, or had plans to deploy, SSBN's in the northern
21. LCDR Richard R. Pariseau, USN, "The Role of the
Submarine in Chinese Naval Stretegy," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, October 1979, p. 68; see also Bruce
Swanson, "China's Navy and Foreign Policy," Surviva l,
July-August 1979, p. 146-154; Gerald Segal, "China's
Security Debate," Survival , March-April 1982, p. 69-77.
22. "Peking Fires Its First Submarine-Launched Missile," The
New York Times . October 17, 1982, p. 15:1.
23. "Peking Deploys a Missile-Firing Nuclear Sub," The New
York Times . August 23, 1983, p. 10:1. The submarine is
reportedly the first of five that will ultimately be
operational. It is believed to be capable of firing the




sector of the Indian Ocean. Perhaps the most significant
such allegation was set forth in a book entitled Submarines
AsaJjist_Submaiin.£S i n 1968. Published by the Soviet Ministry
of Defense, the work was regarded as something more than
mere propaganda for external consumption. The book dis-
cussed POLARIS deployments in the North Atlantic, Eastern
Mediterranean and Pacific Oceans, and went on to say that:
"In the future, the Americans intend [ed] to extend these
regions by including the northern part of the Indian Ocean
25
in the combat patrol sphere."
Argumentation of this sort is, in the main, largely
academic. Only a handful of people in the United States
know for sure whether the United States has deployed, or had
plans to deploy, SSBN's in the Indian Ocean. Likewise only
a very few people in the Soviet Union know with some degree
of certainty whether the Soviet Union deployed its Navy
24. These charges have been made numerous times in overseas
radio broadcasts. See, for example, U.S., Central Intelli-
gence Agency, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "U.S.
Sub Network Threatens World Peace," Daily Repor t: Foreign
Radio Broadcasts , February 12, 1963, p. BB13-BB17; U.S.,
Department of Commerce, National Technical Information
Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "U.S.,
Britain Intend to Militarize Indian Ocean," FBIS Dai ly
Report: The Soviet Union f August 11, 1971, p. Al ; U.S.,
Department of Commerce, National Technical Information
Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Mideast Oil
Reason for Pentagon's Indian Ocean Buildup," FBIS Daily
Report: The Soviet Union , March 10, 1975, p. B7-B8.
25. N. I. Suzdalev, Submarines Against Submar ines (Moscow:




there primarily to counter a U.S. SLBM threat. Nonetheless,
it is useful in that it demonstrates the range of opinions
_>n the issue of U.S. SSBN operations in the Indian Ocean and
therefore suggests some of the perceptions held by the
negotiators.
There is substantial historical evidence that demon-
strates that whenever states have negotiated to control
:heir respective navies, the principal naval strategic
platform of each of these states has been the centerpiece of
:he various naval arms control talks. In this regard, there
ire several comparisons that can be drawn between the
? ive-Power Treaty of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922
2 6
ind the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks.
The Five-Power Treaty focused on the battleship as the
najor strategic unit of measurement for comparing the sea
)ower of states after World War I. Battleships were the
jueens of the sea—the element of naval power on which
lltimately rested the outcome of conflict between maritime
states. Their firepower was awesome as was their mobility.
'he SSBN exemplified superior mobility coupled with the
lltimate capability in projecting power ashore. Both the
16. The following discussion is drawn largely from Richard
^
.
Hoove r , Axins_Co_o.trQ 1 .; Tb_e_„ijikejLwa.t _Jia_v_a_l L im i tat ion
Agreements (Denver: Graduate School of International
Studies, University of Denver, 1980), and Scott Allen, "A
Comparison of the Washington Naval Arms Limitation Treaty of
.927 and the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements of 1972"
[Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1976).
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SSBN and the battleship had the ability to concentrate
firepower together with the unique military capability of
being able to disappear in the vastness of the oceans, wait,
and return to fire again if necessary. Both were the
classic embodiment of Mahan's notions of presence and
deterrence. Both were technological successes as well as
sources of pride and gratification.
From a technological perspective both the battleship
and the SSBN were at the upper end of existing technology at
the time of the Five-Power Treaty and the Indian Ocean
negotiations. Their design and construction were measured
in years which permitted states to conduct negotiations
before arriving at an irreversible decision to proceed with
construction followed by deployment. Both platforms were
quantifiable in units of measure that were broadly agreed on
by the states concerned. This implies that an upper limit
of 35,000 tons per battleship meant about the same to the
United States as it did to Japan and Great Britain during
the Washington Conference. The issue of missile launchers
and SLBM's became part and parcel of SALT I AND II much in
the same way as the tonnage of battleships did in the
Washington talks.
Their political importance was also comparable.
According to the strategic doctrines of the day, they
represented a key, if not vital, element in national power.
They were therefore valuable not only as military platforms
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but as symbols of national resolve. They were the ultimate
means of deterrence. This perception created a strong
desire to prevent one's potential adversaries from deploying
them or at least as many of them as would pose some threat
or achieve some particularly undesirable goal. Moreover,
because of the expense involved in their construction, the
commitment of a state to such a program represented a major
milestone in terms of prevailing strategic thought and
resource allocation.
Nonetheless, a prudent national security planner,
whether he be a Soviet or an American, should have proceeded
from a shrewd assessment of a potential adversary's capa-
bilities rather than from a soft estimate of his inten-
tions. As long as ballistic missiles launched from U.S.
SSBN's deployed in the Indian Ocean remained an option,
however remote, to U.S. planners, the Soviet Union would
have had to find ways either to eliminate or minimize the
threat posed by those forces. It is generally recognized
that Soviet general purpose forces did not have the capa-
bility to threaten the U.S. SSBN force for the foreseeable
future at the time of the talks. Nevertheless, the Soviet
Navy was probably hard at work developing such capa-
bilities. Moreover, the Soviet Union had not neglected the
Indian Ocean in this regard. It had conducted oceanographic
research and laid the groundwork for the kind of facilities
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network required to conduct ASW operations in waters which
27
were not contiguous to the Soviet Union. It had been
reported that the Soviet Union had installed a hydrophone
barrier stretching from the Kola Peninsula to Spitsbergen to
protect the approaches to the Barents Sea. It was also
likely that fixed acoustic installations in the Kuril
Islands guarded the straits into the Sea of Okhotsk.
Moreover, the USSR had developed and deployed bottom-
anchored acoustic devices, essentially large sonobuoys,
which enhanced ASW operations in some waters, such as the
Indian Ocean, not contiguous to the Soviet Union. Such
systems can be laid covertly and can be read by passing
28
submarines, aircraft, or surface ships. However, these
systems were technologically primitive.
Because of these limitations on Soviet ASW capability
at the time of the Indian Ocean talks, there were essen-
tially three possible approaches open to the Soviet Union to
27. Oles M. Smolansky, "Soviet Entry into the Indian Ocean:
An Analysis," Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, eds., The
Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic an_d_ _Mil±tarY_JjDP^X-
tance (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).
28. Joel S. Wit, "Are Our Boomers Vulnerable?" United
States Naval Institute Proceedings. November 1981, p. 63.
There have also been indications that similar systems may
have been emplaced in the Canary Basin off Northwest Africa




conduct strategic ASW against the U.S. SSBN force. The
first, an area search strategy, could theoretically have
resulted in the destruction of a given portion of the U.S.
force. For the Soviet Union to implement such a strategy
would have required the development and deployment of a
system capable of continuously searching an entire SSBN
operating area. This could only have been done either by
the deployment of a large scale acoustic surveillance system
or by means of a satellite constellation. Having achieved
localization of the SSBN's by such national technical means,
the Soviet command and control structure would then have had
to vector ASW forces to intercept them or destroy the SSBN's
by bombardment with ICBM's using high-yield warheads. This
option presumed a substantial technological breakthrough on
the part of the Soviet Union.
This search strategy offered the best chance for the
Soviet Union ultimately to neutralize the U.S. SSBN threat.
However, because of geographic asymmetries, the USSR would
have to construct such a system based on satellite, non-
acoustic systems capable of providing near or real-time
locating data to Soviet command and control facilities
ashore. At the time of the talks there was speculation that
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the Soviet Union was developing the framework for such a
29
national technical means of ASW detection.
The second approach available to the Soviet Union, the
use of Soviet attack submarines in trail on a given SSBN,
might also very well have taken out a given percentage of
the U.S. seabased strategic force. The Soviet Union might
have developed the ability to trail U.S. SSBN's on departure
from their replenishment sites or refit bases. This would
most probably have entailed the use of active sonar. If a
large portion of the SSBN force could have been trailed
simultaneously, a coordinated preemptive attack might have
become feasible. Alternatively, the Soviet Navy might have
fought a war of attrition during a given patrol cycle in
which those SSBN's on station would have been destroyed
during their patrol with the hope that the losses would go
29. See, for example, "U.S. SSBN Force: How Vulnerable?"
Defense/Space Business Daily , December 23, 1977, p. 291-292;
U.S., Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, FY 1978
Authorization for Military Procurement, Resea rch and
Development, and Active Duty Selected Reserve , Hearings
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977)
,
p. 6654. To some extent, the deployment of the TRIDENT
class of submarines minimized this vulnerability due to
their ability to operate in U.S. home waters. However, the
size (18,700 tons) of the TRIDENTs suggests that they are
more likely to generate more distinctive non-acoustic




unrecognized until the first ship failed to return.
Though there is little evidence to suggest that the Soviet
submarine force was capable of executing such a tactic,
there is substantial argumentation that, if there was to be
a credible threat to the U.S. SSBN force, it would most
31likely evolve from the techniques described above.
Geography was a powerful constraint on this Soviet
strategy. Sheer physical distance between Soviet submarine
homeports and U.S. SSBN bases limited the ability of the
Soviet Navy to concentrate sufficient assets to execute this
32
strategy on anything more than an occasional basis. Both
of these strategies were really the only treatments of
choice for the Soviet Union as long as it lacked any
meaningful capability for long-range detection in the open
ocean employing a form of national technical means of
surveillance such as cable systems and satellites. The area
30. The Submarine Emergency Communications Transmitter
(SECT) system includes a buoy capable of radio transmissions
and is automatically released if an SSBN were destroyed.
The system was designed as a specific countermeasure to such
a war of attrition.
31. Tsipis, et al., op. cit., p. ix. Recent articles sug-
gest that such an attack would involve, most probably, two
attack submarines in trail on a single SSBN. The possible
exception to this is the use of a single Soviet ALFA class
SSN. See Norman Friedman, "The Soviet Fleet in Transition,"
United States Naval Institute Proceedings , May 1983,
p. 156-173.




search strategy was a particular vulnerability of Soviet
strategic ASW. By choosing such an option, the Soviet Navy
probably attempted to identify ocean areas where U.S. SSBN's
patrolled. Given this identification, the Soviet Union
would then have had to allocate resources (air, surface, and
sub-surface as well as national technical means) to detect,
and if considered desirable, to localize U.S. SSBN's.
The third and final option was that the Soviet Navy
could have improved its open-ocean ASW equipment suites by
enhancing its ship and aircraft ASW capability either by
improving their acoustic search capability or by some other
undefined non-acoustic technique. It is this option that
the deployment of the TRIDENT system was designed to
counter. To be effective, such a tactic would have had to
offer a high probability that contact could have been
maintained on a substantial portion of the U.S. SSBN's on
patrol at any given time so that a coordinated, preemptive
attack could be carried out. It seems unlikely that, given
the state of Soviet ASW technology and command and control,
such coordination could have been achieved.
There is little evidence that the Soviet Union had the
ability to employ any of these three options at the time of
the talks with any chance of success. Moreover, it is
important to distinguish between those potential vulnera-
bilities which the United States could have been reasonably
expected to be aware of (e.g. active trail) and those which
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might go undetected (e.g. a satellite with an unknown ASW
detection capability) . The latter would be far more
dangerous from a military and technological viewpoint while
the former would entail more political risks to the
perception of deterrence. Both, however, would have been
significant in the negotiation of an arms control
agreement.
The development of an effective national technical
means of detection by the Soviet Union would have changed
both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the
strategic ASW problem it faced. The achievement of such a
breakthrough in technology would have substantially enhanced
the probability of a successful area search strategy. As a
minimum, it would have reduced the geographic area that
required coverage. Barring a successful space system effort
and the deployment of mobile platforms, the Indian Ocean
would be a difficult milieu for the Soviets to operate such
a system because of the lack of contiguity—an issue clearly
tied to bases and geography. Because of this, geographic
considerations were an important, if not dominant, factor in
Soviet strategic and tactical ASW considerations for the
Indian Ocean.
Figure 2 highlights the effect of geography on Soviet
naval operations. Straits and restricted waters controlled
by other states constrain Soviet access to the sea in warm
















































































































restricted to the far north around Norway's North Cape and
in the Pacific to Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka peninsula.
The United States does not have to contend with these
problems in deploying its strategic and general purpose ASW
forces. Hence geography affects the issue of strategic
warfare in the Indian Ocean.
Because of these constraints on the Soviet Navy's
ability to wage an effective strategic ASW campaign,
limiting SSBN deployments anywhere in the world's oceans
would have significantly diminished the problem facing the
Soviet Union in defending against SLBM's. Because the
situation was essentially one of detection and localization
of the missile firing platform coupled with that of defense
against the missile or destruction of the platform prior to
launch, the Soviet Union remained at a significant disad-
vantage due to its lack of technology to solve the detection
and localization issues. Any attempt to create an
anti-ballistic missile defense system to guard the southern
approaches to the USSR would, in general, have been
detectable. Moreover, it would have opened the Soviet Union
to charges of violating the ABM treaty. The inherent
quietness of the U.S. submarine force made the problem even
more thorny for its Soviet counterpart.
One additional factor in the continued survivability of
the U.S. SSBN force was an increase in the size of the
submarine patrol areas. As a rule of thumb, the available
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submarine operating area increases with the square of the
increased missile range. Because the limiting arcs of the
A-3 and C-3 missiles extended only into the northwest
quadrant of the Indian Ocean, the C-4 missile significantly
increased the ocean area suitable for SSBN patrol areas by
extending this arc deeper into and more across that ocean.
Moreover, as this area increased, the quantitative problem
of increased ocean area which had to be covered by Soviet
mobile ASW platforms also increased. Table 1 describes this
relationship quantitatively in terms of SSBN operations as a
33function of distance from Moscow. The implications of
these figures with regard to the Indian Ocean could not have
been lost on Soviet planners.
The Soviet Union had to understand that the forthcoming
deployment of the TRIDENT system would open up vast areas of
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans as SSBN operating areas.
Use of the Indian Ocean would not be necessary to stay
within range of the USSR. In this sense, the deployment of
TRIDENT somewhat increased the attractiveness of an agree-
ment to restrict naval operations in the Indian Ocean.
However, the increased ocean area provided by Indian Ocean
SSBN operations would be of value to the United States if
33. Moscow was selected as the target because of the
apparent value that has historically been attached to its




















Sources: Kosta Tsipis, Anne H. Cahn, and Bernard T. Feld
(eds.)f The Fut ur e of the Se a Based Dete rrent (Cambridge:
The MIT Press, 1973), p. 66; CDR James John Tritten, USN,
"The Trident System: Submarines, Missiles, and Strategic
Doctrine," Naval Wa r College Review, January-February 1983,
p. 65; Caspar Weinberger, "Statement," U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. St rategic





the Soviet Union achieved a major breakthrough in ASW or if
the Soviet Union abrogated the ABM Treaty and began a major
effort to deploy an integrated ABM system. Either case
might require the United States to use the Indian Ocean to
complicate the Soviet defensive problem and to ensure
continued broad target coverage by the U.S. SSBN force.
The foregoing demonstrates that, whether or not the
U.S. actually employed the Indian Ocean as an SSBN operating
area, it was to the advantage of the United States to retain
the option and thus require the USSR to consider it in its
national security policy calculations. This option required
that the Soviet Union be prepared to conduct strategic and
local ASW in four ocean areas versus three (Atlantic,
Pacific, and Mediterranean). Moreover, the United States
stood to gain little, if anything, from a corresponding
limitation on Soviet SSBN's operating in the region since
they posed no threat to the continental United States.
Hence, the United States refused to discuss any explicit ban
on SSBN deployments in the Indian Ocean even though the
Soviet Union continued to argue for inclusion of the subject
34
on the agenda throughout the four sessions of the talks.
34. Bayne . Gelb, S ick , Warnke .
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The Air Breathing Leg
The USSR was not concerned solely with the issue of
SSBN deployments in the Indian Ocean. Although there was no
direct mention of the issue of B-52 deployments to the
Indian Ocean in the open testimony before the House panel on
the Indian Ocean talks, there was reference to a limit on
35land-based strike aircraft. There was good cause for this
since the United States wanted to control Soviet long-range
aviation deployments in the region that could threaten U.S.
military forces or support Soviet military operations in the
littoral states and the Indian Ocean. Yet, the United
States was constrained in its pursuit of such an option
because of the reluctance on the part of its allies to
accept limits on such deployments. The obvious candidates
for such a ban were the U.S. B-52, the FB-111, and the
Soviet BACKFIRE and BADGER aircraft. 36
U.S. strategic aircraft were not strangers to the
Indian Ocean. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) operated a
recovery base at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, from 1951 until
35. Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Asms
Transfer Limitation—Report , p. 4.
36. For analytical purposes, tactical aircraft
considerations have been excluded in this section even





1962. The Soviet Union could not but help recall this
fact when the Department of Defense proposed to extend the
runway on Diego Garcia from its original 3500 feet first to
8000 feet and finally to 12,000 feet and to upgrade the fuel
storage capacity of the island to provide support for KC-135
3 8
tanker aircraft by October 1977. The USSR interpreted
this move as a signal that Diego Garcia was moving toward
the capability to operate B-52's from its airfield. Indeed,
in open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
in June 1975, General George S. Brown, USAF, the Chairman of
the JCS, suggested that the U.S. intended to deploy long-
range combat aircraft to the Indian Ocean from Andersen Air
Force Base on Guam and Clark Air Force Base in the Philip-
39pines as soon as the runway extension was completed.
However, the concept of operations governing these
37
.
Proposed. .ELxpa.ns.lo_n. .of _ u_.s..__iiiLit&r^_Faciiities_ _in__tbe
Ind ian Ocean , p. 23. See also U.S. Department of State,
"Saudi Arabian-United States Agreement on United States
Rights at Dhahran Airfield and Related Matters," American
For eign. .Policy i. Cjj_rj:_ejit_^Bg_cuiDeDts.-rl£>5I (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1032-1034; "Termina-
tion of the Saudi Arabian-United States Agreement for the
Operation of the Dhahran Airfield, Effective April 1, 1962,"
Ame_rJcaD_-. Foreign PP_lj..£y_. CjijjeDt D£>£iimsn^Srrl251 (Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 700-701;
James L. Gormly, "Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: The
United States and the Dhahran Airfield, 1945-46," Diplomatic
Histor y f Spring 1977, p. 189-205, contains a discussion of
the early history and negotiations for this base.
38. Selected Material on Diego Garcia , p. 6.
39 . Disapproving .Const ruction. _Pj_oj_e_c_t_s_ _pji_ . the. .Island _ .o_f
Pj-.egp_ Gaxcia , p . 61.
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deployments envisioned multiple in-flight refuelings on the
40long-range, open ocean, sea control missions. Hence, the
importance of Diego Garcia was principally to support KC-135
tanker aircraft rather than as a B-52 base. U.S. Department
of Defense officials stressed that the extended runway on
Diego Garcia would not have either the strength to support
sustained B-52 operations or the width to accommodate the
outrigger wheels on fully loaded B-52's. However, B-52's
operating in a less than fully loaded configuration could
4-V, 41use the runway.
Limiting this threat, whether by negotiating a limi-
tation on deployment of B-52's to the Indian Ocean region or
by limiting the base support structure, was an obvious
40. For a discussion of this concept of operations see MGEN
W. J. Ellis, USAF, "Air Mobility and Flexibility," Flight
International , August 21, 1976, p. 432; W. C. Moore, "Time
for Aerial Task Forces," United States Naval Institute
PLPceedings , December 1975, p. 79-80; "Navy Cool to Land-
Based Aircraft Study," Aviation Week and Space Technology,
August 21, 1976, p. 91. There was strong support for such
operations in the Indian Ocean within the U.S. Department of
Defense. See D. C. Jones, "Testimony," U.S., Congress,
Senate, Committee on the Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1977
AuthorJL2atJL9n_„f,Qr„, Mili tary Procurement, Research and
Development., __and_.Ac_t_iy_e_ _Du_tiLt_S.eJ^c_.te.d__Res.e,LYe ..and. £iyJJi an
Per. sonnel_-_S_t.r_ejig_th_s , Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1976), pt . 2, p. 985; Noel Gayler,
"Testimony, " Fiscal. . Year _.JL9.7.7. _ AuthPj:i2aiion__f_QX_J'IJJJjtaj^
Ei^siLLeinentL, Eese^r ch_ ..and
_
J)ev_elopjLejLtLt-__ajid_ _Ac_t_i_y.e Duty.,
SfiJ.ec.ted_ R.esejrye.,. and. Civilian. Personnel Strengths , Hear ings




See Proposed. _Fix_p_ajis_ion„Qf._ _U...S_._ .Military . Facilities. _in
fche_Indian_0ceanr p. 47, 150.
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attraction for the Soviet Union. Moreover, there was an
incentive for the United States to negotiate some form of
limitation on Soviet heavy bombers since several of the key
oil facilities in the region, such as the terminals at Kharg
Island, Juaymah and Ras Tanura, were less than 1000 miles
from the Soviet border.
The issue of the operational status of the BACKFIRE
aircraft complicated U.S. calculations. After several years
of testing and modification, the BACKFIRE entered service in
1974 amid a substantial degree of uncertainty as to its
operational capabilities and mission. Much of this uncer-
tainty centered on the BACKFIRE'S unrefueled combat
42
radius. Varying estimates within the U.S. government as
well as by aerospace industry experts placed it at anywhere
43from 1750 to 3100 nautical miles. The lower figure would
have excluded this Soviet aircraft from consideration as an
intercontinental strategic bomber while the higher one would
put it in the same class as those Soviet aircraft which were
SALT accountable. However, in either case, the BACKFIRE
could fly unrefueled missions over the Arabian Sea. Hence
42. U.S., Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, &.£». Mj Jjtary Posture for FY 1975
(Washington: 1974), p. 24.
43. For an unusually well informed discussion of this con-
troversy see John M. Collins, Amejri can. Aad. J3QYiet -fcliLitaj^.




it was of concern to the United States at the time of NALT.
Thus there was a mutual interest in limiting the
operations of strategic aircraft in the Indian Ocean for
both the United States and the Soviet Union. Indirect
evidence suggests that the United States tried to exploit
this potential area of agreement. In April 1977, a usually
well informed Australian journalist reported that the United
States had "shelved indefinitely" a decision to conduct
long-range, open ocean surveillance flights by B-52 aircraft
44into the Indian Ocean. There is no evidence available on
Soviet actions with respect to their strategic aircraft.
This is significant since April 1977 was the same month in
which PRM-25, the Presidential Review Memorandum on arms
control in the Indian Ocean, was issued. This evidence,
even though circumstantial, raises the question of whether
or not the Carter Administration implemented some form of
self-restraint on strategic aircraft operations in the
Indian Ocean. This could very well have been in the form of
a confidence building measure to reassure the Soviet Union
on Carter's seriousness about arms control. Such a decision
would, presumably, have required the approval of Carter
himself.
44. See "America Stops Plan for B-52's in Indian Ocean," The
Australian, April 15, 1977, p. 7:1.

CHAPTER VII
THE ALLIANCE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TALKS
When one asks a neighbor to come to aid and defend
one with his forces, they are termed auxiliaries.
. . . These forces may be good in themselves but
they are always dangerous for those who borrow
them, for if they lose you are defeated, and if
they conquer you remain their prisoner.
— Niccolo Machiavelli (1513)
The Soviet Union has generally defined its national
security to be the condition wherein Soviet military power
is at least equal to, and preferably greater than, that of
the United States plus that of its allies which could be
brought to bear against Soviet forces or Soviet territory.
An example of this policy that is germane to naval arms
control is the force of SSBN's operated by France and Great
Britain. In the preliminary SALT I discussions the USSR
raised the question of this eight-ship force and left unre-
solved how these submarines should be counted in the SALT
balance computations. The Soviet Union argued that the
United States could control the proliferation of French and
British SSBN's beyond those operational or under




level increases. The United States rejected this
allegation and explained that the forces in question were
national forces and not open for discussion within the
bilateral context of U.S. -Soviet negotiations.
The Pa^jc_EleiD£nt; Geogx£P.hy,
Another case study of this linkage is the record of
Great Britain's dilemma in 1921 with respect to the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its concern over the growing
naval power of the United States. The major element in
Britain's strategy to protect its interests in East Asia was
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. Though originally
intended to act as a check on Imperial Russian expansion in
Central and East Asia, Great Britain and Japan renewed the
Alliance in 1907 and again in 1911 with the threat of
Germany uppermost in their minds. Unless extended by mutual
agreement, the Alliance would end in 1921. Great Britain
successfully used this relationship to steer Japanese
expansion towards the Asian mainland, and Manchuria in
particular, to protect British commercial and colonial
interests in Tibet, Burma, India, South China, and
Australia. However, the Alliance was a thorn in Anglo-
American relations and the subject of increasing concern to
Great Britain because of the growth of the U.S. Navy during
1. Tsipsis, et al, op. cit., p. 240.
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World War I and its planned post-war building program.
Moreover, disagreement between the United States and Great
Britain over such matters as the interpretation of the law
of the sea with respect to the rights of neutrals during
hostilities complicated this situation. Two of Britain's
overseas allies, the Dominions of Australia and Canada, had
strong views on Britain's approach to these problems—views
that were shaped in the main by geography.
Canada opposed the renewal of the Alliance because the
Canadians regarded it as a source of friction, if not war,
with the United States. Canada believed that continuation
of the Alliance was bound to damage future Anglo-American
relations and that the consequences of such friction would
be disastrous to Canada's interests should the United States
choose to act against the closest member of the British
Commonwealth—Canada. The Canadians signalled their
seriousness by indicating that Canada would not contribute
to the naval defense of the British Empire and by expressing
strong support for some form of international agreement on
naval arms limitations. The Canadians were convinced that
Great Britain was ignoring Canada's interests in the Pacific
as well as its increasing linkage with and dependence on the
2. See John S. Galbraith, "The Imperial Conference of 1921
and the Washington Conference," Canadian Historical Review ,
June 1948, p. 143-152; Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy Between
-the_Waj:s (London: Collins Press, 1968), v. 1, p. 297.
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good will of the United States. As a result, Canada sup-
ported the U.S. position that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance
3
should be abrogated.
Australia, however, believed that the Alliance
restrained Japanese expansion and immigration. The geog-
raphy of the Pacific, as well as the resource implications
of that geography, suggested that sooner or later Japan
would focus its attention on Australia. There was, more-
over, a significant element of racism in Australia's policy
since the Government of Australia was vigorously enforcing
its "white Australia" policy and opposing Japanese immigra-
tion. Indeed, this was a hallmark of the policy of the
4Australian Prime Minister William M. Hughes. Moreover,
Australia argued that the Alliance could be modified in such
a way that the United States would not object to it or could
be convinced to join it.
3. C. N. Spinks, "The Termination of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance," Pacific Historical Review , December 1937, p. 321-
340.
4. See William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in
the Pacific, 1909- 1922 (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1971), p. 560; William M. Hughes, The Splendid Adventure
(London: Benn, 1929), p. 357-370.
5. Buckley, op. cit., p. 31. For a detailed examination of
Australian perceptions on the subject of the Washington
Conference based largely on primary source documentation see
Robert Thornton, "The Semblance of Security: Australia and
the Washington Conference, 1921-22," Australian QjJtlQQk,
April 1978, p. 65-85.
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Thus Great Britain was in the grips of a seemingly
unsolvable problem. Though unwilling to disrupt its good
relations with Japan in the Pacific, the United Kingdom had
to contend with its aging fleet vis-a-vis that of the United
States while simultaneously trying to enhance Anglo-American
relations. Surrounding both these problems was the dis-
parity of opinion within the Commonwealth on the very point
that linked all three issues: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
The only way out of this deadlock was to postpone any final
action on this question until after the convening of an
international conference to address the issues of the
Pacific. The result was that Great Britain asked the United
States to convene a conference to discuss issues relating to
the Pacific— issues which, to a great degree, were shaped by
geography and alliance politics.
The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks
have a similar geopolitical complexity. The MBFR negotia-
tions have dragged on since 1973. The delay has been the
result of the recognition that regional arms control is not
a purely technical issue as well as the perception that such
negotiations involve the broad security and political
interests of the states within the region in question. MBFR
6. There is a contending view which argues that the
Dominions did not influence British policy as much as this
study suggests. See Ira Klein, "Whitehall, Washington, and
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1919-1921," Pacific Historical
RejLiej*, December 1972, p. 460-483.
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is demonstrated that such negotiations, especially in a
jgional context, have the potential of expanding the range
id depth of issues considered in such talks.
For example, although NATO achieved a breakthrough of
>rts in 1978 with the Soviet Union's acceptance of NATO's
>mand for equal overall ceilings as opposed to proportional
its, this breakthrough has not achieved any positive
jsults. Negotiators continued to disagree on the precise
?vels of manpower already deployed. Moreover, disagreement
;mained on such other basic issues as the types of forces
>en for negotiation (strategic/nuclear versus general
irpose) , verification, and the problem of the imposition of
itional sub-limits within an overall ceiling.
The following discussion on MBFR is based on the fol-
ding sources: Stephen Canby, "Mutual Force Reductions: A
litary Perspective," International Security, Winter 1978,
122-135; Joseph I. Coffey, Arms CQ_ntCQl.__a.nji _ European
'C u r ltyj___A_£jjj_!e__tjQ. J_aj_t.-iJlej_,tL-Keg Qfci&t JQQS (London: Chatto
id Windus, 1977); John Lehman, "Soviet Policy in Mutual and
lanced Force Reductions," George Ginsburg and Alvin Z.
binstein, eds., Soviet Policy Towards Western Europe (New
rk: Praeger, 1978), p. 183-189; Arthur R. Rachwald,
nited States Policy in East Europe," CjJjjrent H istory f
150-153; Robin Ranger, "An Alternative Future for MBFR: A
ropean Arms Control Conference," Survival f July-August
79, p. 164-171; Jeffrey Record, Force Reductions in
ntral Europe: Starting Over (Cambridge: Institute for
reign Policy Analysis, 1980); and Lothar Ruehl, "The
ippery Road of MBFR," Strategic Review , Winter 1980,
24-35; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
la t ions , Th£__Uni£$&„S£ateS-£teL^h£^Qy.igk-i&iQni_2£osp£c^
r the Relationship, Report (Washington: U.S. Government
inting Office, 1983), p. 23-26.
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Underlying these questions, however, was a broad range
f technical problems. The fact that the MBFR negotiations
nvolved some nineteen different states as well as the
orresponding bureaucratic actors within each of them and
heir respective alliance systems complicated the negotia-
ions. Military issues have similarly handicapped progress
n the talks. In what was strangely reminiscent of the
yardstick" controversy surrounding the London Naval
Q
onference of 1930, there have been almost insolvable
roblems of how to compare forces designed to accommodate
iverse, if not, antithetical, military doctrines.
Moreover, the close proximity of the Soviet Union to
he area under consideration compared with its distance from
he United States was an obvious, though oftentimes over-
Doked, reality with which the negotiators have grappled.
le result of this geographic asymmetry is striking. Any
Dviet forces withdrawn from Central Europe under the terms
E an MBFR agreement could rapidly return to the tactical
rea of operations. However, U.S. reinforcements would face
. For a discussion of the "yardstick" as a comprehensive
:>rmula for comparison of naval forces at the time of the
3ndon Conference see Allen W. Dulles, "The Threat of
iglo-American Naval Rivalry," Foreign Affairs , January
>29, p. 173-182; Raymond G. O'Connor, "The 'Yardstick' and
aval Disarmament in the 1920' s," Mississippi Valley
Lstorical Review . December 1958, p. 441-463; Raymond G.
' Connor , Perilous Equilibrium: The United States and the
?ndon Naval Conference of 1930 (Lawrence: University of
msas Press, 1962), p. 28-29, 33-34, 38-39, 69-70.
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a long, and perhaps opposed, return in the event of a crisis
and certainly in the case of war. This geographic mismatch
seems to contradict NATO's, and hence the United States',
fundamental doctrine of a credible forward defense— a doc-
trine which, if it is to work, is contingent upon at least
three weeks' warning time of impending Soviet hostile
action. These realities demonstrate that the influence of
geography is a decisive factor in the national security
calculations of NATO—a fact that the Soviet Union has not
ignored. Moreover, the geography of Central Europe may very
well have created a situation in which the fundamental doc-
trines of the adversaries were so different that meaningful
progress on arms control in an MBFR context is impossible.
The MBFR negotiations have offered little chance of
success because they have been an exercise in solving what
is a political problem through the application of technical
arms control. Moreover, their technical basis has been
flawed because of the varying means of measuring the NATO-
Warsaw Pact force level balance. Geographic considerations
circumscribed both these fundamental discontinuities in the
strategy and policy of the parties to the negotiations.
These precedents suggest the utility of certain tactics as
well as negotiating strategies of the United States and the
Soviet Union which have been used in both bilateral and




One such case in point was the Soviet Union's use of a
tactic employed by the United States to expand the geo-
graphic scope of the MBFR negotiations. When the U.S. tried
to broaden the area covered in MBFR to the flanks of NATO,
the Soviet delegation rejected the demand and explained that
this expansion would entail negotiations on peripheral
problems excluded from the initial MBFR bargaining process.
A northern context would, for example, not be included in a
restricted area definition. They maintained that Soviet
forces in the north did not exist to balance those of Norway
in isolation but rather the sum total of NATO's northern
forces. A Kola Peninsula-northern Norway perspective would,
therefore, require that the whole of Iceland, Britain, and
the Norwegian Sea be addressed. Such a context might well
have included U.S. and NATO FBS as well as POLARIS/
POSEIDON. 9
Despite this explanation, the Soviet Union took
advantage of the geography of Central Europe in the MBFR
talks. Indeed, the first concession by NATO related to the
scope of the area in which forces were to be reduced—the
guidelines area. NATO insisted that Hungary be included
in the guidelines area given the substantial level of Soviet
9. C. G. Jacobsen, SALT-MBFR: Soviet Perspectives on Secur-
ity and Arms Negotiations (Ottawa: Defense Research Analysis
Establishment, Department of National Defense, 1974), p. 62.
10. Record, op. cit., p. 40.

- 246 -
forces deployed there and Hungary's common borders with the
USSR and Yugoslavia. Soviet negotiators, however, refused
to agree to this demand. They argued that a guidelines area
which included Hungary must include Italy as well. The
result was a compromise in which the two sides agreed to
exclude Hungary from the guidelines area with the proviso
that NATO unilaterally claimed a right to raise the issue at
some point in the future. The result was that NATO
accepted a geographic framework for the MBFR talks which
included all major U.S. and West German ground force deploy-
ments in Europe but excluded Soviet forces in Hungary.
The Indian Ocean Case
The Soviet Union applied the same method to the Indian
Ocean talks in an effort to include British, Australian, and
French forces— the other Western naval powers in the
region— in the negotiations as it did during the MBFR
talks. During the first session of the negotiations,
Mendelevich remarked to Warnke that n we are going to have to
take into accound the allied factor." The Soviet delegation
put forth a definition of military presence that contained
four elements. They equated presence to: (1) U.S. forces
in being in the Indian Ocean; (2) those forces of allies in
11. U.S., Congress, Congressional Research Service, National
Defense Division, Prospects for the Vienna Force Reduction





the Indian Ocean with whom the United States had bilateral
or multilateral defense agreements; (3) U.S. and allied
forces in areas adjacent to the Indian Ocean; and (4) the
forces of friends of the United States in the region whether
12
mutual security agreements existed with them or not. The
Soviet delegation contended that, because of the U.S. forces
in the Indian Ocean and agreements with Australia, Great
Britain and France as well as those forces in areas adjacent
to the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union had to have a larger
presence in the region to offset this disadvantage. The
Soviet delegation argued that this preponderance of military
presence, sustained largely through the forces of allies,
made the United States geographically closer to the region
than the Soviet Union! Though seemingly an untenable
position, Mendelevich and his delegation made a very good
case of it.
The issue of regional definition in the Indian Ocean
was analogous to the MBFR case discussed earlier. There had
been enough argument about what actually constituted the
Indian Ocean that both the Soviet Union and the United
States could exploit this ambiguity in the talks. There-
fore, the issue of the limits of the Indian Ocean, though
seemingly a simplistic one at first glance, was as much a




problem in the talks as the definition of the guidelines
area was in MBFR. Indeed, as extraordinary as it may seem,
14
this problem was complicated and remained unsettled.
Though there have been contending views on the question of
the limits of the Indian Ocean, one thing was certain. The
elements of these boundaries were five in number: first,
the ocean itself; next, its boundary with the Atlantic;
third, the Pacific limits; fourth, the islands that dotted
the surface of the ocean; and finally the Antarctic shore.
Beyond this, there was little agreement in academic and
15 ...historic sources. However, it was possible to arrive at a
definition based on strategic and geopolitical considera-
tions. These factors, when viewed in the context of the
effect of physical and political geography on an arms
control forum, cause one to focus sharply on the effect of
the Indian Ocean talks on U.S. alliance relationships.
The clearest limit, as well as the one most generally
agreed on, was that with the Atlantic Ocean. It ran from
Cape Agulhas in South Africa due south along the twentieth
meridian (20° E) to the shore of Antarctica. The limit on
the Pacific side to the southeast usually ran from South
14. Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Report , p. 4; Warnke.
15. See Auguste Toussaint, History of the Indian Ocean
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) for a discus-
sion of the various academic definitions of the boundaries
of the Indian Ocean.
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East Cape on Tasmania, south along the one hundred and
forty-seventh meridian (147° E) to Antarctica. Some geog-
raphers considered Bass Strait, between Tasmania and the
Australian continent, as part of the Indian Ocean while
others argued that it was part of the Pacific. The
northeastern limit was the most difficult to define. Some
geographers held that it ran across the Torres Strait
between Australia and New Guinea and then from the island of
Adi, off the western New Guinea coast, along the southern
shores of the Lesser Sunda Islands and Java, thence across
the Sunda Strait to Sumatra. Others, however, considered
the Arafura Sea and the Timor Sea as parts of the Pacific
and not the Indian Ocean. Between Sumatra and the Malay
peninsula the boundary was sometimes drawn at Singapore and
sometimes from Cape Perdo on Sumatra to the northeast, thus
making the Strait of Malacca a part of the Pacific.
Because geographers, in general, have tended to asso-
ciate various bodies of water with one of the world's major
oceans, there was also the question as to just what seas,
bays, and gulfs were properly part of the Indian Ocean. The
Encyclopedia Britannica includes the Red Sea and the Persian
Gulf to the north as well as the Arabian Sea to the north-
west and the Andaman Sea to the northeast. The Gulfs of
16. See "Indian Ocean," Encyclopedia Britannica , 15th ed.,
v. 9, p. 307.
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Aden and Oman as well as the Bay of Bengal, the Mozambique
Channel, the Gulf of Carpenteria off the north coast of
Australia, and the Great Australian Bight off Australia's
south coast are also included in Britannica's definition.
The United States had publicly suggested what it
considered the limits of the Indian Ocean were prior to the
1
8
talks in a 1976 CIA publication Though it included the
Great Australian Bight and the Strait of Malacca, it
excluded the Timor and Arafura Seas as well as the Gulf of
Carpenteria, the Bass Strait and the Torres Strait. Figure
3 portrays these limits.
Though there was no corresponding Soviet document, it
is possible to sketch out a probable Soviet position.
Because of the strategic considerations discussed earlier in
this study, it is likely that the Soviet and United States
delegations agreed on all but the eastern boundary of the
Indian Ocean. In fact Mendelevich used the CIA chart of the
19Indian Ocean to argue his case. By trying to exploit the
ambiguity of the contending academic approaches to defining
17. Ibid. The International Hydrographic Organization holds
to a more limited definition which does not include the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. See International
Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and S_e_as_
(Special Publication No. 23), 3rd ed. (Monte Carlo: 1953),
p. 22.
18. U.S., Central Intelligence Agency, Tndian Ocean Atlas
(Washington: 1976), p. 4-5.


































































the Indian Ocean, the Soviet delegation tried to expand the
scope of the area to be covered in an agreement. They
argued that the Indian Ocean included the Timor Sea and the
Arafura Sea to the Torres Strait as well as the Indonesian
20
Straits. At first, in an effort to further constrain U.S.
operations, they argued that the definition of the Indian
Ocean should include the waters up to the east coast of
» *. t • 21Australia.
The southern limit of the Indian Ocean was perhaps the
easiest to agree on since the Antarctic Treaty of 1959
prohibited any measures of a military nature, including
military exercises, on Antarctica and in the waters
surrounding the Antarctic continent south of 60 south
22latitude. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
were signatory to the Antarctic Treaty.
Australian Concerns
The implications of these positions disturbed
Australia. The Soviet definition, if accepted by the United
States, would have extended the terms of Indian Ocean NALT
to the Pacific. Even the United States definition included
20. B_ayjie_.
21. Warnke .
22. U.S. Treaties, etc., "The Antarctic Treaty," United
States Treaties and Other International Agreements , TIAS
4780 (Washington: U.S. Department of State, 1962), v. 12,




the waters that washed the shores of Western Australia and
included the approaches to Australia through the Great
Australian Bight. Either of these positions would have
posed both definitional and political problems for the
United States in terms of its obligations under the ANZUS
treaty and would have been politically unacceptable to
Australia.
The language of the ANZUS treaty referred to assistance
to its signatories in the event of "an armed attack on the
metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the
island territories under its jurisdiction, in the Pacific,
or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the
24Pacific." The concern of ANZUS, and particularly
Australia, turned on the meaning of " . . . in the Pacific."
In the past it had been convenient not to impose a rigid
definition on what this phrase implied. However, the
Australian Government, prompted by what it viewed as
excessive Soviet interest in the littoral of the Indian
Ocean, interpreted the pact as broadly as possible. The
withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Asian mainland,
coupled with what Australia perceived as an unsteady U.S.
23. fifilfe.
24. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Multilateral Security Treaty:
Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States of America," United States Treaties and Other
International Agreements , TIAS 2493 (Washington: U.S.
Department of State, 1955), v. 3, pt. 3, p. 3423.
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policy for the region after Vietnam, confronted Australia
with a perplexing national security problem. The sparsely
settled yet mineral-rich western and northwestern portions
of the country, together with Australian responsibility for
the Cocos-Keeling Islands and Christmas Island, suggested a
burgeoning of Australian defense requirements. Moreover,
the concept of a 200-mile economic zone under the Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea added to Australia's
25
concern over the issue of maritime surveillance. These
problems prompted Australia to extend de facto coverage by
ANZUS into the Indian Ocean.
These concerns emerged in 1976 during Parliamentary
hearings on the Indian Ocean. The government took the
position that it "interpret [ed] the spirit of the ANZUS
treaty as conferring obligations on all parties to include
2 6
the Indian Ocean." Moreover, shortly after the first
25. Australia, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australia and the Indian Ocean
Region
r Report (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing
Service, 1976)
, p. 191.
26. Australia, Parliament, Senate, Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defence, Hearing, Transcript of Evidence
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976) ,
Annex A, p. 10, 30. See also William T. Tow, "ANZUS: A
Strategic Role in the Indian Ocean," World Today , October
1978, p. 401-408; J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965); Alan Watt,
"The ANZUS Treaty: Past, Present, and Future," Au stralian
Outlook
, April 1970, p. 17-36; LTCOL P. G. Skelton (RACS)
,
"Indian Ocean's Largest Coastline," Defence Force Journal,
July-August 1979, p. 16-30.
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round of the Indian Ocean negotiations in June 1977,
Australia raised the issue in the twenty-sixth ANZUS Council
meeting on July 28, 1977 at Wellington, New Zealand. The
final communique of the Council included a clause reaffirm-
ing that, in the event of an agreement between the Soviet
Union and the United States, any such agreement should "be
balanced in its effects and consistent with the security
interests of the ANZUS partners."
The United States was prepared for such concerns
because of the consultations that it held with various
friendly governments. In addition to Australia, the United
States discussed NALT with the Governments of the United
28Kingdom, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Italy.
However, the most extensive reaction to Carter's initiative
came from the Australian press and government. The
Australian government viewed Carter's announcement on March
29
10, 1977, as a "complete surprise" with possible future
implications for the region, and a reversal of American
27. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Anzus Council
Communique," Australian Foreign Affairs Record , August 1977,
p. 411.
28. See Indian Ocean Forces Limitation and Conventional Arms
Transfer , p. 44-45, 60.
29. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, J.
Herriot, "Offician Policy on Indian Ocean Unchanged Despite
U.S. Shift," FBIS Dai ly Report: Asia and the Pacific , March
15, 1977, p. M1-M2.
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policy. Indeed, the Carter initiative was at first, to say
the least, unsettling to Australia and was an example of how
30
not to run an alliance. An editorial in The Australian on
March 11, 1977, underscored the impact of Carter's
announcement on Australia's position as an ally. The
editorial commented that:
The composite problem of being a numerically small
nation in a huge continent in an isolated position
has always been with us. As world relationships
shift and turn, the problem becomes more acute,
its solution both more necessary and more diffi-
cult. President Carter's throwaway pebble into
the [Indian] Ocean has set up another ripple to
remind us that it is essentially a problem we have
to solve ourselves. But to do so without allies
would be a terribly lonely and difficult task.
This was especially significant because Australia was
the only littoral nation to reverse its official stand on
Diego Garcia and the peace zone proposal. The former Labor
government of Gough Whitlam was openly and outspokenly
critical of U.S. plans to expand the facilities on Diego
32Garcia. But the coalition government under Malcolm
Fraser, voted into office in December 1975, reversed that
stand. Fraser, who was largely conservative, indicated a
greater willingness to cooperate with the United States on
defense matters. Indeed, shortly after assuming office, he
30. Warnke .
31. The Australian , March 11, 1977.





welcomed American development of Diego Garcia and promised
that the Australian base under construction at Cockburn
Sound would be available to U.S. Navy ships. What was
significant in the Australian position, however, was not
that the Government of Australia supported what the United
States was doing, but that an Australian government and a
significant body of opinion in Australia ever opposed it.
In reaction to Carter's proposal, Australia reaffirmed
that its attitude on the Indian Ocean remained unchanged:
Australia supported the Zone of Peace concept but did not
believe it possible at that time. The Australian Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, explained that:
It [Carter's Zone of Peace announcement] [was] an
important step but it would still be a long way
off because you would need to have the Soviet
Union react favorably to the overtures that have
been made, and then enter into negotiations for a
lowering of their significant facilities and
presence in the Indian Ocean.
Nonetheless, Peacock discussed the Indian Ocean with U.S.
officials shortly after Carter's announcement and said that
he was satisfied that U.S. Indian Ocean policy remained
similar to Australia's long-standing position. He added
33. "New Australian Leader Starts Quietly," The New York
TJjoe_s_, January 18, 1976, p. 10:3.
34. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
J. McMullen, "Australia's Peacock Meets with U.N. Ambassador




that Australian and American policies for the Indian Ocean
35
were in complete accord. Warnke's long-standing personal
relationship with the Australian Ambassador to the United
States, Alan Renouf, helped in assuring the Australian
Government that there was no effort on the part of the
United States to undercut Australia and that the United
States would consult closely with Australia on this
36
matter.
Nevertheless, Fraser wanted further assurances from
Carter concerning his intentions with respect to the Indian
Ocean talks. Australia was concerned about the Soviet
Navy's buildup and its increased capabilities in the
region. Fraser, speaking on the subject at the time of his
first visit to the United States to meet with Carter,
charged that the USSR had expanded its naval operations in
the Indian Ocean and tilted the balance of power in the area
37
against the U.S. He assured Carter that Australia, with
the exception of the Whitlam government, had been a sup-
porter of the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia and critical of
35. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Australia's Peacock Notes Accord with U.S. on Indian
Ocean," FBIS Daily Report: Asia and the Pacific , March 30,
1977, p. Ml.
36. Warnke .
37. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Prime
Minister's Visit to the United States," Australian Foreign
Affairs Record , August 1977, p. 426.
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jviet facilities in Somalia. Speaking on this subject the
:ime Minister explained that:
. . .
[The Australian] Government has supported
the extension of activities on Diego Garcia by
[the U.S.] Government. ... we believe that
balance is a precondition for stability. We are
also concerned that further efforts by the
U.S.S.R. to enhance its strategic status in the
Indian Oaean should be discouraged or adequately
matched.
:aser's visit coincided precisely with the first round of
ilks in Moscow in June 1977. Carter explained to Fraser
lat he had used his Indian Ocean initiative to induce the
iviet Union to negotiate in a serious vein not only on the
idian Ocean but on other arms control issues as well.
•reover, because of Australia's long-term interests in the
itcome of the Indian Ocean negotiations, Carter assured
aser that he would keep him informed as to the issues
39der discussion as well as the progress of the talks.
. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
tion Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
eacock: U.S. Will Consult Australia in Area Disarmament,*''
IS Daily Report: Asia and the Pacific , March 31, 1977,
Ml. The Australian Parliament expressed a consensus that
dian Ocean NALT could get underway only if the Soviets
knowledge that the naval base at Berbera was under Soviet
ntrol. See Australia, Parliament, Hansard's Commonwealth
rliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) , New
ries, 104 (1977) : 205.
. SECSTATE WASHDC msg . 232030Z Jun 77 (State Cite 146566)
ubject: White House Statements on Indian Ocean Working
oup Talks) . The politics of this visit as well as the
oblems of getting Carter to agree to meet with Fraser are
plained in Alan Renouf, The Champagne Trail: The Experi-




Vance, at the request of Peacock, wrote to him in December
1977 to assure him "on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment, that any arms limitation agreement [the United States]
reach [ed] with the USSR on the Indian Ocean will not in any
way qualify or derogate from the US commitment to Australia
or limit [U.S.] freedom to act in implementing [U.S.]
commitments under the ANZUS Treaty." Vance went on to add
that the United States had so advised the Soviet Union and,
specifically, that combined exercises in the Indian Ocean
40
sponsored by ANZUS would not be affected.
From a politico-military perspective Australia con-
sidered any constraint on the ability of the United States
to continue its long-term cooperation on matters of national
security as inimical to its interests. Hence, Fraser would
not have been opposed to the termination of the negotiations
in February 1978 even though this would have made
Australia's efforts to moderate the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace effort within the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean
substantially more difficult. Nonetheless, he probably
would not have objected to the resumption of the talks by
Carter as long as the United States consulted frankly and in
a timely fashion with Australia and provided assurances in
consonance with Carter's promise to Fraser and Vance's
40. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Backgrounder
No. 215 of 5 December 1979," n.p.
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letter to Peacock that the United States would not accede to
anything in the talks that undermined U.S. security commit-
41
ments to Australia and ANZUS. However, the conditions
under which Carter ended the talks may have provided
Australia with an unexpected leverage to encourage a more
extensive U.S. commitment to ANZUS in general and Australia
in particular. Perhaps the Soviet Union did not consider
this outcome in its pre-NALT calculations and decided that
negotiating with the United States would serve its interests
by creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust within
ANZUS.
Just how the Soviet Union tried to constrain the
Australian and ANZUS connections remains an open question.
By using the tactic of expanding the definition of the
Indian Ocean region, the Soviet delegation could have argued
to limit U.S. use of Australian facilities. This objective,
however, seems somewhat doubtful once the goal of the
negotiations had shifted from Carter's March 1977 aim of
demilitarizing the Indian Ocean to the later, mutually
agreed objective of stabilizing Soviet and U.S. activity in
the region. This suggests that U.S. facilities in Australia
were not the subject of negotiation because they had been in
41. See, for example, AMEMBASSY CANBERRA msg. 060722Z Apr 79
(Canberra Cite 2902) (Subject: Foreign Minister Peacock
Discusses Soviet Presence in Vietnam and the Balance of
Power in the Indian Ocean.)
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operation for some time. Moreover, both sides had a mutual
interest in retaining access to those facilities which would
sustain their ability to project forces promptly into the
region in the event of a breakout from the terms of any
Indian Ocean agreement as well as to monitor compliance with
those terms. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that
NAUCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt at Exmouth, Western Australia, the
Joint Space Defense Research Facility at Pine Gap, and the
Joint Defense Space Communication Station at Nurrungar were
not the objects of serious Soviet attention in the negotia-
tions nor was it in the interests of the United States to
open these facilities to discussion in the talks. There
is some evidence of this in an article in the Canberra Times
from the Soviet Union's Novosti Press Agency that described
stabilization as "the renunciation of the construction of
42. For a discussion of the capabilities of these facilities
at the time of Indian Ocean NALT see Desmond Ball, A.
Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Installations in
Australia (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1980) . In general,
NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt is tasked to provide ship-to-shore
communications support for U.S. Fleet units in addition to
its VLF capability (see Chapter III) . It is linked through
the Defense Communications System (DCS) to other naval
communications stations in the Western Pacific including the
Naval Communications Area Master Station Western Pacific
(NAVCAMS WESTPAC) on Guam. It did have a Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS) capability which linked it to,
among other facilities, Diego Garcia. The Space Tracking
and Communication Facilities at Pine Gap near Alice Springs
and at Nurrungar perform command, control, and communica-
tions functions in connection with satellite surveillance.
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new military bases . . . and the termination of the
expansion of the already existing ones."
However, there was one Australian facility that
probably attracted Soviet attention in terms of both U.S.
and Australian military capabilities as well as the fact
that the United States had not established a pattern of
regular and extensive usage of it. Just prior to Carter's
statement in March 1977, Fraser's Minister of Defense D. J.
Killen announced in February 1977 that the Royal Australian
Navy (RAN) would begin to operate from its new facility at
Garden Island on Cockburn Sound in Western Australia begin-
ning in early 1979 on a permanent basis. Though he avoided
tying this basing policy to a Soviet presence in the Indian
Ocean, Killen confirmed that, in the future, half of
Australia's submarine force would be deployed in the Indian
44Ocean. Construction at Cockburn Sound began in 1970 and
wasn't completed until 1978. The base was capable of han-
dling a variety of naval vessels with alongside berthing and
support facilities for submarines and surface ships up to
and including heavy cruisers. The Sound was a good,
natural, medium-sized harbor which Britain's Royal Navy
43. See The Canberra Times , January 24, 1978.
44. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Australia to Base Four Warships at Cockburn Sound," F_BIS_




identified as long ago as 1911 as an ideal site for a base
45
on the western coast of Australia.
Shortly after Fraser took office, he offered the use of
46
Zockburn Sound to the United States. Despite a flurry of
rhetoric during the construction of the base and shortly
following the Australian offer, the United States had not
jsed Cockburn Sound for anything other than occasional,
routine port visits because its potential use as a major
[ndian Ocean operating base for the United States was
Limited. The distance from Cockburn Sound to the Arabian
Sea, the presumed tactical area of operations, was
ipproximately 4900 nautical miles. Moreover, should any
jattle group operating from the Sound need to transit to
mother area of interest such as the South China Sea or
Northeast Asia similar voyages of 2800 and 4800 nautical
niles respectively would have been required. Thus, there
/ere clearly defined disadvantages to the use of Cockburn
>ound by the United States.
t5. See Geoffrey Kemp, "Geo-Logistic Constraints on U.S.
lobility in the Indo-Western Pacific Theater," Francis J.
rest, ed., Environment for u.s. Nava l Strategy in the
'acific Indian Ocean Area r 1985-1995 (Newport: U.S. Naval
far College, 1977), Appendix B, p. 368-370.
>6. "U.S. -British Navies to Use WA Base," Sydney Morning
lej^ld, January 14, 1976, p. 7:1. Australia, Parliament,
lansard's Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of
Representatives), New Series, 117 (1980): 933.
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However, should it have become necessary to divert U.S.
or allied naval and merchant shipping south of Australia
because of the closure of the Strait of Malacca or the
Indonesian Straits, there would have been value in having
access to the facilities at Cockburn Sound. Such an option
also highlighted the reasons for excluding the Great
Australian Bight and the Bass Strait from any definition of
the Indian Ocean. Such a tactical requirement would have
also increased the importance of Australian naval facilities
at Melbourne and Adelaide. Should the base at Subic Bay
have been sealed off or access to it lost because of
unfavorable base rights negotiations with the Philippine
Government, Cockourn Sound, Melbourne, and Adelaide would
have proven valuable to the United States. Finally, even
though it was remote from the Persian Gulf and Southwest
Asia, Cockburn Sound offered the advantage of not being
constrained by straits or territorial waters should any
force using it need to transit to these locations. Hence,
the Soviet Union probably considered the Sound as a subject
for negotiation during the talks.
A similar case could be made for the Soviet try to link
the Timor and Arafura Seas with the Indian Ocean. Even
though the Torres Strait between New Guinea and Australia is
one of the most treacherous bodies of water in the world, it
is at a terminus of the Port Said to Torres Strait route
—
one of the major commercial routes of the Indian Ocean.
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Moreover Darwin, a base of increasing importance to
Australia, was situated at the southeastern edge of the
Timor Sea. Tactical and strategic considerations aside,
these two seas and the Torres Strait were not contiguous to
the Indian Ocean and were more appropriate to naval opera-
tions in the Pacific for both the U.S. and the USSR.
One other Australian concern that arose during the
Indian Ocean talks addressed the issue of military exer-
cises. Traditionally, combined exercises have served as
both a tangible and symbolic means of demonstrating a
state's continuing commitment to a mutual security relation-
ship as well as sharpening the tactical proficiency of the
forces participating in the exercise. As such they were an
alternative to controlling the force levels of an adversary
in an arms control agreement. This option avoided the many
technical problems inherent in the traditional approaches to
naval arms control while still retaining the option of
affecting the actual use of naval forces— a consideration
that may have had greater political impact in some circum-
47
stances than the actual force levels themselves.
The United States, Australia, and New Zealand had a
long-standing program of bilateral and multilateral exer-
cises to test tactics, doctrine, and the interoperability of
47. Richard Haass, "Naval Arms Control: Approaches and
Considerations," George H. Quester, ed., Navies and. Anns.
Control (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 205.
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various military forces and equipment. These included the
annual RIMPAC series of exercises since 1971 which brought
together, in addition to the United States, Australia, and
New Zealand, forces from Canada and Japan. In the summer of
1974, the bi-annual KANGAROO series of exercises began to be
held in the Coral Sea/Queensland area of Australia. This
series of exercises included forces from ANZUS countries as
well as the United Kingdom. In addition, there have been
other lower level exercises conducted throughout the years
involving individual units of ANZUS. In general, Australia
has always regarded itself as a favored ally by the United
States in this realm of their relationship.
Perhaps Australia felt it necessary to test this
position in its relationship with the United States because
of the talks. An Australian delegation headed by W. B.
Pritchett, Assistant Secretary for Policy Coordination in
the Australian Department of Defense, traveled to the United
States for consultations with U.S. officials from April 11
48
to 14, 1978. Pritchett' s probable concern was to gauge
48. F. A. Mediansky, "Indian Ocean Arms Accord May Backfire
on West," Australian Financial Review , June 16, 1978;
Pritchett was accompanied on this trip by RADM Peter H.
Doyle, RAN, Chief of Joint Operations, Air Vice Marshall S.
D. Evans, RAAF, Acting Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, and
John R. Burgess, Acting Assistant Secretary for Defense
Policy, Defense Division, Department of Foreign Affairs; see
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA msg 070547Z Apr 78 (Canberra Cite 2576)





the effect that the four sessions of the U.S. -Soviet nego-
tiations had worked on the ANZUS treaty and Australian
interests in light of Vance's letter to Peacock and Carter's
promise to Fraser. The vehicle that Australia chose to test
the cohesion of the ANZUS alliance was an existing proposal
for an exercise to be held in the waters off Western
Australia in the fall of 1978—SANDGROPER I.
It would have been extremely embarrassing to both the
Carter Administration and the Fraser government if the
United States did not agree to participate in SANDGROPER I.
Such a decision would have demonstrated to Australia that
the United States had agreed to some form of limitation on
its participation in such events in Western Australian
waters within the framework of an Indian Ocean agreement.
Furthermore, it would infer that Vance had been something
less than candid in his assurances to Peacock regarding the
Indian Ocean talks. Moreover, when considered in the con-
text of the United States' condemnation of Soviet activities
in the Horn of Africa, rejection of a long-standing ally's
proposal for a combined military exercise would have been
politically devastating to Fraser.
The issue was a double-edged sword. If the United
States had chosen to retain the option of reopening the
talks with the Soviet Union as a result of some demon-
stration of their good faith in the Horn of Africa, then the
United States would have had to consider the relative merits
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of a precedent-setting, large-scale exercise in the Indian
Ocean off the west coast of Australia vis-a-vis a Soviet
claim that such activity was a change in the U.S. pattern of
operations in the region. The issue, if this was the case,
turned on the question of whether the U.S. and Australian
governments believed that the political and military bene-
fits in conducting combined, peacetime operations could be
reconciled with the goal of constraining future increases in
Soviet military capabilities in the region via an arms
control agreement. Perhaps the U.S. goal of stabilizing the
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean had placed the United
States between "a rock and a hard place" with one of its
oldest allies even though the U.S. delegation made it clear
to its Soviet counterpart during the talks that the U.S.
periodically conducted such exercises with certain littoral
states and that it would continue to do so under an Indian
Ocean agreement. The Soviet delegation did not raise any
49
objections to this statement.
The United States opted to reassure Australia in this
regard. During Vice-President Mondale's visit to Australia
from May 7 to May 9, 1978, Mondale confirmed that he and
Fraser had "reviewed a number of security interests our
nations share as ANZUS allies." He went on to say that he
49. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 211820Z Jul 78 (State Cite 184776)




and the Prime Minister had "agreed that as part of defense
:ooperation, the United States look[ed] forward to con-
ducting a joint naval exercise off Western Australia in the
near future." He concluded his remarks by noting that the
significance of this joint naval exercise was that it
jnderscored the United States' "commitment to the ANZUS
rreaty, and to the understandable, necessary security
SO
:ommitment and needs of Australia and New Zealand."
fondale also reaffirmed Vance's commitment to Peacock that
:he discussions between the United States and the Soviet
Jnion would not reduce the ambit of the ANZUS treaty in any
"sense, shape, or form" in a major policy speech at the
51Sast-West Center in Honolulu. As a result, ANZUS forces
:onducted SANDGROPER I from October 22, 1978, until November
., 1978.
These actions assuaged Fraser's concerns that an
igreement with the Soviet Union on Indian Ocean issues was
>f more value to the United States than continued good
elations with Australia. Fraser confirmed this during a
0. AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 080823Z May 78 (Canberra Cite 3528)
Subject: Press Conference, Canberra, Australia, Vice
resident Mondale)
.
1. See Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, "U.S. Vice
resident's Regional Visit," Australian Foreign Affairs
ecord
, May 1978, p. 256; U.S., Department of State, "The
ice President: America's Role in Southeast Asia and the




speech in Parliament shortly after Mondale's visit. He
referred to SANDGROPER I as "something concrete from the
USA" and "a significant move toward linking ANZUS to the
52
Indian Ocean." Though there have been contending inter-
pretations of the U.S. decision that suggest that it was
taken to help the U.S. position in the Indian Ocean more
53
than that of Australia and ANZUS, the inclusion of New
Zealand forces in an exercise more than 4500 miles from
their traditional operating area demonstrated that the
members of ANZUS, and the U.S. in particular, had recognized
that ANZUS was not limited to a strictly Pacific context and
that ANZUS exercises in the Indian Ocean were not a new
extension of the alliance. Moreover, SANDGROPER I served as
a tacit signal to the Soviet Union that the United States
and its allies had not only the capability but also the will
to challenge the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean.
Moreover, such a decision on the part of the United States
suggests that the Soviet Union and the United States did not
reach an agreement during the four rounds of negotiations on
how much, if any, of the waters around Australia should be
included in an agreement.
52. Australia, Parliament, Hansard's Commonwealth Parlia-
mentary Debates (House of Representatives), New Series, 109
(1978) : 2028.




Australia was not the only state that the Soviet Union
tried to include in its force calculations in the talks.
Both France and Great Britain maintained the types of naval
capabilities that concerned the Soviet Union. Both nations
had consistently abstained from voting on the Indian Ocean
Zone of Peace issue in the United Nations. France deployed
the single largest naval surface force in the region at the
time. Moreover, France expressed concern to the United
States over Soviet operations in the Indian Ocean as well as
54
over the negotiations themselves.
The French connection was somewhat unique because of
the long history of French presence and activity in the
Indian Ocean and France's continued maintenance of both
French forces and dependent territories in the region.
French policy in the Indian Ocean was a reflection of
France's conviction of the need for an independent presence
to serve the goals of visibility and deterrence. In a large
measure, this determination to sustain its independent role
in the Indian Ocean was a microcosm of France's belief in
the efficacy of its own force de frappe. It was, in a





sense, a continuation of de Gaulle's policy that "the
55defense of France be French."
To support this policy and French interests, France had
traditionally maintained a military presence in the Indian
Dcean including the naval facilities at Djibouti. Though
the airfield was not very large, the troop areas offered
Little more than barracks space, and the port facility was
small, Djibouti provided France with a military foothold in
57
the Northern Indian Ocean. France created a naval command
responsible for operations in the Indian Ocean and the Cape
58
route leading to it. The naval forces assigned to this
command were not insignificant and included, on the average,
ibout twenty ships at any given time. Although the force
[iix was somewhat on the low side with one guided missile
Irigate and five dual purpose frigates, it was significant
In terms of its capability to demonstrate presence and
^ranee's commitment to the importance of the Cape route. In
tddition, France usually deployed five minesweepers to its
i5. Quoted in Steven T. Ross, "French Defense Policy," Naval
far College Review , May-June 1983, p. 26.
»6. United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on
he Indian Ocean, Summary Record of the 15th Meeting
A/AC.159/SR. 15) (New York: September 22, 1974), p. 3.
>7. See Robert J. Hanks, The Cape Router Imperiled Western
.ifeline (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
981)
, p. 63.
'8. "French Navy Builds Presence on Oil Routes," The
Jaristian Science Monitor , February 27, 1974, p. 5:1.
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Indian Ocean squadron—the only Western ships of this type
59
in the Indian Ocean.
France also maintained an Exterior Action Force,
renamed the Rapid Assistance Force in 1983, organized as an
intervention force somewhat along the lines of the RDF. The
manpower assigned to this force numbered some 20,000 and was
extremely flexible in terms of its ability to be employed.
U.S. and NATO officers who had observed this force in
exercises remarked that it was well trained and made up of
more long-service troops than other French units stationed
in metropolitan France and Germany. Since 1973 France had
used this force, or at least portions of it, twice in Zaire
and in Djibouti, Mauritania, Lebanon, Chad, and the Central
African Republic. France also maintained smaller contin-
gents of all three of its armed services on Mayotte in the
Comoro Archipelago and on Re 'union.
France's considerable naval presence and its demon-
strated willingness to employ military force in Africa
suggests that the USSR would have been concerned with French
capabilities in the Indian Ocean. There was a precedent for
similar considerations in the MBFR talks in that NATO
consistently excluded French military capabilities from the
59. Drew Middleton, "French Force in a Vital Area," The New




MBFR context while the Warsaw Pact maintained that such an
exclusion was unreasonable in view of its assessment that
France would meet its NATO obligations in the event of a war
in Europe. Though the extent of French cooperation with the
United States in the event of a crisis in the Indian Ocean
would have been difficult to estimate at the time of the
talks, it seems probable that France would have provided
assistance if the French government perceived a serious
danger to French economic and political interests.
While French economic and trade interests, with the
notable exception of oil, pose somewhat of a paradox when
analyzing why France maintained forces in the Indian
Ocean, France's political interests were tied to the
military aspects of French policy. French interests in the
region were oriented more toward the protection and
61. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact have, in general,
been disappointed that they have failed to get France to
join in the MBFR talks. The USSR views the French Army and
Air Force as part of the NATO Military Organization despite
France's withdrawal. They have insisted, and NATO had
agreed, to count the approximately 60,000 French forces
stationed in West Germany. However, because France refuses
to participate in MBFR, no forces stationed on French
territory are included in the forces within the general
guidelines area. See John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (New York: Pergamon
Press, 1980) , p. 126-127.
62. For an in-depth discussion of this dichotomy see
Jean-Piere Gomane, "France and the Indian Ocean," Larry
Bowman and Ian Clark, eds., The Indian Ocean in Global





enhancement of diplomatic, technical, and political rela-
tions with states which had recently gained independence
from France as well as those that provided energy sources
and raw materials to France. Hence the interest in the Red
Sea, the Mozambique Channel, Suez, and the Cape route as
funnels of these resources. Moreover, France had estab-
lished a firm linkage with many of the states around the
littoral of the Indian Ocean as a supplier of arms. South
Africa, Pakistan, and Indonesia were prime examples of this
relationship.
However, there was another, perhaps more subtle, reason
for French concern for the Indian Ocean. As the Draft
Convention on the Law of the Sea moved through its various
stages, it became increasingly clear that the littoral and
island states of the region could achieve broad legal rights
over portions of the Indian Ocean as well as their
resources. France stood to gain from these rights and
especially those that pertained to deep-sea mining. Indeed,
the nodules containing manganese, copper, iron, nickel, and
cobalt were more uniform in composition in the Indian Ocean
than anywhere else. A review of the known locations of
insular and offshore mineral sites of the Indian Ocean
suggests that France, because of its ownership of Re'union,
63. See Indian Ocean Atla s, p. 17, for the location of the




Mayotte and the French southern and Antarctic lands of lies
Crozet, lies Kergulen, lie Amsterdam, and lie Saint Paul, as
well as certain smaller islands in the Mozambique Channel,
stood to gain substantially from the provisions under
consideration. Perhaps the Soviet Union recognized the
potential of such a claim. Shortly after the fourth round
of talks in Berne in February 1978, the USSR mounted a
diplomatic effort to encourage Mauritius to maintain its
claim to sovereignty to at least one of the French islands
64
in question, lie de Tromelin. Thus France would have
perceived any limitation on its maritime activities or
regional military presence in the Indian Ocean as clearly
not being in its long-term interests. Moreover, since the
United States had provided logistic support to certain of
France's military operations in Africa, France would have
been concerned over any agreement that might limit future
cooperation in the region.
The timing of the U.S. -Soviet negotiations must have
also caused concern on the political level in France since
France granted independence to the French Territory of Afars
and Issas, formerly known as French Somaliland, in the very
same month that the first round of the Indian Ocean talks
64. U.S., Department of Commerce, Joint Publications
Research Service, "French Presence in Indian Ocean Will Be
Increased: Western Pressure on Mauritius to Abandon Its
Claim to Tromelin," Translations on Law of the £e_a, JPRS
70824 (Washington: March 23, 1978), p. 33.
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were held—June 1977. The new country took the name of the
Republic of Djibouti. However, France retained the right to
use the port of Djibouti as a naval base and also the right,
and to some extent political obligation, to continue to
station French forces there to block any possible takeover
by Ethiopia or Somalia—the two states which had a paramount
interest in the future of the mini-state. The timing of
this event coincided almost precisely with the fundamental
strategic shift in the Horn of Africa that ultimately led to
the breakoff of the Indian Ocean negotiations between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
This interest stems from the fact that the port of
Djibouti was a terminus of the Franco-Ethiopian railway
which ran from Djibouti to the Ethiopian capital of Addis
Ababa. As such, it served as the main route for most of
Ethiopia's foreign commerce. Though the territory was not
of any great economic importance to Somalia, control over
Djibouti would have allowed Somalia to exert a degree of
pressure on Ethiopia in other areas of their long-standing
boundary dispute. Hence France found itself politically and
militarily linked, even if only as an interested observer,
in the outcome of the struggle in the Horn of Africa and, by
association, with what was to become a key political element
65. Irving Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook fo r Somalia
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 181.
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in Indian Ocean NALT. It is little wonder that France
expressed its concern to the United States over U.S. inten-
tions in the talks. France's real and continuing interests
in the region, which included the long-term health and
welfare of the Republic of Djibouti, as well as the possible
precedential effect on arms control negotiations in the
Mediterranean, suggests that France opposed the whole idea
of Indian Ocean NALT. To the French, the negotiations could
only have been perceived as an exercise in pre-emptive
diplomacy even though, had some sort of formal agreement
been reached to lower the superpower presence, France stood
to gain the most from such negotiations.
NATO
The issue of French capabilities and willingness to use
them in the region raised an even larger issue in the
context of the Indian Ocean talks and, in particular, the
Persian Gulf. One of the geographic foci of the principal
long-term political and military problems facing the United
States and the Western European members of NATO, as well as
Japan, was the Persian Gulf. The issue was the threat to
the security of NATO by crises which developed outside the
established area of operations of the Alliance.
There was demonstrated reluctance to deal with this
issue within NATO. Indeed, this was one of the perceptions
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that emerged from the OPEC oil boycott of 1973 66 which
demonstrated that Europe and the United States did not
necessarily share a common view of their vital interests.
This hesitation, and its potential benefit to the Soviet
Union, was not lost on the Soviet leadership in their
consideration of entering into arms control talks on the
Indian Ocean with the United States since it was generally
recognized at the time that NATO had done little to prepare
contingency plans to deal with Soviet activity outside of
its strictly defined boundaries. Though there had been
informal planning by NATO's Defense Planning Committee as
early as 1972 for protection of the oil tanker traffic
around the Cape of Good Hope from the Persian Gulf to
Western Europe and North America, some members of the
Alliance opposed the diversion of forces from the central
and northern fronts of NATO. Even though NATO reportedly
had completed provisional planning for a NATO battle group
composed of a large command ship, four frigates, a
submarine, and several auxilliary vessels, opposition
within NATO to the deployment of this battle group argued
that thinning out U.S., British, or even French capabilities
for operations elsewhere would virtually eliminate any
66. See p. 79.
67. See Michael Chichester, "Whitehall Cover-Up, Westminster
Exposure," Navy International , July 1976, p. 8.
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chance of prolonged resistance to a Soviet drive into
Western Europe. It seems that NATO had adopted the attitude
that such missions should properly be met by the United
c a
States, Great Britain, and France. Had the United States
successfully concluded an agreement on its force levels in
the Indian Ocean with the Soviet Union, NATO would have been
forced to come to grips with the implications of such an
agreement on its ability to protect the oil routes. These
circumstances might very well have brought the question of
NATO's use of its forces outside the area to which they had
been historically committed since 1949 to the fore—an issue
which had traditionally been a divisive one within the
Alliance.
The reluctance of the Western European allies derived,
in the main, from fears that U.S. force withdrawals from
Europe would detract from the linkage between the deterrence
of ground warfare in Europe and the U.S. strategic nuclear
guarantee to Western Europe— a classic case of military
decoupling of political issues. Refusal to recognize that
NATO must bear a greater share of the defense of Europe if,
as was the case, the United States placed a greater emphasis
on its legitimate national security interests outside of
68. Drew Middleton, "Limited Range Pains NATO," The New York
limes, June 29, 1980, p. 13:1.
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Europe and allocated forces to support those interests, only
exacerbated an already divided Alliance.
The Carter Administration recognized the potentially
devastating effects of these circumstances on alliance
politics and sought to defuse them early on. For some time,
the United States and Great Britain had been holding talks
on the Indian Ocean. Generally held every six months
alternatively in London and Washington, the talks did not
involve negotiations, commitments, or agreements. Their
purpose was to provide a regular opportunity for officials
of the State Department, the Department of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council to
meet with their British counterparts from the Ministry of
Defense and the Foreign and Colonial Offices to exchange
views on a series of politico-military matters in the Indian
Ocean area. Carter's Indian Ocean arms control initiative
was discussed at the U.S. -U.K. meeting on May 24 and May 25,
1977, in London and again on June 23, 1978, in
Washington.
In a much broader perspective, the Carter Administra-
tion wanted to lead NATO in the development of practical
programs to redress the imbalance in military power in
Europe. In May 1977, the NATO members, under Carter's
69. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 111531Z May 77 (State Cite 106891)
Subject: U.S. -U.K. Indian Ocean Talks).
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leadership, committed themselves to aim for an annual
increase in defense spending of about three percent in real
terms. Carter's goal in this regard was to dampen some of
the disunity which had grown up in NATO in the preceeding
decade and to restore a semblance of politico-military
cohesion to the Alliance. His rationale was to shift some
of the burden from what some had called an American-West
70German defense arrangement to one in which military
capabilities were more broadly evident.
Though Carter was successful in getting an agreement to
aim for increased defense expenditures, he had difficulty in
alleviating allied concerns over his arms control policies
in general and particularly SALT II. Beginning in mid-1977,
the United States began intensive consultation on SALT with
NATO. Previously, these consultations had been carried out
by routine briefings. Under the Carter plan, no SALT issue
of importance to European security was resolved without
advance consultation with the allies. The Carter Admin-
istration followed a similar policy with respect to the
Indian Ocean talks. At the conclusion of the first round of
talks in Moscow in June 1977, Warnke discussed them with
70. See, for example, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., The
Atlantic. Community: A Complex Imbalance (New York: Van
Nostrand, Reinhold, Co., 1969), p. 37.
71. Vance, op. cit., p. 67.
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NATO's political body while Hayward had an extensive session
with NATO's Military Committee. 72
The circumstances surrounding the relationship of
NATO's member states and the Indian Ocean reflected the
broader issues of comparative military strength, political
will, and alliance cohesion. All of these can be gauged by
only approximate indicators. Moreover, political will is
very difficult to assess before a crisis—a situation in
which varying perceptions of a critical national interest or
value are, more often than not, the subject of varying
policy perceptions. The readiness to make armed forces
available for an alliance's use is just as much an indicator
of alliance cohesion as the stationing of foreign forces on
one's territory is. These elements of alliance politics
suggest that the issue of Indian Ocean NALT could very well
have been a divisive one at a time when the United States
fought for a unified front within NATO on such measures as
real growth in military spending. Because of these very
real concerns of alliance politics, it seems likely that
most of the NATO states would not have objected to the U.S.
decision to hold the Indian Ocean negotiations in abeyance
nor would they have objected to their continuation provided
that the United States retained the responsibilities which




and the Indian Ocean. However, should the talks have been
continued NATO members might have inferred that the United
States no longer linked Soviet involvement in the Horn of
Africa with its arms control program— a perception that
could have had ominous effects on the question of politico-
military linkage in Europe.
China and Others
The role of the Chinese cannot be neglected in eval-
uating Soviet long-term objectives. Though China was not an
ally of the United States, the potential for a Chinese SL.BM
threat to the USSR from the Indian Ocean, though it did not
appear to be an immediate threat at the time of the
73
negotiations, cannot be discounted in Soviet negotiating
strategy. Though China was the only great power that voted
in favor of all the U.N. Zone of Peace resolutions, the PRC
never criticized the U.S. presence on Diego Garcia. Indeed,
China favored a strong U.S. military posture in the Indian
74Ocean as a counter to Soviet presence. The PRC perceived
Soviet actions in the Indian Ocean as an extension of
Russia's attempt to control southern Africa, including the
73. See, for example, "China's Navy and Foreign Policy";
Maj. Charles D. Lovejoy, "Modernization and the Chinese
Strategic Debate," Research Paper, Center for Advanced
Research, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, June 1979,
p. 68-71.
74. "China Wants U.S. in Indian Ocean," The Japan Times ,
October 21, 1975, p. 1:3.
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Cape route, and the West's vital sea lanes. Repeated
statements by then Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping on
the need for increased U.S. naval presence in the Western
Pacific, from where the bulk of the Indian Ocean force
ultimately came, confirmed the continuing validity of this
appraisal of the Chinese position. The reportedly
successful launch of a Chinese SLBM only heightens this
7 6
perception. China would have been concerned over the
contents of an agreement as well as a U.S. decision to
resume the negotiations. China could have only viewed
Indian Ocean NALT as another example of Soviet plans to
achieve a regional hegemony compounded by a perception of
the United States' penchant to compromise with the Soviet
77Union.
India was another case in point. Carter came to The
White House with a belief that U.S. relations with India
could be and should be improved. Among the ten original
foreign policy goals established by Brzezinski in 1977 was
the weaving of "a world wide web of bilateral, political,
75. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Alexander Steward, "Johannesburg Views Effects of
Podgorny-Castro Visits," FBIS Daily Report ; £u.fr-Saharan
Mxica., April 6, 1977, p. E-5.
76. "Peking Fires Its First Submarine Launched Missile," T_he_
New York Times . October 17, 1982, p. 15:1.
77. Ou Mei, "What Lies Behind the Soviet Intention to Take
Lease of Gan," Peking Review. November 11, 1977, p. 23-24.
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and, where appropriate, economic relations with the new
7 8
emerging regional inf luentials. " India was such a state
along the littoral of the Indian Ocean. Moreover,
Brzezinski established the goal of consulting on critical
issues with such countries as Saudi Arabia, Iran, India, and
Indonesia. Specifically Brzezinski developed a list,
appropriate to each state, of positive acts which would
79
symbolize the United States' new relationship with them.
Indian Ocean NALT may have been one such issue. Accordingly
India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan were
briefed on the substance of the talks by the United
States. 80
It was in the interest of the United States to keep its
allies and friends well informed of its intentions with
respect to the Indian Ocean talks as well as the progress of
the actual negotiations. The lessons learned from the FBS
issue during SALT I, the cruise missile during SALT II, and
MBFR illustrated the value of such consultations. They
could have served as a strong counterweight to the possible
Soviet use of the talks as a means to weaken U.S. alliances
and influence its friends. Because of the precent-setting
78. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 53.
79. Ibid., p. 54.
80. Vance ; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 030104Z Feb 78 (State Cite




nature of the tactic, Warnke firmly resisted any attempt by
the Soviets to link an agreement to allied forces or
81facilities in the region. In short, Warnke made it very
clear to Mendelevich that the United States had no intention
82
of negotiating for anybody else.
Moreover, the question of the relationship of alliances
to the Indian Ocean demonstrated the linkage of geography
and arms control. Two elements stand out in this regard.
The first is the territory of a state
—
perhaps the most
fundamental element in the modern theory of states. The
second, resources, is perhaps more geopolitical in nature
since it is an aspect of a state's power. In either case,
both were elements in the considerations of U.S. allies
about the Indian Ocean talks. These deliberations over an
arms control issue brought to the fore the fact that
geography in the form of territory and resources did affect
the national security and economic viability of the states
concerned as well as their alliance relationships. Hence,
there is a relationship between geography and any process or
technique, such as arms control, which affects the national
security of a state.




GENERAL PURPOSE NAVAL FORCES
. . . We may agree about the signs but can we
agree about their relative value?
. . . Experts
in calculation! I leave it to you to count, to
measure, to compare.
— Jean Jacques Rousseau (1762)
This last issue is the most substantive of the four
since it deals with controlling the principal business of
both superpower navies in the Indian Ocean-naval presence,
or the use of naval forces short of war to achieve nonmili-
tary objectives. The question of presence was significant
because of the character of the forces that both sides used
to carry out this mission—the general purpose naval forces
of the United States and the USSR. This study defines
general purpose forces as those naval forces not earmarked
for a strategic mission. However, this paper does not
address submarines for two reasons. The first is the
implications of verification. The second is that the
classic operational doctrine for the employment of nuclear
submarines has stressed the need for remaining undetected




been few. Therefore submarines operating in their normal,
undetected mode lack the psychological and coercive impact
of a surface battle group. However, on occasion, even a
ballistic missile submarine has executed a political mission
whose goal was particularly sensitive to its capabilities.
For example, USS PATRICK HENRY (SSBN-599) visited Izmir,
Turkey, in November 1963 to reaffirm Turkey's inclusion in
the scope of U.S. nuclear doctrine after the removal of
land-based ICBM's from Turkey following the Cuban missile
crisis. However, there has been relatively little
consideration given to the possibility of exploiting the
unique capabilities of the nuclear submarine to achieve
limited objectives in peacetime. Nonetheless, deployment
options do exist which could strengthen the presence role of
naval forces.
However, by its very nature, presence implies that the
surface components of the respective navies are the most
appropriate for this role. The method chosen to constrain
surface forces in the Indian Ocean talks was the imposition
of numerical limitations on their movements into or their
basing in an agreed upon geographic area. Since this study
1. Edward Luttwak, The Political Uses of Seapower
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 2.
2. See, for example, Richard S. Andersen, "The Invisible
Presence: The Submarine as an Instrument of Foreign




has already addressed the problem of bases and the geo-
graphic area, this chapter focuses on limitations on their
movement into or about the Indian Ocean. Because the basic
U.S. objective in the talks was stabilization of the
superpower naval presence in the region, the analysis is
further directed to means and measures of achieving this
goal of the talks. Finally, the discussion addresses the
resulting constraints on naval power from both an opera-
tional and a policy perspective.
The Presence Mission
National security planners have devoted most of their
time to the warfighting missions of armed services. In
terms of the United States Navy this implied a concentration
almost exclusively on the problems of either waging war at
sea or projecting force ashore. While this is properly so,
most of the operations carried out by the U.S. and Soviet
fleets have been conducted during peacetime, interruped
periodically by crises requiring the use of force. This
suggests an anomaly in the relationship of force and its
political uses. The presence mission is the actualization
of that anomaly. President Warren G. Harding aptly
characterized it in a speech before the Seattle Press Club
on July 27, 1923, when he explained that "the Navy is rather
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more than a mere instrumentality of war. It is the right
3
arm of the State Department. . . . Gorshkov, reiterated
the same theme in his 1972 series of articles when he
described the Soviet Navy as the USSR's "pet instrument of
4foreign policy." Blechman and Kaplan's 1978 study Force
Without War found that the United States employed its armed
forces 215 times for political purposes between 1946 and
5
1975. Naval forces participated in 80 percent of these
cases, and more than 100 incidents involved only naval
forces. If one narrowed the period under consideration to
focus on uses of force since 1955 , the United States Navy
has been involved in nine out of every ten cases.
The role of the Navy in carrying out national security
policy in this regard has been termed as "gunboat diplo-
macy," "overseas presence," and "forward deployment" to name
but a few of the more common terms. Taken together these
3. U.S., Department of the Navy, American Naval Policy as
Outlined in the Messages of the Presidents of the Unit e d.
States from 1790 to 1924 (Washington: 1924), p. 30-31.
4. "Navies in War and Peace," United States Naval Institute
Proceedings . October 1974, p. 61.
5. Barry M. Blechman and Steven S. Kaplan, Force Without
War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978) , p. 23.
6. Ibid., p. 39.

- 293 -
terms have described "the Misunderstood Mission" or "the
Least Understood Mission." There is good reason for this
since one of the most difficult situations that a national
security planner can encounter is that of being thrust into
the midst of a rapidly developing crisis overseas, under
conditions of less than precise objectives, complicated by
broad rules of engagement governing the forces at hand, and
inadequate intelligence available about the changing
situation. Moreover, the planner may be less than perfectly
clear about the desired political goals stemming from the
crisis. Yet, he must somehow tailor a force level to
support those goals. These perceptions seem equally
applicable to a Soviet planner as they do to a U.S. national
security planner. Moreover, the historical record of the
two state's navies in the Indian Ocean confirms these
perceptions. There is no documented case of a U.S. or
Soviet naval force engaging in combat operations in the
Indian Ocean from 1945 until the U.S. Navy's support of
Operation DESERT ONE in 1980. Hence the dominant business of
the two navies was the presence mission.
7. See, for example, LCDR Kenneth R. McGruther, USN, "The
Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," Hay&l War. College
EejLie_w, September-October 1974, p. 3-20; CDR James F.
v-uk uennis k. neutze, unv^v., uoin, Dj.ucja^r»cu 1/j.^j.vmuv^ . o.
Juridical Examination of the Use of Naval Forces in Support




Measur ement—A " Sguishy" Problem
The crux of the matter during the Indian Ocean nego-
tiations was the issue of how could the United States and
the Soviet Union agree on some sort of criteria to define
and measure their presence. Indeed, this problem was the
central one of the negotiations—the one to which the two
pdelegations returned time and time again. There have been
various means of constraining naval power proposed through-
out the years, and each has generally had some measure of
the constraint imposed associated with it. While each
measure had its own advantages and disadvantages, each, in
varying degrees, illustrated the difficulty of trying to
quantify the naval power of two states whose navies were
intrinsically asymmetric in both doctrine and force
structure. Thus, in a broad sense, the U.S. and Soviet
delegations had to contend with the problem of whether to
quantify their respective presence in the Indian Ocean in a
rigorous fashion or to work toward a more generally worded
agreement that would define presence in a broader, more
qualitative sense describing the general force levels that
9
each state had had in the region in the past.
8. Bayne.
9. Q&lh, Vance , Warnke ; see also Indian Ocean Arms Limi;
tations. 1978 . p. 4.
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The first option raised two subissues: What should be
rigorously quantified and how should it be done; both were
"squishy" problems facing the delegations. The strength and
force structures of the U.S. and Soviet fleets, both of
which represented the scope and intensity of their respec-
tive national interests and objectives, influenced each
navies' missions. In turn, it was this structure and its
capabilities which gave meaning and weight to each state's
will in various situations. Unless these technically
generated force structures were somehow integrated into the
political considerations of arms control, there was no easy
way to determine if each navy could perform particular
politico-military tasks well in isolation, much less against
a determined adversary, within the context of an arms
control agreement. In this regard, a force structure that
supported the presence mission and all of its political
implications may very well have been poorly suited to a
warfighting mission. The U.S. Middle East force was such a
case in point.
This somewhat ideosyncratic journey through a confused
and chaotic jumble of ideas has not brought this study any
closer to the specific criteria by which the delegations
tried to quantify presence. Quite the contrary, it suggests
that perhaps it was not in the interests of the United
States or the USSR to try to apply a rigorous "yardstick" to
such considerations especially in the glaring light of an
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arms control forum. Unlike negotiations on strategic
systems, such as SALT, where it was possible broadly to
gauge static measures of balance such as deliverable war-
heads, equivalent megatonnage, missile throw-weight and
bomber payload, there was no easy way to measure naval power
in the Indian Ocean talks given the asymmetric force struc-
tures generated for diverse purposes and in response to each
state's differing needs. Nevertheless, both sides recog-
nized that there was a need for some agreed standard of
measurement. Despite this agreement in principle, this
issue remained one of the principal ones faced by Warnke and
Mendelevich during the talks and, indeed, remained unre-
solved at the close of the fourth round of negotiations in
February 1978. However, there was agreement that naval
ships, and not merchant ships, should be the object of their
quest to find a "yardstick .
"
Combatants v. Auxiliaries
This too, though seemingly an obvious and appropriate
objective of a naval arms control forum, was not without
controversy. The U.S. Middle East Force serves as an
instructive paradigm in examining how this question probably
turned. This study has demonstrated that the MEF performed




essentially a politico-military function in a diplomatic
context by showing the flag, demonstrating the continuing
U.S. interest in the Middle East, and enhancing U.S.
friendship with the littoral nations through a continuing
program of port visits. The force traditionally consisted
of a flagship and two destroyer or frigate class ships. The
flagship at the time of the talks, USS LA SALLE (AGF-3) , had
generally remained in the area on a permanent basis with the
destroyers deploying from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Since
the delegations agreed that any U.S. -Soviet treaty on the
Indian Ocean deal with naval ships only, the U.S. delegation
could have argued that such a premise excluded LA SALLE
because it was legally classified by the Secretary of the
Navy as an auxiliary and, as such, should be exempt from a
limitation ceiling on combatants. This raised the question
of what is an auxiliary ship as opposed to a combatant
vessel within the overall framework of "naval ships" and,
more broadly, should the talks cover combatants and
12
auxiliaries or combatants only.
The issue was not as easily resolved as its simplistic
semantic nature suggests. At the time of the talks, the
U.S. Navy had long excelled in the technique of replenishing
its carrier battle groups while underway. However, the




^chniques in this one of the most difficult and dangerous
jamanship evolutions. In the Indian Ocean the Soviet Navy
rtentimes used deep sea mooring buoys to create anchorages
jcause it lacked recourse to underway replenishment
cills. Moreover, even when the Soviet Navy did develop the
icleus of a Mobile Logistic Support Force (MLSF) such as
is operational in the U.S. Navy, its ships, such as BORIS
IILIKIN, tended to be smaller and less capable than U.S.
jSF ships such as the multi-product, Fast Combat Support
lips of the SACRAMENTO class. CHILIKIN class fleet
jplenishment ships displaced 20,500 tons and were capable
: providing both liquid and solid replenishment products to
tviet combatants. SACRAMENTO class AOE's typically dis-
aced 53,600 tons and could provide up to 177,000 barrels
: fuel and aviation gas, 2150 tons of various munitions,
id approximately 750 tons of dry and refrigerated stores,
i addition, a SACRAMENTO class ship could deliver these
ores either alongside its customer via underway
jplenishment (UNREP) or vertical replenishment (VERTREP)
13ing embarked UH-46 SEA KNIGHT helicopters. Because of
ese disparate capabilities, the Soviet Navy, on the
erage, required more auxiliary vessels in the Indian Ocean
i support its combatants than the United States.
. See, for example, Capt. John Moore, RN (Ret.), ed.,
ne's Fighting Ship s 1974-1975 (London: MacDonald and Co.
ublishers) Ltd., 1974), p. 484 and 580.
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The Soviet Navy could have also exploited this defi-
ciency by citing it as a reason for its larger numerical
presence in the Indian Ocean. Hence, it seems that it would
have been in the interest of the USSR to exclude auxiliaries
from the Indian Ocean talks or, in some way, to cover them
in a different mode than combatants. The close integration
of the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets with the Soviet
Navy exacerbated this issue even more. Speaking in the same
month that the Indian Ocean negotiations began, VADM George
P. Steele, USN (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet,
argued that:
This "interconnection" has been painstakingly
built so that the Soviet Union could send and keep
its naval forces anywhere in the world without
having to wait for political gains that would
enable the building of the traditional system of
overseas naval and air bases. The ubiquitous
presence of Soviet naval forces sustained by
[their] merchant and fishing fleets has con-
tributed in , no small way to [their] remarkable
gains. . . .
There is a precendent in international law that could
have been brought to bear on the question of what con-
stituted a combatant as opposed to an auxiliary vessel. In
the existing Law of the Sea at the time of the negotiations,
Article 8 of the Convention on the High Seas defined a
"warship" as a vessel belonging to the naval forces of a
14. VADM George P. Steele, USN (Ret.), "The Tanker Role in
Strategic Mobility." Remarks delivered at a Conference on
Worldwide Strategic Mobility, National Defense University,
Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington: June 6, 1977.
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state and bearing the external markings distinguishing
warships of its nationality. This article went on further
to classify a warship as a vessel under the command of an
officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name
appeared on the navy list, and manned by a crew who were
15
subject to regular naval discipline. This legal inter-
pretation suggested that the naval auxiliaries of the United
States were properly those vessels displaying a recognized
hull designation for an auxiliary and classified as naval
auxiliary ships in the directives so designating such units
issued by the Secretary of the Navy. In general, this
definition implied that a U.S. Navy ship whose first letter
of its hull designation was "A" was an auxiliary naval
vessel of the United States.
Although similar documentation for the Soviet Navy is
not available, it is possible to formulate a probable Soviet
position on the subject from open-source literature.
Writing in the Soviet Naval Journal in 1976 Captain 1st Rank
15. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Law of the Sea: Convention on the
High Seas," United States Treatie s and Other International
Agreements . TIAS 5200. Washington: U.S. Department of State,
1963) , v. 13, pt. 2, p. 2315.
16. There were two exceptions to this general rule. A CVT
(training aircraft carrier) and an SES (surface effects
ship) were legally classified as auxiliaries. The directive
governing these classifications on the Navy list at the time
of the talks was SECNAVINST 5030. 1G of January 6, 1975. See
U.S., Navy Department, classification s of Naval Ships and





M. Ovanesov and Captain 1st Rank R. Sorokin acknowledged the
general concept of a military warship embodied in Article 8
of the Convention on the High Seas. They argued, however,
that this definition was too academic and did "not take due
regard for the development of naval means." The article
explained that each state should determine the status of a
naval auxiliary vessel on the basis of national legislation
and played down the importance of armament aboard a vessel
as a pre-condition for recognizing it as having the status
of a "warship."
Hence, it seems that the Soviet Union would have held
that "naval ships" included both combatants and auxiliary
vessels which had the right to sail under the naval ensign
or the flag of naval auxiliary vessels of the Soviet
Union—a rather disadvantageous position in an arms control
negotiation that was trying to constrain U.S. naval
operations in the Indian Ocean while seeking to preserve the
underway logistic support structure of the Soviet Navy.
Because of this disadvantage, the Soviet delegation
probably tried to define auxiliaries in the broadest
17. See Morskoi Sbornik , November 1976, p. 77-79. The
translation of this article came from U.S., Department of
State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Regional
Security Affairs Division, Unclassified Files on Indian
Ocean Arms Limitation Talks. The precedent for this
position seems to have come from the definition of an
auxiliary vessel agreed to by the USSR and the United States
in the 1972 Treaty for Prevention of Incidents on and Over
the High Seas. See TIAS 7379.
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possible sense with respect to U.S. forces. In addition to
the commissioned vessels of the U.S. Navy, they probably
moved to include those vessels of the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) that supported the U.S. Navy. At the time
there were two such classes of vessels; the first was the
USNS fleet manned by civilian crews and operated for the
U.S. Navy by MSC; the second was the group of merchant
tankers that operated under charter to MSC under the CHARGER
18
LOG program. All three components, it could be argued,
directly supported the operations of U.S. Navy combatants
and should, therefore, be subject to some form of
limitation.
The Soviet negotiators stood on solid legal ground with
respect to the USNS vessels manned by civilian crews and
operated for the U.S. Navy by MSC since such ships were
within the scope of the definition of an auxiliary described
earlier. However, the issue of merchant tankers under
charter was less clear since it could be argued that such
vessels were not government owned and were commercial
vessels within the purview of the extant Law of the Sea.
Again there was substantial precedent for this line of
argumentation on the part of both the USSR and the United
18. For a general discussion of this concept of operations
see Center for Naval Analysis, Institute of Naval Studies,
Using Commercial Tankers and Container Ships for
Navy/Underway Replenishment, Professional Paper 263
(Alexandria: November 1979) .
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:ates. The Soviet Union, in considering Articles 8 and 9
: the Convention on High Seas, held that government ships,
lduding those operated for commercial purposes, fell under
le protection of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, a
19
:ivilege usually reserved for warships. The United
:ates, on the other hand, objected to such a broad defi-
.tion and countered that the immunity of a vessel owned or
>erated by a state, and hence its legal character, should
20
» based on the purpose of its service. Thus it is
issible that the U.S. delegation would have agreed, because
previous U.S. declaratory positions on the subject and
icause of an advantage in the capabilities of the U.S.
ivy's MLSF ships, that a ship operating in support of a
val vessel or battle group should be regarded as an
xiliary vessel for purposes of the negotiations. Because
. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2d,
ficial Records: High Seas General Regime , v. IV, A/Conf.
/C.2/L.76 (New York: 1958), p. 67-70.
. Ibid., p. 135. For a general discussion of the subject
e Thamarappallil Kochu Thommen, Legal Status of Government
X£jiant..SJii£s__iji^^o^Laatiojial_LaM (The Hague: Martinus
jhoff, 1962); Michael Brandon, "Sovereign Immunity of
vernment-Owned Corporations and Ships," Co rnell Law
arterly . Winter 1954, p. 425-462; William McNair, "Legal
pects of State Shipping," Transactions p_f the Grotjus
ciety , 1948, p. 31-61; Richard B. Lillich, "The Geneva
nference on the Law of the Sea and the Immunity of Foreign
ate-Owned Commercial Vessels," George Washington Univer-
ty Law Review , January 1960, p. 408-420. Articles 95 and
of the Draft Convention on the Law of the_.S.ga contained
ovisions identical to Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention
the High Seas at the time of NALT.
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of its asymmetrical MLSF, the Soviet Union, for reasons
previously described, would have preferred a more restricted
definition or perhaps the generation of a separate paradigm
for auxiliary vessels.
Definitions such as these, though adequate for purposes
of the Law of the Sea treaties, were not comprehensive
enough to be applied in an arms control context. The impli-
cation here is that the Soviet Union probably tried to
exploit any question of definition to its advantage to con-
strain the operations of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean
either by the inclusion of auxiliaries in the proposed
agreement or the creation of a separate one. The impact of
such a broad limitation would have been greater on the
already existing extensive underway replenishment capability
of the U.S. Navy as opposed to the still growing one of the
USSR. If a separate paradigm were adopted, the Soviet Navy
stood to gain the most, at least in terms of ship-days,
because of its higher levels of auxiliary presence in the
past in the Indian Ocean.
Th e Ca rrier, Battle Group
The Soviet Union has consistently focused its attention
on the U.S. capability to use aircraft operating from
carriers to deliver nuclear weapons against Soviet
territory. The following statement as well as the Soviet
reference to the carriers as non-central or Forward Based
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Systems (FBS) exemplifies the Soviet position on the
subject:
The Soviet Union
. . . does not have military
bases on foreign territories close to U.S.
territory, whereas the United States possesses
numerous military bases in Europe and Asia.
According to a number of U.S. evaluations, this
can increase the strategic potential of the United
States and enable it to use it against the USSR in
the event of war, if it is not successfully
averted. Not only nuclear facilities with an
intercontinental radius of operation but so-called
forward forces—above all aircraft based ... on
aircraft carriers.
Though the USSR focused on aircraft deployed overseas that
were capable of striking Soviet territory, it broadened the
scope of the FBS issue to include a significant number of
U.S. overseas bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union and
the sea launched cruise missile. For whatever benefit it
hoped to derive from pursuing the issue, the USSR did not
consider the marginal utility to be sufficiently high to
prevent it from setting the FBS problem aside in 1972 to get
an agreement on SALT I. Throughout 1973, the Soviet Union
insisted that SALT II must include limits on FBS and raised
the issue again— in a regional context— in September 1973
Podgorny called for denuclearization of the
22Mediterranean.
21. M. A. Milshetyn, "SALT: Problems and Prospects," U.S.
Joint Publications Research Service, Translation g_f S_S_HAj_
Economika, Politika, Ideologiya , JPRS 60933 (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office)
.
22. FBIS Daily Report: The Sovie t Union , September 9, 1974.
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The agreement at Vladivostok in 1974 not to include FBS
in the basic accord demonstrated that FBS was not of
significant marginal utility from a strategic viewpoint in
comparison with the central U.S. strategic delivery
systems. Kissinger alluded to this when he reported that:
the progress that has been made in recent months
is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking
for compensation for the Forward Based Systems
partly because most of [them] , or I would say all
of them, are not suitable for a significant attack
on the Soviet Union. At any rate, this is an
element that has disappeared from the negotiations
in recent months.
Moreover, the Soviet leadership apparently realized
that, because of the coordination among the NATO allies
during the SALT negotiating process, the FBS problem had not
significantly divided the Alliance as it had hoped. None-
theless, the USSR may have used the FBS problem to extend
the SALT I negotiations to the point where the USSR
concluded that it had achieved strategic parity with the
United States. Since the Soviet Union had so forcefully
pursued the issue, it became a simple matter of declaring it
to be a bargaining chip and writing it off as a major
concession to the United States. The Soviet leadership thus
retained the option to raise it again in another negotiating
context.
23. U.S. Department of State, The Depa rtment of State Bul-
letin (Washington: December 23, 1974), p. 900.
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The United States traditionally held that its so-called
Forward Based Systems were tactical in nature. Prior to
SALT II and the issues of the sea and ground launched cruise
missiles, the U.S. insisted that only those systems that
were inter-continental, or central, were open for negotia-
tion. The Soviet Union countered by arguing that any
nuclear capable system which could reach its territory
should be subject to negotiation. Given its previous level
of interest, it was reasonable to assume that the USSR would
reintroduce the FBS issue in the Indian Ocean negotiations
as a means to enhance the defense of its territory and with
the hope that it might set a precedent for other regions
such as the Mediterranean and Northeast Asia. For purposes
of analysis as well as delimiting the problem, this study
focuses on FBS as represented by the carrier battle group
(CVBG) . The land-based strike aircraft component, although
an issue of equal importance in the context of FBS, is not
discussed.
At the time of the Indian Ocean talks the carrier
battle group was the centerpiece of the Navy's concept of an
offensive strategy. It had the flexibility, mobility, and
resiliency to establish local sea control and air superi-
ority in addition to its ability to conduct strike warfare
ashore or at sea. It combined the ability to conduct both
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the sea control and the power projection missions.
Moreover, the U.S. carrier battle group was developing into
a formidable ASW force— a force that did not rely on
land-based aviation or facilities to conduct local and, to
some extent, strategic ASW. The Soviet Union, at the time,
was unable to send to sea anything similar to this force.
Thus the Soviet delegation was concerned about the
flexibility of the carrier battle group to conduct both
strategic and conventional operations in the Indian Ocean as
well as offsetting a tactical disadvantage for Soviet forces
operating in the region during a crisis.
The limitation of carrier (CV) operations in the Indian
Ocean would have cut at the heart of the U.S. Navy's ability
to project national power and achieve local sea control. An
agreement limiting CV deployments might have caused some
allies who shared the U.S. desire to be able to project that
power to question not only that capability but also U.S.
intent. Indeed, such an agreement might even have required
the abrogation or renegotiation of existing NATO commitments
25
if the precedent were later applied to the Mediterranean.
24. See, for example, John Lehman, "Aircraft Carrier: The
Real Choices," The Washington Papers , v. VI (Washington:
Center for Strategic and Intenational Studies, Georgetown
University, 1978) .
25. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and
Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 34,
for a discussion of these commitments.
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The ability to control sea areas vital to U.S. economic
interests and those of its allies would also have been
seriously constrained. At best, the Soviet delegation could
have offered only the Soviet Navy's KIEV class carriers as
an offset. However, to equate the tactical capabilities of
the two would have been to the disadvantage of the U.S. in
any such trade-off. Another option which the Soviet
delegation could have proposed, although there is no
evidence that it did, was that a battle group be denu-
clearized before it operated in the Indian Ocean. Such a
proposal would have been unacceptable to the United States
because to agree to such a limitation would have been both
tacit and explicit violation of the U.S. national policy
concerning nuclear weapons. This policy neither confirms
nor denies the presence or absence of such weapons aboard a
specific naval vessel. Though Warnke could have approached
Mendelevich concerning a limit on Soviet deployments to
Cuba, it is doubtful that the Soviet leadership would have
accepted such a constraint.
Nevertheless, since the CVBG was the quintessential
symbol of all the elements of the presence mission, the
negotiators addressed it in the context of their goal of
stabilizing the superpower presence in the Indian Ocean.
The United States operated from a marginal advantage during
the talks on this issue since the Soviet Navy had yet to
deploy a carrier to the Indian Ocean. The United States, on
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the other hand, had deployed carrier battle groups regularly
into the region. Therefore, the onus was on the Soviet
negotiators to demonstrate that operation of their KIEV
class ships in the Indian Ocean would be consistent with the
mutual goal of stabilization or to argue that U.S. carrier
battle group operations should be reduced to a level lower
than that of the past.
How to Measure Presence
Now that the issue of what to measure has been
addressed, it is necessary to turn to the more difficult
question of how to quantify it. The reader should be aware
at the outset that there were numerous criteria that could
have been used to measure limitations on naval forces. The
following discussion summarizes some of the more prominent
criteria with their respective pros and cons. These include
such tactics as confidence building measures, numerical
constraints on force levels, and qualitative limitations on
naval weapons systems and platforms. Though some are less
precise measures than others, all could be accommodated
within the framework of a regional arms control agreement.
Confidence building measures (CBM) offer an alternative
to the frustrations inherent in naval arms control. They
can satiate the desire for progress in arms control since
they are void of the problems of definition and technology
inherent in quantitative approaches to naval arms control.
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rhere are two naval precedents for the use of CBM's. The
:irst was a 1930 protocol between Greece and Turkey. The
;wo states agreed not to order or construct naval units
dthout having first given the other six months notice "so
:hat both governments may thus be enabled if necessary to
prevent any competition in the sphere of naval armaments by
leans of a friendly exchange of views and explanations on
2 6
sither side. ..." The second was the 1972 U.S. -Soviet
agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the
27
Iigh Seas.
CBM's, such as those described, could be applied to the
lOtification of naval exercises as well as deployment data.
lowever, where the national technical means of verification
•rovide a reasonably high level of confidence, CBM's are
argely a symbolic gesture adding more to the form of rela-
ions than to their substance. Where such is not the case
nd the notification process is carried out both to the
etter and spirit of the agreement, CBM's can add to the
tability of a relationship. This may be of value during a
6. The text of this protocol is contained in League of
ations, Secreteriat, "Protocol to the Treaty of Friendship,
eutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration Between Greece and
urkey," No. 2841, Treaty Series (Lausanne: Imprimieres
e'unies SA, 1933), v. 125, p. 21. See also J. Walter
ollins, "The Turco-Greek Rapprochement," Contemporary
eview f February 1931, p. 203-208; Richard Dean Burns and
eymour Z. Chapin, "Near Eastern Naval Limitation Pacts,"




crisis when the uncertainty of the intent of a specific
naval capability could destabilize the issue at hand.
However, a contending approach to the utility of CBM's
argues that the existence of an agreed to CBM will detract
from the ambiguity inherent in the alert of a naval force
during a crisis, a tactic that has been historically useful
to the United States.
Richard Haass has extensively addressed the subject of
CBM's and naval arms control and has grouped CBM's in three
28broad categories. The first type establishes a set of
general procedures to minimize the chance of accidental
conflict at sea as well as reducing the opportunities to
harrass or intimidate an adversary's vessel. The 1972
U.S. -Soviet Agreement on Prevention of Incidents On and Over
the High Seas is such a CBM. Haass' second type of CBM
requires that prior notification be provided for certain
types of naval operations. These could include changes in
force levels, exercises, deployments to a certain area, and
transits. There is some precedent for this type of
notification in the notices which are provided to various
parties of land maneuvers and exercises under the CSCE Final
Act. The final type of CBM that Haass defines is the
imposition of actual constraints on the use of
28. See Richard Haass, "Confidence Building Measures and
Naval Arms Control," Adelphi Papers . No. 149.
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naval forces. In effect these are tantamount to activity
controls.
Haass' second type of CBM offers grounds for further
analysis since the issue of transits did arise during the
29
negotiations. Both delegations recognized that each of
its navies had a legitimate right to sail the Indian Ocean.
Moreover, perhaps as much as one-third to one-half of the
Soviet merchant fleet operations takes place in the Indian
30Ocean. It seems that the issue again turned on the
definition of transit and how to constrain and measure it so
as to minimize its effect on presence.
Unlike the question of what is and what is not a
warship, there was little of precedential value which the
negotiators could have used to shape their discussion on the
subject of transit. Although there was a substantial
literature on the idea of innocent passage and transit
31passage, no precedents existed that defined transit in
terms of the high seas. There was, however, a means of
addressing the problem indirectly.
29. Bayne , Vance . Warnke .
30. See, for example, LCDR James T. Westwood, "The Soviet
Southern Sea Route," Naval War College Review , January-
February 1982, p. 63.
31. See, for example, William E. Butler, "Soviet Concepts of
Innocent Passage," Harvard International Law Club Journal,
Winter 1965, p. 113-130; CDR Peter B. Walker, JAGC, USN,
"What Is Innocent Passage," Naval War College Review,
January 1969, p. 53-76;
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Though really only addressing commercial ocean
transport, de Kerchove' s Interna t ion^_iLaxi±ijfle^J^cjJjmaja:,
32
referred to transit as being "on passage." In turn, de
Kerchove defined "passage" as an outward or a homeward bound
trip or a journey by water from one port or place to
33
another. Therefore, a reasonable definition of transit
was one that applied to a ship on passage from one place to
another. For purposes of the Indian Ocean, this could apply
to a ship on passage from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific
via the Indian Ocean or vice versa. However, because of the
Suez Canal and the geographic definition of the Indian Ocean
discussed earlier in this study, this definition needed to
include vessels on passage from the Mediterranean to the
34
Pacific through the Indian Ocean and vice versa.
There were several other considerations that could have
come into play in the question of transit. They include the
total distance to be steamed and the desired speed of
advance. Normally, a vessel in transit, whether it be a
commercial vessel or a military vessel, takes advantage of
the well known, optimum track between its point of departure
32. Rene de Kerchove, international Marit ime Dictionary
(Princeton: D. Van Nostrand and Co., Inc., 1961), 2nd ed.,
p. 571.
33. Ibid.
34. A similar criteria could be applied to military aircraft
in transit across the Indian Ocean.
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and its destination taking into consideration such factors
as the prevailing meteorological conditions as well as any
hydrographic situations that might cause it to deviate from
its planned track. Moreover, a ship in transit, especially
a military vessel, usually sails that route at the most
economical speed available for its given propulsion plant.
In most cases at the time of the talks this tended to be
about twelve knots unless operational requirements dictated
otherwise.
Given the foregoing it is easy to derive a set of
criteria for transit of the Indian Ocean. Using the data
available in the Tables of Distance Between Ports as well as
the appropriate Sailing Directions , the data in Table 2 are
35
calculated. These figures, however, do not take into
consideration that a ship in transit may have to divert from
its planned track in order to enter port to refuel, take on
provisions, obtain voyage repairs, or to maneuver at sea to
avoid bad weather. This suggests that any definition of
transit needed to include some provision for such contin-
gencies in the form of 2-3 port calls of 2-3 days each or an
aggregate of 4-9 days in port. An alternative to this
35. U.S., Department of Defense, Defense Mapping Agency,
Tables of Distance Betwe en Ports (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office); U.S., Department of Defense,
Defense Mapping Agency, Sailing Directions (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office); U.S., Department of the Navy,
Office of the Oceanographer , Route Cha rt o f the. Ind ian




TRANSIT FROM WEST TO EAST AT 12 KNOTS
DISTANCE (NM.l




GOOD HOPE 5,580 5,132 5,461 4,660
M
SUEZ 5,026 7,454 5,921 6,389





TO SINGAPORE SUNDA LOMBOK CAPE LEEUWIN AVG.
CAPE 19.37 17.81 18.96 16.18 19.69
SUEZ 17.45 25.88 20.56 22.18 21.51
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF TRANSIT DATA (DAYS)
Avg. + Port Calls + 15-20%
(19.69 + 21.51J/2 + (4+9)/2 + (2.95 + 3.93)/2 =
20.60 + 6.50 + 3.44 = 30.54
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consideration is to anticipate an additional 15-20 percent
deviation for each transit.
These data are summarized in Table 3. Hence it seems
that 31 days was a reasonable transit time of the Indian
Ocean provided that the delegations agreed on such issues as
the definition of the Indian Ocean as well as transit
a 36speed.
The advantage of numerical constraints on force levels
is the relative ease of verification. Though there are
several measures which can be applied to this means (e.g.,
total tonnage, number of ships, manpower levels, limits on
the class of ship, etc.), all have this attraction.
Additionally it offers, depending on the measure chosen, the
flexibility of each country allocating its resources as it
sees fit within that limitation. Another objective that is
achievable is a reduction in defense expenditures through
the avoidance of operations and maintenance costs, ship
construction costs, and aircraft procurement costs because
of the lower force level required.
It is in this means that the classic, historical
precedent for naval arms control is found. The Washington
Naval Treaty of 1922 fixed, by mutual consent, the strength
36. A similar table could be developed for aircraft in
transit. This study has not addressed the case wherein a
vessel is towed across the Indian Ocean. This, in the past,
has been a common practice for Soviet vessels.
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of the navies of the United States, Great Britain, Japan,
France, and Italy based on a numerical scheme of tonnages
and ratios for capital ships. As discussed earlier in this
study the negotiations of the 1920's and 1930's on naval
arms limitations were principally an exercise in limiting
force size. The Soviet Navy was not even considered germane
to the issues at hand. Indeed during the heyday of naval
arms control regimes of the 1920's and 1930's, the Soviet
Union participated in only one, relatively minor
, 37protocol.
On the other hand, the use of qualitative limitations
in naval arms control slows the momentum that technological
breakthrough conveys to the development of weapons systems
capable of being employed in naval warfare or to platform
improvements. The objective of this particular means of
naval arms control is to inhibit destabilizing developments
in naval warfare. There has never been a substantive and
practical test of employing this means to any arms control
problem to date. The task of defining and negotiating
qualitative constraints, whether it be in the realm of NALT
37. Harris, op. cit., p. 110. The Soviet Union signed a
minor protocol with Turkey concerning naval activity in the
Black Sea in 1931. The text of the protocol is contained in
Leonard Shapiro, ed., Soviet Treaty Series (Washington:
Georgetown University Press, 1955), v. II, doc. nr. 347,
P. 27. See also John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and





or in the context of START, will prove exceedingly difficult
if not impossible.
Generally speaking, the quantitative aspects of arms
control are concerned with countable and measurable
factors. Unmeasurables, like flexibility, convenience, or
political factors, are intangible and thus not subject to a
systematic quantitative analysis even though in most cases
they are too important to be ignored. Thus they are usually
relegated to being discussed in words.
Moreover, many other factors which, on the surface,
seem amenable to measurement, suffer from an imprecise
formulation. In conventional arms control parlance, such
terms as firepower and mobility serve as useful examples.
Consider what is meant by as well as inferred by these
terms. Can they be measured? Although certain limited
characteristics of each of them can be measured, such as
missile range in the case of firepower and number of
strategic lift aircraft in the case of mobility, it is
impossible to produce a reliable, quantitative aggregate of
firepower for a ship or battle group, for example, because




as well as states. The reason for this disparity is that
there is usually a divergence of opinion on the relative
merits of each characteristic when such matters are referred
to experts— a situation not uncommon in arms control
negotiations. There is no universally accepted paradigm or
rationale by which these characteristics can be combined.
The Soviet Union was concerned with the same kind of
problem. Gorshkov, in commenting on the means of measuring
naval power, remarked in 1972 that:
. . . the relative strength of naval forces cannot
be measured in numbers of combatants or their
total displacements, just as one cannot measure
their combat might by the weight of the gun
projectile salvos or by the,
g
quantity of torpedoes
or missiles being launched.
In another article Gorshkov argued that:
The sharp increase in naval offensive and
defensive capabilities is being achieved not only
and not so much by an increase in the number of
ships and other weapon platforms as by expanding
the range of missions which each platform is able
to prosecute .... In other words clearly it is
38. Some of the other factors that could be measured with
respect to firepower are the maximum rate of fire of a gun
or missile system, the sustained rate of fire of that
system, the number of batteries or missiles of a given
system on a given platform, the accuracy in terms of
circular error probable of a given system, as well as a
measure of lethality in terms of probability of kill (P k ) of
a given system.





but the quality of the weapons
platforms ....
Thus the task in trying to quantify naval presence in
the Indian Ocean was to develop some "yardstick" that was
both measurable, commensurable, and meaningful. This task
was complicated by the very real asymmetrical character-
istics of Soviet and U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean.
While the Soviet Union had more ships, the U.S. had an
advantage in the tonnage of individual ships. The issue
then devolved about a method of deriving a "yardstick" to
resolve the issue of the Soviet numerical advantage versus
that of the U.S. tonnage advantage. During the Indian Ocean
talks these two contending positions took the form of using
either ton-days or ship-days as the measurement of naval
41presence.
Ship-Days v. Ton-Days
Ship-days have been used as a convenient guide for
describing the trend of naval presence in a given region or,
for that matter, a given port. Identifying such a trend is
in itself, however, of little significance unless such
totals can be refined and analyzed to reflect some conti-
nuity, or change therein of purpose or mission. Moreover,
40. Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, "The Development of the Art of
Naval Warfare," U .S. Naval Institute Proceedings , June 1975,
p. 56.
41. Bayne , Gelb , Hayward ,
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the criteria of ship-days may not have been a very
meaningful unit of measurement since it not only did not
distinguish between combatant and auxiliary vessels but also
did not differente between the relative capabilities of such
vessels. For example, there is a substantial gap between
the capability of a U.S. FORRESTAL class CV and a Soviet
KRIVAK class guided missile destroyer (DDG) . Nonetheless, a
FORRESTAL class CV in the Indian Ocean for one day would be
considered as commensurable to the presence established by
the KRIVAK DDG for a like period—one ship day. Though
measurable, there is some doubt as to the significance of
such a unit of measure.
Should the delegations have chosen ship-days as the
unit of measure, the Soviet Union would have been at a dis-
advantage. The data contained in Appendices D and E
demonstrates that, on the whole, the Soviet Navy had
exceeded the U.S. Navy in ship-days in the Indian Ocean.
The majority of these days, however, were attributable to
other than combatant vessels. These data are summarized in
Table 4. Hence while the Soviet Union, on balance, may have
been able to insure a certain measure of sustainability in
the Indian Ocean, it had been at a high cost to its war-
fighting ability. Given the goal of stabilization and the
high ratio of Soviet support vessels to combatants, the use
of ship-days would have been disadvantageous to the Soviet
Union if the level of stabilization was based on historical
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data. On the other hand, U.S. presence measured in
ship-days had generally been lower, though perhaps more
attuned to a warfighting or crisis management mission
because of the higher ratios of U.S. combatants to
auxiliaries. Hence this unit of measurement was a two-edged
sword for both the United States and the Soviet Union.
TABLE 4
U.S. and Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean
1970-1979
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
U.S. 1246 1337 1448 2172 2730 2715 2937 3747 2807 4041
Soviet
Union 4400 4700 9050 10339 11391 7200 7220 6842 8581 7829
Ton-days, on the other hand, favored the Soviet Union
since it would have given an advantage to the force whose
ships were, in the main, smaller. It is theoretically
possible to use the total displacement of ships measured in
tons to compare the relative merits of naval vessels since
such a unit of measurement does reflect the aggregate
weapons suite, stores, and crew carried by a ship. However,
as in the case of ship-days, ton-days does not reflect the
actual capabilities of an individual ship or a battle group
and is thus not very significant.
In general, Soviet ships at the time of the negotia-
tions had a smaller displacement than their U.S.
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counterparts. This has been attributed to a variety of
technological factors including the state of Soviet naval
architecture and marine engineering. However, these
technological constraints and the resulting size limitation
permitted the Soviet Navy to attain nearly a 3:2 ratio
trade-off in construction of hulls for a given amount of
resources. Moreover, the Soviet Navy designed these hulls
primarily in response to a military doctrine which empha-
sized speed, concentration of force, and the primacy of the
42
offensive. There was, however, evidence to suggest that
the Soviet Navy began to change its design criteria in the
late 1970 's. Ships such as battle cruiser KIROV are about
the same size as would have been designed according to U.S.
standards. Indeed, there seemed to be a growing trend to
concentrate on large, highly capable ships displacing 7,000
43tons or greater to conduct open ocean ASW operations.
However, by comparison, the United States generally
built ships to correspond to a military doctrine which
emphasized superior state of the art technology and
42. See Captain James W. Kehoe, USN (Ret.), Kenneth S.
Brower and Herbert A. Meier, "U.S. and Soviet Ship Design
Practices," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , May 1982,
p. 131; J. W. Kehoe, "Destroyer Seakeeping—U.S. and USSR,"
Naval Engineers Journal , December 1973, p. 13-24. There is
no data available on U.S. and Soviet ton-days in the Indian
Ocean.
43. See Captain James W. Kehoe, USN (Ret.), Kenneth S.
Brower, and Edward N. Comstock, "Seakeeping,"
Institut e Proceedings , September 1983, p. 67.

- 325 -
engineering performance, economy of force, and combat
effectiveness. This trend resulted in the U.S. Navy
building a smaller number of vessels which were larger, more
expensive, and perhaps more complex to operate. Hence the
use of a measurement criteria that brought the displacement
of a vessel into play would give the advantage to the Soviet
Navy since it would have been able to achieve proportion-
ately a larger level of presence within a fixed ton-day
limitation.
In general, since Schlesinger 's pronouncement on the
subject in 1973, the United States has sailed a battle group
into the Indian Ocean on the average of three times a year.
These battle groups have, at various times, been centered
around a nuclear carrier, a conventionally powered carrier,
or a guided missile cruiser. Hence, the options for
negotiation would probably have been built around these
three entities operating in the Indian Ocean for varying
lengths of time. Because it would be prohibitive to analyze
all the possible combinations that could be used to define
such limitations, this study addresses only one such
prototype in detail. It is not the goal of this analysis to
criticize this paradigm but simply to employ it as a means




It has been suggested that the delegations tried to get
an agreement based on ship-ton-days. Such a measure
allegedly took into account not only quantitative factors
such as the number of ships and the duration of stay but
also qualitative elements to the extent that tonnage can be
said to relate to warfighting capability. This approach
allowed each state the flexibility to mix numbers and types
of platforms as well as the duration of stay as long as the
aggregate remained below the agreed quota. Table 5 contains
the model agreement. Assuming that this model was a nego-
tiating proposal, several questions would most probably have
been raised by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. such as
those posed earlier in this chapter with respect to the
classification of LASALLE as well as the carrier battle
group.
The remainder of the ship-ton-days allocated to the
United States are used to make up three battle groups, each
with a mix of four surface combatants, deploying to the
Indian Ocean for 30 days each. The model permitted the U.S.
Navy and the Soviet Navy a good deal of flexibility in
allocating their forces to deployment cycles within an
agreed limit. But there were very definite costs that would
have accrued in accepting this benefit. They took the form
of less flexibility available for the remainder of a given
year. For example, if the United States chose, for some




MODEL FOR A U.S. -USSR INDIAN OCEAN SHIP-TON-DAY AGREEMENT
(Based on maximum 12.5 million ship-ton-days
per year per country, surface combatants only)
NUMBER
OF SHIPS TYPE
1 AGF-3 (USS LASALLE)
2 DDG (Charles F. Adams class
1 CV (Kitty Hawk class)
1 CGN (Bainbridge class)
1 DDG (Farragut class)
1 DD (Spruance class)
1 FF (Knox class)
(Total: 12.626 million ship-ton-days per year)
Soviet Union
1 CLG (Kara class) 10,000 365 days
2 DDG (Krivak class) 3,900 (each) 365 days
1 DD (Skory class) 3,100 365 days
1 LST (Alligator class) 5,800 365 days
2 MSF (Natya class) 650 (each) 365 days
(Total: 10.22 million ship-ton-days per year)
Source: Richard Haass, "Naval Arms Limitations in the Indian
Ocean," Survival . March/April 1978, p. 54-55.
TONNAGE DURATION
8,040 365 days








CVBG's to 60 days vice 30 days and included in that battle
group an AAW cruiser such as a BELKNAP class CG, the cost of
opportunity incurred by the U.S. with respect to subsequent
deployments as described by the model would have been some
3,435,000 ship-ton-days, or almost 28% of the total
allowable ship-ton-days. The significance of this example
is that even though there were numerous force combinations
that could have been constructed and deployed, they were all
constrained by a model that was generated from data depict-
ing the peacetime naval presence of the forces of both the
U.S. and the Soviet Union, and not force mixes that were
truly representative of a warfighting capability.
From a policy perspective any such limitation would
have reduced the flexibility of U.S. decisionmakers by
undercutting the U.S. ability to promote stability in the
region and contain crises. U.S. policymakers have routinely
employed sea-based power
—
primarily that offered by the
CVBG's and amphibious ready groups (ARG) of the Sixth and
Seventh Fleets—as a means of influencing the behavior of
other actors in the international system. The means of
exerting this influence were those forces that were forward
deployed to a region to reassure U.S. allies, offer a
visible deterrent to potential adversaries, and guarantee a
quick response capability to demonstrate U.S. intent and
resolve. Except in war, the tempo of naval operations has
always been driven by the pattern of these forward
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deployments. These were the forces that represented the
ability of the United States to influence events ashore.
The second aspect of the stabilizing nature of such
forces was the perception of U.S. -Soviet naval parity
whether on a regional or global scale. Forward deployed
units were a premium that the U.S. paid to insure that it
would be able to assure sea control and influence the out-
come of the land battle in the event of a crisis or major
war. The trend in the open literature had emphasized Soviet
gains at sea, as well as elsewhere. The forward strategy of
the U.S. linking it to its allies required the use of the
sea. The perception that the Soviet Union could deny this
use to the U.S. and its allies would have been damaging to
this strategy.
In many instances where the U.S. has desired to
indicate its resolve, naval forces have been the preferred
means of leverage for a U.S. policymaker. Forward deployed
naval forces can be employed without being committed to
battle and without committing allies. They are mobile and,
since they operate in an international medium, they do not
need to be quite so concerned about the violation of
sovereign territory. They convey, as the policymaker
chooses, a calculated ambiguity and a calibrated response
capability whose presence does not irrevocably commit the
U.S. to a given course of action. They can complicate the
calculations of adversaries in assessing the consequences of
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their available options. Moreover, the deployed naval force
can be tailored to the mission and, through its composition,
convey the message that the decisionmaker desires. If the
crisis is resolved, naval forces can be withdrawn with
limited fanfare.
The Soviet Union had gained an appreciation of these
aspects of the employment of naval forces and had begun to
exploit them to counter the effects of U.S. presence in a
crisis setting and to neutralize the political effects of
the U.S. interposition option. Events of the Mid-East War
in 1973 lend credence to this thesis. It is precisely for
these reasons that it would have been in the Soviet interest
to constrain U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and vice
versa.
It could also be argued that it was in the context of
the presence role that the attractiveness of limiting
conventional naval forces gained the attention it appeared
to have in the original concept of Indian Ocean NALT.
Indeed, the presence mission was not and is not defined as
45
an explicit mission of the U.S. Navy. Moreover, the U.S.
Navy did not size its naval forces to support a presence
mission. Hence, a commitment to presence, such as in the
45. See U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Navy and Marine Corps,"
U.S. Code, Title 10—Armed Forces , 1970 ed. (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), Sec. 5012, p. 1649;
U.S. Office of Naval Operations, Strategic Concept!
U.S. Navy (U) , NWP 1, para 3.2.
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Indian Ocean, could have been viewed as conflicting with the
Navy's principal missions of deterrence, power projection
and sea control. Therefore, the commitment of forces to a
mission for which they were not designed made the idea of
constraining that mission more attractive to those who had
criticized the U.S. Navy for not being able to size its
forces in proportion to its missions.
In February 1977, the same month that NALT surfaced,
Carter reduced the Ford Administration's FY78 shipbuilding
program, largely general purpose in nature, from 25 ships in
FY 1978 and a total of 157 ships at a cost of $44.6 billion
over the FY 1978-1982 planning cycle to 22 ships in FY 1978
and 152 ships in the overall program. Though the essentials
of the Ford program were derived from a 1976 NSC study,
46
Congress reduced the FY78 program to 18 ships.
In January 1978 Carter did not present a new five-year
shipbuilding plan to Congress as required by law. He
promised that a plan would be submitted as soon as a naval
force planning study, Sea Plan 2000, had been completed.
However, the Navy, at OSD's direction, did submit requests
46. For a general description of this study see U.S.,
Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Planning U.S» General
Purpose Forces: The Navy, Budget Issue Paper (Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1976) , p. 52-55.
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for 15 ships estimated to cost $4.7 billion. 47 The second
aspect of Carter's approach to the Navy was that only $42
billion would be available for shipbuilding in the FY
1979-1983 budget cycle. 48
On March 24, 1978, the Carter Administration forwarded
Sea Plan 2000 to Congress. The plan identified three
options for shipbuilding programs through the year 2000. The
first, the high risk option, provided for a 1% growth rate
in real spending for the Navy with a projected authorization
of $6.79 billion and 290 new construction ships. The
second, or minimum acceptable risk option, called for 3%
annual growth rate with an average annual ship construction
authorization of $8.8 billion and 395 new construction
ships. The final option, a much lower risk, called for an
average annual expenditure of $9.5 billion representing a 4%
49
real growth and 447 new construction ships. The analysis
of Sea Plan 2000 identified several naval missions,
including presence, to support three national security
objectives—maintenance of stability, containment of crises,
47. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, Department of
Defense Appropriations, Hearings (V7ashington: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1978), pt. 1, p. 133, 634, 659.
48. See U.S., President, Office of Management and Budget,
The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1979
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 328.
49. "Sea Plan 2000 Naval Force Planning Study," unclassified
extract (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 1978), p. 19-22.
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and deterrence of global war. Only option one, the high
risk option, provided for a relaxation of then current
forward deployed operations—the essence of presence.
Less than one week later, while speaking at the Current
Strategy Forum at the Naval War College, Edward Randall
Jayne, II, Associate Director for National Security and
International Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), argued that one of the deficiencies of Sea Plan 2000,
and indeed of the Navy, was "the simple question of how much
emphasis and attention the Navy [was] giving to its various
50
missions." He went on to question the peacetime presence
mission. He asked his audience if "it was really mandatory
to have a carrier task force sail into a foreign harbor in
order to have the desired foreign policy effect during a
51
crisis?" He closed his remarks by explaining that "what
the Navy needs to do is to understand itself, to know its
highest and its lowest priorities, and to be able to tailor
its forces accordingly within a budget share reasonably
52
consistent with those of the past."
Less than three weeks later, on April 10, 1978, in
testimony before the House Subcommittee on Seapower, Brown
50. Edward R. Jayne, II, "Remarks Before the Current
Strategy Forum of the U.S. Naval War College, Newport,
R.I.," March 28, 1978, p. 6.
51. Ibid., p. 8.
52. Ibid., p. 15.
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revealed Carter's revised five-year shipbuilding program.
It called for 83 ships, only 70 of which were new
construction, estimated to cost $32 billion. The heart of
the presence mission, one new midsized, conventionally
53powered CV, was funded at $1.5 billion. The implication,
as stated by Brown, was that Carter had opted for a 12
battle group Navy. This shipbuilding plan was a rejection
of even the high risk option of Sea Plan 2000 and a clear
message to the Navy that Carter had other ideas on the
importance of presence to naval strategy. Indeed this was
the case according to New York Times correspondent William
Safire, who reported that the Navy's key function in the
future, according to Brown's classified posture statement,
was to provide "adequate sea control forces" to protect
critical waterways and sealanes, or sea control, and that
54
the power projection role was to be deemphasized.
The Office of Program Appraisal and Evaluation (PA&E)
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense supported the
position in the FY79 Consolidated Defense Guidance that the
U.S. Navy should presume that "the U.S. surface fleet could
53. Harold Brown, "Statement," U.S., Congress, House,
Committee on the Armed Services, Subcommittee on Seapower
and Strategic and Critical Materials, Military Posture and
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1979 , Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1978), p. 1134.
54. William Safire, "The Battle of Whizkid Gulf," The New
York Times , February 9, 1978, p. 21:1.
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be sized for peacetime and for conflicts in which the
Soviets chose not to become involved." Brown tried to
clarify this approach in a major policy speech to the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on June 6, 1978, by
arguing that the United States did indeed design its navy
for the standard NATO war scenario as well as highlighting
the need for capabilities to reinforce U.S. allies on the
55flanks of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the perceptions
set forth in the preceding paragraphs influenced formulation
of U.S. national security policy in the Carter Administra-
tion. Their specific effect on NALT cannot be discounted.
Summary o f Issues
If this was the case and if there is indeed a close,
perhaps even symbiotic, relationship between the doctrine
governing the use of weapons and arms control, then there is
at least an arguable relationship between this apparent
shift in U.S. national security policy advocated by Carter
and set forth in his budget proposals and naval arms control
in the Indian Ocean. However, there is a corollary of arms
control that contends that arms control programs should flow
from the doctrine of a state's adversary. In the case of
55. See LCDR David F. Walsh, USN, "Naval Force Sizing:
Zero-Based or 'Bottoms-Up' Method," research paper (Newport:
Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College, 1979),
p. 2-3. See also Bernard Weintraub, "Brown Sees a Soviet
Naval Threat," The New York Times , June 7, 1978, p. 4:3.
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the Indian Ocean talks, no corresponding change in Soviet
naval doctrine was evident. If anything, Soviet doctrine,
as embodied in the Soviet Navy's ship construction program,
was shifting to one more akin to classic U.S. naval
doctrine. In addition, the Carter Administration ignored a
time-tested principle that a presence and warfighting
capability cannot be divorced. Presence forces deployed to
areas wherever crisis management is the rule must have a
credible warfighting capability. They must also demonstrate
the degree of U.S. interest in the area relative to that of
any potential adversary. To be effective in the presence
role, naval forces must signal an identifiable linkage with
the global capability of U.S. power.
Some critics charge that it is difficult, if not nearly
impossible, to judge the effect of presence. Little can be
offered to change this perception. It is only when the
other actors in the international system have decided what
to do during a crisis that it is possible to estimate the
impact. Even then, it is difficult to attribute such
actions to the effect of presence alone because other
options (e.g., economic, political, etc.) may have been
brought to bear on the situation. All that can be known
with a reasonable degree of certainty is that naval
presence, or its absence, is but one transmitter of such
signals. To constrain the option of naval presence
available to the decisionmaker that enables him to transmit
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lis intent and resolve is to deprive him of a valuable
;ool— a tool that once traded away is difficult to replace.
Table 6 summarizes the four issues. It highlights
various advantages and disadvantages for each issue for both
the U.S. and the Soviet Union. All four issues were a high
risk for the United States in the long term should some form
of agreement have been reached on them in the talks.
Indeed, all four favored the Soviet Union. Therefore, when
measured against the criteria set forth in the first chapter
of this study, conclusion of the talks would have enhanced
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Less than three years after Carter's Indian Ocean arms
control initiative, political upheavals in Iran and
Afghanistan, a war between the two Yemens, changing alliance
patterns in the Horn of Africa, and an energy crisis com-
bined to sharpen the West's focus on the region.
In Iran, a fundamentalist Islamic clique dominated by
its anti-Western leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, overthrew Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The result was that the U.S. lost
its principal partner in Nixon and Kissinger's "Two Pillar
Policy." In Ethiopia, a Marxist military government closed
U.S. communications and surveillance facilities at Kagnew
Station and Asmara. Meanwhile, a Muslim regime in Somalia,
reacting to the signing of two separate arms agreements
between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia in December 1976 and
May 1977 and trying to get military assistance from the
United States, expelled its Soviet military advisers,
renounced its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
Soviet Union, and broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba




December 28, 1979, contributed to the downfall of one
pro-Soviet regime and the prompt installation of another.
Despite a hopeful beginning, the United States decided
to forego further talks on the subject of arms control in
the Indian Ocean because Soviet politico-military activity
in the Horn of Africa in 1977 and 1978 strongly suggested,
as Gelb testified, that there was no common understanding on
how the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks would
affect the behavior of the United States and the Soviet
Union in the region. Carter finally realized that an
essentially naval agreement could not address the broader
issue of intervention in the region by other military and
political means. The Carter Doctrine was a statement of




THE CARTER DOCTRINE AND GEOGRAPHY
The state
. . . finds itself forced to choose one
of two alternatives, either to give up this
endless labor and to abandon its frontier to
perpetual disturbance ... or to plunge deeper
and deeper into barbarous countries, where the
difficulties and expenses increase with every
step. The greatest difficulty is knowing when to
stop.
— Prince Gorchakov to Imperial Russian
Representatives Abroad (1864)
Throughout the remainder of 1978 and all of 1979 three
events dominated U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean region.
The first was the developing relationship between Egypt and
Israel that led to the Camp David Accords in September 1978
and, ultimately, to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of
March 1979. The second was the series of events leading to
the collapse of the monarchy in Iran in February 1979. The
bhird event was the growth of Soviet influence in the Horn
3f Africa. Although a comprehensive analysis of the first
t\fo of these events is not possible in this study, their
outcomes altered the U.S. strategic perception of the Indian
)cean region and require some discussion.




The continuing dispute with Israel conditioned the
policies of the Arab states, including the oil producers of
the Persian Gulf. It was an issue deeply rooted in cen-
turies of conflict and competing religious tenets. In some
cases, certain Arab states used the Israeli issue as a
pretext for playing out inter-Arab rivalries. But whether
it was in the foreground or the background, the Arab-Israeli
issue was a constant factor that had to be accommodated in
2
any policy for the Indian Ocean area.
The problem was particularly acute for the United
States which had become the arbiter of a Middle East peace
settlement and the staunchest supporter of Israel. The
opposition to the Camp David Accords in most of the Arab
world expanded the problem of formulating an effective U.S.
Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf policy. For example, the proba-
bility of continuing Arab-Israeli problems made it very
difficult to maintain a significant ground force in the
3
region —a problem that ultimately shaped both the concept
of operations and the force structure of the RDF and caused
Carter to reexamine his long-term plans for the United
2. R. James Woolsey and Michael Moodie, "Geopolitics and
Maritime Power in the Indian Ocean," Conference Report on
the Future of Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics and Maritime
Power (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Inter-






States Navy in the region. Egypt and Israel, both publicly
and privately, welcomed the increase of U.S. military
presence, in the form of the U.S. Navy, in the Persian Gulf
4
and the Indian Ocean. However, other Arab states believed
that the lack of progress on the Palestinian question made
it politically unattractive for moderate Arab states pub-
5licly to approve this U.S. policy.
The collapse of the monarchy in Iran demonstrated the
problem of Nixon and Kissinger's "Two Pillar Policy" which
relied on Iran as a regional surrogate for the United
States. The fundamentalist Islamic revolution illustrated
the difficulty, and perhaps the futility, of depending on
clients to look after the vital interests of the United
States in the Indian Ocean. Even though the U.S. gained a
new ally in Egypt while losing Iran, the importance that
previous U.S. Administrations had attached to Iran left U.S.
policy for the region in a near vacuum. The seizure of the
hostages in Teheran on November 4, 1979, was the capstone of
these events.
4. Harold H. Saunders, "Material Submitted for the Record,"
U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East,
U.S. Interests in, and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulfr
1980






The situation in the Persian Gulf brought these prob-
lems sharply into focus. The combination of the Gulf as a
source of the bulk of Western oil, its strategic location
and the region's instability, insecurity, and uncertainty
made it a source of concern. It was a unique geographical
setting in which all forms of international power—the
resource power of the Arabs, the military strength of the
USSR, the commercial and diplomatic leverage of Japan and
Western Europe, and the political leadership of the United
States— intersected. Saudi Arabia emerged as the dominant
factor in U.S. considerations during policy reviews.
Although Saudi Arabia privately welcomed the demonstra-
tion of U.S. resolve to resist Soviet aggression in the
region, it publicly explained that U.S. bases would not be
welcome. The Saudis made it clear that a large U.S. ground
presence in the region could be potentially destabilizing
both domestically, as in the case of Iran, and regionally.
Yet Saudi Arabia was genuinely concerned about the ability
of the United States to deter Soviet aggression in the
region using conventional forces.
6. See, for example, Bernard Gwertzman, "Saudis Considering
Military Tie to U.S.," The New York Times . February 6, 1980,
p. 1:5; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Jets Near Gulf Improve War
Data," The New York Times . October 9, 1980, p. 13:1; Richard
Halloran, "Brown Orders a Study of Saudi Request for Equip-




The Soviet Union a nd the Horn
Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean region grew con-
siderably since 1970 and rose sharply in late 1977. From one
end of the region to the other, the USSR tried to bolster
its political and military position. Mrs. Gandhi's return
to power in India in 1979 produced a more workable rela-
tionship with the dominant power in the subcontinent. Along
the western littoral, the Soviet Union supported the
Mengistu regime in Ethiopia against both Somali forces and
Eritrean guerrillas. Moreover, the Soviet Union developed a
close relationship with the government of People's Demo-
cratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and secured access to Aden's
superb maritime facilities in the process. The Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was the last in a series of moves
that reflected the shift in the region's strategic military
balance in favor of the Soviet Union. In Afghanistan, the
USSR was closer to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean than
ever before. By staging flights from Afghan airfields, it
was easier for Soviet forces to project land-based tactical
and strategic air power towards those areas. This would be
important in a crisis or war in which targets in the Persian
Gulf, U.S. carrier battle groups within range, and major
U.S. support complexes, like Diego Garcia, presumably would
be Soviet targets.
The Soviet Navy supplemented Moscow's accomplishments
on land as it evolved from a coastal force to one capable of
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operations anywhere in the world. Moreover, the Soviet
Union had used its merchant marine effectively to provide
much of the arms and other material that it had supplied to
its regional client states. During the Somalia-Ethiopian
conflict, for example, Soviet merchantmen delivered nearly
one billion dollars in military equipment to Ethiopian
ports. While Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean
had not always been extensive, they did not have to be. In
situations short of war, operations such as those described
in Chapter IV of this study were sufficient to create the
perception of a substantial naval presence in the region.
However, in April 1979, the Soviet carrier MINSK, the
amphibious warfare ship IVAN ROGOV, and a KARA class guided
missile cruiser conducted a demonstration cruise for South
Yemeni officials while visiting Aden and also visited ports
in Mozambique, Mauritius and the Seychelles. That same
month two Soviet IL-38 aircraft on open ocean reconnaissance
flights in the Arabian Sea flew so close to USS MIDWAY
(CV-41) that MIDWAY'S aircraft in its landing pattern had to
take emergency evasive action. Soviet access to air and
naval facilities increased following a coup in June 1979
that brought a pro-Soviet government to power in the PDRY.
In August 1979 a Soviet nuclear powered ECHO class submarine
entered Aden along with a submarine tender. In October 1979
7. State Cite 233001.
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the USSR and the PDRY signed a treaty of friendship and
cooperation. By early 1980 the Soviet Pacific Fleet was
maintaining a continuous nuclear submarine presence in the
Indian Ocean as well as enlarging its conventional submarine
8presence.
U.S. Responses
These events suggested that a reappraisal of U.S.
national security policy for the region was necessary. The
Carter Administration, responding to circumstances that had
slipped beyond its control, recognized the need to reassess
its ability to protect U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean.
The result was a shift from considering the region as one
suitable for the negotiation of naval arms limitations to
believing it to be part of Brzezinski's "Arc of Crisis."
This term, expressed in rather colorful language a premise
which had been intuitively recognized for a long time—the
region that stretched from North Africa through the Middle
East to the Persian Gulf and thence to the Indian subcon-
tinent was one of peril for the United States and the
Western democracies because of its instability and
8. Ibid.; Captain James F. Kelly, Jr., USN, "Naval
Deployments in the Indian Ocean," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings , May 1983, p. 176-177.
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9insecurity. An examination of Carter's reappraisal of the
importance of the Indian Ocean, a process that began early
in 1978, will show why and how, in terms of the background
and the issues of the talks, Carter rejected his earlier
approach.
The Zone of Peace
Although its prospects for success seemed slim, the
Zone of Peace was not a dead or forgotten issue especially
among the littoral countries. In 1977, the year the talks
began, the Soviet Union, along with its Warsaw Pact allies,
voted in favor of the resolution on the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace for the first time. Perhaps the Soviet leadership
intended this move to offset any political advantage that
the United States might have gained from its NALT proposal
to the Soviet Union earlier that year. The United States
abstained to keep the question of the Zone of Peace separate
from its talks with the USSR.
When the talks broke off in February 1978, the littoral
and hinterland states tried to exert pressure on the U.S.
and the Soviet Union to reopen them. The General Assembly,
in Resolution 33/68, urged that talks be resumed without
delay. In addition, this resolution recommended the
9. Robert G. Neumann, "Emerging Security Issues in the 'Arc
of Crisis," " Proceedings of the Seventh Annual National






convening of a meeting of the littoral and hinterland states
of the Inoian Ocean in New York during the summer of 1979 in
preparation for the long-sought-after conference on the
Indian Ocean to implement the zone of peace in accordance
with General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI)
.
10 When the
USSR realized that there was little hope of getting the
talks going again, it, along with its allies, reverted to
their previous policy of abstaining on resolutions dealing
with the Indian Ocean. The Soviet delegation explained its
change in position by arguing that the resolutions did not
place the blame for suspension of the talks on the United
States. 11
It was at the Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in July 1979
that the issue of precise limits for an Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace came to the fore. In what was strangely reminiscent
of the problem that confronted the United States and the
Soviet Union in their bilateral talks, the Final Document of
the 1979 meeting stated that
10. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records;
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 34th
Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/34/29) (New York: 1979), p. 1.
11. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records,
Verbatim Record of the 50th Meeting of the First Committee,
34th Session, "Statement of the Soviet Representative
(Troyanovsky) in the First Committee ... on 30 November




the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should
cover the Indian Ocean itself, its natural
extensions, the islands thereon, the floor
subjacent thereto, the littoral and hinterland
states and the air space above. . . .
and then qualified this definition by noting that "the final
12limits were yet to be agreed upon." This suggests that
the idea of the Zone of Peace had expanded to include the
territory as well as the territorial waters of the littoral
states as well as the high seas of the Indian Ocean. Much
as during the Indian Ocean negotiations, several states were
lot pleased with this aspect of the document. Australia
rejected the document because the geographic scope defined
:he Indian Ocean as including all of the territory of the
Littoral states and precluded it from entering into defense
agreements pertaining to that part of its territory lying
13)utside the Indian Ocean region.
The USSR favored the so-called "narrow" approach set
iorth in the 1971 U.N. resolution. Although it did not
specifically object to a broader definition, the USSR argued
:hat it was better to adopt the least complicated definition
.nitially since it would help to achieve an agreement and
:ould be broadened later. The United States also revised
.2. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records;
leoort of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States
>f the Indian Ocean . 34th Session, Supplement No. 45
A/34/45) (New York: 1979), p. 13. The final document was
lot actually put to a vote. Hence, its contents do not
epresent agreement among the meeting's participants.
3. Ibid., p. 6-7.
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the position that it held during the talks and expressed a
preference for a broader approach to defining the limits of
the Indian Odean. The U.S. representative, participating as
an observer, argued that it would be wrong to take into
account only the armed forces which were stationed in the
area since such a definition ignored the need for an overall
balance and courted instability. He argued that account
should also be taken of air and ground forces based perma-
nently in areas contiguous to the littoral and hinterland
states which could be used to influence the regional
security balance.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the focal point
for further debate on the subject within the U.N. By 1980,
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean consisted of 45
members, several of which were leading world powers and not
countries of the littoral or hinterland holding parochial
15
views about the Indian Ocean. In addition, the General
Assembly enlarged the membership of the Ad Hoc Committee in
1980 by adding new members to be appointed by its President
and inviting the permanent members of the Security Council
14. The U.S. has, in general, maintained this position. See
United Nations, General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the
Indian Ocean, Summary Record of the. 209th Meeting
(A/AC. 159/SR. 209 (New York: February 18, 1983), p. 4-6.
15. United Nations, General Assembly, Official
—
Record s ;
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 35th
Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/35/29) (New York: 1980), p. 2




and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on the
expanded committee. France and the Soviet Union accepted
this invitation almost immediately whereas the United States
at first informed the Committee of its intention to attend
the meetings of the Committee on an interim basis pending
its formal reply to the invitation. The U.S. subsequently
became a permanent member of the Committee, along with Great
17
Britain, in June 1980. In addition, the Committee
developed an informal agenda for the as yet unconsummated
conference. The agenda items included the unresolved defi-
nition of geographical limits, foreign military presence,
nuclear weapons, security, and use of the Indian Ocean by
foreign vessels and aircraft— issues strangely reminiscent
18
of those in the talks.
There was significant opposition to this conference.
In general the United States and its allies opposed the
16. A/35/29, p. 2. Membership of the Committee included:
Australia, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Democratic
Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic
Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Poland,
Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania,
United States of America, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
Sweden has attended meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee as an
observer.
17. Ibid., p. 3.
18. Ibid., p. 5.
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meeting on the grounds of "continuing substantive differ-
ences among the members of the [Ad Hoc] Committee regarding
the fundamental principles of the Zone" and "the marked
deterioration in the security of the region over the past
year, caused to some extent by local conflicts but most
especially by the Soviet invasion and occupation of
19Afghanistan." The traditional proponents of the Zone of
Peace, as well as the Soviet Union, argued that, while
further agreement of views was preferable, it was not
essential since the conference itself would serve this
, 20goal.
Indeed, by linking the conference to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan while urging compliance with the
General Assembly's resolution calling for Soviet troop
withdrawals from Afghanistan, many of the Western members of
the General Assembly along with some regional states, such
as Pakistan, seemed to suggest that a Soviet pullout was a
pre-condition to their agreement to hold the conference.
Thus, for the first time, a resolution of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean passed by consensus with only
19. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records,
Verbatim Record of the 42nd Meeting of the First Committee,
35th Session, "Statement of U.S. Representative (Floweree)
in the First Committee ... on November 25, 1980"
(A/C.1/35/PV.42) (New York: 1980), p. 22.
20. "Wide Ranging Discussion on Zone of Peace," DJJ
Chronicle
, June 1983, p. 14.
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Albania "disassociating itself." Even the United States,
because of the compromise wording of the resolution, was,
for the first time, in a position to support a draft reso-
lution on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. 21
Diego Garcia and Base s
In the course of the long debate in Congress as well as
in academic literature and the press over U.S. presence in
the Indian Ocean, it became a cliche to reiterate the fact
that the Indian Ocean lay on the opposite side of the earth
from the United States. Trincomalee in Sri Lanka was
exactly 11,500 miles from New York if measured westward and
the same distance from San Francisco if measured eastward.
21. See A/C.1/35/PV.42, p. 32. The substance of this debate
and the positions maintained therein continued throughout
1981 and 1982. The only consensus achieved was that consid-
eration be given to convening the conference at Colombo, Sri
Lanka, not later than the first half of 1983. The issue of
U.S. -Soviet NALT was part of this debate. On March 12,
1982, Mendelevich queried the U.S. delegate to the Ad Hoc
Committee if the U.S. was prepared to resume bilateral talks
on the Indian Ocean. Mendelevich charged that, in the
absence of any meaningful progress by the U.S., the Soviet
Union would have to reconsider its own activities in the
Indian Ocean. Mendelevich argued that, although these
activities were restrained in the eyes of the Soviet Union,
the USSR would be forced to strengthen its position in the
Indian Ocean as a matter of strategic necessity. The U.S.
delegate responded to Mendelevich's allegations. He argued
that, as long as the Soviet Union resorted to the use of
force or the threat to use force, the idea of mutual
restraint in the Indian Ocean lacked credibility because of
Soviet actions in Afghanistan. See United Nations, General
Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, Summary
Record of the 182nd Meeting . . . on 12 Ma rch J.982,
(A/AC:159/SR.182) (New York: 1982), p. 4-9.

- 355 -
rhis fact of geography is obvious, perhaps even banal, but
nevertheless important, because it is one of the reasons why
:he debate over U.S. Indian Ocean policy has continued for
30 long. It is geographically impossible for the United
States to establish and maintain a military presence farther
iway from its territory. That very remoteness remained a
lagging issue in the minds of those who questioned the
/isdom of having such a capability in the Indian Ocean. Did
:he United States, they asked, really have interests of
sufficient importance so far away as to require a permanent
laval installation where none existed before? In a sense
ilbert Wohlstetter presaged this debate in his 1968 article
Illusions of Distance" in Foreign Affairs when he argued
;hat distance bore no simple relation either to interests or
22
ulitary strength.
However, distance was the principal problem confronting
he United States in 1978, 1979, and 1980. Diego Garcia,
'hile it was an excellent location for supporting Indian
>cean operations, was 2100 miles from Aden and 2600 from
ahrain. Facilities at the port of Mombassa in Kenya were
2. Albert Wohlstetter, "Illusions of Distance," Foreign
ffa irs , January 1968, p. 244. The debate continues in 1984
ecause of speculation on a possible agreement between
akistan and the United States that would allow U.S. forces
o use Pakistani ports and airfields in a crisis in the
iddle East. See "State Dept. Official Says U.S. Seeks No
ases in South Asia," The New York Times, March 4, 1984,
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almost as far. Australia had offered Cockburn Sound on its
west coast as a base for a U.S. Indian Ocean force.
However, operating from Cockburn Sound, as discussed in
Chapter V, would be comparable to staging operations from
Subic Bay in the Philippines though it would have the
advantage of avoiding the potential choke points of the
Malaccan, Lombok, and Sunda Straits.
To overcome these disadvantages, the United States
required land-based support facilities to sustain operations
in the Indian Ocean. Operational requirements were too
great to be satisfied without such facilities. However,
total reliance on access to shore facilities that were
subject to the vagaries of regional and domestic politics,
such as the case of Berbera, was equally untenable. The
United States, therefore, needed a logistics infrastructure
that utilized both shore-based and sea-based and had the
flexibility to shift from one to the other when the need
arose.
When the United States began seriously to consider
expanding its naval presence in the region, Diego Garcia was
pivotal in the options that were available. Once Carter
made the decision to deploy an increased U.S. naval presence
in the Indian Ocean, access to ports and airfields was the
driving factor in both planning and operational considera-
tions. Nonetheless, the United States was cautious in its
approach to this problem. The Carter Administration
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dispatched a delegation of Defense and State Department
officials to Kenya, Somalia, and Oman in December 1979 to
sound out their governments on the issue of U.S. access to
facilities as well as security cooperation. As a follow-on
to this visit, U.S. technical inspection teams visited
facilities in the three countries in January 1980. Mr.
Reginald Bartholomew, Warnke's deputy at the first session
of NALT in June 1977 and Gelb's successor as Director of the
Politico-Military Affairs Bureau of the State Department,
23headed this delegation. Bartholomew also visited Saudi
Arabia. Carter confirmed his Administration's interest in
such facilities in a January 7, 1980, interview with
television reporter John Chancellor though he disclaimed
24that any agreement had been worked out. Vance went to
great length to explain that the United States was "not
talking of huge U.S. bases for the use of facilities that
25
exist in various countries."
23. See Richard Halloran, "Crises Impelling U.S. to Plan
Permanent Naval Presence in Indian Ocean," TJie. Ne_w. York
Times
, January 5, 1980, p. 3:1; SECSTATE WASHDC msg 122244Z
Feb 80 (State Cite 039151); George C. Wilson, "Three Nations
Said Receptive to U.S. Bases," The Washington Post , January
4, 1980, p. 1:1.
24. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 082336Z Jan 80 (State Cite 005916)
(Subject: U.S. Interest in Indian Ocean Facilities).
25. Richard Halloran, "U.S. Looking to Leasing of Bases for
Easier Access to Crisis Areas," The New York Times , January
20, 1980, p. 12:1.
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The significance of the issue came to the fore when the
logistics problems involved in supporting three carrier
battle groups in the Indian Ocean began to be felt in late
January 1980. The geography of the region created enormous
logistics problems. In a superb study of the historical
evolution of logistics, Martin van Creveld argued that after
florid War I, as a consequence of the changing nature of
2 fi
warfare, strategy became an appendix of logistics. This
was a hallmark of U.S. operations in the Indian Ocean area.
Logistics considerations virtually drove American policy and
strategy because the geography of the problem imposed
serious constraints on military options available to
policymakers. The principal facility responsible for this
task was the U.S. Naval Facility at Subic Bay in the
27
Philippines, itself the subject of joint U.S. -Philippine
:ontrol since the conclusion of the U.S. -Philippine base
28
rights treaty in 1979. Diego Garcia was strained to its
Limit to augment this support because of its size and the
16. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War; Logistics—from
fallenstei n to Patton (London: Cambridge University Press,
L977)
, p. 233.
11. See Richard Burt, "Japan Area Loses Its U.S. Carrier to
iuildup Near Iran," The New York Times , January 20, 1980,
>. 12:4.
58. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Military Bases in the Philippines:
Agreement Amending the Agreement of 14 March 1947, as
Unended," TIAS 9224, United States Treaties and Other
[nternational Agreements (Washington: U.S. Department of
State, 1980), v. 30, pt. 1, p. 869, 879-881.
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fact that it was 2300 miles from the Strait of Hormuz. The
constraints placed on operations because of the length of
the logistic pipeline demonstrated the need for U.S. access
:o facilities closer to the Persian Gulf.
In essence, the events surrounding this quest for U.S.
iccess transformed Carter's policy for the Indian Ocean
region from one whose hallmark had been cast in an arms
:ontrol forum which addressed bases to one which focused on
:he importance of access to facilities in the region as a
lecessary adjunct to the U.S. ability to project force into
:he Persian Gulf. The SCC had completed some preliminary
fork on the problem during the summer and fall of 1979. On
)ecember 4, 1979, at an NSC meeting Carter instructed Brown
ind Vance to develop joint initiatives for approaching Oman,
29
:enya, and Somalia. This sudden, indeed almost frantic,
eversal of the long-term decline of U.S. and Western
'acilities in the Indian Ocean marked a recognition of the
importance of the region in U.S. national security
, . 30
•olicy.
9. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 446.
0. This reversal of policy is generally described in:
ichard Burt, "How U.S. Strategy Toward the Persian Gulf
egion Evolved," The New York Times , January 25, 1980,
>• 6:3; "Have Doctrine, Need Mobility," Th£ Economist ,
ebruary 9-15, 1980, p. 22-26; Richard Halloran, "Pentagon
ctivates Strike Force: Effectiveness Believed Years Away,"




The focus of the effort was Berbera. For almost the
ntire first half of 1980, the United States negotiated with
he Government of Somalia on the issue. Although the U.S.
as prepared to support Somalia as early as 1978 in a
imited fashion, including the transfer of defensive arms,
his support was contingent on Somali withdrawal from the
31gaden. Such withdrawal was not forthcoming. In what can
nly be seen as a tactic aimed at favorably influencing the
overnment of Somalia towards U.S. basing requirements, the
utgoing Carter Administration cleared the way for
resident-elect Ronald Reagan to deliver $40 million in
ilitary aid to Somalia after he took office. The House
ppropriations Committee had previously held up approval of
his aid package until the President had provided verified
ssurance that Somali forces were no longer engaged in
ombat with Soviet-backed Ethiopian troops in the disputed
a o
gaden region. The Carter Administration's action was the
ulmination of an unexpected turn in the negotiations
1. See Richard Halloran, "U.S. Is Reported to Study Offer
f a Somali Base," The New York Times , December 23, 1979,
. 1:2.
2. Juan de Onis, "U.S. Clears the Way for Delivery of $40




in August 1980 and the subsequent relief of Congressional
33
skepticism on the issue.
Berbera was attractive for a variety of reasons. In
addition to the port facilities discussed earlier in this
study, the Soviet Union had finished construction of an air
base with a 15,000-foot reinforced concrete runway southwest
34
of Berbera. Before the Somali government expelled the
Soviet presence, the Soviet Union had completed, in addition
to the runway, reinforced revetments for parking aircraft
and was in the process of erecting hangars and administra-
tion buildings. The potential for such a base, both in
terms of tactical and strategic aircraft, was not lost on
U.S. security planners.
Oman did not prove as difficult as Somalia in nego-
tiating access to its facilities at Muscat, Masirah Island,
and the airhead at Seeb. Though there was some hesitancy
among the states of the region to become too closely
identified with the United States because of a perceived
inconsistency in Middle Eastern policy, the U.S. reached
33. See Richard Burt, "U.S. and Somalia Expected to Conclude
Pact on Bases," The New York Times , August 19, 1980,
p. 10:4; Graham Hovey, "U.S. and Somalia Sign Arms Accord,"
The New York Times , August 23, 1980, p. 3:2; Juan de Onis,
"House Panel Skeptical on U.S. Pact with Somalia," The New
York Times , September 17, 1980, p. 14:3.
34. State Cite 233001.
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agreement with Oman in June 1980. 35 Kenya also proved to be
amenable to expanded U.S. access in the form of the right to
stage P-3 flights through Mombasa as well as an expanded use
of the port facilities at Mombasa. 36
Strategic Forces
In planning for the expanded Indian Ocean operations a
major problem became apparent to the Carter Administration.
35. Richard Burt, "Indian Ocean Lands Reported to Agree to
U.S. Use of Bases," The New York Times . February 12, 1980,
p. 1:6; Richard Halloran, "Snags Arise in Talks on Access to
Bases," The New York Times
, March 30, 1980, p. 8:1; Richard
Burt, "U.S. Wins Bases in Oman and Kenya," The New York
Times , April 22, 1980, p. 3:4; "U.S. Announces Pact with
Oman on Access to Air Bases and Port," The New York Times
,
June 6, 1980, p. 9:4.
36. "Kenya Agrees to Expand U.S. Use of Military Bases," The
New York Times , June 28, 1980, p. 5:5. This trend continued
with the Reagan Administration. Shortly after President
Reagan's inauguration he submitted a request for almost $1
billion in additional funding for Indian Ocean related
operations. These funds included a $106.4 million provision
for the improvement of the Egyptian port and military base
at Ras Banas on the Red Sea. A lesser amount, $75 million,
was earmarked for the refurbishment of the former British
base on Masirah Island off the coast of Oman as well as
improvement of the airfield at Seeb. Approximately $24
million was identified for the repair of various facilities
at Berbera while the Port of Mombasa was allocated $26
million for dredging. Diego Garcia was also addressed in
this funding request. Funds in the amount of $237.7 million
were identified as necessary to complete a variety of
projects, including the widening of the air strip and con-
struction of ramps to accommodate B-52 aircraft. See
Richard Halloran, "Reagan to Request $38 Billion Increase in
Military Outlays," The New York Times . March 4, 1981, p.
1:6; Richard Halloran, "Reagan Plan Looks to String of Bases
in Mideast and Indian Ocean," The New York Times . March 12,
1981, p. 8:1; Richard Halloran, "U.S. Base in Indian Ocean




In a sense, it was a variant of the problems associated with
the United States' loss of escalation dominance. The notion
that by virtue of its strategic nuclear superiority the
United States could forestall a conventional attack or other
action short of a nuclear war in Europe or elsewhere had
been undermined by the USSR's achievement of parity, or
better, at the strategic nuclear level. American strategic
nuclear dominance had, at one time, made up for any gaps in
U.S. capabilities to wage conventional warfare that were
becoming all too apparent. Escalation dominance demanded
that there be no such gaps. Their existence relinquished
control over the process of crisis management to the
adversary and left to him the choice of taking the next
escalatory step. This deficiency suggested the need to be
able to bring a balanced force of arms, in addition to
general purpose naval forces, to bear on the region. The
actions of the Carter Administration in this regard may have
been just as important, and perhaps more telling to the
Soviet Union, than the imposition of the grain embargo on
January 4, 1980.
On November 23, 1979, the U.S. Air Force established a
detachment of four KC-135 tanker aircraft on Diego
Garcia. 37 Some two months later B-52 aircraft operating
37. U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval History,
Navy Operational Archives, "Command History, U.S. Naval
Support Facility, Diego Garcia, 1979," p. 6.
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from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and in conjunction with
the KC-135 tanker detachment from Diego Garcia overflew the
Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron on January 21, 1980. The
arrival of B-52 aircraft in the Arabian Sea was obvious
cause for concern by the USSR. Although the aircraft were
reportedly being employed in a maritime surveillance role as
provided for in the 1975 USN-USAF Collateral Functions
Agreement, the demonstration that U.S. strategic aircraft
could be introduced into the Arabian Sea could not have been
3 8lost on the Soviet Union. The use of aircraft that were
earmarked for a strategic role on a mission that could have
been performed more cheaply by the expanded P-3C ORION
detachment on Diego Garcia suggests that there was more to
this sortie and subsequent ocean surveillance flights by
39B-52 aircraft in the Indian Ocean.
The publicity associated with this first B-52 mission
may have been intended as a signal that, because of Soviet
38. See Richard Halloran, "Carter Sends Bombers Over a
Russian Fleet in Display of Strength," The New York Times f
January 22, 1980, p. 9:4; see also U.S. Office of Naval
Operations and U.S. Air Force Headquarters, Memor andum of
Agreement on the Concept of Operations t£Ll USAF Forces
Collateral Functions Training (Washington: September 2,
1975) .
39. LCDR John R. Thompson, USN, "USN-USAF Interaction for
Ocean Surveillance Using Land Based Aircraft," Research
Paper, Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, R.I.: June 1979, p. 50, contains an illuminating
breakdown of the comparative costs of flying a typical ocean
surveillance mission for the P-3C and B-52D aircraft.

- 365 -
activities in the region, any prospects for the continuation
of NALT were poor. The choice of the B-52 as the carrier of
this message was clear and unmistakable. Moreover, the Air
Force requested some $39 million in March 1981 to construct
the parallel taxiway and parking apron extension to enable
B-52's to operate routinely from Diego Garcia. In support
of this operational concept, the United States concluded an
agreement with Australia on March 11, 1981, permitting
B-52's operating from Guam on Indian Ocean surveillance
operations to use the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)
airfield at Darwin for refueling and crew rest. The text of
this agreement is contained in Appendix F. Even though the
agreement contained a clause that required the United States
to obtain Australian agreement prior to the use of Darwin
for any mission other than ocean surveillance and navigation
41
training, the impact was far-reaching to say the least.
40. Richard Halloran, "Reagan to Request $38 Billion
Increase in Military Outlays," The New York Times, March 4,
1981, p. 1:6.
41. "Backfire in Vietnam," Flight International , March 28,
1981, p. 894. The agreement contained provisions for the
support of a detachment of up to three B-52 and two KC-135
aircraft as well as the stationing of some 100 U.S. person-
nel to service the aircraft. See Brigadier F. W. Speed,
"American B52 Bombers in Australia," The^Jmny Quarterly and
Defence Journal
,
January 1982, p. 11. See also Australia,
Parliament, Hansard's Commonwealth Parliamentary—Debates,
(House of Representatives), New Series, 121 (1981): 664-665;
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Canberra, "U.S.-
Australian Agreement on Transit Through Darwin by USAF B-52
Aircraft on Training and Sea Surveillance Missions," Press
Release (Canberra: March 30, 1981).
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Australia and the United States renewed the agreement in
42October 1982. The U.S. also considered using the airfield
at Berbera to support B-52 operations in the Indian
43Ocean.
Alliance Implications
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a situation
that brought the issue of allied burden sharing to the
fore. It demonstrated both the capability and intent of the
USSR to use military power against a non-European state in a
manner that posed a threat to Western interests outside the
traditional NATO geographic area of operations. The inva-
sion and the seizure of the hostages created a force
allocation problem for the United States—a problem that was
not simply military in nature.
The dominant political question that confronted the
leadership of the Alliance was how could the United States
continue to bear the major burden for the maintenance of
European security while, at the same time, allocating scarce
resources to support crisis management in the Persian Gulf
where European interests were as great as those of the
42. "Australia Allows U.S. Flights," The New YpjlE. Times,
October 17, 1982, p. 4:6.
43. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
P.. £.. . .In texes_t s^ . io ,_ aniLJP.cLLigifefi- Toward, feha. _Pe c_aia.n Gulf»
1980





United States while NATO adhered to a Europe-first policy.
On February 27, 1979, General Alexander Haig, USA, Supreme
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) , warned that:
Clearly our most important challenge in the period
ahead is the necessity to deal with the relation-
ship between events occurring outside NATO's
geographic boundaries and the security of the
alliance itself.
Carter, in his State of the Union message on January 23,
1980, warned that the United States could not be expected to
shoulder the entire burden of international security on its
45
own.
NATO was not pleased with the prospect of U.S. force
redeployments or picking up the slack. In a speech to the
Bundestag in January 1980, Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of
West Germany, warned against "unconsidered talk about a
geographical extension of NATO obligations." The Military
44. General Alexander Haig, USA, "Statement," U.S. Congress,
House, Committee on the Armed Services, Military Posture and
Department o f De fense Authorization for Appropriations for
liscaj Year 198 and Department of Defense Supplemental
Author izatigrj fp£_ . Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 ,
Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1979)
, p. 1376.
45. U.S., President, "The State of the Union: An Address
Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, January 23,
1980," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, January
28, 1980, p. 197 (hereinafter referred to as State o f the
Union. 1980 )
.
46. John Vincour, "Schmidt Still Plans Moscow Trip," The New
York Times , January 18, 1980, p. 4:3.

- 368 -
Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly argued in 1980
that:
When discussing re-establishing an allied
naval presence in the Indian Ocean on a permanent
basis, it should be remembered that naval assets
in NATO's current areas of responsibility are
already said to be below SACLANT's requirements
and national replacement programs do not provide
for greater numbers. While the allies will have
to cover any gaps left by American redeployments
... it is unrealistic to expect a permanent
contribution to the InrLian Ocean without creating
a shortfall elsewhere.
Nonetheless, in Kay 1980, NATO agreed to the first phase of
a plan enabling the U.S. to employ forces currently
earmarked for or assigned to NATO for contingencies in the
4 8
Persian Gulf. Hence, even if only by implication, NATO
tacitly defined a security interest which lay outside its
traditional defense perimeter.
In what certainly was a test of this agreement, there
is evidence that the deployment of several German warships
to the Indian Ocean in 1980 was the result of pressure from
the United States to send naval forces into the region even
if only as a symbolic gesture of recognition of the
importance of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to NATO.
The notion of deploying German forces outside the NATO
47. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Military Committee,
General Report on AlliaPi^-^S.e.QHrity Issues (Brussels: NATO
Information Service, 1980) (1980X200 MC(80)8, para 13).
48. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Final Com-
munique Issued by the NATO Defense Planning Committee,'' KATO.
Review. June 1980, p. 31-32.
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geographic area of operations was sensitive and involved
certain constitutional questions within Germany. Indeed,
there was a prohibition in the basic law of the Federal
Republic against permanent deployments of West Germany's
maritime forces in areas such as the Indian Ocean. Never-
theless, some Christian Democrats in Germany expressed the
opinion that a symbolic West German naval presence in the
Gulf would serve as a valuable gesture of solidarity toward
the United States. They explained that such action was not
inconsistent with German national security policy in view of
West Germany's decision on where its warships would operate
in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea in support of
NATO." While U.S. efforts to operate with these ships in
spontaneous tactical maneuvers, commonly referred to as
Passing Exercises, in both the Mediterranean and the Indian
Ocean were unsuccessful, the German ships did exercise with
French forces in the Mediterranean. This deployment
demonstrated that with more detailed NATO planning, the
Bundesmarine either could provide some units for an Indo-
Pacific contingency or, more preferably, could deploy a more
substantial number of surface combatants to the Baltic and
North Seas thereby releasing the more experienced U.S. and
49. John Vincour, "Bonn Expects Pressure from Allies to Send




British forces for duties elsewhere. 50 Since 1979, Great
Britain and Italy have also contributed directly to the
force structure in the Indian Ocean through the deployment
51
of naval forces to the region. Between March 1978 and
September 1980 Great Britain raised its force level in the
Indian Ocean to an average level of eight ships of the Royal
Navy. These units usually operated in the Gulf of Oman with
52four on patrol at any given time.
Australian cooperation with the United States, both on
a bilateral basis as well as within the framework of ANZUS,
increased. At the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the ANZUS
Council in Washington, D.C., on June 7 and 8, 1978, the
Council reviewed the Indian Ocean Naval Arms Limitation
Talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and reiterated
its concern that any Indian Ocean agreement "must not
53detract from the ANZUS Alliance." At its meeting in
Canberra on July 4 and 5, 1979, the Council noted that the
United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to discuss the
50. William T. Tow, "U.S. Alliance Policies and Asian
Pacific Security: A Trans-Regional Approach," Naval War
College Review f September-October 1981, p. 42.
51. U.S., Department of Defense, Report on Allied Con-
tributions to the Common Defense (Washington: March 1983),
p. 61.
52. Kelly, op. cit., p. 182.
53. U.S., Department of State, "ANZUS Council Communique,"
The Department of State Bulletin/ July 1978, p. 48.
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resumption of their bilateral talks on questions concerning
arms limitation measures in the Indian Ocean. Although the
Council expressed its support for mutual restraint, it did
so only so long as any such measures were "consistent with
the security interests of the ANZUS partners." 54 When the
Council met in Washington on February 26 and 27, 1980, it
"acknowledged that the political climate" as a result of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was "not conducive to
resumption of U.S. -Soviet talks on arms limitations in the
55Indian Ocean."
Despite this cautious rhetoric there was growing evi-
dence that the Indian Ocean had become part of ANZUS' sphere
of concern. Australia began to step up its maritime patrols
in the Indian Ocean ranging as far as into the Bay of
Bengal. It is also significant that RAAF P-3 aircraft began
to use Diego Garcia on an ad hoc basis to support these
reconnaissance flights. Moreover, the airfield on the
Cocos-Keeling Islands took on a new significance in this
regard. In early 1980, Australia and New Zealand agreed, in
discussions with the United States under the aegis of the
ANZUS treaty, to expand their respective military roles in
the Indian Ocean. Australia agreed to deploy a battle group
54. U.S., Department of State, "ANZUS Council Communique,"
The Department of State Bulletin , September 1979, p. 57.
55. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Backgrounder
No. 223 of February 27, 1980, Annex, p. 3.
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built around HMAS MELBOURNE. Beginning in 1979 a series of
combined exercises nicknamed BEACON COMPASS have been held
in the Indian Ocean with the Australian, New Zealand, and
British navies. The U.S. participated in BEACON COMPASS 80
contributing a battle group centered on USS MIDWAY. This
exercise, planned largely by the ANZUS navies, involved 25
ships, 170 aircraft and 18,000 personnel. Its objective was
to demonstrate the continued presence, cooperation and
readiness of allied forces in the Indian Ocean.
The question of Cockburn Sound arose again when Defense
Minister Kileen again extended an invitation to the U.S.
Navy "to use the facility at HMAS STIRLING" on Cockburn
Sound in Western Australia. He also noted that "a warm
57
welcome will always await [the U.S. Navy]." In the wake
of the search for facility access in the Indian Ocean, the
United States began to reconsider Cockburn Sound. Speaking
during a visit to Sydney on June 3, 1980, Admiral Robert L.
J. Long, USN, Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) , com-
mented that:
The U.S. Government is certainly looking at
Cockburn Sound as a likely homeport for its
carrier forces in the Indian Ocean. We are
looking at a number of possibilities, including
Singapore. If the U.S. were to establish a
56. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 210005Z Oct 80 (State Cite 280482)
(Subject: Public Affairs Guidance - Exercise BEACON COMPASS.
57. Ibid., p. 56.
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homeport at HMAS STIRLING on Cockburn ,-jSouth it
would involve several thousand families.
The prospect of U.S. use of Cockburn Sound for home-
porting a CVBG became a political issue shortly after Long's
remarks. Speaking at a press conference in Perth on August
22, the leader of the Australian Labour Party, William
Hayden, stated that "if the Fraser Government approved the
use of Cockburn Sound for homeporting U.S. ships and a
Labour Government gained power, the approval would be
59
repudiated." The State Labour Party Conference supported
Hayden's views on the subject and called on the Fraser
Government to press for a resumption of the U.S. -Soviet
fi
Indian Ocean Arms Limitation Talks. Though this rhetoric
was probably the result of domestic political infighting,
there was some concern that, should a Labour Government
replace Fraser' s Conservative Government which had been in
power since 1975, the Labour Party's left wing would
58. Adelaide Advertiser , June 3, 1980, p. 1:1.
59. AMCONSUL PERTH msg 250303Z Aug 80 (Perth Cite 0343)
(Subject: Opposition Leader States ALP Would Repudiate Any
Agreement for US Homeporting in Cockburn Sound)
.
60. AMCONSUL PERTH msg 270344Z Aug 80 (Perth Cite 0348)
(Subject: State ALP Conference Opposes Permanent Basing of
Non Australian Naval Units at Cockburn Sound and Urges




press the new Prime Minister to depart in some areas from
Australia's growing support of the United States. 61
Genera] Purpose Forces
The problem of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn
of Africa raised the issue of what, if any, response in
addition to refusing to schedule the next round of talks was
appropriate. Although the debate within the Administration
was cast in the broader context of linking SALT with Soviet
conduct in the Horn of Africa, there was discussion in the
SCC during 1978 of deploying a U.S. carrier battle group
near Ethiopia. Brzezinski supported this position while
Vance and Brown opposed the deployment in the area of the
Horn. In the end, Carter did not approve the deployment of
61. When the Labor Party won the elections in March 1983,
Prime Minister Robert Hawke selected Hayden as his Foreign
Minister. Hawke, however, reassured the Reagan Administra-
tion during a visit to the United States in June 1983 on
this matter. Though he acknowledged that there were some in
Australia who wanted U.S. bases there closed, he went to
explain that he believed that Australia had:
. . . a clear perception of global realities and
would regard it an exercise in delusion to think
that we can engage in some unilateral process of
disarmament and detachment from the alliances of
the West.
See Richard Bernstein, "Australia Assures U.S. on Use of
Joint Bases," The New York Times , June 19, 1983, p. 15:1;
see also Russell Schneider, "U.S. Will Help US in Any
Regional War," The Australian , June 15, 1983, p. 1:3.




the battle group to the Horn but did indicate a willingness
to consider moving a CVBG to the vicinity of Diego
Garcia. However, a decision was made to enhance U.S.
presence in the region. On February 21, 1978, the same day
that the fourth round of talks ended, USS FOX (CG-33) , a
guided missile cruiser, accompanied by two frigates and an
oiler, entered the Indian Ocean on what was described as "a
routine deployment in keeping with [U.S.] policy of
conducting naval operations in international waters. In
April 1978, FOX became the first ship of its class to
64
operate with the MEF. There was no change in the U.S.
deployment patterns until November 15, 1978, when a surface
battle group comprised of USS STERRET (CG-31) , USS WADDELL
(DDG-24), USS BRADLEY (FF-1041) , and USNS PASSUMPSIC
(T-AO-107) entered the Indian Ocean. The deployment of
this battle group marked the beginning of what was to be a
near continuous pattern of presence in the Indian Ocean
until well after Carter left office. This deployment was in
response to the worsening situation in Iran. Some two
months later on January 7, 1979, guided missile destroyers
USS DECATUR (DDG-31) and USS HOEL (DDG-13) , destroyer USS
63. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 183; Vance.
64. "U.S. Sends Ships to Indian Ocean," The New Yock Times,
February 22, 1978, p. 3:3; Kelly, op. cit., p. 178.





and the replenishment oiler USS KANSAS
CITY (AOR-3) joined this battle group. 66
Armed Iranian rebels attacked the U.S. Embassy in
Teheran on February 14, 1979—the same day that rebels
killed U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs in Kabul.
One week later on February 21 the MEF flagship, USS LA SALLE
(AGF-3) , and five destroyers from the battle group in the
Indian Ocean evacuated more than 400 persons, including 200
U.S. citizens from the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and
67
Chah Bahar. Once again the concern of the West focused on
access to Middle East oil as a result of the growing
instability in Iran. Two weeks later on March 8, 1979, the
Defense Department announced that a carrier battle group led
by USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64) had deployed to the Indian
Ocean. In addition Thomas B. Ross, the Defense spokesman,
explained that STERRETT, WADDELL, and KANSAS CITY had
6 8
extended their deployment to the Indian Ocean.
On March 25, 1979, during a routine press briefing at
the Defense Department, Ross made known that a new naval
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Brzezinski claims that Carter personally approved this
deployment when, by prearrangment with his national security
advisor, the President showed up unexpectedly at an SCC
session and approved the SCC's recommendation to sail
CONSTELLATION immediately to the Arabian Sea. See
Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 447.
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orce, which would be called the Fifth Fleet, was an option
nder study by the Carter Administration. He acknowledged
hat Carter and his advisors were seeking a larger military
resence in the area and that a Fifth Fleet was "a serious
ption" in view of the instability in Iran and Yemen. 69 Two
eeks later on April 6, 1919, a surface combatant battle
roup led by guided missile cruiser USS ENGLAND (CG-22)
ntered the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca,
uided missile destroyer USS ROBISON (DDG-12) , destroyer USS
LIOT (DD-967)
, frigate USS DOWNES (FF-1070) , and the fast
ombat support ship USS CAMDEN (AOE-2) accompanied ENGLAND,
hus by early April 1979 U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean
ad increased to 15 ships. This marked the highest level
£ U.S. presence in the ocean at any one time since the
373-74 oil crisis.
Therefore, by mid-spring of 1979 the Administration's
scision regarding U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean
^gan to take shape. The decision to sail the CONSTELLATION
ittle group to the Arabian Sea and the expansion of U.S.
). "U.S. Considering Plan to Create a New Fleet for the
idian Ocean," The New York Times . March 9, 1979, p. 5:1.
). SECSTATE WASHDC msg 061733Z Apr 79 (State Cite 085529)
Subject: Indian Ocean Deployment).
.. Bernard Weintraub, "Pentagon Is Urging Indian Ocean
.eet," The New York Times . March 1, 1979, p. 14:1; and
.chard Burt, "U.S. Sends Ships to Arabian Sea in Yemen
:isis," The New York Times . March 7, 1979, p. 1:4.
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naval presence in the region lend credence to this percep-
71
tion. Although nothing came of the discussion of the
Fifth Fleet and the Administration did not choose to draw a
CVBG from another theater for permanent assignment to the
region, battle groups did deploy more frequently. Until
1979, the customary interval between the departure of one
battle group and the arrival of the next one in the Indian
Ocean had been no less than two months with the average
nearer to three months. Implementation of a revised policy
was evident on April 14, 1979, when a carrier battle group
built around USS MIDWAY relieved CONSTELLATION on station in
the Indian Ocean. This simultaneous replacement of one
carrier battle group with another seemed to signal the
Carter Administration's recognition that it was in the
national interest to demonstrate the ability to project
power in the region. In June 1979, the Administration
refined its new national security policy when the Policy
Review Committee of the NSC examined the question of U.S.
72
military posture in the Middle East and South Asia. The
President's approval of three of the Committee's recommen-
dations suggests that its principal agenda item was the
ability of the United States effectively to project power in
the region. The first of Carter's decisions authorized an
72. Richard Burt, "U.S. Buildup in the Persian Gulf Urged,"




increase in the force level of the U.S. Navy's Middle East
Force. The second policy decision increased the number of
incursions by U.S. carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean
from three to four per year. Finally, Carter directed the
U.S. Air Force to begin a program of "Demonstration Visits"
to selected Arab states, particularly Oman and several Gulf
73
shiekdoms. Carter made reference to the maritime portions
of this decision during his October 1, 1979, address on the
Soviet brigade in Cuba when he explained that "we have
reinforced our naval presence in the Indian Ocean."
The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran on November
4, 1979, by armed Iranian students marked the watershed in
U.S. Indian Ocean policy. Although the outlines of a
strategy had been identified, including the initial identi-
fication of U.S. forces for the RDF, the seizure prompted a
thorough, high level review of U.S. military capabilities in
the region. The sobering conclusion of that review was that
U.S. ability to project military power in the region was
limited. On November 20 Carter approved an NSC recommenda-
tion to deploy an additional carrier battle group to the
73. Ibid.
74. U.S., President, Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents . "Peace and National Security: An Address to the
Nation on Soviet Combat Troops in Cuba and the Strategic





Indian Ocean. By the end of November 1979, U.S. presence
in the Indian Ocean had increased to 21 ships. One month
later the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
In response the Carter Administration increased the
level of naval presence to three full carrier battle groups
centered on USS KITTY HAWK (CV-63) , USS MIDWAY, and USS
NIMITZ (CVN-68) . On February 13, 1980, Ross announced an
unprecedented change in U.S. policy. He explained that:
A four ship amphibious task force from the Seventh
Fleet with an embarked Marine Amphibious Unit,
including 1800 Marines, will deploy to the Arabian
Sea in mid-March. The Amphibious Task Force is
now in the Western Pacific and will conduct
exercises there during the next two weeks. It
will then proceed to the Arabian Sea to join with
the two Carrier Battle Groups operating there.
This force included the helicopter assault ship USS OKINAWA
(LPH-3) , dock landing ship USS ALAMO (LSD-33) , attack cargo
ship USS MOBILE (LKA-115) , and tank landing ship USS SAN
BERNARDINO (LST-1189) . USS GRIDLEY (CG-21) and USS BARBEY
(FF-1088) escorted this force into the Indian Ocean. This
was the first time in the history of U.S. presence in the
Indian Ocean that a Marine force of this size had deployed
to the Indian Ocean77 and was the first of four such
deployments that saw a Navy-Marine Corps amphibious
75. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 483.
76. SECDEF WASHDC msg 132047Z Feb 80 (Subject: Press
Announcement— Indian Ocean Deployment)
.
77. SECDEF Washington DC msg 132047Z Feb 80.
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capability on station in the northwest quadrant of the
Indian Ocean almost continuously until March 1981. One month
later on April 27, 1980, U.S. naval presence in the Indian
Ocean reached a record level of 34 ships with the return of
the CONSTELLATION battle group. U.S. presence remained at
or near this level for the remainder of 1980 and for two
months subsequent to the release of the U.S. hostages on
January 20, 1981. The U.S. Navy continued to maintain two
carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean until October 21,
7 8
1981, when the force level dropped to one battle group for
the first time since November 1979.
Reconsidering NALT
The Soviet media did not remain silent throughout these
events. Though interested in continuing the talks, the
Soviet Union tried to embarrass the United States because of
its decision not to schedule further rounds of negotia-
tions. Even before the U.S. broke off the talks in February
1978, Radio Moscow charged that U.S. actions in the Indian
Ocean, such as the completion of the planned construction on
Diego Garcia, were a "direct result of deliberate attempts
by certain groups in the United States, closely connected
78. Kelly, op. cit., p. 180.
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with the military-industrial complex, to torpedo the Soviet
79American talks on the Indian Ocean."
Six months later in June 1978, TASS, in a commentary on
the Twenty-Seventh Session of the ANZUS Council in
Washington, charged that:
The recent trip to countries of Southeast Asia and
Oceania by U.S. Vice President Walter Mondale has
patently showed that to presenve its positions in
that area the United States is making a stake on
further envigoration of the ANZUS bloc. Attempts
are being made to involve the Indian Ocean basin
in military preparations. The testimony of this
is, specifically, the intention of the United
States, Australia, and New Zealand to hold major
joint
Rfnaval exercises in the Indian Ocean this
year.
The reference to SANDGROPER I was unmistakable.
One month later in July 1978 in a summary commentary on
the talks TASS again criticized the United States for
refusing to reschedule the talks. Noting that "neither side
has officially suspended the talks," the commentator went to
great length to explain that the decision to halt further
rounds was "by no means on the Soviet Union's initiative."
The commentary concluded by noting that "while talks on the
Indian Ocean are not conducted, the USA is intensively
79. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "USSR
Ready to Discuss Indian Ocean Proposals," FBIS Daily Report:
The Soviet Union , January 23, 1978, p. B6.
80. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"ANZUS Pact 'Tool' of U.S. Policy in Asia," F_EIS_
—
Daily
Report: The Soviet Union , June 6, 1978, p. B4.
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widening its military activity in that area." 81 The USSR
supplemented this public diplomacy with private efforts to
convince various states that the United States was trying to
establish a position of military advantage by delaying the
talks. 82
The announcement in March 1979 that the United States
was considering establishing the Fifth Fleet touched off a
flurry of activity in the Soviet media. After the fall of
the Shah and during the Yemen crisis, the Soviet media used
every opportunity to criticize U.S. actions in the Indian
83Ocean as "gunboat diplomacy." On March 15 Izvestia
claimed that the U.S. was "building up its naval forces in
the Indian Ocean to ensure its military superiority in the
Indian Ocean region and impose its will on the states in the
84
region." TASS also reiterated the claim that the United
States was "preparing to establish a special Indian Ocean
fleet" and "enlarging its facilities on Diego Garcia to
81. See U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Serious Questions Raised by 'Frozen 1 Indian Ocean Talks,"
FBIS Daily Report: The Soviet Union , July 11, 1978, p. Bl.
82. SECSTATE WASHDC msg 211820Z Jul 78 (State Cite 184776)
(Subject: Status of Indian Ocean Talks)
.
83. See, for example, U.S., Department of Commerce, National
Technical Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, "U.S. Unleashing Large Scale Arms Race in Indian





support this increased naval presence." The commentary also
alleged that the U.S. broke off the Indian Ocean talks
because "the very prospect of curtailing military activity
in the Indian Ocean came up against U.S. strategic con-
cepts." It also claimed that, unlike the USSR, the U.S. had
refused to support the United Nations resolution calling for
85
a resumption of the talks.
In February 1979, one year after the talks had been
held in abeyance, TASS marked the event. The commentary
noted that:
A year passed since that time. There is hardly
any doubt that over this period the negotiations
on the Indian Ocean could have been brought to
their successful conclusion had they continued the
way they began. But this did not happen. Instead
of continuation and intensification of the nego-
tiations, the American side unilaterally suspended
them. Though the Soviet side repeatedly proposed
resumption of the negotiations, the delegations of
the USSR and the USA had no other meetings. In
Washington they fully disregarded the anxiety
expressed by the countries of the Indian Ocean
area, specifically India, in connection with the
suspension of the negotiations. At the 33rd ses-
sion of the U.N. General Assembly the United
States refused to support a resolution which urged
an undelayed resumption of the Soviet-American
85. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"U.S. Unleashes Large Scale Arms Race in Indian Ocean," FBIS
Daily Report: The Soviet Union , March 20, 1979, p. A3-A4.
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negotiations on the Indian
ft
Qcean
voted for the resolution).
(the Soviet Union
The commentary concluded with the observation that:
The matter obviously is that determinant in the
American policy in the Indian Ocean again becomes
the approach which the United States practiced for
many years in the past and which seemingly started
to be replaced by a more realistic line that made
it possible to open Soviet-American negotiations.
The priority in this policy apparently received
not the objective of strengthening the peaceful
situation in the area of the Indian Ocean, on the
basis of accords with the USSR with due account
for the legitimate interests of both sides and the
coastal states, but the desire to ensure for the
United States military supremacy in the Indian
Ocean area so as to dictate its will to the
countries of the region. The build-up of the
American naval force in the Indian Ocean and its
movement in the most acute period of the political
crisis in Iran reaffirm this most patently.
The focus on propaganda in the Third World was evident
in the joint communique issued at the conclusion of
Kosygin's visit to India in March 1979. The communique
stated that both India and the Soviet Union:
. . .
reaffirmed their support for the idea of
transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace
in accordance with the aspiration of that region's
peoples. They expressed their regret that the
Indian Ocean talks between the USSR and the United
States have been suspended. India rates highly
the USSR's readiness to resume those talks. Both
sides advocated their immediate resumption and
successful completion—which would contribute to
86. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Status of U.S. -USSR Indian Ocean Negotiations Reported,"





implementing the UN declaration on proclaiming the
Indian Ocean a zone of peace. °
Radio Moscow addressed the Fifth Fleet specifically on
March 21, 1979. The commentator charged the issue of the
force under consideration indicated that:
. . . the reduction of military activity in that
zone goes against the new plans the United States
has for the Indian Ocean region. Judging by
statements from Defence Secretary Brown, Secretary
James Schlesinger and various senators the United
States is planning again to operate from a
position of strength. This is in reaction to the
events in Iran, when the people decided to take
the fate of the nation into their own hands.
Washington views the situation in Iran as
justification for reviving the doctrine of armed
interference in the affairs of other countries,
therefore the United States is planning to
increase its military presence in the Middle East
and enlarge naval forces in the Indian Ocean, and
so the United States has returned to the policy it
practiced for many years.
The broadcast concluded by alleging that:
the United States is not making it a
priority policy to strengthen peace in that part
of the world by reaching an agreement with the
USSR on the basis of the legitimate interests of
both countries as well as the coastal nations.
Instead, priority is being given to building
88. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Joint Communique on Kosygin Visit to India," FBIS Daily
Report: The Soviet Union , March 21, 1979, p. D.l.
89. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical Infor-
mation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "U.S.
Charged with Plans to Establish Indian Ocean Fleet," EB_I£
Daily Report: The Soviet Union , March 21, 1979, p. D.8.
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military superiority in hopes of beina able to
dictate to the countries in the region.
Despite this rhetoric, the talks were the subject of
discussion between Carter and Brezhnev at the June 1979
91
summit in Vienna. U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean prior
to the seizure of the hostages suggest that the Carter
Administration remained open on the subject of resuming the
talks. As discussed earlier, the U.S. did not change its
deployment patterns in the Indian Ocean in any drastic way
when the Soviet Union expanded its presence in the Indian
Ocean from November 1977 to June 1978. However, even though
Soviet naval presence returned to near normal by the summer
of 1978, Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn of Africa
and in Afghanistan demonstrated that there were other
factors in the presence equation which had not been
addressed in the negotiations and which seemed to contradict
the idea of stabilization under such an agreement.
However, Carter and Brezhnev agreed to have their heads
of delegation to the talks meet to discuss their resump-
tion. As a result, Mendelevich and Ralp Earle, Warnke's
successor at ACDA, met in Washington on July 20, 1979, but
were unable to reach agreement on a basis for resuming the
90. Ibid.
91. Kathleen Teltsch, "Indian Ocean Called Vienna Topic,"
The New York Times , May 15, 1979, p. 4:3; Hedrick Smith,
"U.S. and Soviet Sign Strategic Arms Treaty; Carter Urges
Congress to Support Accordingly," The New York Times, June
19, 1979, p. 14:3.
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negotiations. The talks remain dormant. Although the
Reagan Administration has not taken a formal position on
resumption of the talks, there is no evidence that either
the United States or the Soviet Union has tried to resume
92
them.
This decision having been made, the Soviet Union
exploited it to exert pressure on the U.S. to resume the
talks and as a tactic of public diplomacy to discourage a
larger U.S. presence. On August 21, 1979, Pravda carried an
article that detailed the history of arms control proposals
concerning the Indian Ocean. Though noting that both the
U.S. and the USSR shared certain security interests there,
the article alleged that:
Precisely at the time when the outlines of a
possible accord were beginning to appear the
Americans called a halt to the talks and rejected
all subsequent approaches from the Soviet side
suggesting their resumption. At the same time a
92. See U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
Information Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
"Commentary on U.S. -Soviet Indian Ocean Talks," FBIS Daily
Report: The Soviet Union , November 8, 1979, p. CC.3;
Australia, Parliament, Hansard's Commonwealth Parliamentary
Debates (House of Representatives), New Series, 118 (1980):
2228; Powell A. Moore, Assistant Secretary of State for
Congressional Relations to Congressman Duncan Hunter, March
18, 1983 (provided by Congressman Hunter); U.S., Department
of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, "U.S. Refusal to Resume
Indian Ocean Talks Causes 'Anxiety,'" EB1S Daily Report; The




rapid buildup of the U.S. military presence in the
Indian Ocean began.
[•he article went on to explain that, although the Soviet
Jnion "reaffirmed its readiness to resume the Indian Ocean
:alks," the next step in this process was up to the United
94
Jtates. This public criticism of the U.S. position on the
:ndian Ocean talks was timed to coincide with the opening of
;he meeting of the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau in Havana
>n August 28, 1979. 95
What then did the Carter-Brezhnev communique mean in
erms of Indian Ocean NALT? The Earl-Mendelevich meeting
>robably was the culmination of a decisionmaking process
hat decided not to resume the talks at that time. Carter
robably had a choice of three options in the process. He
ould either begin the talks again at some appropriate time,
ait to make such a decision to see how Soviet behavior in
he Horn of Africa developed, or, as was the case, abandon
3. U.S., Department of Commerce, National Technical
nformation Service, Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
Pravda Scores U.S. Stance on Resuming Indian Ocean Talks,"
BIS Dail y Report: The Soviet Union . August 23, 1979,
. A.l.
4. Ibid., p. A. 3. Graeme Beaton, Washington Correspondent
or The Australian , reported on August 29, 1979, that the
oviet Union and the U.S. had agreed formally to resume the
ndian Ocean talks. Beaton said that this development
Dincided with Soviet assurances to a group of U.S.
Dngressmen visiting the Soviet Union. Nothing came of this
sport. See Graeme Beaton, "Talks on Ocean to Resume," The.
jstralian
, August 29, 1979, p. 5:1.
5. See SECSTATE WASHDC msg 242208Z Aug 78 (State Cite




the negotiations entirely. If selected, the first option
would have inferred that Carter still considered it in the
best interest of the United States to constrain the USSR
from building up its infrastructure in the Indian Ocean even
at the cost of accepting some limit on U.S. military capa-
bilities in the area. His speech at the graduation
ceremonies at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis on June 7,
1978, referred to the talks and suggested that they were an
"avenue of cooperation despite the basic issues which
9 6divide" the U.S. and the USSR. The second option suggests
that Carter, with some legitimacy, was hoping that, even
thouth the situation in the region was too unsettled at the
time to decide whether or not to resume negotiations,
relations between the two superpowers would improve. There
is some evidence that this was a viable option in the cable
sent by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to all
U.S. Ambassadors in the Indian Ocean region on August 24,
1979, on the subject. He told them that "for our part, we
intend to continue contacts with the Soviets with regard to
97
the resumption of formal talks." The final option, if
chosen, would confirm that the United States had decided
that it needed the flexibility that it was originally
96. U.S., President, "United States Naval Academy: Address
at the Commencement Exercise," Weekly Compilation QJL
Presidential Documents , June 12, 1978, p. 1054.
97. State Cite 223010.

- 391 -
willing to yield in the Indian Ocean talks. Moreover, this
decision implied that refusing to resume the talks would
have only marginal significance on the U.S. -USSR
relationship and, that the United States, at least for the
time, was better off without an agreement than with one.
Because the summit communique committed Carter and
Brezhnev only to have their respective representatives meet
promptly to discuss the resumption of the talks, it seems
9 8that Carter chose the last option. Carter's choice gave
him the advantage of not complicating the SALT II process
which was already in trouble domestically in the United
States and was both personally and politically important to
the President, while deferring any firm commitment to resume
a set of marginally useful talks in the glaring light of a
summit meeting. By choosing this option, Carter was able to
delegate the responsibility for advising the Soviet govern-
ment that he had decided not to resume the talks to a head
of delegation meeting—a forum that would certainly be less
public and less politicized than a summit meeting.
The Carter Doctrine
On January 23, 1980, Carter delivered the final blow to
Indian Ocean NALT. In his third State of the Union message,
98. U.S., President, "Joint U.S. -USSR Communique, June 18,
1979," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, June




An attempt by an outside force to gain
control of Persian Gulf region will be regarded as
an assault on the vital interests of the United
States of America and such assault will be
repelled by any means necessary, including
military force.
Later that year he argued that:
Soviet aggression in Afghanistan unless checked
confronts all the world with the most serious
long-term strategic challenge since the Cold War
began. To underestimate the magnitude of that
challenge would constitute an historic error.
• • •
The Indian Ocean talks pose a dilemma if examined in
terms of the Carter Doctrine. Though Carter and his
advisors could not have reasonably predicted how events
would develop, the political and military realities of the
situation in the Indian Ocean made it difficult to under-
stand how the United States could have foresworn the ability
to project power, as embodied in U.S. general purpose naval
forces, into the region. The Carter Doctrine recognized
this reality. Yet, the question remains as to how Carter
would have handled the situation had the Indian Ocean talks
been carried to some form of successful conclusion. Almost
all the elements of this policy which were in operation by
99. State of the Union. 1980 , p. 197.
100. U.S., Department of State, "U.S. Interests and Ideals,"
The Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, p. 7.
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the end of 1980 were, in one way or another, issues during
the Indian Ocean talks.
Brzezinski, who claims credit for the drafting of
Carter's State of the Union message, 101 detailed these
elements in a little-noticed speech in Montreal on December
102
5, 1980. Recalling an interview he gave to The Wall
Street Journal on January 15, 1980, Brzezinski began
with an analysis of U.S. policy in the post-World War II era
for what he termed "the two central strategic zones—Western
Europe and the Far East." He went on, much like Saul Cohen
did some 17 years earlier, to explain that "a third strate-
gic zone [had] assumed in recent years vital importance to
the United States and its allies: the region we call
Southwest Asia today, including the Persian Gulf and the
Middle East.- 104
Brzezinski explained how the Carter Doctrine was an
expression of the views discussed in the SCC on the need for
a new "regional security framework"—a subject on which
Brzezinski had drafted a memorandum to Carter on January 9,
101. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 444-445.
102. Sick, op. cit., p. 74.
103. See "An Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski," The Wall
Street Journal , January 15, 1980, p. 20:3.




1980. WJ Brzezinski noted that Carter, subsequent to this
memo and his State of the Union speech, had convened the NSC
on several occasions and more than twenty meetings of the
SCC had been held to develop this concept. Brzezinski
later explained that this was a logical conclusion to hiu
107
"Arc of Crisis" thesis in late 1978 and to his memorandum
to Carter on February 28, 1979, on the Indian Ocean talks.
This memorandum urged Carter to consider a new "security
framework" to reassert U.S. power and influence in the
region and thereby abandon his earlier plans to demilitarize
the Indian Ocean.
The framework of this policy already was evident before
Carter's speech. The discussions with Oman, Somalia, and
Kenya for access to bases are noteworthy in this regard..
The establishment of the KC-135 detachment on Diego Garcia,
followed by the open ocean reconnaissance flight of B-52
aircraft in the Indian Ocean, was singularly significant.
105. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 444.
106. Sick, op. cit., p. 74.
107. See "The Crescent of Crisis," lime., January 15, 1979,
p. 18.
108. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 446-447. There is another
possible explanation of Brzezinski's actions. The "Arc of
Crisis" and the role in the formulation of the Carter
Doctrine could very well have been an exercise in bureau-
cratic politics designed to help Brzezinski seize the high




The increased level of presence generated by the deployment
of carrier battle groups to the region beginning in April
1979 was a portent of things to come.
Others followed. Secretary of Defense Brown made it
clear in his January 1980 Annual Report that, as a conse-
quence of renewed turbulence in the region, it was
imperative for the United States to "accelerate [its]
efforts to improve the capabilities of our rapid deployment
109force." By March 1980 the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force (RDJTF) headquarters had been established at MacDill
Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida.
To support that force, the Carter Administration
accelerated a December 1979 decision by Brown to develop a
force of ships carrying the heavy equipment and supplies to
sustain the three U.S. Marine brigades earmarked for assign-
ment to the RDJTF. The ships would be prepositioned in the
Indian Ocean. On March 5, 1980, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Graham Claytor testified that, as a near-term
option, MSC was assembling a seven-ship force of commercial
vessels which would be prepositioned within a few days'
109. U.S., Department of Defense, Department g_f Defense
Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980), p. 115-117.
110. U.S., Department of Defense, Harold Brown, "News
Conference," Headquarters, U.S. Readiness Command, MacDill
Air Force Base, December 27, 1979.
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sailing time of the Persian Gulf-Arabian Sea. 111 MSC
completed action to charter these vessels by mid-June. One
month later in July 1980, they arrived on station at Diego
Garcia.
In addition to these maritime prepositioning ships, the
U.S. Navy proposed to purchase eight 27,000-ton, high speed
SL-7 container ships which would be converted to roll-on/
roll-off ships. These ships could carry both cargo and
troops and could travel at a speed of 33 knots. Given this
capability, such a force could reach the Suez Canal from the
east coast of the United States in approximately 11 days
112
with a mechanized infantry division on board.
Thus, by the end of 1980, the Carter policy for the
Indian Ocean had shifted from one of stabilization cast in a
regional arms control proposal to confrontation built around
an enhanced U.S. military capability in the region.
Although some, including Brzezinski himself, explained this
111. Graham Claytor, "Statement," U.S. Congress, House,
Committee on the Armed Services, Subcommittee on Seapower
and strategic and Critical Materials, Military Posture and
Department of Defense Authorization fo r Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 1981 , Hearings (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1980), p. 484; see also RADM F. C. Collins,
Jr., USN, "Near-Term Prepositioned Ship Force," United
States Naval Institute Proceedings , September 1980,
p. 117-118.
112. See Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN (Ret.),




change in the historical perspective of the Tr uman
113Doctrine, there may be a more fundamental explanation of
this shift. Its basis is the geography of the problem.
As a result of this geography and its effect on the
politico-military position of the United States, geopolitics
underwent a resurgence of sorts in U.S. national security
policy for three reasons—all of which are germane to the
Indian Ocean. The first, the West's growing dependence on
imported sources of energy, especially oil, sensitized
policymakers to the realities of geography. In the past,
physical terrain, demographic characteristics, and
boundaries did not play in the calculations that governed
the flow of oil. However, because of the West's dependence
on oil from the Persian Gulf and the politics of the Indian
Ocean region, there was a growing concern over the stability
of Gulf regimes and the impact of external intervention in
the affairs of the states along the littoral of the north-
west quadrant of the Indian Ocean. In a sense, these events
gave new meaning and relevance to the theories of Mahan and
Mackinder. As long as there was a requirement for the oil
of the Persian Gulf states, U.S. interest in the region
would continue. As long as that dependence remained, there
L13. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 444-446; see also Melvyn P.
Leffler, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine:
Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War," Diplomatic History,
Pall 1983, p. 245-266.
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would be a close linkage between the energy that it provided
and the security consequences that it engendered.
The second factor, the growth of Soviet power and the
enhanced capability to project that power beyond the borders
of the Soviet Union, had invested a hitherto ignored area of
the world with considerable strategic importance. Defense
planners found themselves addressing questions of distance
and climate as the probability of confronting Soviet forces
114
in the region increased. Moreover, enduring geopolitical
realities played a role here. There is a striking parallel
between Russian expansion into central Asia in the
nineteenth century and the Soviet advance into Afghanistan.
To protect its borders, the Russian Empire had felt it
necessary to expand, only to be confronted with resistance
from new forces. Over a century after they were written,
115
the words of Prince Gorchakov, the czarist Foreign
Minister who presided over that expansion, cited at the
beginning of this chapter, are indicative of this.
The third element that stimulated the recognition of
geography as a factor in strategic planning was the
perception that the existence of parity between the Soviet
114. Woolsey and Moodie, op. cit., Appendix B, p. 2.
115. "Circular Dispatch Addressed by Prince Gorchakov to
Russian Representatives Abroad, Dated November 21, 1864" in
Russia's March Towards India r Vol. II, by 'An Indian




Union and the United States at the strategic level may have
lessened the utility of nuclear weapons. As a consequence,
general purpose forces have assumed a new significance in
the national security policy of the U.S. This fact required
that geographic factors must be carefully evaluated if these
forces were to be employed effectively. This element is
particularly germane to the sizing of general purpose naval
forces since the composition of these forces is usuallly
estimated by specifying theaters and missions, by analyzing
hypothetical but plausible naval campaigns, and by
determining the number of theaters to be dealt with
simultaneously. The applicability of this element, which is
geographic in nature, to arms control is one that was
neglected in the case of the Indian Ocean talks even though
it was the driving force in the considerations of the United
States that led up to the Carter Doctrine.
These geopolitical considerations affected the conduct
of military operations in the Indian Ocean as well as the
type and quantity of forces assigned to carry them out.
This perception is not new. The shift from wood to coal and
then from coal to oil, for example, each created a new
geopolitical situation for the Royal Navy in the nineteenth
century and generated new operational requirements as well.
Then, just as in 1980, three issues loomed large in the
calculations of the respective national security decision-
makers. The first of these was that the focus of planning
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for such operations should be on the Navy's role in a
conflict or crisis in the region. While the logistics
difficulties discussed earlier created problems for
peacetime naval operations, those problems were not
insurmountable. The third point was that to address naval
operations in the region in isolation was virtually
useless. The role of naval forces in the Indian Ocean was
primarily to influence the situation on land. The naval
environment, therefore, cannot be divorced from the land and
air operations, because events in one milieu strongly
influence operations in the other. Unless a planner deals
strictly with sea control operations, naval operations in
the Indian Ocean must be considered in conjunction with
operations ashore. The air environment is equally important
as well since a case can be made that the party who quickly
secures control of the air in a conflict in the Persian Gulf
holds the key to ultimate success.
Although the Carter Administration ignored these
premises in its conduct of the Indian Ocean talks, the
Carter Doctrine recognized these geopolitical realities. It
is hard to find a situation in the diplomatic history of the
United States wherein a policy of an administration had been
so completely rejected and replaced by its exact conceptual




The influence of geographical conditions upon
human activities has depended
. . . not merely on
the realities as we now know them to be and have
been, but in even greater degree on what men
imagined in regard to them.
. . .
— Sir Halford John Mackinder (1919)
It has been suggested that President Carter's Indian
Ocean arms control initiative was a cardinal maritime
error. He embarked, it has been said, on a voyage into
unknown waters without the requisite charts which any
mariner knows he must have at hand to help him avoid the
inevitable rocks and shoals. Nonetheless, the four
sessions of the Indian Ocean negotiations from June 1977
until February 1978 were the first serious attempt to
control naval warfare since well before World War II. The
circumstances that formed the background against which this
study has examined this policy change—the Zone of Peace,
1. Rear Admiral Robert J. Hanks, USN (Ret.), "The Indian
Ocean Negotiations: Rocks and Shoals," Strategic RevieWf




iego Garcia and the U.S. Senate, the UNA-USA study, the
enth Dartmouth Conference, and the events of 1978, 1979,
nd 1980— illustrated the range of both the political and
echnical problems that the Indian Ocean talks were bound to
ncounter. Even if the talks had continued, their back-
round and content augured that there was a good probability
hat they would have bogged down in a mire of technical
ssues that would have turned them into a technical game
lerein the substantive, political problems involved might
ave become lost in the play.
The Background
The Zone of Peace did not contribute anything to the
lccess of the talks. It was a proposal that was devoid of
igorous definition and measures of limitations; it cost
)thing to support, or at least express sympathy with, and
is loaded with emotionalism. Its principles meant differ-
it things to different people and some of its supporters in
ie U.N., such as Australia, evinced no problems whatsoever
i living with what appeared to be conflicting prefer-
ices. As a policy issue per se, it had become one of the
cepted elements to which the nonaligned nations routinely
bscribed. The verbiage associated with the statements of
See, for example, Andrew Peacock, "Opening Address to the
nference 'An Australian Dilemma: Defence and Diplomacy in
e Indian Ocean 1 ," Canberra: Australian Institute of
ternational Affairs, November 12, 1976.
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its supporters and the language of the various U.N. reso-
lutions illustrated both the range of concepts associated
with the Zone of Peace and the lack of depth of its defini-
tional content. It was so lacking in rigor that both the
United States and the USSR, in spite of the talks, declined
to participate in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee
until 1979. Instead they chose to keep that body "informed"
of the progress of their negotiations.
The obstacles to an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace were two
in number. The first was the attitudes of the extra-
regional states whose military activities were the greatest
source of concern. The second was the inability of the
regional states to agree on such basic matters as the geo-
graphic scope of the Zone. This point demonstrates both the
range and depth of the intra-regional, interstate disputes,
which attracted competition between the United States and
the Soviet Union—disputes which were oftentimes shaped by
geography.
The issue of the geography of the Zone of Peace
reflects these perceptions. The official list of "littoral
and hinterland" states of the Indian Ocean did not contain
such key states as Israel and South Africa. This is
incredible, from an arms control perspective, in view of the
relationship of Israel to the United States and the fact
that most of the South African coast fronts on the Indian
Ocean. Despite Israel's declared willingness to participate
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in the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian
Dcean, both South Africa and Israel were excluded from the
3iscussions entirely for political reasons. This decision
:alls into question the efficacy of the Zone of Peace pro-
:eedings as well as the ultimate validity of any possible
igreement on the Zone of Peace. Moreover, the U.S. and the
JSSR, as a result of their interests, steadily increased
:heir presence in the region. Because of this heightened
perception of interests and values and the associated mili-
ary activity that accompanied it, any substantive progress
>n the Zone of Peace was not possible. However, had the
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace been pursued seriously rather
:han as a forum for local and superpower diatribes against
iach other, it may well have demonstrated that the Indian
)cean could not be isolated from the broader, global context
»f the national security interests of the United States and
:he Soviet Union as well as those of the littoral and hin-
:erland states.
The debate in the Senate opposing the construction on
»iego Garcia was deceptive when examined in terms of naval
rms control. It was principally a manifestation of the
esurgent congressional interest in the formulation of
oreign policy. Its main objective was to challenge the
loctrine that the President was the sole representative in
latters of foreign policy. The dominant issue was not the
xpansion of a naval support facility on a small coral atoll
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in the British Indian Ocean Territory but rather a challenge
to the structure in which U.S. national security policy for
the Indian Ocean region was being formulated. Although the
War Powers Act of 1973 was perhaps the pinnacle of this
debate, it continued with concern by some over Carter's
withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan and Reagan's views on
the two China issue. What this suggests is that naval arms
control was used as the case to prove the point. It was a
lever on the larger question of policy formulation and its
use may have been based on a less than clear appreciation of
all the problems involved.
Although generated by honest concerns for decreasing
the potential for conflict between the superpowers, the
members of Congress who supported negotiations on the Indian
Ocean did so with a myopic view of the world. They refused
to acknowledge that, despite U.S. disengagement from
Vietnam, crises and conflicts would continue to be part and
parcel of the international system and that, in such cases
in the Indian Ocean, distance would accentuate the United
States' inability to achieve escalation dominance. If they
believed that crises created a situation with a dangerously
high probability of war, then it is difficult to understand
how they refused to recgonize that escalation dominance was




U.S. inability to check Soviet gains in Angola,
Mozambique, and Yemen demonstrated a lack of ability and
will to discipline Soviet behavior on the periphery. This
was not only a question of political will. It was also a
question of location. The events of 1978 through 1980 in
the Indian Ocean also demonstrated this factor of conflict.
Moreover, they suggest that the force required by either of
the parties in such a crisis situation is directly propor-
tional to the distance between those forces' normal bases
and theater of operations. Moreover, the forces available
tend to be inversely proportional to the distance. There-
fore, distance in a purely physical, geographic sense serves
as a modifying factor, and perhaps as an equalizer, in the
application of escalation dominance in a crisis situation.
Hence, any arms control agreement for the Indian Ocean had
to take this into consideration.
Because of its positional advantage the Soviet Union
could exert more pressure than ever before in its history on
the Northern Tier and the region in general because of its
role in Afghanistan, its ability to use the former Royal
Navy base in Aden, and its presence in Ethiopia. In a world
where the evaluation of intent versus capability was becom-
ing increasingly less clear, the recognition of naval parity
with the Soviet Union and the inference of a Soviet sphere
of influence that accompanied it could very well have
intimidated the states of the region and caused their
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leadership to question just how much and what type of pres-
sure the Soviets might be willing to exert in any future
test. Continuation of the Indian Ocean talks could only
have exacerbated this perception and could very well have
oeen interpreted as U.S. intent to withdraw from the region
and leave the Soviet Union as the sole remaining manager of
conflict within the framework of detente. Just as the
recognition of strategic parity may have altered the inter-
lational system, the recognition of naval parity in the
Indian Ocean could have had a similar effect on the regional
sub-system.
The association of several of Carter's key policy level
officials with the Dartmouth Conference of 1976 and the
JNA-USA study in November of that same year prove that
barter and his associates were sincerely searching for a new
ind broader based approach to the role of arms control in
:he superpower relationship. However, there are a number of
)ther plausible explanations for Carter's 1977 initiative on
:he Indian Ocean.
The first is that it institutionalized, in a sense, an
ilready existing politico-military situation. In 1977 there
*as no imminent danger of a maritime competition in the
[ndian Ocean between the United States and the USSR. By
:asting the negotiations in a bilateral forum, the U.S. and
:he Soviet Union regained control and remained the
Principals in the talks. This tactic blunted the Ad Hoc
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Committee's approach to move talks on the Indian Ocean to a
multilateral basis yet still satisfied those states which
wanted progress on the talks.
A second, and closely related, explanation was that the
talks served to counter Soviet rhetoric in the Third World
that the United States was not really interested in the
process of arms control and disarmament. Moreover, the
talks served to give both form and substance to Carter's
hope for improving relations with the Third World while, at
the same time, serving as a tacit signal to the Soviet
leadership that the superpower relationship in the Third
World could be handled differently. Carter honestly
believed that reasonable men could solve problems that were
central to their relationship, such as SALT II, by opening a
dialogue on problems, such as Indian Ocean naval arms
3
control, which were only marginal to the central balance.
Carter, more than any other American president who has
had to contend with this problem, believed deeply in the
importance of dialogue and mutual accommodation between the
United States and the Soviet Union on fundamental issues of
peace and international security. He was truly prepared to




issues of East-West competition. Perhaps this commitment
caused Carter and his advisors to operate at first under the
assumption that, because arms control could lead to a reduc-
tion in superpower tension, it would necessarily do so.
Carter's first statement on "demilitarizing" the Indian
Ocean also reflected his belief that progress on issues of
lesser concern in the superpower relationship would lead to
progress in issues that were central to that relationship.
In both cases, the end result, or at least the first step in
that process, would be disarmament. The means that Carter
saw to these ends was technical arms control. In the case
of the Indian Ocean, it was technical arms control in a
regional context.
Carter's convictions were symptomatic of what was, in
many ways, a backlash against the tradition of Realpolitik
of Nixon and Kissinger. Carter tried to shift the emphasis
of U.S. foreign and national security policy from one
grounded in power to one based on morality. The shift from
an overriding concern for East-West detente to Carter's
addition of North-South cooperation to U.S. policy was
indicative of this. His desire to establish grassroots
contacts between ordinary American citizens and their coun-
terparts overseas was also distinctive in this regard. His
emphasis on human rights and his deep, personal commitment
4. Sick, op. cit., p. 73.
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to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament also indicated
this. Perhaps Carter viewed the Indian Ocean talks as the
first step in his goal of moving from arms control to
disarmament
.
Yet, less than one year after Carter's proposal, the
United States refused to reschedule any more rounds of
talks. Less than two years after the initial proposal, the
United States was looking for ways to enhance its presence
in the Indian Ocean. Three years after the March 1977
announcement, the Carter Doctrine had been proclaimed and
the United States Navy was allocating more of its resources
to the Indian Ocean than ever before. This trend reflected
a conflict between Carter's commitment to disarmament and
his recognition that power did play a role in the superpower
relationship. This dilemma, and it was a dilemma for
Carter, is another case of the juxtaposition between inter-
est and ideals in the formulation of foreign and national
security policy. If the Indian Ocean case was typical, then
long-term interests as articulated by the state dominated
the state's policy. However, to reject the idea that ideals
and moral values contributed to the formulation of these
interests was to reject a portion of the intellectual
process by which strategy and policy are made. Yet, despite
this, Carter chose interests over his ideals in the end.
The Indian Ocean talks were a case in point of what Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr., has called "the tension between experiment
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and ideology ... in the American experience in world
affairs."
The Issues
Carter's principal strategic problem in the Indian
Ocean was the disjunction of U.S. interests and military
power. Historically, the presence of vital interests
unattended by sufficient military power to protect them has
been a standing invitation to adventurism. It is difficult
to believe that this mismatch escaped the attention of the
Soviet Union. This raises an interesting question regarding
Soviet national security policy. Were the Soviet actions in
Ethiopia, Aden, and Afghanistan part of some master plan or
were they simply an exercise in taking advantage of an
opportunity? Perhaps the two were not mutually exclusive
since broad geopolitical and geostrategic considerations may
have come to the fore in Soviet considerations of a region
marked by uncertainty, insecurity, and instability.
Once Carter chose to explore the possibility of nego-
tiating with the Soviet Union on the Indian Ocean, geography
became a determining factor. The Indian Ocean was a naval
theater. Its overwhelming feature was its distance from the
United States. These two elements dictated that the talks
would focus on the superpowers' navies since only these
5. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the
American Character," Foreign Affairs . Fall 1983, p. 2.
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forces could provide the access and operational endurance
required to support policy across such a broad reach of
geography. Therefore, distance shaped the fundamental
issues of the talks. However, the events in Iran,
Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa ultimately caused Carter
to question his decision to limit the agenda of the talks to
forces afloat. This in turn demonstrated a lack of appre-
ciation for the finer points of the relationship of a
state's power to the geography in which that power must
function and suggested that the role of geography in the
strategic and policy calculations of the United States
required a more informed and sophisticated appreciation.
Bases were important because a naval force operating
thousands of miles from its support infrastructure required
a well developed and integrated system of forward bases,
replenishment sites and repair facilities. The general
purpose forces were relevant because the U.S. had tradi-
tionally employed such forces as symbolic of raw, yet
relevant, power whose deployment best supported U.S.
interests. The general purpose forces, and especially the
carrier battle group, had the sustainability and mobility
that could expand the radius of U.S. influence ashore while
securing the sea.
The issue of bases suggests that location once again
may have entered into the national security calculus of the
superpowers much moreso than it had in the past. Diego
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Garcia, Berbera, and Aden demonstrated that, when there was
no substitute for their capabilities, national interests
took on a situational character. Berbera was important to
the Soviet Union as long as bases in Ethiopia were not
available as an alternative option. Once that option was
available to the Soviet Union, Berbera and Somalia were
expendable. Oman, Kenya, and Somalia took on an importance
in U.S. national security policy that was hitherto unknown.
The islands of the Indian Ocean such as Diego Garcia, Gan,
and Masirah took on the same enhanced value.
Thus it seems that, at least in the case of the Indian
Ocean Naval Arms Limitation Talks, the issue of bases,
whether they were wholly owned by a state or simply a
subject for negotiation for access, demonstrated a return to
Mahan's international value system that placed a substantial
emphasis on geography in the strategic considerations of
states. The locations cited in the preceding paragraph were
permanent features of the geography of the Indian Ocean.
However, their importance rose and fell according to who
controlled them in the context of the superpower competition
in the region.
The distance from the Indian Ocean to the southern
border of the USSR and the fact that physical distance
constrained the Soviet Navy from operating there much as it
did the U.S. Navy made the problem of SSBN operations an
element of concern in the talks. Faced by a technological
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disadvantage in anti-submarine warfare as well as no
apparent way to defend against the threat, the Soviet Union
had to try to raise the issue of U.S. SSBN's operating in
the Indian Ocean in the talks.
Perhaps no other issue in the talks demonstrated the
problems of relative advantage as did the question of
strategic warfare in the Indian Ocean. The factors of
geography and technology combined to give the United States
a decided advantage at the time of the talks. U.S. SSBN's
operating in the Indian Ocean could execute a strategic
strike against the Soviet Union. However, Soviet SSBN's
operating from the same region could not strike the conti-
nental United States. This relative advantage dictated that
the issue would ultimately not be negotiable. When the
Soviet Union raised the issue it introduced a new facet into
the dialogue on U.S. -Soviet arms control. By introducing a
weapons system that was central to the strategic balance and
which the superpowers had previously addressed only in the
functional, mission oriented SALT forum, the Soviet Union
tried to address a strategic issue in what was essentially a
conventional arms control forum. By so doing it complicated
not only the forum for the negotiations but also the pos-
sible outcome of those negotiations.
What this suggests is that the association of geography
and technology will make it difficult at best to separate
the superpowers' central, strategic relationship from the
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various regional concerns of their national security
policy. The problems of the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and the
U.S. cruise missile in SALT II and now the issue of the
Soviet SS-20 missiles and the U.S. PERSHING II and cruise
missiles are additional examples. The Indian Ocean talks
demonstrated that consideration of a central strategic
system can have substantial consequences for a theater
military balance and that a relative advantage held by one
side will not be easily bargained away.
The Indian Ocean negotiations brought to the fore the
theorem that arms control agreements must take into account
the interests of allies and that the substance of any
agreement must be generally acceptable to allies. The
Indian Ocean talks highlighted this perception especially
with respect to Australia. The level of Australian interest
in the talks demonstrated that an arms control agreement
that may be conducive to a more stable superpower relation-
ship can be counterproductive to longstanding alliance
relationships. Australia was genuinely concerned that the
talks would institutionalize U.S. -Soviet naval parity in the
Indian Ocean which, in turn, would ultimately reduce the
linkage of the United States with the defense of Australia.
Carter and Vance went to great lengths to reassure Fraser
and Peacock in this regard. The net result of this give and
take demonstrated that no member of a politico-military
alliance who places value on the alliance's continued
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existence can initiate independent actions of an arms
control nature which are not generally acceptable to its
allies.
The subject of alliances also illustrated other classic
elements of alliance diplomacy. It has been suggested that
the U.S. -Soviet competition after World War II may have
caused international politics to become an extension of war
by other means. Perhaps no single feature of this compe-
tition demonstrated this mutation of the Clausewitzian
dictum than the alliances which evolved as a dominant part
of the superpower Cold War strategy. The principal goals of
this strategy were to retain the allegiance of one's own
allies, weaken the adversary's coalition, and win the
support of the non-aligned nations—all elements of both the
U.S. and Soviet strategies for NALT. However, the Soviet
Union stood to gain more in this regard by pursuing Indian
Ocean arms control since such a tactic would certainly win
favor with India, its principal friend in the region.
Moreover, if the United States chose to accede to some form
of agreement, its principal coalitions capable of influenc-
ing events in the region, NATO and ANZUS, would have been
weakened.
Perhaps the quintessential aspect of classical alli-
ances is the purpose for which they were formed—the conduct
of or preparation for war. Indeed, this partnership for war
has been the fundamental index of the performance of
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alliances and their members. The alliances of the
Napoleonic Wars and World War I are perhaps the prime
examples of this ingredient of traditional alliance
politics. Yet it has been this aspect of alliances that
eventually caused their disintegration. NATO was not
interested in preparing for war, or even crisis management,
in the Indian Ocean. Perhaps the Soviet Union took this
into consideration in its NALT calculations and recognized
that in either the case described above or in the issue of
preparing for war, it stood a chance of weakening the
Western alliances.
The events in the aftermath of the negotiations
demonstrate another factor of alliance politics in U.S.
national security policy—the problem of globalism versus
regionalism. The United States was a nation with global
interests as well as global commitments. Its partners in
NATO and ANZUS, on the other hand, had global economic
interests but only regional military commitments and capa-
bilities. The disjuncture in this fact of alliance politics
with respect to the Indian Ocean suggests a relationship
between globalism, regionalism, and the strategic quality of
the sea.
The importance of the sea comes from the access it
provides to the land. If this is so, the function of navies
is to secure such use when it is to a state's advantage and
to prevent such use when it is to the state's disadvantage.
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Such interests can be positive or negative depending on the
outlook of the state. The positive aspect of the use of the
sea lies predominantly in the carriage of seaborne trade
while its negative element is the denial of the use of the
sea for this purpose as well as the projection of force
ashore. NATO's nations were predominantly interested in the
positive aspect of the Indian Ocean but did not have the
military capability or the political will to fund and deploy
forces to support that interest. Hence they relied on the
United States to take up this portion of their national
security.
Much like the issue of the cruise missile, NATO and
ANZUS wanted a voice in the U.S. position on NALT but were
concerned that the talks might lessen the U.S. commitment to
keeping the Indian Ocean lines of communication open. In
other words, NATO did not want the U.S. to bargain away its
naval capability in the Indian Ocean nor did it want to
provoke the idea of creating a naval force that would oper-
ate outside the NATO tactical area of operations to offset
this shortfall. In short, NATO's regionalism dominated its
global concerns.
As a policy, NALT implied that it was both cheaper and
more desirable to negotiate a mutual restraint on presence
in the Indian Ocean than to compete with the Soviet Union
there. The context in which this study discussed the issues
of the talks tends to confirm this perception. Carter's
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willingness to pursue a form of regional, general purpose
naval parity would not only have directly affected the naval
balance but would also have legitimized a sphere of influ-
ence for the USSR in the region. Moreover, any agreement,
especially when signed by the heads of state and attended by
worldwide publicity, would have resulted in the widespread
perception that, in the Indian Ocean at least, the U.S. and
Soviet navies were equal in capabilities. In fact, the U.S.
Navy could have achieved an edge in war-fighting in that
region. It is, therefore, difficult to identify a real quid
pro quo for the United States in the Indian Ocean talks;
indeed it is difficult to determine any measurable advantage
that would have accrued to the U.S.
The foregoing does not challenge the fact that arms
control is a valid alternative to the use of force, but it
does suggest that it is not the only way to enhance U.S.
national security. Arms control by itself cannot reverse
the trend of Soviet military growth and the influence it
exerts. In any case, naval arms control could only have
contributed in a limited manner to the situation because the
United States had relatively little margin of global conven-
tional maritime safety remaining at the time of the talks.
The key issue was the effect which the acceptance of limita-
tions on general purpose forces would have played in the
overall balance of power in the Indian Ocean. Power projec-
tion was crucial to U.S. interests in the region. It was
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principally this consideration which made such limitations
so unattractive for the U.S. In considering the power
projection balance, the role of air power—a factor which
gave the Soviet Union a decided advantage especially since
it could overfly all the countries between its domestic
bases and the Persian Gulf—could not be ignored. The
Navy's carrier-based air was the only means available to the
U.S. to counter this threat.
Although it has often been argued that air power has
revolutionized the naval environment, the most potent
offensive naval system is the attack carrier with its mix of
aircraft. Nevertheless, improved land-base tactical air
power has complicated the projection of naval power against
the shore while maritime reconnaissance has been improved by
the introduction of even more capable reconnaissance air-
craft and satellites. This suggests that any conceptual
distinction, as in the case of the Indian Ocean talks,
between the dominance of sea power over land or air power in
the region was fictitious and indeed misleading.
Because the maritime environment cannot be separated
from the land and air milieu, land, air, and naval forces
have to complement each other. The public record of the
Indian Ocean talks suggests that the Carter Administration
ignored the criteria of complementarity and attempted to
isolate the naval forces of the Soviet Union in the Indian
Ocean from their land and air counterparts at the cost of

- 421 -
working the same disadvantage on U.S. naval forces in the
region.
The talks were unable to resolve this most basic of
force asymmetries—an asymmetry that was generated in the
main by geography. The Carter Doctrine symbolized this
failure of arms control to resolve this asymmetry. More-
over, the Carter Doctrine, much like the other presidential
doctrines in American history such as those of Monroe and
Truman, addressed itself to a geographic area.
For the U.S. to have foregone superior naval capabil-
ities in favor of a negotiated semblance of naval parity, it
must have gained an offsetting advantage in some other
sphere of Soviet-American interaction. What the linkage was
is not clear. While Carter stressed that arms control was
not linked to other issues, his suspension of the Indian
Ocean talks in disapproval of Soviet actions in Ethiopia
demonstrated that at least this arms control forum had a
linkage formulation.
The question is: linked to what? The most apparent
link was a U.S. willingness to forego its war-fighting edge
in the region in return for less Soviet military assistance
and political meddling in Africa. A written contract to
that effect would have been technically and politically
impossible. There could be no verification of Soviet com-
pliance in a gentlemen's agreement to forebear in African or
Mideast politics. Indian Ocean arms control for the sake of
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such political linkage was unwise and unworkable. Moreover,
if arms control was independent of the environment, then the
controls should have pertained in times of crises as well as
in times of relative tranquility. The 1978 Ethiopian and
Iranian crises as well as the events of Afghanistan demon-
strate that naval arms control in the Indian Ocean was a
subject totally dependent on the environment. Both the U.S.
and the Soviet Union placed other objectives ahead of NALT.
This suggests that their navies were a subject most fit for
negotiations when they were not needed. Moreover, both
sides demanded escape clauses to any agreement so that in a
crisis each could have employed its navy as it wished.
These actions, when coupled with the decision in
February 1978 not to continue with the talks, suggest that
the strategy of linkage politics was very much an option of
the Carter Administration despite repeated statements to the
contrary. This in turn suggests that there was some ques-
tion as to the real utility of Indian Ocean NALT. If NALT
was to be pursued on its own merits, then why, other than as
a tactic, was it linked to Soviet behavior in Africa when no
successful linkage was achieved in SALT II until January
1980 despite the efforts of both Kissinger and Brzezinski?
This tends to cast some doubt on the intrinsic validity and
merit of the objectives of the Indian Ocean negotiations.
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Arms Control. Geography, and
National Securi ty Policy
Because arms control is first and foremost a political
process, the framework of any arms control negotiation is
political. One of the principal, if not dominant, consid-
erations that must be addressed in formulating the political
structure of such negotiations is the impact that they could
have on a state's power vis-a-vis its negotiating adver-
sary. The historic struggle for power among nations and
peoples cannot be interpreted without the help of geography
because geopolitical considerations, in their broadest
sense, have been the cause of most wars. Geography has been
an integral part in the planning and execution of war on
land as well as at sea. Indeed, as Will and Ariel Durant
have observed, geography is the matrix of history. It is
no less important today to the effective planning of a
state's arms control strategy because geographic factors may
tend to drive the issue of what systems are appropriate for
a specific set of negotiations.
Because there is a strong relationship between this
power equation and the geographic circumstances in which
states find themselves, geography should be high among those
elements that enter into the formulation of the political
context of arms control negotiations. How then did
6. Will and Ariel Durant, The Lessons of History (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 15.
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geography operate on Carter's perceptions of the Indian
Ocean?
Perhaps Carter and his associates did not recognize
that the Indian Ocean was emerging as the third geostrategic
region that Cohen had forecast in the early 1960's. Although
the region lacked both social, cultural, and political
cohesion and both real and potential political instability
were present at the time of the talks, there was a certain
coherence developing in the region that gave meaning to
Cohen's definition of a geostrategic region.
The resources of the region and the sea lines of com-
munication that carried those resources between what Cohen
called the "trade dependent maritime world" and "the
Eurasian continental world" lent an element of strategic
coherence to the Indian Ocean and its littoral. One
resource of the region—oil—was vital enough to have a
global influence. Moreover, the changing patterns of
superpower access to overseas bases and the growing economic
interdependence of the world added to the Indian Ocean's
emergence as a new geostrategic region—a region that was
more maritime than continental. It was in fact becoming a
single feature region in the sense that the Indian Ocean was
the unifying feature that enabled power to be applied to the
region. In short, the region was moving from one that was
tactical in the considerations of the United States and the
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Soviet Union to one that was part and parcel of the central
balance between the two superpowers.
Perhaps Carter believed that the region was a geo-
political one rather than a geostrategic entity and that
arms control was a possible technique to govern the
superpower relationship in the Indian Ocean. What he
ignored was the fact that geography influenced, and
oftentimes governed, the range of policy options that a
nation could exercise since the regional setting, especially
in a state with global interests, sets the framework for its
international behavior. The net result of such a perception
is complicated even more when the state that holds it cannot
match its global interests with the global politico-military
capability to support those interests. Carter's mispercep-
tion of the Indian Ocean is a good case for Mackinder's
prescription at the beginning of this chapter. The Carter
Doctrine and the actions of the Reagan Administration
represent a reordering of American "mental maps" of the
region. One can surmise that this reordering recognized the
need to address the Indian Ocean region, particularly
Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf, as a geostrategic
entity that could not be separated from the global issues
confronting the U.S. The implications of such a decision
are clearly geographic in nature.
Finally, the Indian Ocean naval arms limitation talks
violated a seemingly irrefutable theorem of arms control.
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Because arms control must be related to deterrence theory,
national security must be the independent variable. The
form and the substance that any arms control negotiations
assume are the dependent variable in the equation that
relates arms control to national security. In practice, an
Indian Ocean agreement would have constrained U.S. response
options more than those of the Soviet Union in either a
regional or global crisis or warfighting situation. The
talks were not able to resolve the asymmetries that charac-
terized the U.S. and Soviet force presence in the region.
This failure and the aftermath of the talks suggest that the
imperatives of flexibility and control in the realm of
conflict at points of confrontation between the U.S. and the
USSR pose serious problems for arms control. Moreover, the
talks attempted to isolate the Indian Ocean from the broader
global context of the superpower relationship— a premise
that proved to be both impractical and imprudent. By
separating the Indian Ocean from its littoral, Carter lost
sight of a time-tested premise of strategy and policy.
Navies in war and crises have been primarily used to support
and otherwise further a state's interests ashore. Lacking
any ground or air capabilities in the Indian Ocean, the
United States depended on its Navy to exert political
influence, control crises, apply pressure when necessary,
and project power if required. The Indian Ocean talks
ignored this principle and tried to separate the Indian
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Ocean from its littoral. Thus, the Soviet Union would have
been free to operate outside the structure of such an
agreement to maximize its influence and presence in Africa
and Southwest Asia without concern.
The entire aura surrounding these talks suggests that
they were an adjunct to the Carter Administration's prin-
cipal national security objective— the successful conclusion
of SALT II. When push came to shove in the Indian Ocean,
Carter abandoned them. Their worth as a dependent variable
did not enhance U.S. national security. Of all the arms
control negotiations in which the United States has been
involved in recent years, NALT was among the most ill-
conceived and executed. The general lack of appreciation of
the importance of the Indian Ocean as a geostrategic region
to the West and the United States as well as the attempt to
decouple the region from a comprehensive global setting
created an untenable political situation that was to
boomerang and cause Carter to reverse course. In short, the
Indian Ocean had moved from a zone of peace in 1970 to an
arc of crisis in 1979.

APPENDIX A
DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
AS A ZONE OF PEACE

APPENDIX A
2832 (XXVI) . Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of
Peace.
The General Assembly
Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the
littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to
preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and
social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity.
Recalling the Declaration of the Third Conference of
Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held
at Lusaka from 8 to 10 September 1970, calling upon all
States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of
peace from which Great Power rivalries and competition as
well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and
competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area
should also be free of nuclear weapons.
Convinced of the desirability of ensuring the mainte-
nance of such conditions in the Indian Ocean area by means
other than military alliances, as such alliances entail




of the limited resources of the States of the area from the
more compelling and productive task of economic and social
reconstruction and could further involve them in the
rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their
independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing
international tensions.
Concerned at recent developments that portend the
extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area,
thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such
conditions in the area.
Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in
the Indian Ocean would contribute toward arresting such
developments, relaxing international tensions and
strengthening international peace and security.
Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of
peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could
have beneficial influence on the establishment of permanent
universal peace based upon equal rights and justice for all,
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations.
1. Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within
limits to be determined, together with the air space above
and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated
for all time a zone of peace;
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2. Calls UPQn the Great Powers, in conformity with this
Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the
littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:
(a) Halt in the further escalation and
expansion of their military presence in the
Indian Ocean;
(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all
bases, military installations, and logis-
tical supply facilities, the disposition of
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction and any manifestation of Great
Power military presence in the Indian Ocean
conceived the context of Great Power
rivalry;
3. Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the
Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council
and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in
pursuit of the objectives of establishing a system of
universal collective security without military alliances and
strengthening international security through regional and
other cooperation, to enter into consultations with a view
to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as
may be necessary to ensure that:
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(a) Warships and military aircraft may not
use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use
of force against the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and independence of any
littoral or hinterland State of the Indian
Ocean in contravention of the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United
Nations;
(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the
norms and principles of international law,
the right to free and unimpeded use of the
zone by vessels of all nations is
unaffected;
(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to
give effect to any international agreement
that may ultimately be reached for the
maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of
peace;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the
progress that has been made with regard to the
implementation of this declaration.

APPENDIX B




INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE VOTING RECORD
THROUGH 197 6 1




























3080 3259 3468 31/28
A Y Y Y Y Y
X Y Y Y Y Y
X X X Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
X X X X Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
A A A A A A
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
X Y Y Y Y Y
A A A A A A
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
A Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y
X Y X X X Y
X Y X X Y Y
X X X X Y Y
X A A Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y A
A X Y Y Y Y
1. 1976 was chosen because U.S. -USSR Indian Ocean NALT
commenced the following year - 1977.
2. The states chosen are either littoral or island nations






prc y y y y y y
Qatar Y Y Y Y Y Y
Saudi Arabia Y Y Y X Y Y
Seychelles X X X X X X
Singapore A Y Y Y Y Y
Somalia Y Y Y Y Y Y
South Africa A A A X X X
Sri Lanka Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sudan Y Y Y Y Y Y
Tanzania Y Y Y Y Y Y
Thailand A Y Y Y Y Y
UAE X Y Y Y Y Y
UK A A A A A A
US A A A A A A
USSR A A A A A A
Yemen Y Y Y Y Y Y
Voting Legend: Y - Voted in favor of U.N. resolution
N - Voted against U.N. resolution
A - Abstained
X - Indicates that the nation was either
not in attendance or did not vote or
in the case of South Africa has not
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APPENDIX D
SOVIET SHIP-DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
1970-1979
The data contained in this appendix was derived from
the following sources:
U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Intelligence Command,
Navy Operational Intelligence Center, CO, NOIC ltr 3800 Ser
02/1160 of October 31, 1983; Australia, Parliament,
Hansard's Commonwealth Pa rliamen tary Debates (House of
Representatives), New Series, 86 (1973) :7472, 92 (1974) : 4727-
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U.S. SHIP-DAYS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
1970-1979
The data contained in this appendix was derived from
the following sources:
U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Operations,
Plans, Policy, and Operations, Fleet; Australia, Parliament,
Hansard's Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of
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AGREEMENT RELATING TO OPERATIONS
OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY FLIGHTS THROUGH
RAAF BASE DARWIN

AGREEMENT RELATING TO OPERATIONS
OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY FLIGHTS THROUGH
RAAF BASE DARWIN
The Department of Foreign Affairs presents its com-
pliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and
has the honour to refer to recent discussions between
representatives of the two Governments concerning the
proposal by the United States for the staging of United
States Air Force B52 aircraft and associated KC135 tanker
aircraft through Royal Australian Air Force Base Darwin, and
the terms under which the proposed operations might
proceed.
Subject to the terms and conditions specified below,
the Government of Australia agrees to USAF use of RAAF Base
Darwin for these staging operations:
(I) The B52 staging operations shall be for sea
surveillance in the Indian Ocean area and for
navigation training purposes. The agreement of the
Government of Australia shall be obtained before the





(II) The operations shall consist of periodic deployments
through Darwin of up to three B52 and six KC135
aircraft, supported by about 100 USAF personnel and
associated equipment. En route to or from Darwin the
B52s may conduct low-level navigation training over
Australia on the basis of the arrangements announced
by the Australian Minister for Defence on 3 February
1980.
(Ill) Staging may include the stationing at RAAF Base
Darwin of some US support personnel and equipment if
requested. The support personnel would remain under
US command and the RAAF would provide mutually agreed
levels of logistic and administrative support.
The Status of Forces Agreement of 9 May 1963 would
apply.
(IV) Irrespective of financial arrangements agreed between
the two Governments, RAAF Base Darwin shall remain an
Australian facility under Australian control.
No circumstances arising from this Agreement shall
affect the title of the Government of Australia to
the relevant land, or the pre-existing authority of
the Government of Australia in the use of RAAF Base
Darwin.
(V) Arrangements shall be made for consultations to
ensure that the Government of Australia has full and
timely information about strategic and operational
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developments relevant to B-52 staging operations
through Australia.
(VI) In considering whether to agree to any request for
alteration of the terms of this Agreement the
Government of Australia shall give weight to its
international commitments and policies relating inter
alia to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, to Australia's commitments under the
Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and
the United States of America signed at San Francisco
on 1 September 1951, to the common objective of
deterrence of Soviet military expansion and to its
understanding of US strategic and operational
policies and activities as derived from the
consultations under sub-paragraph VII above.
The Department of Foreign Affairs has the honour to propose
that, if these terms and conditions are acceptable to the
Government of the United States of America, this Note,
together with the Embassy's reply, shall constitute an
agreement between the two Governments. The Department
further proposes that the Agreement shall enter into force
on the date of the Embassy's reply and that it shall
continue in force until terminated on one year's notice in
writing by either Government.
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The Department of Foreign Affairs takes this oppor-
tunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of
America the assurances of its highest consideration.
Canberra, ACT
11 March 1981
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA
No. 38
The Embassy of the United States of America presents
its compliments to the Department of Foreign Affairs and has
the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department's Note
Number CH099032, dated March 11, 1981, concerning the pro-
posal for the staging of United States Air Force B-52
aircraft and associated KC-135 tanker aircraft through Royal
Australian Air Force Base Darwin and the terms under which
the proposed operations might proceed.
The Government of the United States of America accepts
the terms and conditions for the use of Royal Australian Air
Force Base Darwin specified in the Department's Note and
concurs that the Department's Note, together with the
Embassy's reply, shall constitute an agreement between the
two Governments effective as of the date of this Note.
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The Embassy of the United States of America avails
itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of
Foreign Affairs the assurances of its highest
consideration.
Embassy of the United States of America
Canberra, March 11, 1981
Source: Australia, Parliament, Hansard's Commonwealth
Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) , New




AAW: Anti Air Warfare
ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACDA: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AGF: Miscellaneous Command Ship
ANZUS: Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
AOE: Fast Combat Support Ship
ARG: Amphibious Ready Group
AN-12 CUB: Soviet reconnaissance aircraft
AS: Submarine Tender
ASW: Antisubmarine Warfare
B-52: U.S. bomber aircraft
BACKFIRE: Soviet bomber aircraft
BADGER: Soviet bomber aircraft
BIOT: British Indian Ocean Territory
CBI: China-Burma-India
CBM: Confidence Building Measure
CENTO: Central Treaty Organization
CG: Guided Missile Cruiser
CGN: Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Cruiser
CINCPAC: Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT: Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet




CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CV: Aircraft Carrier
CVA: Attack Aircraft Carrier
CVN: Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier
CVBG: Carrier Battle Group
D-5: Designation of Follow-on TRIDENT Missile
DCS: Defense Communications System
DD: Destroyer
DDG: Guided Missile Destroyer
DSCS: Defense Satellite Communications System
ENMOD: Environmental Modification
FBS: Forward Based Systems
FB-111: U.S. fighter-bomber aircraft
FF: Fast Frigate
FY: Fiscal Year
GAO: General Accounting Office
HMAS: Her Majesty's Australian Ship
ICBM: Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
IL-38 MAY: Soviet ASW aircraft
JAGC: Judge Advocate General's Corps
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
KANGAROO: Combined exercise conducted in Australian waters
LST: Tank Landing Ship
MBFR: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
MEF: Middle East Force
MLSF: Mobil Logistics Support Force
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MSC: Military Sealift Command
MSF: Fleet Minesweeper
NALT: Naval Arms Limitation Talks
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCAMS WESTPAC: Naval Communications Area Master Station,
Western Pacific.
NAVCOMMSTA: Naval Communications Station
NAVSUPPACT: Naval Support Activity
NSC: National Security Council
NSSM: National Security Study Memorandum
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPNAV: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OSA: Soviet fast patrol boat
P-3: U.S. ASW Patrol Aircraft
PD: Presidential Directive
PDRY: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PRM: Presidential Review Memorandum
RAAF: Royal Australian Air Force
RAN: Royal Australian Navy
RDF: Rapid Deployment Force
RIMPAC: (Rim of the Pacific) combined exercise
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SANDGROPER I: Combined exercise conducted in Australian waters
SCC: Special Coordination Committee
SCR: Senate Concurrent Resolution
SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
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SECDEF: Secretary of Defense
SLBM: Sea Launched Ballistic Missile
SR: Senate Resolution
SSBN: Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSN: Nuclear Powered Attack Submarine
STYX: Soviet Surface to Surface Cruise Missile
UH-46: U:S. Sea Knight Utility and Transport Helicopter
UNA-USA: United Nations Association of the United States of
America
UNREP: Underway Replenishment
USAF: United States Air Force
USN: United States Navy
VADM: Vice Admiral
VERTREP: Vertical Replenishment
VLF: Very Low Frequency
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